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Abstract 
Citizen participation is an important part of the democratisation debate in Mexico. A 
wide range of participatory mechanisms, including plebiscites, referenda and 
neighbourhood committees, has been introduced by different political parties at the local 
level in Mexico. Why is there such interest from parties in citizen participation? What 
impact have these participatory initiatives had? To what extent have citizens been 
genuinely empowered? This thesis addresses these questions, using a qualitative, 
comparative case study methodology, by examining the implementation of the 
participatory agenda in three localities - Tlalpan, Puebla, San Pedro - governed by 
Mexico's three main political parties (PRI, PAN and PRD). The thesis argues that 
parties have a broad range of political motives in promoting participatory mechanisms. 
The restricted powers and resources given to these bodies and the top-down 
implementation process have contributed to the limited extent to which citizens have 
been genuinely empowered by these participatory initiatives. The thesis makes a 
distinctive contribution by providing three detailed empirical case studies that bring out 
the political agendas underpinning these initiatives and the diversity of participatory 
forms currently in place. It also shows that the literature on participatory democracy 
underestimates the significance of social class and clientelist practices in shaping the 
nature of local participatory mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
Citizen participation has become an important part of the democratisation debate in 
Mexico. Over the last decade there has been a proliferation of participatory initiatives. 
While participatory initiatives were promoted during the 1970s and 1980s, most of these 
schemes were used for the party or political purposes by the then ruling party, the PRI. 
However, as part of the growing pressure for greater democracy, citizen participation 
mechanisms were increasingly promoted by pressure groups, social movements and 
opposition political parties. Currently, local governments of all political parties have 
been introducing participatory initiatives, in particular referenda, plebiscites and 
neighbourhood forums. In addition, the recent creation of the Coordinaci6n 
Presidencial Para la Alianza Ciudadana (CPAC)' represents an interesting attempt to 
develop a national participatory strategy. 2 But why would political parties in a country 
where government has traditionally been centralised and has displayed little concern 
about accountability, suddenly become willing to share its decision-making power with 
citizens? Why are participatory mechanisms now at the core of the political agendas 
right across federal, state and local authorities? What are the implications of this 
theoretical transfer of power? 
According to political theorists, citizen participation mechanisms offer a means to 
promote democratic values, accountability and, more importantly, a way to increase the 
decision-making powers of citizens. In Mexico, as elsewhere, most of these initiatives 
have been at the local level. This is consistent with the observation by Parry, Moyser 
and Day that 'there is substantial evidence that people participate much more readily on 
local issues than on national issues' (Parry, Moyser and Day 1992). To what extent has 
the introduction of these mechanisms in Mexico produced these kinds of outcome? 
Have citizens truly been empowered or has their participation been used merely for 
'legitimation purposes' by political parties and local authorities? 
The overall aim of the thesis is to examine why Mexican political parties and authorities 
have shown such interest in citizen participation and to explore what these initiatives 
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have actually achieved. The main research questions of the thesis include, what do 
political parties hope to achieve by introducing participatory mechanisms? What are the 
sources of inspiration and principles underpinning these initiatives? What forms of 
participation have been introduced? What functions and powers have been given to 
these mechanisms? How far have citizens genuinely been empowered by these 
participatory mechanisms? 
These research questions are addressed by studying the participatory agendas of three 
localities - Tlalpan, Puebla, San Pedro - governed by Mexico's three main political 
parties (PRI, PAN and PRD). The thesis contributes to existing debates on the role of 
local governments in democratisation in Mexico (Cabrero 1996, Ramfrez Saiz 1997, 
Marvdn Laborde 2000). Furthermore, it also adds to the limited body of research on 
local citizen participation initiatives in Mexico, including Ziccardi (1994 and 1996) and 
Zermeflo (1999). The thesis argues that parties have a wide range of political motives in 
promoting participatory mechanisms. In particular, the main aim of the traditional 
opposition parties - the PRD and the PAN - was to undermine pre-existing PRI local 
structures of power. Both parties saw participatory initiatives as part of a wider process 
of democratisation and wished to demonstrate their capacity to govern in a more 
democratic manner than the old PRI system. However, in practice these mechanisms 
have been used primarily to legitimate their position by giving a democratic image to 
their regimes, rather than genuinely share power with the citizens. Consequently, the 
restricted powers and resources given to these bodies and the top-down implementation 
process have contributed to the limited impact of these participatory initiatives on 
ordinary citizens. 
It is important here to define what is meant by citizen participation, for there is much 
debate about what participation involves. At the most general level, participation 
implies involvement by part or all of those who will be affected by a decision, (in this 
case a governmental one). This may include: the employees of the organisation making 
the decision; the persons whom the organisation serves or regulates (the clientele); and, 
the taxpayers whose wallets will be affected. Nevertheless, participation in a decision- 
making context is extremely difficult to define, especially because [as it will be shown 
later in this thesis] it means different things to different people. Defining participation in 
decision-making should be straightforward. It should involve merely posing the 
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question - do the people decide? If this is not the case, then they don't participate. But 
the rhetoric of policy-makers often emphasises the importance of citizen participation 
when in practice they really mean consultation between decision-maker and citizen. 
Indeed the idea of sharing the process of decision-making itself is unpalatable to most 
policy-makers. 3 Nonetheless, this thesis will adopt an inclusive definition of 'citizen 
participation' as those citizens who take part in any of the forums provided by any of 
the three local authorities studied. However - as this study will show - this participation 
does not necessarily mean that the citizens will necessarily have the last word. Indeed, 
this research finds only limited evidence of citizen participation bringing about the 
kinds of changes anticipated by the participatory literature in terms of genuinely 
empowering citizens, bringing decisions closer to local level or educating them. 
The thesis makes a distinctive contribution to the Mexican democratisation debate by 
providing three detailed empirical case studies that bring out the political agendas 
underpinning these initiatives and reveals the diversity of participatory forms currently 
in place. The study analyses the relationship between political parties, citizens, and 
authorities and the role that each of these actors has taken in the implementation of 
different participatory schemes. It also shows that the literature on participatory 
democracy underestimates the significance of social class and extant clientelist practices 
in shaping the nature of local participatory mechanisms. Whilst participatory theorists 
are concerned about the positive benefits of participatory democracy, such as their 
educative impact on citizens, they have ignored the possibility that citizens from 
different backgrounds do not necessarily react in the same way to the implementation of 
participatory schemes. Further, in Mexico, long-standing clientelistic relations between 
politicians and poorer communities may influence the operation of participatory 
mechanisms or even bypass them. Nevertheless, the thesis adopts a normative approach 
to the literature on participatory democracy. The participatory democratic models are 
used as ideal types; as a benchmark against which to measure the participatory 
programmes of the three case studies here analysed. 
The organisational structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter I provides a background 
to the role of participatory democracy in Mexican local politics. This introductory 
chapter presents a general overview of some of the most significant recent structural 
changes to local government, especially those dealing with the introduction of citizen 
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participation mechanisms. The first section introduces the legal structure of local 
government, along with some of the most common practices taking place in it. The 
second part examines some of the most important social movements that have helped to 
trigger the implementation of participatory opportunities at the local level. The third 
section provides an historical account of the main participatory initiatives implemented 
by Mexico's three main political parties, and outlines the current presidential 
participatory agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main reasons why 
these participatory mechanisms have been implemented. 
Chapter 2 examines the literature on participatory democracy. The chapter is divided 
into five sections. The first section discusses the background, principles and main 
acclaimed advantages of participatory democracy. The second part analyses the 
limitations of participatory democracy. The following sections outline the main 
participatory forms in use and introduce two typologies that have been developed to 
help measure the levels of empowerment that citizens gain when taking part in 
participatory processes. The final section examines the reasons why many influential 
international organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, are currently advocating greater use of participatory mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 introduces the case of Tlalpan. After identifying the main conditions under 
which the 1998 participatory reform took place, the details of the 1998 citizen 
participation legislation are introduced. The third section analyses the main strengths 
and weaknesses identified in this document. The fourth part covers Tlalpan's main 
characteristics, and the fifth section examines the bureaucratic structure responsible for 
implementing the participatory agenda. The sixth section analyses how the participatory 
agenda works. Finally, an overview of all the participatory mechanisms implemented in 
Tlalpan is presented. 
Chapter 4 examines Puebla. It starts with an overview of Puebla's main characteristics, 
followed by a section that reviews the controversial Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN 
initiative. The third section introduces the PAN-LJN participatory scheme, and the next 
analyses the implications of the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the 
implementation of the Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN initiative. The fifth section 
evaluates both the Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN and the PAN-UN schemes. It then 
4 
examines the participatory agenda carried out since the PRI re-gained control of the 
municipality of Puebla in the 1999 local election. The final section compares the three 
initiatives. 
Chapter 5 analyses the case of San Pedro. It starts with an overview of the conditions of 
San Pedro, which include a brief history of the main participatory schemes and some 
constitutional reforms that have been discussed by state authorities. The next part 
outlines the current citizen participation legislation, followed by a discussion of its 
strengths and weaknesses. The next section examines San Pedro's bureaucratic 
structure. The fifth section covers the way the participatory agenda has been put in 
practice and it is followed by a short analysis of other participatory activities that have 
also been implemented before concluding with an overview of the participatory 
activities in San Pedro. 
Chapter 6 introduces the conclusions of this thesis. The first section covers the sources 
of inspiration from where these mechanisms were brought and also the main theoretical 
principles behind the three participatory agendas analysed here. The second section 
analyses the forms of participation found in each of the case studies. The third part 
highlights the importance of taking iiýto account the basic infrastructure and the class 
conditions of each locality before implementing participatory schemes. The fourth 
section deals with issues of implementation and the fifth with issues of citizen 
empowerment. The final sections outline the overall argument of the thesis, its 
distinctive contribution and some avenues for further research. 
The methodology used in this thesis involved a qualitative comparative case study 
approach. The use of qualitative data-gathering allowed the researcher to build trust 
with the respondents -a crucial aspect when analysing Mexican politics - and thereby 
to produce an in-depth empirical study. Semi-structured questionnaires were applied to 
politicians, citizens, and community leaders. In Appendix I the research framework and 
methodology followed throughout this research is presented. Appendix 1 has six 
sections. It begins by setting out the research questions that shape the study. The second 
part briefly examines the role of the implementation process in the analysis of Mexican 
policy and politics. The next sections explain the use of qualitative methods and of the 
comparative case study method. The fifth section justifies the selection of Tlalpan, 
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Puebla and San Pedro as case studies. The chapter finishes by outlining the way in 
which case study findings were presented. 
The study is a contribution to the debate of participatory democracy initiated by 
Mexican academics during the 1990s with such documents as the Agenda para la 
Reforma Municipal (Municipal Reform Agenda). It may also be of interest to a number 
of governmental actors (i. e. local authorities in charge of the implementation of a 
participatory agenda) and members of the third sector interested on participatory matters 
in Mexico. 
Notes 
1 Translated as Presidential Co-ordination for the Citizen Alliance. 
2 This issue is discussed to a greater extent in chapter 1. 
3 For example, in Madison, Wisconsin, citizen participation refers to a web site describing the activities of 
municipal government. Visit: http: //www. ci. madison. wi. us/ccc. html. 
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Chapter 1 
Local government and participatory transition in Mexico 
Introduction 
The political potential of local government was denied for many years in Mexico. 
Despite being defined as the level of government where people feel most competent and 
are most immediately engaged (Phillips 1996: 26), in the case of Mexico, generally, 
local government has been perceived as defenceless against the 'totalitarian' domain of 
state or national authorities - both economically and politically (see Cornelius 1999). 
However, recently, the perception of local government as an impotent, and capable of 
little more than following those decisions taken elsewhere, has started to change. Local 
government has become a generator of political change (Cabrero 1996). Indeed, the 
cur-rent (2000-2006) President of Mexico, Vicente Fox, has commented on the 
importance of local government, stating, 'we must design policies where the decisions 
are taken from the bottom to the top of the political structure; decisions that emerge 
from the social bases to the structures of government. This is why we must promote 
giving greater power to local authorities, so that they can manage their own budgets, 
govern, and promote development' (La Jomada 3 0/8/200 1). 
In several respects local government has been at the core of Mexico's democratic 
transition. It is at the local level where social movements claiming better living 
conditions emerged. It is also at the local level where groups of citizens gathered against 
the caciquill practices of the state, and above all, it is at the local level where the cry for 
fairer elections was initiated. As a consequence of these processes it has been more 
common for opposition political parties to take office. These administrations - mainly 
led by the PRD and the PAN - have attempted to implement a different style of 
management in local governments. One feature at the core of this recent 'new local 
agenda' has seen the proliferation of a wide range of participatory initiatives in 
government. Formerly used by the PRI as mechanisms of political control, suddenly 
citizen participation mechanisms are seen through different eyes, as it is claimed they 
bring transparency, accountability and democracy at the local level. But must this be the 
7 
case? Are these mechanisms the magic solution to the dientelistO environment that 
has surrounded local government for many years? Are the three main political forces 
engaged in a genuine democratic (participatory) reform of Mexican politics? 
The aim of this introductory chapter is to present a general vision of some of the most 
significant recent structural changes to local government, especially those dealing with 
the introduction of citizen participation mechanisms. The first section introduces the 
legal structure of local government, along with some of the most common practices 
taking place in it. The second part examines some of the most important social 
movements that have helped to trigger the implementation of participatory opportunities 
at the local level, along with the development of movements aiming for free and fair 
elections. The third section provides an historical account of the main participatory 
initiatives implemented by Mexico's three main political forces, followed by the 
introduction of the current presidential participatory agenda. The chapter concludes with 
a section that identifies the main reasons why these participatory mechanisms have been 
implemented. 
The Structure and Role of Mexican Local Government 
It is important to make several general points regarding the way the Mexican political 
system operates to provide the context to the participatory changes we will be 
examining. The legal document setting out how the political institutions should operate 
is the Mexican Constitution. An ambitious document created in 1917 that, since then, 
has been repeatedly reformed to adapt it to the prevailing social, economic and political 
circumstances. It draws on many sources: 
Mexico's constitution, like those of the other Latin American countries, 
takes its inspiration from the ideas of the French Enlightenment and the US 
Founding Fathers; Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty, Montesquieu's 
thoughts on the separation and balance of the three powers (executive, legislative 
and judicial) and the ideas about checks and balances of state power developed 
by Madison in the federalist papers are the theoretical political bases of the 
constitution (Gonzdlez Casanova 1970: 11). 
The constitution states that Mexico is a federal republic divided into 31 states and a 
federal district, Mexico City, which is the capital. Each state is composed of numerous 
municipalities. Most of the 2,427 municipalities 3 in Mexico have a similar government 
structure, 4 which is based on what is known in the constitution as the municipio libre 
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(free municipality). The municipio is the official body in charge of carrying out all 
governmental duties at the local level. Article 115 of the Mexican constitution 
establishes that each municipality will be governed by a slate led by the Municipal 
President (mayor) and the number of regidores and s[ndicos (local congressmen) 
determined by each municipal legislation. The slate that wins the local election will 
occupy the majority of the seats at the cabildo (municipal congress) and the losing slates 
will also be represented at this chamber on a proportional basis. Every three years a 
municipal election takes place and no individual may be elected mayor for two 
consecutive terms in office. 
The cabildo is the most important official body within the municipality. It is here where 
all parties are represented and where local projects are discussed and voted upon; it is 
also where the municipal budget is approved. The only place where cabildos do not 
operate is in Mexico City, where the functions of a cabildo in each of the 16 
delegaciones (local authorities) that constitute the city are performed by the Asamblea 
de Representantes del Distrito Federal (Congress of Mexico City). 
The municipality in the constitution is established for two main purposes: service 
provision and development planning. Both activities are described in article 115, which 
states that the main services provided by each municipality are: 
1) Piped drinking water, sewage, treatment of residual water. 
2) Electricity. 
3) Collection of rubbish. 
4) Administration of Municipal Markets. 
5) Pavement of streets, maintenance of parks. 
6) Public security. 
And the main activities to be carried out by each municipality are: 
a) Formulate, approve and administer all municipal urban development plans. 
b) Participate in the creation and administration of municipal terTitorial reserves. 
C) Participate in the creation of regional development plans, which must agree in all 
aspects with plans developed on a national scale. 
d) Authorise and control the utilisation given to the land under their respective 
jurisdictions. 
e) Intervene to regulate the tenure of the land. 
f) Give licences and construction permits. 
g) Participate in the creation of ecological reserves. 
h) Formulate public transport programmes. 
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Notwithstanding the powers given to municipal authorities in the constitution, when 
trying to carry out the activities presented above, things seem not to have worked 
according to the legislation. According to Gonzdlez Casanova: 
Governmental structure and political practice are a far cry from the 
models used to create the constitution. They will not help us to understand the 
actual functioning and full significance of Mexico's government structure. The 
parties, voting patterns, elections, the 'three powers, ' the 'sovereignty of the 
federal states, ' and the whole apparatus of traditional democracy generally 
operate in such a way that political decisions are made in a way having little or 
nothing to do with the theoretical models of the constitution. The dynamics of 
the government, the institutionalisation of change, equilibrium, and controls, and 
the concentration and distribution of power are classical formulations that have 
become symbolic elements to envelop and sanction novel situations (Gonzdlez 
Casanova 1970: 11). 
Although the Mexican constitution states that the unit established to carry out all the 
actions of government at the local level is the municipality, local governments are 
widely dependent on those decisions taken by federal (Mexico City based) and state 
governments. The principle of 'el municipio libre' (the free municipality) has been 
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questioned by academics, as this is the last condition local governments seem to have. 
The authoritarian way in which Mexican politics operate leaves municipal authorities 
under almost total economic and political control of the federal and state governments. 6 
In the view of Rodrfguez, (1997) 'things have not changed that much since the 1970s' 
and recounts what Fagen and Tuohy, along with other writers, 7 have detected in 
Mexican politics: 
Each level of government is weaker, more dependent, and poorer than its 
immediate-superior level. Local government is the least autonomous entity of 
the Mexican political pyramid. Normally a local government is constituted to the 
'taste' of state authorities, it controls a very reduced budget, and it can only 
perform activities of maintenance and administration (Fagen and Tuohy cited in 
Rodrfguez 1997: 83). 
Cornelius goes even further, 'traditionally each presidente municipal (mayor) has been 
handpicked by higher-ups within the PRI government apparatus, normally a 
congressman or the state governor' (Cornelius 1996: 30). The fact that local government 
terms last only three years leaves the careers of local politicians dependent on contacts 
at the federal or state level. There is an evident clientelist relationship between those 
groups operating at the upper levels of the Mexican political pyramid and those wanting 
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to exercise power locally. In particular, these types of relationships were a key element 
in the operational scheme of the former 'official party, ' the PRI: 
The Mexican political class is permeated with patron-client relationships, 
in which the 'patrons'- persons having higher political status -provide benefits 
such as protection, support in political struggles with rivals, and chances for 
upward political or economic mobility to their 'clients'- persons with a lower 
political status. In exchange, the 'clients' provide loyalty, deference, and useful 
services like voter mobilisation, political control, and problem solving to their 
patrons within the official party or governmental bureaucracy (Cornelius 
1996: 39). 
Aiming to break with this pattern, a series of democratic reforms have been introduced 
by federal authorities since the 1990s. Although the PRI lost its first presidential 
election in 2000 and a wide-ranging democratic reform programme has been promoted 
by the new PAN (rightwing) administration, there is considerable concern that the same 
practices that took place under the PRI for more than 70 years will simply be repeated. 
As commented by Bruhn, 'an opposition government does not mean that it would be 
more democratic than the preceding one' (Bruhn 2000: 145). 
One of the major recent disputes at the local level is the cry of municipalities for greater 
economic resources. ffistorically, the federal government has controlled 85 percent of 
public revenues, state governments have controlled less than 12 percent and 
municipalities scarcely 3 percent. In 1994, the share of total public spending allocated to 
municipalities rose to 4 percent and at the state level to 16 percent. Yet the federal 
government still took 98 percent of all public revenues obtained through taxation, while 
states collected 1.5 percent and municipalities 0.5 percent (Cornelius 1996: 32). 
According to the constitution there are three main sources of revenue for each 
municipality: firstly, local property tax (which must be negotiated with state 
authorities); secondly, federal grants (which are set on an annual basis by each state's 
legislature); and thirdly, revenues derived from the services provided by each 
municipality. As a consequence of local authorities' claims for greater economic 
resources, such special allocations of resources as ramo 33 (section 33)8 have been 
introduced. This branch has been allocated to local projects since 1998 with the aim of 
reducing the authoritarian way in which economic resources were traditionally managed 
by federal authorities, as well as reducing the levels of poverty in each municipality. 
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Some of the effects of the 1998 fiscal reform were identified in a survey carried out by 
the Mexican newspaper Refonna (3/9/2001). 9 Most of the mayors interviewed agreed 
that economic resources are unevenly distributed and that they do not arrive in time to 
solve most of the needs faced at the local level. In the view of the 2000-2003 Mayor of 
Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n, Felipe de Jesds Cantij, 'the distribution of resources from the 
federation to each municipality should be increased and improved. We (the 
municipalities) are like a chair with only three legs, we need the federation's support 
otherwise the whole thing - municipal government - will collapse' (Refonna 
03/09/2001). That said, the majority of the mayors said that since the 1998 reform the 
federal government had intervened less in decisions about how local budget is spent. 
Only 12 percent of the mayors surveyed still see federal intervention as highly 
influential in the way the budget is spent. 
The scenario depicted above - especially the economic and political dependence of 
local governments on federal and state authorities - has prompted several attempts at 
reform. For, as Phillips comments, 'one standard argument for local government is that 
it disperses over-centralised power' (Phillips 1996: 23). 10 Via social movements, NGOs 
and especially opposition administrations, local government has become the most 
important source of political change in Mexico. It is at the local level where movements 
demanding a more democratic distribution of power have emerged and where groups 
demanding greater transparency and better living conditions have formed. It is also at 
the local level where opposition administrations had their first opportunities to govern. 
In the view of Cabrero (1996), 'one of the most important transformations that our 
societies are experiencing at the end of this century is the realisation of "the local" as 
the space where new forms of social organisation are developed' (Cabrero 1996: 11). 
In Mexico, at the core of the discussion for the local 4revolution' is the Agenda Para la 
Refortna Municipal. A document published by some of Mexico's most prestigious 
academic institutions (e. g. CIDE and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte) and which aims 
to bring to academic circles discussions dealing with refonns to improve the operating 
conditions of Mexico's local administrations. In this document, the role of citizen 
participation is perceived as essential for increasing the levels of accountability and 
democracy in local administrations, as well as reducing some of the authoritarian trends 
identified above. In the view of Alvarez and Castro, (1999) it is mainly opposition 
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governments that want to promote citizen participation at the local level as a means to 
bring the government closer to the citizenry, involving them at the same time in 
decision-making processes (1999: 2). " 
There are two main sources of pressure in society that have transferred the process of 
decentralisation and democratisation: social movements and political parties. 12 The next 
section examines the impact of social movements on the democratisation process that is 
currently taking place in the Mexican polity, particularly at the local level. 
Social Movements: Pressure for Change 
In this section the aim is to examine the impact that social movements have had on the 
long transition to democratic political structures in Mexico. It is argued that social 
movements have influenced the local political spectrum in four main areas. Firstly, 
those movements that were created to demand better living conditions. Secondly, 
movements that emerged to protest against caciquil practices of government (i. e. 
demanding more civil liberties, or fairer treatment by the government). Thirdly, social 
movements that promoted respect for election processes. Finally, those organisations 
that aimed to scrutinise election processes and to educate the population on democratic 
matters. Whether initiated in rural areas, urban areas, by NGOs or other independent 
groups of citizens, these movements have played a key role in increasing the 
opportunities for political participation, especially under a political system plagued by 
corruption, corporatism and undemocratic practices of government. 
Social Movements in the Mexican Context 
The 'mother' of all social movements in Mexico was the 1968 student movement. As 
commented by President Fox, 'the 1968 student movement is one of the most important 
antecedents in Mexico's democratic struggle. Due to that struggle we currently enjoy an 
environment of freedom, plurality, and greater participation' (La Jomada 3/10/01). The 
student movement of 1968, described by some intellectuals as the 'organised society' 
(see Monsivais 1987), erupted by demanding greater political openness and the respect 
of citizens' civil liberties (see Poniatowska 1994). The official response in 1968 was 
quite different from the sentiments expressed in the recent speech given by the current 
president, as the government of President Dfaz Ordaz allegedly perpetrated the killings 
of thousands of students at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the neighbourhood of 
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77atelolco (see Krauze 1997). This oppression resulted in the dispersion of student 
leaders to form different social organisations throughout the country. The 1970-1976 
government of President Luis Echeverda in a way, 'authorised' the proliferation of 
social movements: 'Echevefffa responded to the political crisis of the 1960s and early 
1970s with a policy of opening up spaces for opposition political action outside of 
existing PRI-affiliated organisations' (Rubin 1999: 181). However, despite this apparent 
tolerant attitude towards social movements, the state continued using violent means to 
oppress them, as illustrated by the incident that took place on 6 October 1971 known as 
the Halconazo (the strike of the hawk) where, again, a group of students was attacked 
by the army. The authoritarian way in which Echeverrfa dealt with this social pressure 
promoted the 'desire to struggle' in those who were to become the protagonists of the 
social movements of the 1980s (P6rez Arce 1980). 
One of the starting points in the analysis of social movements deals with the relationship 
between economic conditions and the insurgence of these movements. For instance, 
Foweraker comments on the distinguished tradition of historians (Barrington Moore, EP 
Thompson, James Scott) who have demonstrated the importance of the moral outrage 
created by unequal economic and social conditions, and popular movements can be seen 
in part as the organised political expression of such outrage (Foweraker 1990: 5). In the 
view of Zermeflo, the economic conditions prevailing in Mexico during the 1980s were 
crucial for the expansion of social movements: 
A feeling of impoverishment, disillusionment, the lower sectors of the 
population were becoming poorer and poorer and although the official discourse 
was trying to soften the situation a large majority of the population felt 
politically, economically and socially excluded, it is in this environment that 
social movements proliferated (Zermefio 1990: 166). 
The neoliberal policies implemented by the 1982-1988 Miguel de la Madrid 
government influenced the flourishing of social organisations aiming to improve their 
living conditions. The withdrawal of the state, a drop in wages, a reduction in the 
government's budget for social projects, and the elimination of subsidies are only a few 
examples of the 'adjustment' policies implemented by the government (see Lustig 
1987). Although most protest movements emerged with the clear idea of challenging the 
state, the neo-liberal policies employed by the De La Madrid administration created the 
context within which most social movements - regardless of the form of their demands 
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- would simultaneously become political movements (Tamayo 1990: 122). This became 
evident during two events. Firstly, the 1985 earthquake that affected Mexico City saw 
the mobilisation of large numbers of organisations (i. e. Asamblea de Barrios) that later 
became politicised. Secondly, the disorganised support - as defined by Zermefio (1990) 
- that social organisations gave to Cuadhtemoc Cdrdenas in the 1988 presidential 
campaign, which later became the basis of the leftwing party, PRD. But to have a 
clearer idea of how social movements have had an impact on Mexico's political scene, it 
is necessary to take a closer look at how some of these organisations developed. 
Citizens wanting to improve their living conditions: Asamblea de Barrios 
Asamblea de Barrios (neighbourhoods assembly) was established to protect the interests 
of groups of neighbours who were threatened by official authorities' projects to remove 
large number citizens from their original places of residence. 13 Initially formed by four 
organisations that operated independently, 14 those citizens taking part in the movement 
would participate in mobilisations against state housing policies, and would also ask for 
land to build low-cost housing projects (Nufiez Gonzdlez; 1990). An unexpected event - 
the 1985 earthquake that hit Mexico City - triggered the consolidation of Asamblea de 
Barrios as one of the most successful neighbourhood social movements in urban areas. 
According to Safa (1997), 'the earthquake proved that the civil community was ready to 
get involved in those problems affecting their city' (1997: 246). The earthquake 
strengthened the cry for a large reconstruction project, especially in those areas affected 
by the phenomenon. 
The largest social movement that emerged after the earthquake was the Coordinadora 
Unica de Damnificados (CUD) constituted by tenants of 42 neighbourhood 
organisations. One of the main attributes of the organisation was that via strong internal 
networks the group did not cede to the clientelist practices promoted by the government, 
which aimed to divide the movement. It was due to this unity that the group managed to 
include up to 30,000 people supporting the same demands without experiencing any 
serious internal divisions. 15 The first triumph of the organisation took place when its 
leaders were received by (1982-1988) President Miguel de la Madrid who, responding 
to the pressure of these groups, expropriated 5,563 buildings to benefit those affected by 
the disaster (Tavera-Fenallosa 1999: 113). In the view of some analYsts (Snow and 
Benford 1988) this particular citizen movement contributed significantly to Mexico 
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City's democratic transition. A political effect of the movement caused was that the 
governor of Mexico City - Ram6n Aguirre - announced for the first time in Mexico 
City's history that public hearings were to take place at Mexico City's central hall (see 
Tavera-Fenallosa 1999). 
Once the reconstruction project led by the CUD was finished in 1987 the group 
fragmented and most of the organisations that formed it saw no need for it to continue. 
However, many citizens were still interested in improving their housing conditions, 
which is how asamblea de barrios (Assembly of Neighbourhoods) officially came to 
existence in 1987. The first Asamblea de Barrios meeting took place on 4/4/1987, and 
more than 4,000 citizens representing 280 neighbourhoods participated (Cuellar and 
Duranl990: 40). The federal election of 1988 proved to be crucial for the future of the 
organisation, as Asamblea de Barrios became the first urban organisation that expressed 
its support for Cuauhtemoc Cardenas' presidential campaign. In 1988 the number of 
people who affiliated to Asamblea de Barrios increased considerably, however, after the 
presidential election the number of members decreased again, only to increase again in 
the midterm election of 1991. It proved to be an effective magnet during elections, as 
many organisations saw it as having the potential to represent their particular causes. 
With the large inflows and outflows of members, the organisation soon acquired a 
political perspective focused on the issue of building better projects. This political side 
of the organisation was brought by members who had been quite active within their 
respective communities and who joined the organisation. to strengthen their own 
communities. Perhaps without intending to do so, Asamblea de Barrios became a 
powerful urban political arm of the PRD. By 1993 Asamblea de Barrios was 
representing more than 100 organisations in Mexico City's metropolitan area and 
working in similar networks at the international level (see Greene 1997). 
Asamblea de Barrios became the most important urban organisation linked to the PRD. 
Beyond asking for credits to build houses, the movement also developed three political 
objectives. Firstly, to help candidates representing Asamblea de Barrios or the PRD win 
elections. Secondly, to have a voice within the PRD to manipulate the relationship 
between the movement and the party. Thirdly, to educate citizens about national and 
local politics, as well as democratic processes (Greene 1997: 214). Due to the large 
number of political currents that got involved in the movement, and after accusations of 
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internal corruption, the movement divided in 1993 into two fractions. Both of them are 
still called Asamblea de Barrios, however, each of them has a different ideological 
approach to the procedures that should be followed to succeed in their housing and 
political aims (see Greene 1997). 
Thus Asamblea de Bartios followed the trend highlighted by Tamayo (1990) for social 
movements to become political movements. The effects of this transition can influence 
the original aims of social protest organisations, as these organisations can forget the 
purposes for which they were established and broaden attention to electoral issues, 
instead of remaining focused on defending the interests for which they were created . 
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But is this inevitably the case? 
When social movements promote changefrom within: The COCEI and the CDP 
The notion of institutionalising social movements is at the core of Fowerakers' analysis 
of social movements in Mexico, in his own words: 
Popular movements in Mexico seek institutional recognition in order to 
get material improvement; and, despite a sometimes radical or revolutionary 
rhetoric, they pursue these ends through political exchanges and gradualist 
strategies. The political outcome is a range of particular and differentiated forms 
of linkage between popular movements and the political system, which the 
movements will then seek to fix and validate in law (Foweraker 1990: 11). 
The Coalition of Workers, Peasants and Students of the Isthmus (COCEI) is a Zapotec 17 
social movement that includes peasants, workers and students of the Isthmus. It was 
initiated in the early 1970s as a leftist coalition in the southern state of Oaxaca, mainly 
to organise mobilisations against state rice and sugar mills, private enterprise 
exploitation, landowners, and the state's agrarian bureaucracy. On the other hand, the 
Popular Defence Committee (CDP) started its activities in the northern state of Durango 
when a group of students involved in the 1968 student movement created the current 
known as polftica popular (popular politics). From a Marxist background, its leader 
Adolfo Oribe aimed to create autonomous movements in deprived areas of diverse 
cities. Along with its establishment in the state of Durango, cells of the organisation 
were formed in the states of Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Nuevo Le6n, Nayarit, Tlaxcala 
and the State of Mexico (see Haber 1997). 
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Both of these movements experienced the violent response of the state to their claims, 
especially when dealing with land issues (see Rubin 1999 and Haber 1997). Nonetheless 
each organisation gained some influence and respect at the local level, in the case of the 
COCEI, Martfnez highlights how it won battles over labour rights and municipal 
services and rapidly expanded its political and cultural projects (see Martfnez 1985). 
The CDP, after several unsuccessful attempts to invade land, in 1973 reached an 
agreement with the INDECO (National Community Development Institute) and 
obtained 20 hectares to be paid over a five years. It was in this area where the first 
colonia popular (popular neighbourhood) of Durango - the Divisi6n del Norte - was 
created (see Haber 1997). 
A breakthrough for these movements came when they decided to institutionalise their 
activities. One of the main characteristics of the COCEI is that its members decided 
relatively soon to take part in election processes (Guti6ffez 1981). Aiming to finish with 
the caciquil practices of the PRI, the COCEI took part in the local elections of 1974 and 
1979, but it was not until 1981 that it achieved its first political success. Forming an 
alliance with the communist party, the COCEI won Juchitdn's local election in Oaxaca, 
becoming the first left wing municipal government of Mexico (Campbell 1990). The 
political activities of the COCEI expanded during the 1980s, and through political 
alliances with left wing political organisations managed to have candidates stand for 
state and federal congresses. In office, the COCEI proved capable of leading efficient 
and transparent administrations, working with city residents, municipal official repaired 
streets, built and refurbished local health centres, created a public library and rebuilt the 
city hall. The COCEI also negotiated agricultural credits with national authorities. In 
Juchitdn, COCEI intellectuals published a literary magazine that became known not 
only in Mexico's intellectual circles, but also internationally (see Rubin, 1999). This 
record increased its popularity, but at the same time brought them problems with pritsta 
structures, who saw the organisation as a constant threat to their leadership. 
In an attempt to diminish the power of the COCEI, groups of pritsta and businessmen 
formed right-wing groups to weaken the COCEL 18 The pressure exercised towards the 
COCEI 'blew up' in 1983, when the army removed the COCEI administration from 
office and a new prifsta government was appointed by state authorities. The years 
between 1983 and 1989 were characterised by a series of protests, arrests, and constant 
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ups and downs in their relationship with the federal authorities. It was not until 
President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) unveiled in 1989 the concertaci6n social project 
that the movement regained its influential position in Oaxaca. As commented by Rubin: 
'this programme offered substantial economic and political support to established 
oppositions in return for a reduction in militant tactics, along with public 
acknowledgement of negotiation and coexistence with the regime' (Rubin 1990: 193- 
194). 
The fragile political environment that surrounded the controversial 1988 presidential 
election contributed significantly to the establishment of an 'open-door' policy to the 
social movements that supported the candidature of Cuadhtemoc: CArdenas, who 
allegedly won the election (see Krauze 1997). President Salinas sought to control any 
social movements that might represent a threat to the governmental agenda. As Zenneflo 
put it, 'the 'system' has the capacity for constant and rapid reaction to political struggle 
in the civil society; by absorbing or destroying the social identities generated through 
the struggle it maintains itself intact (Zermefio 1990: 18). A good example of this 
strategy can be found in the way the CDP institutionalised its activities in 1989. Despite 
supporting the presidential candidature of Cdrdenas in 1988 the CDP became the first 
movement to sign a concertaci6n social agreement with President Salinas. In an 
unprecedented move, the Salinas administration developed a scheme based on the 
establishment of 'democratic projects'19 aimed at alleviating poverty and promoting 
development. The projects foresaw spending huge economic resources to improve the 
basic infrastructure conditions of neighbourhoods as well as the establishment of small- 
scale industries where the locals would be self-employed. 20 
The CDP move opened fractures in the leftist movements that supported the candidature 
of Cdrdenas in 1988, as other leftwing organisations soon decided to follow the steps of 
the CDP, and even criticised Cdrdenas (see Haber 1997). The close relationship between 
the CDP and federal authorities reached its climax in December 1990 with the formation 
of a new political party, the Partido del Trabajo PT (Work-Party), set up by 22 social 
movements or organisations, mainly from the north of Mexico. After its creation, the PT 
was soon 'christened' as the party of Salinas. 21 
In the view of Foweraker (1990), social movements contribute to political change 
through their continuous attempts to achieve a linkage with the political system, which 
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tends to change the institutional configuration of the system itself. However, in both 
cases presented above, it was the state that first stopped these movements and then 
wanted to institutionalise them, in order to keep them under control. There is some 
evidence to support Foweraker's claims, especially in the case of the COCEI, where 
there has been genuine political change due to the transparent and democratic way they 
have governed the municipality, and the COCEI has won consecutive elections in 
Juchitdn. 22 Nevertheless, in both the above examples it is important to highlight the role 
of the Salinas administration in attracting these movements to the institutional route. 
Salinas masterminded a strategy to fragment the organisations that supported Cdrdenas 
in 1988, even creating a political party using the former autonomous structure 
developed by the CDP to become an instrument of the state. A question that emerges 
after discussing these examples is whether all social movements need institutional 
recognition to remain in existence. And, secondly, if the political system seems to be 
obsessed with controlling these grassroots social movements, perhaps the same is 
happening with the different participatory mechanisms promoted by the state to involve 
the citizenry in decision-making processes. These issues will be addressed later in this 
chapter, but the next section examines a movement that has contributed to the increase 
of democratic practices of government at the federal, state, and local level, especially 
during election processes. 
Political campaigns based on social movements: the case of Salvador Nava 
The 1991 mid-tenn federal election represented an 'acid test' for the Salinas 
administration. After recognising the triumph of the PAN in the 1989 state election of 
Baja California, opposition forces saw an opportunity to achieve more electoral 
victories on other fronts. In 1991 Dr. Salvador Nava initiated one of the social 
movements that has had most impact in Mexico's democratic transition. Nava's political 
activities date back to the 1950s, when due to problems with the local cacique (Gonzalo 
Santos) he ran as an alternative candidate representing a coalition of opposition forces. 23 
Nava managed to win San Luis Potosf's 1958 local election and, in 1961, he attempted 
to do the same for the governor position, but, this time the pritsta system finished his 
hopes by using the 'usual' fraudulent methods to win the election. 24 
Coincidentally, during the years in which President De la Madrid was implementing a 
wide range of neoliberal policies, the Navista movement for democracy was resurrected 
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in the shape of the Potosi Civic Front. The movement aimed to challenge the set of 
dictatorial policies implemented by the1979-1985 prilsta governor of San Luis Potosf, 
Jongitud Barrios. The Potosi Civic Front was supported by different sources of civil 
resistance in the states of Oaxaca, Durango, Baja California and Chihuahua (Cornelius 
1999). Between 1982 25 and 1990 the Navista movement went through the same cycles 
experienced by most social movements of the time: popular mobilisation, electoral 
victory, control of municipal government, expanded social participation and repression 
(Calvillo Unna 1999: 88). In 1990, members of the Potosi Civic Front decided to form a 
coalition to support one candidate of the movement in the 1991 governor election. The 
local leaders of the PAN, PRD and PDM26 decided to form the Open Opposition 
Movement, aiming to defeat convincingly the PRI at the 1991 state election. On 23 
February 1991 Nava was declared the unity candidate both by the PAN and the PRD 
(Granados Chapa 1992). The opposing candidate appointed by Salinas was Fausto 
Zapata, a 'man of the system' who had occupied different positions for the Mexican 
government, mainly abroad (Anderson and Van Atta 1991). The Navistas began 
preparing the 'battlefield' a few months before the election when they organised a 
conference entitled 'Challenges in the Transition to Democracy. ' The occasion was 
attended by some of Mexico's most influential intellectual and opposition political 
27 figures. The aim was to increase the relevance of the San Luis Potosf's coalition to a 
national scale and perhaps to plan a future alliance for the 1994 presidential election 
(see Calvillo Unna 1990). 
According to data provided by the government, the result of the election gave Zapata 
(329,292 votes) a comfortable margin over Nava. Zapata (170,646 votes) (see Aziz 
Nassif 1992). As soon as the result was announced a press conference led by Nava 
showed the national and international media that another fraud had been committed. 
Groups of businessmen, professionals, students, and the press had the opportunity to 
validate the fraud (Anderson and Van Atta 1991). The fraud committed in San Luis 
Potosi was not the only one; in the state of Guanajuato the PRI also won using the same 
old tactics. The defence of the vote started by Nava in San Luis Potosf suffered a major 
blow when trying to join the resistance movement started in Guanajuato, as the PAN 
decided to accept the 'political offer' of President Salinas. This deal involved appointing 
an interim governor of the PAN, instead of keeping the fraudulently elected pritsta 
candidate Ram6n Aguirre. By declaring as winner neither Vicente Fox nor Ram6n 
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Aguirre, and by selecting Carlos Medina Plascencia (former panista mayor of Le6n), 
the federal authorities presented the arrangement as reasonably fair. 
Although Salinas offered a similar deal to Nava, he did not accept and instead decided 
to start La Marcha por la Dignidad (the dignity march). The march consisted of 
walking from the state of San Luis Potosi to Mexico City, covering a distance of 463 
kilometres that 77 years old Nava expected to walk in one month. Salinas ceded to the 
pressure and two weeks after taking office Zapata had to resign. 
Ironically, this authoritarian decision at the centre served to open up democratic space at 
the local level (Calvillo Unna 1999: 102). The democratic effects of the struggle became 
more evident a few months after an agreement was reached. Calvillo Unna (1999) 
highlights four achievements of the movement: 
1) The incorporation from civic organisations and opposition parties into electoral 
institutions. 
2) The consolidation of a network of groups serving as observers of the political 
process and as observers of any attempted authoritarian behaviour. 
3) Changes within the local PRI, obliging the party to uphold basic rules of democratic 
conduct and to recognise opposition victories. 
4) Some preliminary reforms of the local media, which had been widely condemned 
for its biased coverage of the 1991 electoral process. 
Furthermore, as a result of the political fight other organisations also emerged; in 1992 
the Citizen's Movement for Democracy was created and led by Nava. The organisation 
aimed to consider the possibility of a national alliance to defeat the PRI in the 1994 
presidential election, however, the movement lost impetus with the death of Nava in 
May 1992 and could not consolidate an alliance. Nevertheless, the results of the struggle 
to respect electoral results led to the formation of organisations heavily engaged in 
electoral and democratic matters. This is how one of the most successful experiments of 
citizen participation through an NGO was initiated via Alianza Clvica. In fact the Civic 
Front Salvador Martinez Nava is still operating in the state of San Luis Potosi. The 
movement has kept on fighting for justice, democracy and equality. For instance, in 
1998 the movement collected 24,327 signatures to address the issue of the Acteal 
Massacre. In a document sent to 1994-2000 President Ernesto Zedillo, the organisation 
demanded that those responsible (s) for the massacre be brought to justice (see 
www. zonamaya. net 28/l/1998). 
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Civil society organisations pressingfor democratisation: the case ofAlianza Civica 
As noted above, it was no secret to most Mexicans that for many years the PRI managed 
to keep its power through electoral fraud. Alianza Civica (Civic Alliance) was 
established as a consequence of two political phenomena. Firstly, the fraudulent 1988 
presidential election, and secondly, the political events that took place in the first 
trimester of 1994 (the Zapatista uprising, the assassination of the pritsta presidential 
candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, and the internal crisis of the PRI). There were seven 
organisations involved in the formation of Alianza CNica, 28 (AC) all of them with 
previous experience of monitoring elections in contested states. Initially these 
organisations signed an agreement promising to dissolve AC after the 1994 presidential 
election (see Ramfrez 1997). 
As part of the 1994 programme, Alianza Civica implemented 8 basic actions: 
1) Surveys about the electoral process. 
2) The campaign entitled no se vale (it is not allowed) against vote coercion. 
3) Monitoring the media. 
4) Studying of the total list of electors that would participate in the 1994 election. 
5) Observation of the federal, state and local electoral institutions. 
6) Observation of the quality of the electoral process. 
7) Coordination of international observers. 
8) Civic education campaign. 
For the 1994 presidential election AC trained 37,060 citizens in electoral matters, and 
placed 18,280 electoral observers in 10,000 voting posts all over the country (see 
Alianza Cfvica 1994). AC also implemented a national campaign to educate people on 
electoral matters, something that had never been done before in Mexico. After the 1994 
presidential election the AC drew three conclusions. Firstly, 'it is probable that the 
deficiencies detected in the 1994 electoral process would have not altered the actual 
result of the election. ' Secondly, 'especially in rural areas there was a lot of pressure 
exerted on votes, we must question the results obtained in these areas. ' And thirdly, 'we 
can conclude that in Mexico there are not the necessary conditions or elements that can 
make us say that the 1994 presidential election was balanced, or a fully trustworthy 
process' (see Alianza Cfvica 1995). 
After the results of the observation process, the members of the seven NGOs that 
combined to establish Alianza Civica thought that there was still a lot to achieve and 
decided to maintain the organisation and at the same time expand it to other states. The 
23 
main activities that were part of the new agenda were to, a) give voice to public opinion, 
b) scrutinise public functionaries and c) educate the population regarding their civic 
duties. This is how the organisation directed three consultation processes in 1995. 
In 1995 AC conducted two national citizen consultations and one referendum. The first 
consultation, on 26 February 1995, aimed to discover the public's opinion regarding the 
responsibility of public functionaries for the 1995 economic CriSiS. 29 The consultation 
also intended to find out what the public thought about the economic 'rescue package' 
that the US was asked to provide for the Mexican economy. There were 666,525 
citizens who took part in the process that was coordinated on a national scale by 15,000 
citizens divided in 5,600 'opinion collection centres. ' A massive 96.68 percent of the 
participants voted in favour of investigating President Carlos Salinas and his 
collaborators, for their alleged responsibility for the crisis. Also, 80.56 percent of the 
citizens that took part in the consultation thought that the congress should reject the 
economic aid package (Alianza Cfvica 1996: 6). 
Under the topic of peace and democracy, the second consultation organised by AC took 
place on 27 August 1995. This participation process sought citizens' opinion regarding 
the possible future of the Zapatistas or the EZLN as a political organisation. The EZLN 
asked for AC's support to organise a national process similar to the one they had 
previously coordinated the same year; with the aid of 40,000 volunteers and the 
participation of 1,570 indigenous communities, 8,245 reception centres were installed 
all over the country. In this process 1,094,000 citizens participated and 52.6 percent 
were in favour of having the EZLN participating as an independent political force. 
While 48.7 percent approved of the possibility that the EZLN participate in politics 
through forming alliances with other political organisations (Alianza Cfvica 1996). 
The third consultation process took place between 15 September 1995 and 20 
November 1995. The aim of the 'Referendum for Liberty' was to find out whether the 
population would support alternative schemes of development for the reactivation of the 
economy, the strengthening of the internal market and a redefinition of Mexico's 
international agenda. Alianza Civica, along with other 7 organisations, 30 organised the 
consultation in which 428,345 citizens supported the establishment of an alternative 
agenda to that proposed by the official authorities (see Alianza Cfvica 1996). 
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Thus the AC has maintained its independent status as an organisation that aims to bring 
greater transparency to electoral processes, consult on controversial issues, and educate 
the population on democratic matters. These actions have had a positive effect on the 
political system, as commented by Ramirez, 'the external pressure exercised by the 
organisation, in a way, 'obliged' the political system to start being more accountable 
and democratic' (Ramfrez 1997). According to Ramfrez, the actions performed by AC 
have had an impact in four different ways, (see Box 1.1). 
Box 1.1 The inDUt of Alianza Civica to the Mexican Societv 
Reaffirm the importance ofthe vote as the core element The actions of AC, especially the organising capacity 
in a democracy showed during the 1994 presidential election, was crucial 
in changing the perspective of the Mexican population 
regarding election processes. For Ramfrez, this has had 
an effect on the political culture of the Mexican 
Community. 
Establishment of Pioneering Direct Citizen The 1995 plebiscites and referendum are part of a new 
Participation Practices direct democratic culture recently initiated in Mexico. 
These actions had a direct effect on the political reform, 
as none of these practices is part of a legislation; 
currently there is great concern to legalise them, making 
them part of the constitution. 
Accountability ofgovernors The main aim of AC was to create sufficient public 
pressure to make authorities aware of the importance of 
being accountable to their electorate. 'Me strengthening 
of citizen power was perceived as essential to start a new 
relationship between federal, state and local authorities 
and citizens. 
Democratic Education for the people of Mexico One of the most important functions carried out by AC 
has been educational. Through the establishment of 
workshops, the organisation has managed to increase 
people's awareness of the importance of taking part in 
political processes. There have been a large number of 
flyers, posters, pamphlets, radio and television 
advertisements that have been used as support material to 
achieve this huge task. 
The impact of social movements on the democratic agenda 
With their actions at the local level, social movements have helped the population to 
develop greater awareness of the importance of taking part in political processes. For 
Diamond, without pressure from the bottom of the political pyramid it would be 
difficult to introduce any reforms to any political system (cited in Ramfrez 2000: 32). 
We can say that social movements influence the political pyramid at the bottom, and as 
it has already been shown, there is a reaction at the top, through negotiations or 
introducing policies to satisfy the demands of these groups. Although the government 
can react violently or try to co-opt the pressure exercised by these groups, as happened 
in Mexico, in the long run these mechanisms have proved to be important opportunities 
for promoting democratic values. According to Camacho, 'social movements initiate a 
dynamic created within the civil society, which purposefully directs itself to the defence 
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of specific interests. They may partially or totally challenge the prevailing structures of 
domination and their implicit objective is to transform the conditions for social growth' 
(Camacho 1987: 8). 
Although their own internal operational structures are perhaps not that democratic, 31 
these movements still act as 'defenders' of the interests of those taking part in them. 
Whilst it is dangerous to generalise, one characteristic of social movements is that after 
succeeding in their claims, they tend to follow the institutional route, as was evident in 
Mexico during the 1980s, especially throughout the Salinas administration. Some 
academics argue that this institutionalisation makes social movements lose their 
innovative capacity. For instance, Aberoni recalls, 'if social movements remain 
independent, they can keep on accomplishing their objectives. Moreover, it is possible 
to combine both agendas (institutional and non-institutional) because when social 
movements become institutional, then it would not be possible to auto-destroy them 
systematically' (Alberoni 1981: 143). 
One of the most important inputs of social movements has been their contribution to the 
transparency of electoral processes. Aiming to end with the 'fraud tradition' so common 
in Mexican politics, democratic movements struggled to secure fair voting assessments 
and to educate the population on participatory and electoral matters. It was only after 
years of pressure that the government realised that the 'opening' of the political system 
was necessary, and especially under opposition administrations the changes have been 
dramatic. It seems clear that there has been a link between an active civil society and the 
implementation of different forms of democracy at the municipal level. The influence of 
social movements that have institutionalised and that now form part of local 
administrations has been a crucial factor in ensuring the implementation of more 
participatory mechanisms at the local level. 
Political Parties and Political Change 
The role of political parties, especially at the municipal level, has been crucial for the 
implementation of the mechanisms analysed in this study. With the proliferation of such 
movements as Alianza Mica, electoral fraud has became harder to commit, and this 
relative electoral stability has contributed to increasing the levels of electoral 
competitiveness. It is revealing that the number of municipalities governed by the PAN 
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and the PRD, the two main opposition parties, multiplied, especially during the 1990s. 
For instance, in 1996 the PAN was governing 225 municipalities and the PRD governed 
181. This opened up the possibility of implementing a considerable number of 
participatory schemes at the local level (see Rodrfguez 1997). Political parties are 
important means for citizens to express their desire for change. In the view of Ramirez: 
Through having fairer election processes is how the citizenry decided to 
actively take part in elections, instead of not taking part assuming that the PRI 
was going to win anyway whether they participated or not. Political parties 
became a sort of reward-punishment mechanism, where if administrations did 
not perform as expected, they would be punished, while if they performed 
properly they would be rewarded by citizens who would elect them again 
(Ramfrez 2000: 11). 
As a result of having a fairer political environment, governments try to be more 
responsive and accountable to citizens, opening up their agendas to the establishment of 
a greater number of participatory practices in government. This section presents a 
historical account of the participatory agendas of the three main political forces of 
Mexico, covering some of the most common participatory mechanisms used, and 
examining the agendas currently being implemented. 
The PRI 
Although the PRI was established in 1929, it was not until the 1940s that the first 
participatory experiments were carried out under a prifsta administration. It was Adolfo 
Rufz Cortines, as Governor of the southern state of Veracruz, who created the groups 
for moral and citizen improvement. The aim of Cortines' project was to organise 
citizens at the municipal level so that they would become useful assistants to their local 
authorities. Hence, citizens were invited to provide either their labour or construction 
materials to finish incomplete social projects. The initiative generated such a positive 
response that some of these boards still operate today (Krauze 1997). Notwithstanding 
the positive impact of the 'Veracruz experience, ' most subsequent citizen participation 
schemes have been used as organisations of political control or 'social blackmailing' 
where local bosses or caciques, under the orders of the PRI, play a key role. As C6rdova 
argues, 'the bases of the Mexican political system were placed over a corporatist 
structure that did not allow citizen participation in an open way. It was only through the 
corporations created for control purposes that citizens could exercise their political 
rights' (C6rdova 1979: 72). 
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Despite C6rdova's description of the way the PRI implemented its 'participatory 
agenda' there were some exceptions. For instance, a case that did not follow the 
'caciquil trend' is found in the municipality of Naucalpan, in the state of Mexico. There, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, groups of upper middle class neighbourhoods combined to 
improve the living conditions of the area known as Ciudad Sat6lite. These organisations 
negotiated directly with local authorities for diverse schemes in which residents would 
administer the provision of certain public services in return for a 70 percent discount on 
local tax (Conde Bofil 1996: 54-55). 
During the 1970s the PRI promoted two 'citizen participation' initiatives. Firstly, the 
Mexico City Citizen Council was established in an attempt to make citizens participate 
in those decisions taken by the government of the City. However, the lack of a strong 
legal framework supporting its operations and its mere consultative character 
condemned it to disappear shortly after it was set up. The main reason for the 'non- 
consolidation' of this body was that it did not possess the necessary power to solve the 
problems presented by the citizenry, who continued handing over their demands to local 
authorities directly (Safa 1997: 245). 
The second initiative was promoted by the 1976-1982 Regente (governor) of Mexico 
City, Hank Gonzdlez, who advocated the establishment of the local 'participatory' 
structure denominated jefes de manzana (block representatives). Under this scheme, 
citizens are supposed to inform authorities periodically about the problems faced in their 
respective communities, and also to search for joint solutions to tackle those problems 
previously exposed. Despite the good intentions behind the programme, jefes de 
manzana became a mechanism of political bargaining and control, and have been 
mainly used as a sort of 'apparatus of political approval, ' where local bosses occupy 
privileged positions when politicians visit their neighbourhoods or rural areas of domain 
(see Lazurtegui 1995). Indeed, most representatives have not been democratically 
elected, and their work has been closely linked to achieve specific political goals (see 
Safa 1997). 
More recently, at the core of the pritsta participatory agenda was the PRONASOL or 
SOLIDARIDAD. During the years of the Salinas administration (1988-1994) the 
number of participatory initiatives under this scheme were abundant in many Mexican 
municipalities. Some revealing data about the popularity of SOLIDARIDAD is that by 
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November 1993 more than 150,000 solidarity committees were operating throughout 
the country (see Cornelius, Craig and Fox 1994: 8). For instance, in the municipality of 
Charcas, San Luis Potosf, the 1992-1995 mayor, Blanca Sdnchez Navarro, representing 
the PRI, introduced some participatory initiatives to improve women's living 
conditions. Following the framework of the national programme called Mujeres en 
Solidaridad (women in solidarity), Mayor Sdnchez established two participatory 
projects: firstly, a women's housing committee and, secondly, the creation of a 
women's underwear enterprise. Through the first scheme, the 700 women who 
composed the committee participated in the construction of 100 houses. The second 
scheme also became an important source of jobs, initiated with 12 members, by the end 
of Mayor Sdnchez's administration the underwear enterprise had around 500 members 
(see Cabrero 1996). 
Despite the relative success of SOLIDARIDAD, the whole participatory and democratic 
sense of the programme was constantly jeopardised by the corporatist practices that 
characterised the PRI. For example, the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for 
implementing SOLIDARIDAD limited the distribution of resources for public services 
through corruption and high administrative costs, and ministries declined to consult and 
co-operate with each other. These problems were compounded when the state-level 
agencies replicated the federal pattern, and when they became engaged in conflicts with 
the federal government over the appropriate responses to community demands 
(Cornelius, Craig and Fox1994: 12-13). Once President Salinas left office in 1994 and 
the economic crisis hit the Mexican economy in December 1994 the programme was 
concluded. 
Aiming for a different tone from the clientelistic approach of Salinas, President Ernesto 
Zedillo (1994-2000) engaged in a new national participatory exercise. During the first 
year of his mandate, Zedillo organised several regional forums to discuss the policies 
that the 1995-2000 National Development Plan should include. Regional forums were 
organised in Colima (February of 1995) to discuss political aspects of federalism, and in 
Yucatdn (March of 1995) to discuss economic aspects of federalism. A forum also took 
place in Guadalajara (March 1995) where federal and state bodies discussed diverse 
aspects of a new federal agenda. In April and May 1995,32 forums were arranged - one 
per state plus Mexico City - to discuss political, fiscal and institutional issues, along 
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with possible reforms that could be made to the relationship between federal and 
municipal authorities. Whether all the initiatives discussed in these forums were 
included in the 1995-2000 National Development Plan or not would remain uncertain, 
however, at least the will to let the public have 'a say' in these decisions was present. 
As a result of these forums the National Development Plan 1995-2000 declared that 
under the banner of El Nuevo Federalismo (the new federalism) the state would promote 
a new relationship with local governments. This relationship would be based on 
providing opportunities for citizen involvement in decision-making processes at the 
local level. According to the document, this measure was expected to bring greater 
participation, and also to strengthen the process of public policy implementation. 
Nonetheless, in a recent meeting organised by the Mexican newspaper Reforma, several 
mayors expressed criticisms of the decentralisation agenda carried out by federal 
authorities. According to the ptifsta mayor of Corregidora, Quer6taro, Mr. Luis Antonio 
Zapata, 'we still depend a lot on the federation' (Reforma 3/09/2001). Also representing 
the PRI, mayor of San Luis Potosf, Marcelo De los Santos, expressed similar views, and 
added, 'a true federalism must respect municipal autonomy, we must finally achieve a 
full decentralisation of power' (Reforma 3/9/2001). 
According to the 2001 statutes of the PRI, any strategies dealing with citizen 
participation or communitarian development would be proposed by the National 
Committee for Community Development. Article 166 of the statutes of the PRI 
recommends seven lines of action to promote citizen participation. 
1) Promote citizen participation to solve community problems. 
II) Design strategies to strengthen the information available for the civic education 
of the family. 
III) Design and promote strategies to promote and strengthen the unity of the 
families supporting the party and of our leaders, always following the social and 
political objectives of the party. 
IV) Promote the programmes of the party in accordance with the national policies 
aiming to protect the rights of children, the old, and the handicapped. 
V) Participate in the development of programmes channelled to promote health, 
education, community work, self-construction of households, and the protection 
of the 'family-economy. ' 
VI) Promote the formation and participation of community development 
committees. 
VII) Design programmes that aim to improve the quality of live of deprived groups of 
the society. 
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However, there is no clear blueprint for the implementation of this participatory 
programme. For instance, there is no mention as to whether consultations, referendums 
or plebiscites would be the best means of achieving these goals. Consequently, local 
authorities are left practically 'on their own, ' allowing them to give citizen participation 
the interpretation they consider most convenient. As discussed later in this thesis, this 
loose participatory agenda has resulted in a wide variety of interpretations that range 
from genuinely open practices of citizen involvement to the repetition of the clientelistic 
patterns traditionally found in the PRI. 32 
The PRD 
Founded in 1989 by a combination of the democratic current of the PRI, leftwing 
political parties, and diverse social movements, the PRD was conceived as a genuine 
democratic party that could provide an alternative economic and social project to the 
dominant neoliberal agenda of the late 1980s. Because the party was established around 
the figure of Cuadhtemoc Cdrdenas - son of General Cdrdenas, 1934-1940 President of 
Mexico - who was bom in the state of Michoacdn, it was there where the party achieved 
its first electoral victories. During the 1989-1992 municipal term, the party governed 52 
out of 113 municipalities. It was in Michoacdn where the PRD attempted to carry out a 
participatory agenda through 'urban councils. ' The aim of these councils was to 
organise open forums where citizens would propose solutions to urban problems. 
However, due partly to a lack of a coherent programme, but mainly due to the obstacles 
put forward by groups of ptitstas trying to destabilise these administrations, the concept 
of the urban council was soon forgotten (Bruhn 1999: 40-41). 
Some isolated examples of citizen participation introduced by the PRD occured in the 
municipalities of Atoyac, Guerrero and in Xico, Veracruz. In the municipality of Atoyac 
in 1993, Marfa de la Luz Nuflez Ramos, representing the PRD, based her political 
campaign around three core proposals: constant interaction with citizens; elaboration of 
the municipal development plan with the views of all sectors of the community; and 
making people participant in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the 
municipal government. Once Mayor Nuflez Ramos took office, with the support of the 
community she prioritised the local agenda and also the strategies to tackle the problems 
to be addressed in the 1993-1996 Development Plan (Cabrero 1996). 
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Along with the involvement of citizens in designing the new development plan, there 
were also six participatory activities. Firstly, open sessions of cabildo, where the public 
is invited 48 hours in advance to participate in discussions with local congressmen and 
the mayor. Secondly, through the election of neighbourhood leaders - or its equivalent 
in rural areas - in open processes, where anyone aiming to work for his/her community 
can take part. Thirdly, the establishment of joint commissions (composed of citizens and 
authorities) to scrutinise different local projects. Fourthly, through the election of 
municipal councellors, who would be responsible for engaging the community in 
different activities (e. g. planting trees in a park). Fifthly, citizens can take part as 
auxiliary authorities (these positions are mainly for rural areas) by presenting proposals 
to local authorities regarding the future development of their respective places of 
residence. Finally, through the programme Contribuyente Solidario (Solidarian Tax- 
payer) where citizens can provide an agreed amount of economic resources to conclude 
specific projects (Cabrero 1996: 180-181). 
In Xico, the perredista local authority re-implemented ancient forms of community 
organisation. After a tight result in the 1991 local election, Mr. Gonzdlez Galvez saw in 
the faena 33 a mechanism that would serve as a trigger for both promoting social 
improvements and citizen participation. La faena is an ancient type of community 
organisation 34 that has prevailed in certain communities - mainly in the rural ones - of 
Mexico and it is organised along the following lines. Firstly, the inhabitants of an area 
get together to identify their priority needs, and then elect representatives (a president, a 
secretary and a treasurer) who will be in charge of organising the wholefaena. No legal 
framework supports these previous steps, rather it is based on a kind of 'social 
agreement' where citizen participation is constantly promoted and where each 
individual develops a feeling of belonging (Cabrero 1996: 140). Once these 
organisational steps are taken, then the 'faena board' would tell the community what is 
needed from them. Under this informal participatory scheme, the community takes part 
mainly by offering their labour, or sometimes their economic support if required (see 
Cabrero 1996). 
The PRD has carried out a more aggressive participatory agenda in Mexico City. Where 
in 1997 it became the first political party to win governor of the city and immediately 
launched a participatory programme. Together! We will govern, was the slogan used by 
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Cuadhtemoc Cdrdenas during his 1997 political campaign to become the governor of 
Mexico City. 'We have to establish a coherent programme so that people can participate 
in conjunction with authorities to try to solve the main problems affecting their 
everyday lives' (La Jomada 13/6/1998). In the view of Zermefio, this is why Cdrdenas, 
when announcing his public security project, linked three of the main issues that still 
occupy a paramount position in the agenda of the City: decentralisation, public security 
and citizen participation. Through the establishment of strong neighbourhood units, 
public security could be transferred to neighbourhoods, and the nexus between criminal 
organisations and authorities reduced (La Jomada 13/6/1998). 
The core 'participatory move' of the PRD since leading the government of Mexico City 
has been the approval of the 1998 citizen participation legislation. Although this 
legislation will be analysed in greater depth in chapter 5, it is helpful to present an 
example of the types of initiatives carried out before the implementation of this 
participatory document. On 25 July 1998 the government led by Cuadhtemoc Cdrdenas 
invited the citizenry to participate in consultation about the future of El Zocalo (Mexico 
City's central square). The question of the consultation was to determine whether the 
population agreed that planting trees on the square would make it look better. In this 
consultation 12,401 citizens took part and 76.59 percent of them agreed that the square 
required some green areas (see La Jomada 26n/i998). After the consultation took 
place, Alejandro Encinas, member of the 1997-2000 government of Mexico City, stated 
that, 'this is the ideal complement to the democratic development of the City. It has 
been demonstrated that citizen participation is a real way to democratise the decisions of 
the city' (La Jomada 26/7/1998). 
Since securing a second consecutive term at the government of Mexico City for the 
(2000-2006), the PRD has continued with its participatory efforts. Furthermore, some 
reforms proposed by Andrds Manuel L6pez Obrador, current governor of the city, 
foresee an increasing the number of participatory practices sharing such responsibilities 
as managing a budget with citizens. 
The PAN and its participatory agenda 
The National Action Party (PAN) was formed in 1939. Intellectuals, businessmen, 
middle class professionals, and members of the Catholic Church gathered to found this 
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rightwing party. Like the PRD, the PAN had its first electoral victory in the state of 
Michoacan, when in 1947 it won the election of the municipality of Quiroga. The first 
participatory initiatives carried out by the PAN were implemented much later, in 1989, 
when, for the first time in Mexico's post-revolutionary history, an opposition 
government triumph was recognised in a state governor election. Ernesto Ruffo was 
elected governor of the northern state of Baja California, and immediately tried to 
differentiate his government from previous prilsta administrations (Espinoza Valle 
2000). The Ruffo government promoted citizen participation through two main 
channels: firstly, the programme called manos a la obra (let's get to work) and, 
secondly, the voluntad (will) programme. The declared aim of these programmes was to 
end the prevailing corporatist pritsta structure in the state. However, according to 
Espinoza Valle (2000), these programmes were created to compete with the 'star 
programme' of the Salinas administration, SOLIDARIDAD. 
In a similar vein, citizen consultations have been implemented by the panista local 
administrations of Wrida in Yucatdn state. These processes are mainly used to 
'legitimise' those actions taken by the local administration. For instance, in November 
1994, while discussing reforms to the state electoral legislation, independent citizen 
organisations in co-ordination with municipal authorities organised a consultation to 
determine whether Wrida should be represented only by one deputy at the federal 
congress or by more. In this consultation 20,000 people participated and decided that the 
capital should have two congressmen (Poot Capetillo 2000: 112). 
According to Poot Capetillo, having more transparent electoral processes has motivated 
greater competitiveness between political parties and has obliged administrations to 
maintain a constant communication and interaction with their citizens (Poot Capetillo 
2000: 113). In M6rida, the participatory agenda has four forms. Firstly, open sessions of 
cabildo, where the citizens can express their opinions regarding local issues. Secondly, 
Migrcoles Ciudadanos (Citizen Wednesdays), where citizens have the opportunity to 
talk about their problems directly to the mayor, or those functionaries responsible for a 
specific issue. The third channel is the women's municipal council, where women can 
engage in projects for their personal development. Finally, the municipality has decided 
to change the way rural jueces auxiliares (auxiliary authorities) are selected, as before 
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they were appointed by official authorities and the new scheme foresees an election with 
the participation of the general public (Poot Capetillo 2000: 114). 
In the Jalisco state, it was not until the PAN won the 1995 governor election that 
participatory reforms were introduced to the state constitution. The participatory 
initiatives of the referendum, the plebiscite and the popular initiative were introduced to 
municipal legislation. State authorities promoted what they defined as 'popular 
consultation forums' where several sectors of the civil society, academics and the 
citizenry in general are invited to discuss and put forward solutions to local issues. 
Marvdn Laborde (2000) suggests that for the first time a genuinely open process has 
been promoted by authorities. However, as with previous participatory experiences, 
authorities usually have a draft of the final conclusions to be reached before the 
consultation process even started (Marvdn Laborde 2000: 74). Another novelty was the 
introduction of deals that included citizens in the discussion of municipal development 
plans. Despite the 'democratic-spirit' behind these initiatives, it is argued that these 
channels are still insufficient to ensure the constant participation of citizens in the issues 
that affect them: 'political parties use the electorate to get to power, but once they reach 
a position, they do not seem to be that concerned about providing permanent 
participatory spaces at the local level. Spaces where the views and decisions of citizens 
are taken into account for the elaboration of public policies' (Marvdn Laborde 
2000: 105). 
One of the most common participatory practices implemented by panista 
administrations is the Migrcoles Ciudadanos where citizens communicate directly with 
the mayor and members of the local administration about their problems (see chapter 6). 
The initiative has been carried out by more than 60 panista local authorities, however, 
the advantages of the programme have not been clearly explained and there is the risk 
that the programme could be labelled as mere administrative populism (Ramfrez 
2000: 16). In the view of Ramfrez, panistas administration fear organised groups, which 
is why they prefer to deal with citizens as individuals rather than with citizens grouped 
in organisations. Ramfrez identifies three features of these panista regimes. Firstly, their 
aim is to stop corporatist practices. Secondly, they tend to promote an environment 
under which alternative groups to the pre-established prifsta structures can develop. 
Tbirdly, they mistrust the existing social groups because they tend to link them with PRI 
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or the PRD (Ramfrez 2000: 14). The types of practices identified under panista 
administrations have led some academics to state that 'the PAN believes that to govern 
Icss is to govem bcttcr' (Loacza 1997: 11). 
Despite the declared intention of these initiatives to involve the citizenry, some 
academics criticise PAN governments as lacking a social project, 'the PAN does not 
possesses an alternative interaction model to involve the civil society' (Mizrahil. 995: 
200). For Rarnfrez, the big issue within the PAN seems to be whether to give any real 
powers to citizens or not, and the response does not seem to be clear-cut (Ramfrez 
2000: 14). 
The Presidential Participatory Agenda 
On 2 July 2000 Mexico's political life changed. For the first time in Mexico's modem 
history, the candidate of the PRI, which had ruled for 70 years, was defeated in a 
presidential election. Vicente Fox, representing the PAN, became the symbol of a 'new 
Mexico' - what many hoped would be a truly democratic Mexico. Once in office, one 
of the first priorities of the new administration was to give greater importance to citizen 
involvement in decision-making processes. For these renewed participatory purposes, 
the Coordinaci6n Presidencial Para la Alianza Ciudadana (CPAC)35 was created. This 
secretariat aims to establish a new relationship between the government and those actors 
taking part in the civil society (i. e. NGOs), as well as giving advice to other secretariats 
on how to implement mechanisms where citizens could get involved in decision-making 
processes. The office has been established to take actions in the following directions: 
1) To strengthen the legal grounds to promote and improve the relationship between 
organisations of the civil society and the government. 
2) To increase citizens' participation in the design, execution, supervision and 
evaluation of public policies. 
3) To develop new mechanisms of public expenditure, where the organisations of the 
civil society take a more active role in the management of resources of these 
programmes. 
4) To promote the professionalisation of the actors of the civil society. 
(La Jornada 15/7/200 1) 
At the core of the current participatory agenda is the National Participatory Programme 
that aims to create policies to encourage citizens to take an active role in decision- 
making processes related to public policies. Mr. Elizondo, 2000-2006 Coordinator of 
the CPAC declares, 'the aim is to create a 'pedagogic route' and a feedback system to 
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transmit the knowledge and develop a greater participatory culture-this government 
wants to walk along with the citizenry. 36 During a citizen participation conference held 
in Vancouver, Canada Elizondo commented, 'citizens want to be part of public policies, 
they want to participate effectively. Citizens need adequate mechanisms to take part in 
decision-making processes, and the Mexican government coincides with this vision and 
promotes it. ' 37 
Recently, Elizondo stated that there is a project to install pilot citizen councils in 100 
municipalities ain-ýing to guarantee the transparency of local administrations. The 
objective is also to promote citizen participation all over the country. At the core of the 
CPAC agenda is the revision of existing citizen participation mechanisms. According to 
Elizondo, 'the CPAC is developing performance indicators of the different participatory 
practices taking place in Mexico. We are convinced that the only way to reduce 
inequality is not through corporatist practices, but through educating the population. All 
citizens, whether indigenous people, women, or unemployed, must be able to exercise 
their rights with entire liberty. ' 38 
It seems the present administration believes that citizen participation can be used as a 
Gweapon' to fight poverty. According to Elizondo, 'the distribution of political power is 
essential to break the vicious circle of poverty and marginality that is increasing all over 
the world as a failure of the social policies currently implemented. To re-organise and 
distribute political power, democracy requires citizen participation ... political 
democracy require citizens' equality that gives citizens liberties and power. ' 39 Despite 
the range of interesting aspects covered in this initiative, it is still too early to analyse 
the impact that these policies are having in Mexico's participatory context. 
Barfiers to participation 
Despite the 'democratic participatory' intentions that Mexico's three main political 
parties seem to display, we must consider that whenever participatory initiatives are 
implemented there are a series of obstacles that could be faced. In a series of paperS40 
that highlight the barriers to participatory democracy, Professor John Stewart (2001) 
identifies seven core obstacles. In his view, the first obstacle is the attitude of some 
elected representatives and officers based on the passive conception of representative 
democracy. It is often assumed that the elected representative speaks for the citizens and 
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knows what they want or should have and the officer knows what they need. The lesson 
for developing democratic practice is that the best way of changing attitudes is 
experience. Stewart establishes that both councillors and officers have been surprised at 
the potential displayed by citizens in such bodies as citizens juries and the richness of 
ideas put forward in conferences where the public has taken part. 
The second obstacle is the fear of raising expectations. According to Stewart, 'if we 
invite views, we will never be able to meet all that everybody wants (Stewart 2001: 2). ' 
The key is to make clear the constraints under which authorities operate. Apathy is often 
seen as the key obstacle, Stewart recalls: 'we have tried to involve the public but they 
are just not interested (Stewart 2001: 4). ' That should be seen, however, not as an 
argument against seeking to involve citizens, but as an argument for exploring 
innovation in democratic practice as a means of involving citizens. Lack of information 
available to the public can be an obstacle to effective involvement, since it means that 
views expressed can be discounted by those with expertise in the area. The development 
of deliberative approaches such as citizens juries, and deliberative opinion polls and 
visioning conferences help to overcome this obstacle. 
There are also practical problems in developing citizen involvement, particularly at 
national level. People naturally find it easier to be involved at the local level (ParTy, 
Moyser and Day 1992). According to Stewart, the problems can be overcome by 
encouraging the development of multiple approaches to citizen involvement based on 
initiatives in different regions and localities. Central government could undertake such 
initiatives itself, but could also draw upon initiatives undertaken by local authorities, or 
by other bodies such as health authorities at local level. 
Democratic exclusion or democratic injustice create problems for citizen involvement, 
if it tends to mean certain voices are excluded and approaches are dominated by the 
articulate and the involved. This means special emphasis should be given to approaches 
focusing on groups not normally involved. 
Inappropriate use of particular approaches can be an obstacle to the effective 
development of citizen involvement. For instance, approaches or participatory 
mechanisms used for the wrong purposes (i. e. particular political or party intentions) or 
using a participatory mechanism (e. g. referendum or plebiscite) and not respecting its 
outcome. Such inappropriate use may cause disillusion, and reduced levels of 
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participation. The question remains as to whether each of these seven obstacles 
identified by Stewart can be found in the case studies analysed in this dissertation. Are 
there any other obstacles peculiar to the Mexican context worth considering in the cases 
analysed? For instance, what is the role of clientelistic relationships - so common in 
Mexican local politics - in our three cases? 
Costs of Participation 
Alongside the barriers to participation identified above, there are also such issues 
concerning the costs of these mechanisms (time and resource-wise) that must be 
considered. For instance, according to Crowley: 41 
It is undeniable that those who believe in mass participation in policy 
making always neglect the fact that knowledge is very costly to acquire - it is 
not a free good. Nor is the time available for deliberation very great, as people's 
time is valuable. And frankly, most people think they have better things to do 
with their time than to bone up on the latest operation of the equalisation formula 
or the financing of medicare or the negotiation of the current international trade 
agreement. In fact, it is quite rational to want less public participation in policy 
making, not more. As a wise man once said, the problem with participatory 
politics is that either you don't show up to defend your interests, in which case 
people will vote themselves benefits at your expense, or else everybody is there 
to listen and debate, and you can never get your pipes fixed because the 
plumbers, and everybody else, are always down at the assembly (Crowley 2001). 
Another example which is linked to the quote above introduced deals with the way 
neighbourhood meetings have taken place in Ceard, Brazil. The implementors of the 
participatory agenda have identified that: 
The main disadvantage of the participatory programme implemented in 
Ceard is the number of meetings people must attend. As every social program 
jumps on the bandwagon of participatory management, citizens find themselves 
overwhelmed with requests to volunteer their time. It is easy to mobilise energy 
during a crisis, such as a drought, but it is harder to find volunteers to work on 
more routine matters. Government officials sometimes find it hard to get their 
work done when they spend so much time on co-ordination meetings (Goertzel 
2002). 
In addition to time costs we must also consider the economic costs that participatory 
democracy generates. For instance, the cost of a recent consultation promoted by the 
government of Mexico City to discuss the construction of a second floor on one of 
Mexico City's most important motorways was 48 millones de pesos (around f 3.2 
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million). The economic cost for each of the 420,522 citizens included in the voting list 
was of 115 pesos (around ;C8.30) for a decision that perhaps could have been taken 
without the consultation process (La Jomada 24/9/2002). Taking into consideration 
these points, it is important to question whether authorities and political parties have 
considered sufficiently the temporal and economic costs of participatory mechanisms. 
Have local authorities considered that perhaps the population is not interested in taking 
part in any of these initiatives unless they are directly affected? Or that perhaps the large 
sums that are spent on participatory mechanisms could be used more effectively for 
other programmes? These are open questions that will be answered as this research 
progresses. 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to determine the exact reasons why citizen participation mechanisms have 
been increasingly implemented in Mexico. Certainly, in the past the use of these 
participatory tools was reserved primarily for political control or blackmailing purposes. 
However, once alternative forms of participation emerged via social movements, NGOs, 
and opposition administrations, the aims of participatory practices might - in some 
instances - have changed. Certainly, the pressure exercised by social movements and 
political parties throughout the 1970s and 1980s translated into having a wide variety of 
participatory programmes today. It is undeniable that the 'democratic outcry' expressed 
by social movements in the four areas discussed above played a crucial role in 
practically forcing politicians and political parties to establish participatory schemes. It 
can be argued that without the contribution of these movements the participatory 
agendas carried out all over Mexico would not have happened. Thus, social movements 
have contributed to perceiving participatory mechanisms as a way of breaking with the 
past and having more transparent administrations (see Ramfrez 2000). 
Each of the schemes presented in this chapter is evidence of the recent concern 
manifested by local authorities - especially those representing the PRI, the PAN and the 
PRD - to establish participatory initiatives. For instance, in a surveY42 carried outin 
September 2001 by the newspaper Refonna, 97 mayors were asked about their 
participatory agendas, and 74 percent of them responded that they engage in 
participatory activities several times per week (see Reforma 3/9/2001). Although the 
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types of participatory activities implemented by each mayor are not mentioned in the 
survey, this trend does reflect the importance that participatory initiatives have acquired 
in Mexico's local context. It seems that some of the factors that have influenced the 
implementation of these mechanisms reflect the wish of some authorities - especially 
those belonging to the PAN and PRD - to become more accountable or approachable to 
citizens. The trend to eliminate all aspects of the PRI seems to be the major concern of 
several local administrations. Opening up opportunities for discussion and interaction 
between authorities and citizens is at the core of the local agenda; moreover, at the 
national level, suddenly citizen participation has been perceived as a possible solution to 
reduce inequality, or simply to promote more democracy. 
Yet how genuine are the declared intentions behind these participatory mechanisms? 
One aim of this study is to discover their underlying principles and main purposes. With 
the proliferation of a wide variety of participatory practices, it is important to 
understand what political parties and governments understand by citizen participation, 
what types of mechanisms they promote to involve citizens in decision-making 
processes and what they really hope to achieve. For example, questions emerge about 
whether these mechanisms are really used to obtain local knowledge to solve specific 
problems. As commented by Phillips, 'the argument for implementing local decision- 
making processes is partly an argument for employing local knowledge, and taking 
maximum advantage of local experience and imagination and expertise' (Phillips 
1996: 24). Or perhaps these schemes are being used to legitimise controversial 
decisions? Perhaps the aim is to create official participatory mechanisms with limited 
decision making power so politicians can argue that they are providing participatory 
channels, but in reality they are only consulting the population over unimportant, 
marginal issues. One indication of this might be the way the traditional top-down 
implementation model of most Mexican governmental initiatives is used for schemes 
that, if really intended to give greater decision-making power to the general public, 
should come up from the grassroots. A critical question is whether these mechanisms 
are really that participative, or whether they are used to legitimise policies that originate 
from the centre. This seems to be one of the major concerns of those involved in the 
Agenda para la Refonna Municipal, as has already been identified by Alvarez and 
Castro (1999) 'in most cases, the participatory mechanisms defined in state or local 
legislation are misleading, bureaucratised, or corpomtised and they have become an 
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illegitimate source of political power' (1999: 1). It seems there are certain similarities 
between the types of issues analysed in this thesis and those studied in the municipal 
reform agenda. 
By examining three municipalities governed by each of the three main political forces of 
Mexico, this study will analyse such aspects as the legal basis of the participatory 
mechanisms they implement, the actual input of citizens to the outcome of the policies 
carried out at the local level, and the decision-making power that citizens have when 
taking part in these processes. In short, how far are citizens genuinely empowered? We 
aim to understand more about citizens' reactions to these initiatives. Does the public 
still follow the traditional local caciques or have citizens decided to participate in the 
structures recently developed by local authorities? How do people respond to these new 
participatory opportunities? What roles have social movement leaders and local bosses 
played in these participatory initiatives? Of course, by establishing participatory 
schemes, political parties such as the PRD aim to eliminate the involvement of local 
bosses who have traditionally been linked to the PRI, but has this actually happened? 
An important consideration is the social context in which the participatory schemes are 
implemented. In particular, it is clear that there are great differences between the local 
needs of the upper and middle classes and those of the working classes. One question 
this raises is whether the same types of participatory schemes are appropriate for 
different socio-economic groups? 
This chapter has highlighted the contemporary political significance of local 
participatory initiatives in Mexico. But, of course, participation is not a new idea, and 
there is a long history of attempts to increase public participation in local government 
all around the world. Why has participation attracted so many adherents? What claims 
are made on behalf of participatory policies? How, if at all, might have these approaches 
have shaped the Mexican local participatory agenda? The next chapter examines the 
participatory democratic literature, to see what light can be thrown on the current 
enthusiasm for participatory policies in Mexico; and to explain what lessons can be 
drawn about the aims, implementation and impact of participatory policies in local 
government. 
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Notes 
1 According to the Latin American Political Dictionary, caciquismo is the system of local rule by a strong 
political boss. Caciquismo is derived from the Indian word 'cacique' meaning Indian Chief of the village 
or tribe. During the colonial period of Spanish America, Spaniards ruled through Indian caciques, who 
were given special privileges and were used as local bosses. After independence, the term cacique 
referred to a strong local leader, and caciquismo became a way of life in rural areas (LAPD 1980: 143- 
144). In contemporary times, caciquismo is not only widespread in rural towns but also in urban slums 
where rural migrants have congregated. A cacique maintains himself/herself in power by a complex 
system of nepotism, patronage, for his clients, control over government services, illegal activities and the 
use of force. In this research, we will define a cacique as an informal leader who performs any of the 
activities presented above, a leader who bases his/her operations on a series of coercive practices to keep 
the population under his/her domain. 
2 Clientelism is defined as the personal relationship that links patrons and clients together in a system 
where favours and protection are exchanged for labour, support, and loyalty (LAPD 1980: 60). Although 
clientelism is mainly found in agricultural regions, patron-client relationships are also found in urban 
areas. In such circumstances, employers, bosses, political leaders and government figures provide 
opportunities for loyal employees and followers. The system of clientelism is related to the cultural trait 
of personalism, which stresses personal relationships rather than institutional ones. One of the main 
characteristics of clientelistic relationships is that bosses seek to expand their networks of well-placed 
friends, relatives, and patrons to maximise their opportunities (LAPD 1980: 60). Clientelism takes place in 
most sectors of Latin American societies (i. e. government, business, politics, agriculture and commerce). 
Under such conditions, face to face contacts and connections with friends are more important than any 
personal merit or professional achievement (LAPD 1980: 60). In this research clientelism will refer to any 
relationship that puts authorities or informal leaders in an advantageous position over the citizenry, 
roviding aid or jobs in exchange for political support. 
The figure of 2,427 municipalities does not include the 16 delegaciones (local governments) of Mexico 
City, which function like a municipality but which are not recognised as such in the constitution. 
Currently the government of Mexico City is attempting to conclude a political reform that will give the 
'official status' of municipality to delegaciones. 
4 Although this may vary, especially in regions inhabited by groups of indigenous people, see Morjardfn 
and Rebolledo (1998). 
5 For further discussion of this matter, see Merino (1994) and Cabrero (1995). 
6 Analyses of the authoritative nature of the Mexican political system include, Purcell (1973), Reyna and 
Weimert (1977), Harvey (1989) and Garrido (1993). 
7 See also Grindle (1977) and Almond and Verba (1980). 
8 Other branches that have been introduced or strengthened are ramo 26 and ramo 28. Both of these 
special budgets are allocated through the social development secretariat. 
9 In this survey 76 mayors and 80 treasurers of 97 different municipalities were interviewed between 
28/2/2001 and 2014/2001 and was co-ordinated by Reforma journalist Maria Antonia Mancillas. 
10 For similar discussions see BorJa (2000). 
11 Some of the debates included in the Agenda para la Refornia Municipal will be discussed throughout 
this dissertation. 
12 See Alonso (1972), Arriaga (1981), Ashby (1967), Cohen (1985) and Melucci (1988). 
13 Some of these projects are discussed by Cuellar (1990) and Tirado Jim6nez (1990). 14 These organisations are the Uni6n Popular de Vecinos y Colonos de la Colonia Guerrero, Uni6n 
Popular de la Colonia Pensil, Comit6 de Lucha Inquilinaria del Centro and Coordinadora de Cuartos de 
Azotea; see Greene (1997). 
15 See Cuellar (1990), Massolo (1986), Ziccardi (1986), Mecatl, Michel and Ziccardi (1987). 16 For further discussions see Alvarez (1990), Boschi (1987) and Castells (1983). 17 Mexican indigenous group from the south of Mexico. 18 Via the distribution of different pamphlets, these protest groups accused the COCEI of promoting a 
'communist-paradise and anarchy, ' also they were accused of performing obscene sexual acts at the 
municipal palace. A group of businessmen even accused the groups as being 'sandinismo on a smaller 
scale' (see Rubin 1999: 190). 
19 Most of these projects were part of a national agenda organised through the PRONASOL or 
SOLIDARIDAD and implemented by the Secretariat of Social Development. 
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20 The proportions of the first agreement signed by the CDP and the Salinas administration were divided 
as follows: 65 percent federal resources, 5 percent state resources and 30 percent CDP resources which 
could be provided either via cash, construction materials, or labour (see Haber 1997: 63). 
21 See Hemdndez (1991) and Haber (1997). 
22 JuchitAn exhibited a vibrant democratic politics in the early 1990s including honest and competitive 
elections, a responsive administration, efficient administration of social welfare funds, and active and 
innovative Zapotec cultural institutions. In the face of obstruction by successive Mexican administrations, 
the COCEI had stimulated political debate, dramatically increased voter turnout, and improved living and 
working conditions. Juchitecos secured these gains, furthermore, during a period of increasing inequality 
and considerable manipulation of elections nationwide (Rubin 1999: 194). 
23 Dr. Nava was then a member of the PRI, however, because of his dispute with Gonzalo Santos, he 
decided to run as an independent candidate representing a wide coalition of political forces, see Caballero 
(1992). 
24 See Calvillo Unna (1999) and Pansters (1997). 
25 In 1982 Dr. Nava won again the election for the municipality of San Luis Potosf, representing the PAN 
and the PDM (Mexican Democratic Party). However, his mandate was severely undermined by budget 
restrictions and political pressure from the governor. 
26 The Partido Den16crata Mexicano (Mexican Democratic Party) had an important presence in the state 
and was a crucial ally for the coalition. 
27 The conference was attended inter alia by Jos6 Ortiz Pinchetti, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, Rolando 
Cordera, Francisco Paoli, Diego Femdndez de Cevallos, Jorge Alcocer, Carlos Monsivais, Lorenzo 
Meyer, Miguel Granados Chapa, Jorge Castafieda, and Luis Javier Garrido (see Calvillo Unna 1990). 
2g Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, Acuerdo Nacional por la Democracia (ACUDE), 
Convergencia de Organismos Civiles por la Democracia (Convergencia), Consejo por la Democracia, 
Fundaci6n Arturo Rosenblueth (FUNDAR), Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia (MCD) and 
Instituto Superior de Cultura DemocrAtica. See Alianza Cfvica (1994). 
29 During the 1995 crisis such groups as El G-100 composed of 100 prominent intellectuals of Mexico 
were established to scrutinise the actions of government performed by public functionaries at the national 
level. The organisation is still operating and recently they expressed their disagreement with the decision 
to build Mexico City's new airport in the former Lake of Texcoco (see Refornia 25/10/2001). 
30 These were Asociacion Nacional de Industriales de la Transformaci6n (ANIT), Confederaci6n Nacional 
de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOC), Foro Permanente de Acci6n y Resistencia Contra la Crisis, Foro 
de Cambio Empresarial, Red Mexicana de Acci6n Frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC), Uni6n de 
Productores Agrfcolas Industriales, Comerciantes y Prestadores de Servicios El Barz6n, and Uni6n de 
Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas (UNORCA) see Alianza Civica (1996). 
31 See Rubin (1999), Tamayo (1990), and Cohen (1985). 
32 This point is discussed in depth by Alvarez and Castro (1999). 
33 Lafaena can be translated as a working day. 
34 According to some authors it has been taking place since pre-hispanic times, see Cabrero (1996). 
35 Translated as Presidential Co-ordination for the Citizen Alliance. 
36 Elizondo cited in www. presidencia. Rob. mx 4/10/2001. 
37 Elizondo cited in www. 12residencia. %zob. mx 21/8/2001. 
38 Elizondo cited in www. presidencia. gob. inx 14/10/2001. 39 Elizondo cited in www. 12residencia. eob. mx 30/10/2001. 
40 This paper is entitled 'Citizen Involvement: Opportunities and Obstacles' and it is part of a series of 
three papers where Professor Stewart describes the developments of Innovation in Democratic Practice 
and that have been submitted to the Citizen Participation Committee of the House of Commons. 41 Quote from the paper 'Putting the "Public" Back in Public Policy' given by Dr. Brian Lee Crowley, 
President of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies. Private Foundations of Canada Member Seminar 
Toronto, February 2001. 
42 See footnote 9. 
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Chapter 2 
Participatory Democracy 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, the number of participatory initiatives implemented in 
Mexico has increased considerably in recent years, however, Mexico is not the only 
country where such processes have taken place. There has been a widespread utilisation 
of participatory mechanisms in such countries as the US, Germany, Britain and Sweden 
(Stewart 1996); in the Latin American continent countries like Brazil or Uruguay have 
taken the lead in the implementation of such participatory policies (Zermeho 1999). 
These initiatives draw their inspiration from the range of theoretical approaches 
advocating greater involvement of citizens, especially underprivileged groups, in 
decision-making processes at the local level that have emerged since the late 1960s. 
These participatory democratic models are underpinned by a critique of the liberal 
representative democratic system for its promotion of social inequalities and its failure 
adequately to represent the views of the citizens. This chapter analyses this body of 
literature which has influenced most local participatory schemes of democracy. To help 
tackle the research questions this thesis addresses, the chapter aims to unearth any 
linkages between the theoretical underpinnings of the Mexican participatory agenda and 
the wider themes of participatory democracy. The chapter draws on several currents 
within the participatory literature, mainly the 'neo-classical' proponents of participatory 
democracy, notably, Carole Pateman, as well as more recent writers, especially those 
that identify the links between the civil society, NGOs, and government as crucial for 
carrying out participatory projects, such as those approaches promoted by the 
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents the background, 
principles, and main acclaimed advantages of participatory democracy. The second part 
analyses the limitations of participatory democracy. Thirdly, we introduce the main 
types of units where participatory initiatives have been implemented, and the 
penultimate part covers two typologies that have been developed to help measure the 
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levels of empowerment that citizens gain when taking part in participatory processes. 
Finally, we recount some of the main arguments that have been used for the 
implementation of participatory democracy; here, the policies of such international 
organisations as the WB or the IMF are at the core of the discussion. This chapter plays 
a critical role in this thesis, as it is from the theoretical principles discussed here that a 
relationship with the participatory initiatives implemented in Tlalpan, Puebla and San 
Pedro will be made. It is important to look at the participatory literature as most 
participatory schemes carried out in different parts of the world have - explicitly or 
implicitly - taken as them as their sources of inspiration. So lessons can be leamt about 
the thinking underpinning the Mexican initiative, the choice of mechanisms and the 
impact they may leave on citizens. 
Participatory democracy 
Background 
Participatory democracy has a long history, going back to the Greek city of Aristotle, 
where every (free) male was involved in all public decisions. ' It was from these 
principles that classic writers of the participatory tradition such as Rousseau got their 
inspiration: 
As long as several men in assembly regard themselves a single 
body ... the common good is everywhere apparent, and only good sense is needed 
to perceive it ... When, among the happiest people in the world, bands of peasants 
are seen regulating affairs of state under an oak, and always acting wisely, who 
can help scorning the ingenious methods of other nations? A state so governed 
needs very few laws; and as it becomes necessary to add new ones, the necessity 
is universally seen (Rousseau 1968). 
Unlike the Greek participatory model, Rousseau visualised a state where 'no citizen 
shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself' 
(Rousseau 1968: 96). Rousseau's model of democracy was inspired by the idea of 
'assembly politics' where individuals would get involved in the creation of the laws that 
regulate their lives. From this perspective, all citizens should meet together to decide 
what is best for the community to enact the appropriate laws; it is a system where the 
ruled should be the rulers. The main asset which citizens must have in Rousseau's 
model is that citizens must enjoy political and economic equality in order that nobody 
can be master of another and all can enjoy equal freedom and development in the 
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process of self-determination for the common good (Held 1997: 6 1). 2 Furthermore, 
Rousseau perceived that participatory democracy played a crucial role for the 
development of each individual, as Paternan notes: 
Rousseau's entire political theory hinges on the individual participation 
of each citizen in political decision-making and in his theory participation is 
very much more than a protective adjunct to a set of institutional arrangements; 
it also has a psychological effect on the participants, ensuring that there is a 
continuing interTelationship between the working of institutions and the 
psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting within them 
(Pateman 1970: 22). 
Writers from a different philosophical perspective, such as John Stuart Mill, have also 
advocated participatory democracy. In his view, 'it is only within the context of popular, 
participatory institutions that an "active, " public-spirited type or character would be 
fostered' (see Mill 1963). For Mill, the effects of participating in community decision- 
making processes were expected to have a positive impact not only for increasing 
citizens' political awareness, but also for each individual's psyche. Mill argued that 
'where the individual is concerned solely with his own private affairs and does not 
participate in public affairs then the "self-regarding" virtues suffer, as well as the 
capacities for responsible public action remaining underdeveloped' (Mill 1910: 217). 
One key point where both Rousseau and Mill coincide is in the educative importance of 
participatory democracy, a point that will be discussed to a greater extent later in this 
chapter. Rousseau and Mill are two of the most prominent proponents of participatory 
democracy, and their works have been an important source of inspiration for 
contemporary participatory theorists. The next section addresses some of the main 
principles in recent participatory democratic approaches. 
Pfinciples of Contemporary Participatory Democracy 
During the 1960s and 1970s the widespread political and economic problems 
confronting liberal democratic systems led to a renewed interest in participatory 
democracy, albeit adapted to the needs of modem society. The liberal representative 
model was attacked on two fronts. The first front questioned the 'free and equal' status 
of citizens promoted by the liberals, and the second challenged the effectiveness of 
representative democracy. The period 1968-69 represents something of a watershed 
(Hall et al 1978). The student movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and a vast 
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variety of groups associated with the new-left erupted during this period (see Pierson 
1986). These groups wanted greater equality, peace, better rights for workers, the 
emancipation of women, and an end to racism. These events shocked the foundations of 
representative liberal democracies and opened new avenues of democratic thought. The 
protest movements of an 'awakening society' even prompted such previously pluralist 
writers as Lindblom (1977) and Dahl (1985) to admit that the constraints imposed by 
the requirements of private accumulation must limit policy options. For instance, Dahl 
acknowledges that the most fundamental challenge to liberty derives from the 
inequalities that derive from the power of corporate capitalism. The way in which the 
markets are managed in the current world economy has led to the development of 
several forms of inequality: 
Ownership and control contribute to the creation of great differences 
among citizens in wealth, income, status, skills, information, control over 
information and propaganda, access to political leaders and on the average, 
predictable life chances, not only for mature adults but also for the unborn, 
infants, and children ... differences like these help to generate significant inequalities among citizens in their capacities and opportunities for participating 
as political equals in governing the state (Dahl 1985: 55). 
Just as Rousseau believed that socio-economic inequality would prevent citizens from 
equal political rights (Sorensen 1998: 8), a key issue for the new-left was to what extent 
the concept of the 'free and equal' individual praised by the liberal theory of democracy 
actually exists. For participatory theorists like Carole Pateman, the 'free and equal 
individual' is a person that is harder to find than liberal theory suggests (Patemanl985: 
171). The trouble with liberalism is that it only encourages a 'thin democracy' based 
around self-interested bargaining (Barber 1984). 
The liberals take for granted that a series of relationships between men and women, 
blacks and whites, working, middle, and upper classes would enjoy the same rights, 
however, reality showed that these situations would not necessarily occur (Hart 1972). 
An assessment of freedom must be made on the basis of liberties that are tangible, and 
capable of being deployed within the realms of both state and civil society. If freedom 
does not have a concrete content - as particular freedoms- it can scarcely be said to 
have profound consequences for everyday life (Held 1997: 264-265). For Held, 
Under the circumstances that liberal democracies operate, it would not be 
difficult to discover that massive numbers of individuals are restricted 
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systematically -for want of a complex mix of resources and opportunities- from 
participating actively in political and civil life. What were referred to earlier as 
vicious circles of limited or non-participation directly illustrate this point. 
Inequalities of class, sex and race substantially hinder the extent to which it can 
legitimately be claimed that individuals are 'free and equal' (Held 1997: 265). 
The importance of establishing mechanisms where citizens could have 'a say' in those 
decisions affecting their lives was identified by some writers as a possible way of 
reducing the prevailing inequalities. For instance, Stoker states, 'opportunities for 
political participation also matter because they help reduce inequalities in the 
redistribution of power and encourage a responsiveness to individual and collective 
needs' (Stoker 1996: 188). Furthermore, new-left writings have stressed the importance 
of a two way process that involves govemments, political parties and citizens. In the 
view of these writers, 3 the state should be democratised to make it more open and 
accountable to citizens, white citizens (through diverse organisations) must ensure that 
society and the state are subject to procedures that ensure accountability (Held 
1997: 266). 
The second main concern of the participatory democrats is to determine the extent to 
which a representative democracy genuinely represents the interests of voters. 
Participationists reject the elitist views of Schumpeter, who believed that the citizenry 
should only get involved in voting processes to keep the electoral machinery working. 
Moreover, Schumpeter is convinced that the most important aspect of any representative 
democracy is the issue of electing those who would decide for the masses (Schumpeter 
1943: 383). 4 
Since Rousseau, the issue of 'representativeness' has been put under scrutiny. He 
argued that, 'once you transfer your right of self-government to someone else, even if 
that person is deemed to be your 'representative, ' you are no longer free' (see Rousseau 
1968). More recently, Arblaster establishes that when analysing the results of 
representative democracy we can conclude that, outside the electoral process, the 
people, those who are represented have strikingly little control over what their 
representativc(s) actually do in their name. He argues that it is hard to resist the 
conclusion that the distinction between a representative and a delegate, although real 
enough, is posed in misleading terms. A true representative is surely someone who is 
authorised to speak and act on behalf of those he/she represents, and who has been 
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authorised to do so by them. In other words, a true representative is a delegate, carrying 
a mandate and acting under instructions (Albaster 1987: 84). Bevan also adds, 
A representative person is one who will act in a given situation in much 
the same way as those he represents would act in that same situation. In short, he 
must be of their kind ... Election is only one part of representation. It becomes full representation only if the elected person speaks with the authentic accents of 
those who elected him ... he should share their values; that is, be in touch with 
their realities (Bevan 1978: 35). 
From a different angle, but in the same tone, Phillips criticises the representative model 
arguing that politicians retain considerable powers of manipulation in the timing of their 
most unpopular policies and this often undermines their accountability to their electorate 
(Phillips 1996: 29). How can citizens be sure that their representatives are taking the 
right decisions on their behalf? Arblaster concludes that even if we stated that a 
representative democracy was the best that could be achieved under modem 
circumstances, the idea or principle of representation is far from being fully or 
effectively embodied in existing political arrangements (Arblaster 1987: 89). 
Benello and Roussopoulos define decision-making in the context of a participatory 
democracy as, 'the process whereby people propose, discuss, decide, plan and 
implement those decisions that affect their lives. This requires that the decision-making 
be continuous and significant, direct rather that through representatives, and organised 
around issues instead of personalities' (Benello and Roussopoulos 1971: 3). This is why 
Sorensen believes that a participatory democracy would make the common man 'better 
able to assess the performance of representatives at the national level, better equipped to 
take decisions of national scope when the opportunity arose to do so, and better able to 
weigh up the impact of decisions taken by national representatives on his own life 
(Sorensen 1998: 8). 
These two core ideas - the issues of inequality and representativeness - underpin the 
participationists, theoretical platform. The main argument is that perhaps the only way in 
which citizens can really control those decisions that affect them would be if they are 
able get directly involved in those decision-making processes. 
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Perspectives on Participatory Democracy 
Etymologically speaking, participatory democracy is based on two terms: the Latin 
partis (part) and capere (to take), and the Greek demos (people) and kratien (to rule) 
which together suggest taking part in rule by the people (Cook and Morgan 1971: 2). 
Amongst the many works of the participatory theorists of democracy those of CB 
Macpherson and Carole Pateman have been particularly influential. Both Macpherson 
and Pateman have argued that Rousseau's ideas are compatible with modem society and 
that representative government can be combined with elements of direct participation 
and, indeed, ought to be if democracy is to be more than merely formal (Sorensen 
1998: 8). According to Macpherson and Pateman, structures of participation in local 
society and in the workplace will vastly improve the quality of representative 
democracy. In the view of Pateman, 'the theory of participatory democracy stands or 
falls on two hypotheses: the educative function of participation, and the crucial role of 
industry'5 (Pateman 1970: 44). C. B. Macpherson (1977) argues that participatory 
democracy is the key to a more democratic future. For him, liberty and individual 
development can only be achieved by the direct involvement of citizens in activities that 
regulate both society and the state. He bases his perception of participatory democracy 
on the work of John Stuart Mill. 
Theories of participatory democracy are built around the central assertion that: 
individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another 
(Pateman 1970: 42). Pateman considers that the establishment of diverse channels of 
interaction (between authorities and citizens) is essential to increase people's awareness 
of participatory matters. Put differently, participatory theory is an articulation of the 
principle that in a democracy people rule themselves rather than being ruled by others 
(Grahaml986: 152). Pateman believes that in a participatory theory, 'participation' 
refers to (equal) participation in the making of decisions, and 'political equality' refers 
to equality of power in determining the outcome of decisions: 
The justification for a democratic system in the participatory theory of 
democracy rests primarily on the human results that accrue from the 
participatory process. One might characterise the participatory model as one 
where maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not 
just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political 
capacities of each individual, so that there is 'feedback' from output to input 
(Pateman 1970: 43). 
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From Pateman's perspective, 'the existence of representative institutions at the national 
level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that 
level socialisation, or 'social training, ' for democracy must take place in other spheres 
in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be 
developed' (Pateman 1970: 42). Thus participation entails more than the periodic 
expression of preferences; it must involve continuous interaction between the 
participant and his environment - including, of course, other participants (Keim 
1975: 16). 
Macpherson recognises the complications involved in implementing face-to-face 
discussions on every issue that affects a community, especially in large and complex 
societies. He believes that political transformation could be achieved through a 
combination of competitive parties and establishing organisations of direct democracy. 
In contrast to Pateman's perspective, at the core of Macpherson's approach is the re- 
organisation of the political party system. In his view, the party system should be 
reorganised on a less hierarchical basis with the aim of making political leaders more 
accountable to their membership. If these reformed parties were involved in parliaments 
or congresses at the workplace or local community level, then under such a political 
system citizens would be aware of the liberal democratic value of the equal right to 
liberty and self-development (see Macpherson 1977). 
Once the ideas of contemporary participatory democracy theorists began to spread, 
different lines of thought sharing the same principles were developed. For instance, the 
interaction of institutions and citizens in participatory bodies was defined by some 
political analysts as the liberal perspective to the theory of participatory democracy. In 
the view of Hain (1980), the liberal perspective is primarily concerned with reforming 
the structures of representative democracy, making it more responsive to the individual 
citizen, hence, improving the quality of democracy. These theorists (i. e. Pateman) aim 
to have a more open government where information and government decisions are 
shared with citizens and where the secrecy with which much public data is managed is 
reduced. A reduction in the number of bureaucratic barriers to participation should 
occur whilst the government should promote instruments where the public could 
express and receive feedback from the authorities (Hain 1980: 18). 
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By contrast, the radical perspective of participatory democracy includes those theorists 
and activists who seek to confront and replace representative democracy with a more 
active and independent citizenry (see Lynd 1972 and Cowley 1977). These theorists 
highlight the relevance of small structures of government and argue that the role which 
citizens should play within these structures should be an active one. The radical 
interpretation of participation stresses the concept of 'community control' that would 
involve a complete re-distribution of power and its location at the neighbourhood level 
(Hain 1980: 19, Green 1970 and Altshuler 1970). Radical advocates of participation 
believe that the poor and minorities constitute an 'underclass' or a 'forgotten' class that 
has been deprived of the rewards of the capitalist system, therefore, these groups 
potentially represent a source of radical change (see Kotler 1969, Gitlin 1970, Piven and 
Cloward 1971). This approach also highlights the way in which 'modem communities' 
interact and how the establishment of appropriate channels of communication (e. g. 
neighbourhood boards) could contribute to the promotion of democratic values and 
communitarian development. 
... the problems faced by big cities (i. e. urban disorder, inadequate housing and transportation) could be solved by organising the citizenry into 
groups to tackle urban problems. It is argued that the results that can be achieved 
through these bodies could be more successful, when compared to the results 
that the established system could deliver (Kotler 1969). 6 
For these radical theorists, citizen participation is perceived as an invigorating, 
personally fulfilling, strategy that poses an alternative to a mechanised, bureaucratised, 
dehumanised society (Lasch 1970: 180). The main idea driving the work of the radical 
advocates of participatory democracy is the re-establishment of a self-governing 
community that might give citizens a sense of identification, which has been diminished 
in contemporary societies. Special stress is placed on the size of communities, as small 
communities are seen as the basis for regenerating democracy, and also face-to-face 
discussion is paramount for these theorists. 7 By promoting 'direct action' policies, the 
radical theorists would initially involve deprived groups in securing community control, 
with the long-term aim of transforming the capitalist system. 8 
David Held, in his 1997 categorisation of models of democracy, summarises 
participatory democracy as follows: 
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An equal right to liberty and self-development can only be achieved in a 
participatory society, ' a society which fosters a sense of political efficacy, 
nurtures a concern for collective problems and contributes to the formation of a 
knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a sustained interest in the governing 
process (Heldl997: 271). 
According to Held, the following key features are essential for the development of 
participatory democracy: 
1) Direct participation of citizens in the regulations of society, including the workplace 
and the local community. 
2) Reorganisation of the party system by making party officials directly accountable to 
membership. 
3) Operation of 'participatory parties' in a parliamentary or congressional structure. 
4) Maintenance of an open institutional system to ensure the possibility of 
experimentation with political forms. 
An interesting point to discuss is to determine whether these conditions are present in 
the Mexican political system. Because in case these characteristics are not present, 
perhaps we might expect the creation of participatory mechanisms of a different nature 
or used for different purposes than to those discussed in this chapter. 
The casefor participatory democracy 
a) Impact on the locality 
Participatory democratic theorists all attribute great importance to the locality as an 
arena where citizen participation should be fostered. For instance, Mill argues that it is 
no use having universal suffrage and participation in national government if the citizen 
has not been prepared for this participation at local level; it is at this level that he learns 
how to govern himself. A political act, such as voting carried out only once every few 
years, and for which nothing in the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him, leaves 
his intellect and his moral dispositions very much as it found them (Mill 1963: 229). For 
Mill, local participation is crucial for 'educating' individuals to take better decisions 
when taking part in elections or in political matters. In his view, 'it is at the local level 
where the real educative effect of participation occurs, where not only do the issues 
dealt with directly affect the individual and his everyday life but where he also stands a 
good chance of himself being elected to serve on a local body' (Mill 1910: 347-348). It 
is by participating at the local level that an individual 'learns democracy. ' 'We do not 
learn to read or write, to swim or ride, by being merely told to do it, but by doing it, so it 
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is only by practising popular government on a limited scale, that the people will ever 
learn how to exercise it on a larger scale' (Mill 1963: 186). 
According to Carole Pateman, 'it is only if the individual has the opportunity to 
participate directly in decision-making at the local level that, under modem conditions, 
any real control over the course of everyday life can be achieved' (Pateman 1970: 100). 
Furthermore, Arblaster believes that: 
If we move away from the national level to consider the smaller local 
communities, or particular institutions such as factories and offices, colleges and 
schools, it is quite clear that there are no problems of either size or 
communications which stand in the way of their being governed according to the 
principle direct participatory democracy. There may well be -there always are- 
other grounds for resisting the implementation of such a principle; it would be 
time-consuming, it would be costly, it would not work well -and so on. But it 
cannot plausibly be said that it is wholly impracticable (Arblaster 88-89). 
Pateman is convinced that the locality is the main area where citizens could have a true 
impact on politics. In her view, 'in an electorate of, say, thirty-five n-dllion, the role of 
the individual must consist almost entirely of choosing representatives; even where 
he/she could cast a vote in a referendum his/her influence over the outcome would be 
infinitesimally small. Unless the size of national political units were drastically reduced 
then that piece of reality is not open to change' (Pateman 1970: 109). For instance, 
Barber establishes that the involvement in a flourishing array of local and regional 
assemblies would transform the very way people think and behave (Barber 1984). The 
argument for local decision-making is partly an argument for employing local 
knowledge, and taking maximum advantage of local experience and imagination and 
expertise (Phillips 1996: 21). Indeed, in many countries, including Britain, (Parry, 
Moyser and Day 1992) and Mexico (Cabrero 1996 and Ramirez Saiz 2000), it is at the 
local level where people are traditionally more likely to get engaged in political issues. 
The relevance of participatory democracy to local government and democracy is 
especially attractive because it involves a decentralisation of power and the opportunity 
to use local knowledge to meet local needs (Stoker 1996: 188). Furthermore, local 
governance should be open so that people are recognised as having the right and the 
opportunity to act in local public life. There should be a capacity for deliberation about 
the key issues both on the part of civic leaders and 'ordinary' citizens (Stoker 
1996: 189). According to Wolman: 
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Local democracy consists of the expression of and conflict among 
diverse views and values held by contending groups attempting to shape local 
government decisions to meet their ends, with all important groups having the 
ability to gain access to and exercise some degree of influence over decision 
makers. Local government's role is thus with ... the authoritative allocation of 
values or in ... classic language, 'who gets what, when and how' (Wolman 1995: 137). 
More recently, some authors have recognised the potential of local government as a 
'cradle' from where actions that could have a national and international impact emerge. 
For instance, Ward (1993) argues that behind the slogan 'act locally, think globally' is 
the idea that actions at the local level could trigger national and international reactions 
that could help improve environmental problems. 
b) Educating through participating 
Participatory theorists argue that participation produces a sense of community for 
individuals which, given the circumstances of modern mass society, is not otherwise 
easily achieved, and fosters an identification with a collective and its enterprise 
(Bachrach 1975: 40). Although Patcman identifies a series of advantages that citizens 
would enjoy when taking part in mechanisms of participatory democracy (i. e. it fosters 
human development, enhances a sense of political efficacy, reduces a sense of 
estrangement from power centres, nurtures a concern for collective problems and 
contributes to the formation of an active knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a 
more acute interest in government affairs) the main advantage she highlights is the 
educative process in which citizens engage when taking part in such mechanisms (see 
Pateman 1970 and Dahl 1985: 95ff). According to Pateman, 'the major function of 
participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative one, 
educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the 
gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures' (Pateman 1970: 42). 
Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more 
individuals participate the better able they become to do so (Pateman 1970: 42-43). 9 
Similarly, Cook and Morgan (1971) argue: 
Participatory activities taking place at the local level can be compared to 
attending school and learning about maths or history, only that when the 
individual engages in participatory activities at the local level, he/she learns to 
be a better citizen. Many theorists have argued that the experience of direct 
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participation can shape a new man, since it socialises people into new beliefs, 
attitudes and values (Cook and Morgan 1971: 7). 
Mill, too, claims that if individuals were provided with the opportunity to participate in 
public affairs, then they would be more concerned about collective issues and take the 
public interest into account, rather than merely worry about their personal issues Null 
(1963). Pateman agrees with Nfill in the sense that the main function of citizen 
participation is an educative one. 
In addition to the educative process, there is also the perception of citizen participation 
as an activity that can help improve a citizen's negotiating abilities. Subsidiary 
hypotheses about participation are that it has an integrative effect and that it aids the 
acceptance of collective decisions. When citizens realise that they are able to influence 
the outcome of the policy process, then they could develop greater awareness and a 
desire to be more informed about the political issues affecting them. In an age of 
bigness and bureaucratisation, people experience a feeling of helplessness, of being 
'administered' in the complexity of a 'Kafkaesque' world (Cook and Morgan 1971: 7). 
Perhaps the primary change in the participants as a consequence of their direct 
involvement might be an increase in their sense of effectively manipulating their 
environment through political participation. The main idea is that people can learn to 
become effective political agents on the basis of experience in more limited contexts, 
and that this will provide them with the capacity to act in the wider political domain, as 
well as encouraging a tendency to identify with the group in which they actively 
participate, thus reducing the problem of disparate views and conflicts of will (Graham 
1986: 150). 
Summary 
This first section has outlined the case of the theorists of participatory democracy. The 
core principles of the participatory democrats are based on a critique of the liberal 
model of representative democracy. Participatory democrats believe that through 
improving liberal representative democracy (the liberal reformers) or by transforming it 
(the radicals) the 'have-nots' in society could gain some decision-making power by 
taking part in those decisions affecting their respective localities. Participatory 
democratic practices are expected to have a positive impact both on the locality, and in 
an 'educative way' on each individual. The issues raised in this section are of great 
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relevance for Mexico, especially after analysing some of the participatory practices 
presented in chapter 1. For instance, such initiatives as the miercoles ciudadano 
established by the PAN or the approval of a new citizen participation legislation in 
Mexico City appear to be examples of the attempts that political parties are making to 
involve the have-nots in those decisions that affect their daily lives. Is the aim to 
educate the population on democratic matters through these types of initiatives, or to 
foresee local government as a cradle that could bring democratic change? Or do these 
parties have a different political agenda in mind when introducing participatory 
reforms? An important question concerns the relationship between the participatory 
practices carried out in Mexico and the ideas of the participatory democrats presented 
above. This point acquires relevance when we analyse the conditions for participatory 
democracy raised by Held; do these conditions prevail in Mexico? Are political parties 
even concerned about finding a correlation between the issues discussed in this chapter 
and their participatory agendas? If not, are their participatory reforms doomed to fail? 
Further questions concern the political effects (s) of participatory policies in Mexico's 
local context or, more widely, on the nature of Mexican democracy. However, before 
addressing them, it is important to identify some of the limitations identified by the 
critics of participatory democracy. 
The Limits of Participatory Democracy 
The first problem with the citizen participation debate deals with the definition of 
participation itself. According to Keim, 'one of the main problems when defining 
participation is the ambiguity of the term; to some participation means choosing leaders, 
to others it means actually deciding policy' (Keim 1975: 2). Clearly, where direct 
participation is possible then the definition is relevant but it is not clear (Pateman 
1970: 44). The core of participatory theory contains the idea of the ordinary citizen 
taking part in political decisions to far a greater degree than at present, but with no 
attempt to quantify the precise degree of involvement (Graham 1986: 160). 10 
Gould argues that the main idea of participatory democracy, which is sharing 
authorities' power with citizens, opposes the basic principle of authority. 
The requirements for participation and for authority in political life 
appear to stand in contradiction with each other. Participation requires the full 
exercise of the agency of each of the participants in making decisions, whereas 
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authority seems to connote that some individuals have the right to exercise 
power over others to make decisions for them, (based on the model of 
representative democracy) to which these others are bound. This suggests that 
any democratic theory that takes participation as a central value would have to 
exclude any concept of authority; or altematively, if some form of authority is 
seen to be indispensible to civil or political life, then the theory would have to 
recognise that limits on the freedom or agency of individuals can justifiably be 
imposed by an authority extemal to them (Gould 1988: 215). 
What the participationist has to confront is that we live - in the case of Mexico - in a 
representative democracy and that even if their preferred idea of democracy involves a 
higher amount of citizen control, this control would still require the recognition of 
citizens' local or national representatives (e. g. governors or mayors). As Graham (1986) 
observes in reference to the establishment of participatory bodies at the local level, 'the 
major decisions affecting the nature of any community frequently do not emanate from 
within. They come instead, from some central authority whose knowledge of the 
community in question may be relatively poor' (Graham 1986: 151). Moreover, in the 
view of Sartori, the participatory theorists of the 1960s and 1970s were more concerned 
about establishing assemblies, which would attract a considerable number of citizens 
from the inert masses, without considering any clear boundaries between the roles that 
authorities and citizens would assume (Sartori 1997: 75). Eckstein (1966) highlights the 
importance that establishing clear boundaries between the roles of official and unofficial 
bodies has for achieving proper levels of interaction. In his view, stability requires a 
congruence between authority patterns in government and those in other social 
institutions, since otherwise a kind of psychological strain results from being subjected 
to conflicting normative demands in different contexts (Eckstein 1966: 234,255-256). 
Thus, we can conclude that it is important to establish the boundaries between 
participatory bodies and the role of authorities to distinguish the functions held by the 
respective bodies. 
A second problem concerns the claim that democratic participation can transform 
individuals into more-public spirited, tolerant, knowledgeable, attentive and more 
assertive citizens (Warren 1992: 8). Held observes that, 'while the evidence certainly 
indicates that we learn to participate by participating and that participation does help 
foster -as Rousseau, Wollstonecraft and JS Mill all contended- an active and 
knowledgeable citizenry, the evidence is by no means conclusive that increased 
participation per se will trigger a new renaissance in human development' (Held 
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1997: 313). Less sympathetically, Sartori argues that 'the call to participate more is 
perceived by the participationists as a tentative solution to all the problems of 
democracy. It is a childish and dangerous perspective that foresees a citizen that lives to 
serve the democracy' (Sartori 1997: 76). Held also states that: 
Participatory theorists can be criticised because their approach leaves 
them vulnerable to the charge that they have attempted to resolve prematurely 
the highly complex relations among individual liberty, distributional matters 
(questions of social justice) and democratic processes. By focussing squarely on 
the desirability of collective decision-making, and by allowing democracy to 
prevail over all the considerations, they tend to leave these relations to be 
specified in the ebb and flow of democratic negotiation (Held 1997: 272). 
Another concern is that participatory democrats assume that citizens will always be 
interested in participatory processes, yet as Sartori asks, 'if the average citizen is 
generally uninterested in politics, why do the participationists believe that individuals 
are going to change' (Sartori 1997: 77)? Participationists want to establish units where 
citizens would be willing to engage in communitarian activities, mainly dealing with 
discussion of their daily problems in search of the most appropriate solutions. However, 
we have to be realistic in accepting that perhaps not all citizens are interested in 
participating. It might be the case that citizens have better things to do such as watching 
TV, playing football or reading a book and the whole portrait of an interested, active 
citizenry which is enthusiastic about participating is simply too idealistic. The following 
lengthy extract captures these points effectively: 
In a world where the main part of citizens' lives is devoted to earning 
enough to satisfy their material and other needs, it is unlikely that they will 
develop a deep interest in public affairs. That, we might surmise, will largely be 
left to those with the leisure and the resources to become expert in the matter, 
while the rest of the populace will continue to interest themselves in various 
forms of relaxation in the hours that they are not earning their living. But even if 
citizens do so, there is something absurd, it may be felt, in the idea that they 
might equip themselves successively, in all the different areas where expertise is 
required, with the knowledge needed for any meaningful contribution to 
decision-making. Over a large area or our lives, it may be concluded, we simply 
have no alternative but to defer to experts. This is why there is a problem for 
participation theory not only with respect to motivation but also with respect to 
expertise and social organisation (Graham 1986: 159). 
Indeed, Macpherson perceives the motivational factor as one of the main problems 
facing participatory democracy. He argues that the puzzle is not how to run a 
participatory democracy but how to reach it (Macpherson 1977: 98). However, even if 
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the people were motivated to participate, their influence over 'final decisions' would be 
minimal. In the view of Sartori, 'if participatory approaches conceive an active citizen 
participating in those decisions affecting his/her environment, then this participation 
would be restricted to the number of people taking part when each individual 
participates. ' He continues, 'if one participates in a group of five, then this participation 
is worth one fifth, and this participation could be reduced to a lower fraction as more 
citizens get involved' (Sartori 1997). One conclusion to draw from this is that if 
participatory schemes give little real power to citizens, and specifically do not give 
individuals a sense that they are personally influencing decisions, then disillusionment 
might quickly set in. 
Following on, another point that the participationists seem to ignore is to determine 
whether participation should be an obligation. If the participationists are so convinced 
that participation would bring a series of positive advantages for those citizens taking 
part in such processes, it is worth questioning the coercive side of these actions. Prior to 
the development of participatory democratic theory, extensive participation was 
perceived as something that would inevitably lead to increased social conflict, undue 
disruption and fanaticism (see Berelson 1952; Parsons 1960). A lack of political 
involvement was interpreted quite positively: as it probably suggested widespread trust 
in those who govern (see Almond and Verba 1980). Or, as Lipset put it, 'political 
apathy may reflect the health of a democracy' (Lipset 1963: 32). There are those who 
believe that participation should remain as an autonomous decision for each individual. 
Participation would express to a certain extent the level of freedom that a particular 
society has and also the commitment that authorities should provide opportunities for 
the self-development of the individual. Gould sums up the argument well: 
I would argue that participation in joint decision-making remains an 
exercise of autonomy, inasmuch as the individuals have freely chosen to 
participate in the activity and in the determination of the shared ends, and since 
participation in common activity is itself a general condition for their freedom 
and self-development, and finally, since the decisions to which they thus bind 
themselves freely have the authority of their own mutual self-determination and 
not an external imposed to one (Gould 1988: 233). 
Surely then it would be wrong to make participation an obligation? Citizens should have 
the possibility to discuss the issues that effect them at the local level in forums where 
their views are respected and taken into account before a governmental decision is 
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taken. However, maintaining high levels of participation could be difficult. Thus, the 
aim of these forums should be to provide an opportunity for citizens to influence 
decisions related to issues that affect their daily lives. But, Mansbridge observes, 
'convinced that their interests are already well protected, in determined circumstances 
citizens may decide that their participation is not necessary' (see Mansbridge 1983). 
Held links the issue of autonomy to the possibility of citizens participating in public 
affairs. " The issue of autonomy and the right to participate are directly related to the 
ideal of an active citizen who participates at all times in decision-making processes, 
however, it is one thing to recognise a right, and quite another to say that everyone 
must, irrespective of choice, actually participate in public life. Participation is not a 
necessity (Held 1997: 325). 
These criticisms raise a broader question about participatory mechanisms of democracy. 
Should we be justified in introducing large changes in people's lives, by setting up 
institutions that they might feel bound to participate in, when they might be chemists or 
astronomers or church workers, whether living a life of selfless pursuit of knowledge or 
of the welfare of their family who would in any case prefer to leave 'politicking' to 
others (Pennock 1979: 463-464)? According to Held, what participatory democracy 
requires is, 'a detailed theory of the "frontiers of freedom, " and a detailed account of the 
institutional arrangements necessary to protect them, if it is to be defended adequately' 
(Held 1997: 303). In fact, and as a consequence of this lack of an appropriate definition, 
one of the main questions raised by Sartori is whether participatory democracy can be 
labelled as representative democracy or as direct democracy. In his view, 'it is quite 
worrying that participatory theorists have managed to stay in the middle, without 
defining which way they will take' (Sartori 1997: 75). 
Although participatory democracy themes have been extensively criticised, nevertheless 
some of their principles are the basis upon which a large number of participatory 
initiatives take place today. Significantly, in an era where the withdrawal of the state is 
evident and where inequalities' 2 (especially economic ones) have increased on a global 
scale, the implementation of participatory mechanisms for the less developed groups of 
the population has become an increasingly popular policy. Participatory democracy 
provides inspiration for authorities trying to solve a wide range of problems in less 
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developed countries, but they need to be wary, as there is no guarantee it will produce 
the desired outcomes. 
This analysis of the main weaknesses found in the participatory democratic literature 
raises a number of questions relevant to the Mexican context. For instance, what has 
been the role of local authorities in the implementation of the participatory agenda? Are 
local authorities enthusiastic about participatory democracy or do they have no intention 
of letting go of power? How far have real powers been given to these participatory 
mechanisms? Have authorities ceded some real power over resources or just over minor 
decisions? To what extent are ordinary citizens encouraged to take part in these 
initiatives and how much power do they really receive? More importantly, what is the 
true intention behind their implementation? Also, what is the 'citizen motivation' for 
taking part in participatory processes and what role do clienteslistic relationships 
continue to play? At the very least, the discussion of limitations suggests that it would 
be unrealistic to expect participatory mechanisms to deliver everything promised by 
their proponents. Crucially, there is likely to be a direct relationship between the reason 
why participatory practices are introduced and how they are implemented; we will 
return to this discussion later in the dissertation. 
Types of participatory units 
Having discussed some of the conceptual principles underpinning participatory 
democracy, this section examines it in practice, by reviewing some of the most common 
forms found around the world. Although there is a wide range of participatory practices, 
this section focuses on five - neighbourhood organisations, citizens' juries, consensus 
conferencing, standing citizens' panels and referenda - as these are all found in the case 
studies. 
Types of Participatory Democracy 
The theorists of participatory democracy identify two main areas where participatory 
democracy could be practised: the local community and the work place (see Pateman 
1970). As the focus of this research is community institutions in Mexico, the discussion 
here concentrates on the former. The forms of participatory democracy vary from 
country to country, nonetheless, they share several operational principles. According to 
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Cook and Morgan (1971) there are two basic types of participatory structures: co- 
determination models and self-determination models. 
The co-determination type involves joint decision-making by amateurs 
and non-amateurs, (formally trained experts or regularly elected officials) and it 
usually provides for the election or appointment of amateur representatives by or 
some immediate intimate grass-roots constituency of other amateurs. Ordinarily 
new positions for amateurs are created with existing structures in which they 
were previously excluded from any direct participation. Whenever amateurs 
move beyond consultation to voting, they may acquire a minority, parity, or 
even majority of amateur and non-amateur seats (Cook and Morgan 1971: 5). 
Some examples of co-determination models of participatory democracy are citizen 
juries, opinion polls, consensus conferences and standing citizens' panels (see Stewart 
1996). When these initiatives are carried out, citizens are invited to participate and could 
even occupy a seat on permanent advisory or discussion bodies; however, each of these 
institutions would be entirely led by authorities. 
In contrast to co-determination structures, a self-determination body 'is a participatory 
unit with a sphere of power at least formally reserved for amateurs alone, not to be 
shared with elective or appointed officials of the political structures' (Cook and Morgan 
1971). 
Examples of self-determination structures include the town governments 
of New England and the Swiss cantons. The extreme form of the self- 
determination unit is that of the sovereign direct-democracy city-state of ancient 
Greece and Rome, and the extreme is projected as well in the anarchists' ideal- 
the fragmentation of nation states into myriad community-control units (Cook 
and Morgan 1971: 5). 
A further aspect, not raised by Cook and Morgan, is that another subdivision can be 
identified within self-determination participatory units. Which reflects the origins of a 
self-determination body. Two divisions can be identified: those created entirely by 
individuals without any governmental intervention, and those established by 
governments for citizens to participate in them. An example of the former would be 
those associations highlighted by Robert Putnam (1993) where social capital is 
developed without any governmental intervention, such as sports clubs or cooperatives. 
An example of the latter, are those associations such as neighbourhood boards, 
established by local authorities but which are internally run by citizens (see Bums, 
Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). 
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Benello highlights some of the advantages of involvement in self-determination bodies. 
When people come together to form a group, they perceive that their 
problems are in fact shared problems, about which something can be done. Thus, 
the image of the individual helpless against the all-powerful of society is 
replaced in the members' minds by the image of the group, working for a shared 
sense of social need, and capable of modifying the social environment that has 
caused the problem. But for the group to be effective it must develop a sense of 
the political dynamics that affect it- the workings of local power structures, and 
ways in which they can be moved (Benello 1971: 42). 
Cook and Morgan suggest that to have a better understanding of the types of 
participatory democracy units covered in the citizen participation literature, we must 
keep in mind the following four basic models: 
1) A co-determination structure confined to rule-implementation authority. 
2) A co-determination structure including rule making authority. 
3) A self-determination structure confined to rule-implementation authority. 
4) A self-determination structure including rule-making authority. 
An example of a co-determination structure confined to rule implementation is the 
volunteer fire department, where such units will have the authority to implement rules 
that originate elsewhere. Co-determination structures with rule making authority are 
frequently found in co-determination arrangements in judicial decision-making, in 
which amateurs join legal experts (Cook and Morgan 1971: 5-6). Examples of self- 
determination structures are neighbourhood or town governments, which, depending on 
the circumstances, could be established as self-determination structures with either rule- 
implementation or rule-making authority. A criticism that can be made of Cook and 
Morgan's categorisation is that there are also participatory bodies that are established 
merely for the discussion of community issues and not necessarily to implement or 
make rules, as will be discussed in the next section. 
A last sub-division of participatory units, which is absent from Cook and Morgan's 
categorisation, is the distinction that can be made between permanent and non- 
permanent types of participatory units. Permanent participatory units, such as 
neighbourhood associations, meet on a regular basis to discuss community issues. Non- 
permanent types of units (i. e. consensus conferences) may be organised by authorities to 
discuss a particular matter as a 'one-off' event, and for a specific period of time. Once 
the matter is discussed and the course of action decided, then the structure created for 
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this particular purpose is dismantled. To have a clearer perspective of the different types 
of participatory units that are commonly implemented, the next section examines some 
of the most common forms of participatory democracy currently in operation around the 
world. 
Neighbourhood organisations 
Neighbourhood organisations are one of the most common permanent forms of 
participatory democracy and they are to be found in several countries. Although the 
concept of the neighbourhood 13 is not the same in every country, however it is defined, 
it still represents the nearest 'opportunity' that many citizens have for interacting with 
their fellow citizens and governors. When these participatory democratic bodies were 
developed in the late 1960s, they were established as an attempt to regain self-rule and 
representation in local government (Kotler 1969: 27). The radical theorists of 
participatory democracy were the first to develop and promote these structures. Most of 
the neighbourhood organisations promoted by them were conceived as entirely 
independent, and set up mainly in deprived areas in order to change the oppressive 
domination of the poor (see Alinsky cited in Kotler 1969). 
The trend to develop neighbourhood organisations in deprived areas was followed in 
diverse countries, and in most cases these organisations were structured under strict 
government supervision. In Britain, for example, the government published in 1974 a 
consultative document on neighbourhood councils. The Association for Neighbourhood 
Councils regarded it as a major step forward for urban communities, believing 'at last it 
would be possible to give formal statutory voice to the most deprived neighbourhoods 
who would be able to raise small sums for themselves' (cited in Hain 1980: 33). 
Although initially mostly established to support the poor, in some countries 
neighbourhood organisations have involved people from all social backgrounds (Bums, 
Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). 
Another example is the French proposal of local democracy that made it obligatory to 
establish neighbourhood councils in towns with more than 20,000 residents. The 
politique de la ville began to be implemented in the late 1970s and was institutionalised 
in the 1980s. Although the aim of these neighbourhood organisations targeted 
improving the living conditions of deprived groups of society, in the long run, these 
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institutions became purely consultative and therefore offered only a limited form of 
participation (Bacqu6 and Sintome 2001). Their limited impact draws attention to the 
way the agenda is implemented by local authorities. 
Neighbourhood organisations are at the core of the participatory mechanisms analysed 
in this dissertation. In Tlalpan, Puebla, and San Pedro, neighbourhood organisations 
have played a key role, mainly as institutions created by authorities to provide an option 
for citizens to defend their interests, and to have a say in local matters; the extent to 
whether this has truly happened is one of the central themes of interest covered in this 
dissertation. As will be demonstrated in the three cases analysed, here the way local 
authorities implement participatory mechanisms plays a key role to determining whether 
the intervention of citizens truly affects the outcome of those decisions where they take 
part. 
Citizens'Juries 
A citizen jury is another recent participatory democratic structure which involves 
citizens' participating as observers of proposed policies or projects. Citizens' juries have 
mainly been established to discuss local issues. The jury of citizens, usually consisting 
of 16-18 individuals, serves as a microcosm of the public. Jurors are paid a stipend for 
their time. They hear from a variety of expert witnesses and are able to deliberate 
together on the issue. On the final day of their moderated hearings, the members of the 
Citizens Jury present their recommendations to the public. In a Citizens Jury project, a 
randomly selected and demographically representative panel of citizens meets for four 
or five days to carefully examine an issue of public significance. 14 The methods for 
electing those who participate in juries may vary; for instance, in Germany jurors are 
selected at random from the electoral register, while in the US they are selected as a 
representative sample, controlling for such factors as gender, age, race and education 
(see Stewart 1996). 
A small group of citizens representing the 'general public' meet together 
to explore a specific policy issue, Witnesses present information and jurors-cross 
examine their statements. Jurors deliberate on the issues amongst themselves 
and then make public their conclusions (Stewart, Kendall and Coote 1994: 1). 
The number of citizens taking part in juries varies, and the deliberation process 
normally lasts for about a week. Those citizens participating as jurors are not required to 
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reach a unanimous view so members may express different views. The jury process 
typically generates a deep sense of commitment amongst the jurors, who feel they are 
acting on behalf of the general body of citizens (Stewart 1996: 33). One of the most 
important aspects of this type of process is that it must be protected against bias. To 
avoid this, great stress is placed on the selection process, the presentation of issues and 
the organisation of the discussion. 
Citizens' juries have been implemented in different countries, for instance in Spain, in 
the locality of Cardedeu. The consultation involved the revision of the city's General 
Urban Distribution Plan (GUDP). The question on the agenda was what do we want 
Cardedeu to be like? Conducted in autumn 2000, in this Catalan municipality of some 
12,000 inhabitants, a group of 68 people were randomly selected and divided in three 
groups to discuss the future development of the city. The conclusions reached by the 
citizen juries favoured better planning of the city, especially regarding the development 
of green areas in the municipality (Font, Jarque and Medina 2001). An important aspect 
of this participatory practice is that in Cardedeu, those participating as citizen juries 
received a daily payment of 5,000 pesetas (approximately E20) per session. This salary 
was intended to make the participants take their role more seriously and avoid bias. 
An initiative operating under similar principles was identified in the locality of San 
Pedro. Despite the similarities in the operation process of this participatory mechanism, 
there are some differences - mainly dealing with the selection process of those taking 
part in juries - that are discussed to a greater extent in chapter 6. 
Consensus Confereneing 
Consensus conferencing is designed to incorporate public interests and concerns into the 
process of science policy-making, which has often been seen as a matter for experts 
alone, but which increasingly raises issues of wider ethical or environmental concern 
(Stewart 1996: 34). A consensus conference is a forum in which people discuss scientific 
issues with experts. This approach was developed in Denmark - the subjects that have 
been discussed in the Danish context include air pollution, food irradiation, and 
electronic identity cards (see Stewart 1996) - and it is defined as follows: 
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A forum in which a group of lay people put questions about a scientific 
or technological subject of controversial political and social interest to experts, 
listen to the experts' answers, then reach a consensus about this subject and 
finally report their findings at a press conference (Joss and Durant 1994: 3). 
The selection process of those involved in consensus conferencing is similar to that 
employed for the citizens' juries. The members of a consensus conferencing panel are 
selected through advertisement on the basis of written applications and normally those 
selected work two preparatory weekends and a final three to four day conference with 
the aid of a professional facilitator (Stewart 1996: 35). Preparation, especially during the 
weekends preceding the conference, is crucial and it normally lasts for two weeks. The 
preparatory weekends give the members of the consensus conference any relevant basic 
scientific theory and information on present and planned applications in the field to be 
examined. They enable the members to identify the issues they want to examine and the 
experts they want to question (Stewart 1996: 35). 
Those issues raised during the preparatory sessions are then sent to the experts, who 
reply by letter. Those responses and outstanding questions are discussed with the 
experts on the first two days of the main consensus conference. The remainder of the 
conference is devoted to preparing the report with the help of the secretaries. The final 
report is presented of a press conference held on the last day of the conference (Stewart 
1996: 35). One example was the UK conference on plant biotechnology organised by the 
Science Museum in London. For this encounter, a lay panel of between 10-20 people 
was selected through advertisement (in 11 regional newspapers and on BBC local and 
independent radio stations) (see Stewart 1996). In the locality of Tlalpan, which is 
analysed in chapter 4, consensus conferences are known as neighbourhood consultations 
under the principles of the 1998 Mexico City participatory legislation. Also, in San 
Pedro, these types of conferences have been organised to discuss environmental issues 
or reforms to local legislation, these aspects will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
Standing citizens' panels 
This type of panel is constituted to analyse routinely those policies to be carried out by 
local authorities. The selection process for panelists is not open; however, authorities try 
to make it as representative of the population as possible. 
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A standing citizens' panel in a local authority could be constituted as a 
representative sample of citizens weighted for gender, age, ethnic background, 
and occupation. It could compose one to two hundred citizens and would be 
used by the council as a sounding board for issues and problems before it 
(Stewart 1996: 35). 
Membership for such panel could change gradually over time with, for example 10 
percent of the panel being replaced at each meeting. In this way the habit of citizenship 
would spread. According to Stewart, 'if citizens' panels were adopted by local authority 
then most citizens could have an opportunity to play a part in them at some point in 
their life, creating a habit of citizenship' (Stewart 1996: 35). 
The mechanism implemented by the Institute of Public Politics (IPP) in Holland is an 
example of a standing citizen panel. In Leerdarn -a town of 20,000 inhabitants- a 
citizen panel was established in January 1999 in conjunction with local authorities to 
discuss the renovation of Europe square. Several meetings were held between a 
consultation group (the members were selected by local authorities), local authorities, a 
project manager, an urban planning expert, and were chaired by a member of the EPP. 
The resulting plan prompted few objections from the general public, and the renovation 
of the square was finished in summer 1999 (Monnikhof 2001). In the San Pedro case 
study discussed in chapter 6, a standing citizen panel operates parallel to the local 
administration. Whilst this initiative is not exactly the same as was implemented in 
Leerdarn or follow the precise principles highlighted by Stewart, nevertheless, we shall 
see that there are elements that make it an interesting initiative. 
The Referendum 
Although the referendum is generally classified as an instrument of direct democracy, if 
accompanied by a publicly funded campaign, where educative materials and debates 
take place, then the referendum can be an effective trigger for citizen participation. 
Referenda have been regularly used in the US, and in several European countries, 
mostly Switzerland, for many years (Butler and Ranney 1978). According to John 
Stewart, 15 there are there are three types of referenda: 
1) The compulsory referendum, where legislation requires the holding of a referendum. 
2) The authority initiative, where the local authority decides to hold a referendum. 
3) The citizen initiative, where a referendum is called by citizens, either on a proposal 
before the council or on a proposal they wish the council to consider. Such referenda 
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are normally called after a request signed by a specified number or percentage of 
citizens, but there can be requirements to call them as a result of a resolution carried 
at a town meeting or community assembly. 
Referenda, especially at the local level, can be valuable sources of information and 
debate: 
Referendums called by local authorities can strengthen representative 
democracy, particularly if they serve to enhance the quality of deliberation in the 
polity, and lead to more widespread discussion of the interests in question. They 
can be used by a local authority as a consultative mechanism on issues on which 
they wish to know the public's views (Stewart 1996: 39). 
It is sometimes argued that referendums will always favour a particular point of view, 
for example, they will normally show a majority in favour of reducing tax levels. If that 
were so, then perhaps that view should prevail, but it shows a lack of confidence by 
advocates of increased expenditure (Stewart 1996: 39). However, Cronin argues that 
over the past decade, voters have known when to cut and when to leave tax matters 
alone (Cronin 1989: 206). A good example is the referendum organised in February 
1999 by the Milton Keynes Council to vote on the 1999/2000 budget. Referendum 
papers were distributed by post to all 149,241 citizens on the electoral registrar; the 
papers included an explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of the three options 
citizens had, whether voting for a 5,9.8, or 15 percent increase on the council tax. 
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The turnout was of 44.7 percent (66,647 citizens), where 24 percent voted for a 15 
percent tax increase, 46 percent for a 9.8 percent increase and 30 percent for a5 percent 
increase. The results surprised the organisers and most commentators as it showed that 
in this particular case the participants cared for more than the money in their pockets 
(Snelson 1999). Yet, perhaps reflecting a lack of trust in its citizens Mexican 
participatory legislation forbids the utilisation of referenda to decide on tax matters. 
For Stewart, 17 the potential of referenda as tool of participatory democracy can be 
maximised by the following steps: 
a) The referendum should raise considerable interest, because if only a small minority 
vote in it, the whole process falls into disrepute. 
b) The issue should be capable of being resolved by a simple voting procedure, ideally 
a yes/no answer. 
C) The issue should be separable, (i. e. it should not be so interrelated to other decisions 
that is impossible to resolve on its own). 
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d) There should be many opportunities for citizens to be informed about the issue. 
e) If the referendum encourages informed discussion amongst the public, it is making a 
major contribution to deliberation in democratic life. However, this contribution will 
only be realised if there is appropriate literature, media discussion and an 
opportunity to hear and discuss views at public meetings. 
Although these mechanisms are expected to bring a series of benefits for both 
authorities and citizens, there are important questions about the way these mechanisms 
are implemented, or the true impact that citizens have on the outcome of the decisions 
taken within these structures, which relate to wider debates about participatory 
democracy (see Font 2001). Referenda have been a common practice in two out of the 
three cases (TIalpan and San Pedro) analysed in this thesis. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the way this fion-permanent participatory initiative has been carried out 
will be discussed to a greater depth in chapter 6. Next, having outlined a range of 
participatory forms, it is useful to draw on typologies that have been developed to 
measure the impact of the mechanisms analysed in this research project. 
Measuring the impact of participatory democracy 
Many claims are made about the benefits of the various participatory mechanisms 
discussed above. But how can we assess the strengths and weaknesses of these claims? 
The importance of measuring the level of empowerment that citizens receive is summed 
up by Arblaster: 'if a group has no power, its meetings can never be democratic. 
Democracy involves debate and discussion, but these are not enough if they remain 
inconclusive and ineffective in deterinining actual policies' (Arblaster 1987). This 
section examines two approaches that attempt to measure the impact of participatory 
mechanisms: Amstein's 'ladder of citizen participation' and Bums, Hableton and 
Hoggett's 'ladder of citizen empowerment. ' 
Sherry Arnstein's ladder 
The core of participatory theory contains the idea of ordinary citizens taking part in 
political decisions to a far greater degree than at present, but there are few attempts to 
quantify the precise degree of involvement (Graham 1986: 160). Of course, it is very 
difficult to measure the exact impact of participatory democracy. The first effort of this 
kind was Sherry Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation, which was developed in the 
US in the late 1960s. With a 'participatory boom' taking place in the US, the main 
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objective behind Amstein's model was to determine whether citizens were being truly 
empowered, or whether authorities were only using citizens as a means of legitimising 
decisions previously agreed. According to Amstein 'there is a critical difference 
between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power 
needed to affect the outcome of the process (Arristein 1971: 176). Amstein's ladder of 
citizen participation consisted of an imaginary ladder with eight rungs, which was 
divided into three main areas: a) an area of non-participation, b) an area of degrees of 
tokenism, and c) an area of citizen power. 
The non-participation zone of the ladder is composed of the first two rungs: 1) 
manipulation and 2) therapy, 'it is in this area where the public would be "educated" to 
participate in advisory committees or boards for the purpose of engineering their 
support' (Arnstein 1969: 362). Here there is little space for ordinary citizens to influence 
any decisions made by authorities; it is merely using the public as 'legitimators' of 
previously taken decisions or of decisions which are about to be taken. This area is 
characterised by the absence of channels of communication between authorities and 
citizens (see Figure 2.1. below). 
Figure 2.1 Sherry Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation 
8 Citizen Control Degrees 
7 Delegated Power of 
6 Partnership 
Citizen Power 
5 Placation Degrees 
4 Consultation of Tokenism 
3 Informing 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
Non-Participation 
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The second area of the ladder, degrees of tokenism, is composed of the next three rungs: 
3) informing, 4) consulting and 5) placating. This space is characterised by higher 
degrees of interaction between authorities and citizens. Some examples of policies 
carried out in this section of the ladder are neighbourhood forums, public hearings or 
other interactive governmental programmes. 
The highest area of the ladder is composed of three rungs 6) partnership, 7) delegated 
power and 8) citizen control. In the view of Sherry Arnstein, it is in this area where 
citizens need to have the control of the policies implemented in their respective 
neighbourhoods. 
People are simply demanding that degree of power (or control) which 
guarantees that participants or residents can govem a programme and be in full 
charge of the policy and of any managerial aspects; and also able to negotiate the 
conditions under which outsiders may change them (Arnstein 1969: 371). 
Although for the radical advocates of participatory democracy, it would be 'ideal' to 
have total control over the participatory initiatives implemented, realistically speaking 
this is very difficult to achieve. As we will see in the case studies chapters, the 
authorities' 'blessing' is usually essential to keep these participatory schemes working. 
Following the ladder 
Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett developed a new version of Amstein's ladder in the 
1990s to take account of the many new forms of citizen participation subsequently 
developed by local authorities (see Figure 2.2 below). The first part of the new ladder 
identifies four areas of interest over which all citizens interact. These areas are, 1) the 
individual sphere, 2) the sphere of the sub-local (i. e. neighbourhood), 3) the sphere of 
local government, and 4) the sphere of national governance. Their ladder of citizen 
participation is composed of twelve rungs and like Arnstein's ladder it categorises 
citizen participation into three main divisions: a) citizen non-participation, b) citizen 
participation and c) citizen control). 
The first four rungs of the ladder 1) civic hype, 2) cynical consultation, 3) poor 
information and 4) customer care -are defined as a one- way communication process. It 
is in the first rung of the ladder where authorities implement large publicity campaigns 
to distract the public's attention from any participatory intentions. 
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Figure 2.2 Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett ladder of citizen empowerment 
12 Independent Control Citizen 
Control 
11 Entrusted Control 
10 Dele2ated Control 
9 IDýý--I- 
I 
1 Limited Decentralised. 
Decision Making Citizen 
7 Effective Advisory 
Participation 
Bodies 
6 Genuine Consultation 
5 High Quality 
Information 
4 Customer Care 
Poor Information 
Citizen 
Non-Participation 
Cvnical Consultation 
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Cynical consultation can be defined as the establishment of pseudo-participatory 
mechanisms to legitimise actions that have been previously decided by local authorities. 
Poor information constitutes one of the biggest problems faced by citizens, for instance, 
Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett comment on how the City of Birmingham area 
committees struggled to decipher certain communications issued by local authorities 
(see Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett 1987). Customer care, the last rung in the non- 
participatory section of the ladder, is related to civic hype. It is at this stage where local 
authorities implement 'aggressive' image campaigns to avoid losing the confidence of 
their constituents. 
The citizen participation section of the ladder is the largest one, its six rungs are: 5) high 
quality information, 6) genuine consultation, 7) effective advisory bodies, 8) limited 
decentralised decision-making, 9) partnership and 10) delegated control. When 
authorities provide high quality information it gives citizens the possibility of engaging 
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in discussions and interacting with their representatives. A deeper interaction occurs 
when citizens are asked to take part in genuine consultation processes. 
Bums, Harnblcton and Hoggett established a series of steps that need to be taken to 
introduce the next two rungs: effective advisory bodies and decentralised decision- 
making bodies. 
1) Bringing the people together. 
2) Agreeing how the service under scrutiny should operate. 
3) Looking at what is happening now. 
4) Choosing something that can and should be improved. 
5) Deciding on and putting a plan into action. 
6) Seeing how things have changed and deciding what to do next. 
According to Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett, there is an important difference between 
the way they perceive advisory bodies and the average neighbourhood boards 
established here: 
These forums contrast sharply with many neighbourhood forums, which 
lose members very rapidly because they do not make the time to allow people to 
get to know each other. In many forums the people who attend meetings are 
rarely given time to develop a vision of what they would ideally like. Citizens 
are often flooded with too much information, and asked to do so much with, that 
they cannot see the wood for the trees (Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett 
1994: 170). 
Partnerships (the ninth rung) are represented by joint efforts between authorities and 
citizens. Such schemes as management co-operatives or parish councils can be 
mentioned as examples. These types of bodies can perform a wide variety of activities, 
but the citizens taking part in such organisations would not have the total control of the 
programmes they run, as they would still be subordinated to authorities. An example is 
the Rochdale's Cloverhall Cooperative that in 1985 took over the management of 240 
properties. Some of the activities performed by this organisation were collecting the rent 
and environmental maintenance (see Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). 
For Bums, Harnbleton and Hoggctt, delegated control is defincd as the stage where the 
public acts with the authority's permission. 
Here the government can be seen as a kind of composer. The players 
may be allowed some licence to interpret the conductor's requirements, and they 
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may well influence the conductor considerably, but there is no doubt who is in 
control (Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994: 178). 
Parish councils in the UK are also a good example of delegated control bodies, these 
organisations have the same attributes as a district council, however they have fewer 
obligations. The two main assets of these organisations are firstly, that the people 
involved in the board are elected by the Iocals, ' and secondly, that they have the power 
to call referenda. 18 
The area of citizen control is the smallest in the ladder and is represented by rungs 11) 
entrusted control and 12) independent control. The types of organisations established in 
the last rungs of the ladder are characterised by involving citizens and having the power 
to govern a programme, area or institution of government more or less independently. 
The public could be in charge of different types of associations, neighbourhood 
governments, and in some cases, it would be seen as normal that these bodies control 
budgets assigned to develop their communities (Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett 
1994: 174). 
Probably the majority of the forms of citizen control correspond to 
community organisations that are user-led. Some interesting contemporary 
examples would include day and resource centres run by and for the people with 
disabilities, (i. e. centres for independent living) black and ethnic minority 
housing co-operatives and community housing associations, independent 
membership-based community associations, cultural clubs and so on (Bums, 
Hambleton, and Hoggett 1994: 176). 
The main contribution of these two approaches is that they provide some basis for 
measuring the levels of empowerment that citizens receive when participating in 
decision-making processes at the local level. As most research on participatory 
democratic mechanisms in Mexico has ignored this question, the application of these 
two typologies may help in evaluating the degree of citizen empowerment found in our 
case studies. It is important to note that these typologies have been previously used to 
measure the impact of citizen participation in Holland. During 1997 and 1998, the 
Institute for Public Policy used an adaptation of Arnstein's ladder to measure the impact 
of a project entitled, 'Testing Grounds of Democracy Project, ' which included five 
cases. The outcome of the study showed that people do tend to participate if they see an 
immediate impact on the decision taken by local authorities after consultation processes 
take place (see Monnikhof 2001). 
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Despite the fact that these typologies have been used successfully to measure 
participatory processes, we must still be aware of their limitations. Although they can be 
useful for mapping out the main advantages and disadvantages of participatory 
initiatives, they do not provide an exact account of the level of empowerment authorities 
share with their governed. Clearly these are not explanatory models, just heuristic 
devices to help us categorise empowerment. 
Current trends in the participatory agenda 
We have observed how participatory democracy emerged as a critique of the liberal 
representative democratic model. These ideas have helped inspire a growing number of 
participatory practices in government across the world. However, the discussion 
introduced in chapter 1 suggests that the participatory agenda implemented in Mexico 
bears only limited resemblance to the principles outlined in the literature. Anyone with a 
minimum knowledge of Mexican politics would be sceptical about the participatory 
agenda carried out by the PRI, PAN and PRD; especially bearing in mind the top-down 
implementation model that each of these parties have followed. Chapter 1 concluded by 
considering the real intentions behind the Mexican participatory agenda. Is it about 
providing genuine opportunities for citizens to get involved in decision-making 
processes? Or, could there be underlying - party or political - objectives behind its 
implementation? From where have the Mexican authorities drawn their inspiration? In a 
global environment where the policy agendas set by international organisations (i. e. 
World Bank or United Nations) are increasingly linked to the internal policies 
implemented in many countries, it is interesting that these organisations have began to 
promote participation. Moreover, these policies acquire greater relevance in an 
environment where they could be used as a method for bypassing the central state and 
ensuring the influence of international NGOs at the local level. This section examines 
why these international organisations have promoted participatory democracy in order 
to identify a possible external influence on the Mexican participatory agenda. 
In recent years the number of participatory practices involving the low-income (working 
class) sectors of the population has increased in many countries. Mayo and Craig 
observe: 
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Community participation and 'empowerment' have become more vital 
and yet more overtly problematic than ever in the current global context. In the 
face of deepening poverty resulting from international recession and 
restructuring, international agencies and national and local states have 
demonstrated increasing interest in strategies to promote community 
participation as a means of enhancing the development process. And there has 
been increasing emphasis upon the importance of alternative, grass roots 
approaches to development, starting from the empowerment of local 
communities (Mayo and Craig 1995: 1). 
The promotion of participatory initiatives has been part of a series of structural changes 
advocated by such international organisations as the World Bank and the PAR The 
intention is to ensure that third world development projects reach the poorest groups in 
the most efficient and cost-effective way, sharing costs as well as benefits, through the 
promotion of self-help (Paul 1987). Free-market, neo-liberal, new-right strategies to 
'roll back the state' both in Third World and in urban, industrialised contexts, are 
intended to reduce state spending on social welfare and to promote alternative solutions 
based upon the voluntary/NGO sectors and community based self-help (Mayo and Craig 
1995: 4). 
Community participation is perceived as a strategy that would be directly 
related to overall goals of cost-sharing/cost reduction for the public sector (that 
is, shifting the costs from public sector budgets by persuading communities to 
make increased contributions through voluntary effort and/ or self-help/ 
voluntary unpaid labour) and through increased project/programme 
efficiency ... In this context, programmes and projects should 
be delivered in 
ways which do not involve continuing subsidies and costs reduced through cost- 
sharing, including community inputs on a self-help basis. And through targeting 
initiatives towards the poor and the poorest, adjustment also acquires a 'human 
face' (Mayo and Craig 1995: 4). 
Thus citizen participation is perceived as a strategy to promote savings and to improve 
the living conditions of those who desperately need it. More importantly, the aim is to 
shift costs from the public sector onto communities (Craig 1993; Mayo 1994). The 
World Bank has installed an internal learning group to ensure that its entire staff not 
only becomes familiar with the pros and cons of citizen participation, but practices it 
(Bhatnagar and Williams 1992: 1). 
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Box 2.1 International Omanisations and citizen participation 
Organisation Perception of citizen participation 
OAS The importance of active citizen participation has become 
particularly apparent with regard to decision-making on matters of 
sustainable development and environment. Development efforts are 
more likely to be successful in the long run if the key players - 
governments, donors, and most important, local people- are 
genuinely interested in the outcome (OAS 1996). 
OECD Social Capital, according to the preferred OECD definition, refers 
to networks, shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate 
co-operation within and among groups. Communities or societies 
with high social capital are thought to be characterised by higher 
levels of mutual trust, reciprocity, unwritten and unspoken 
agreement about societal rules, and social cohesion. Such societies 
may also be more effective at achieving collective goals - including 
those for environmental protection (OECD 2001: 14). 
World Bank Citizen participation is defined as follows: 'participation is a 
process through which stakeholders influence and share control 
over development initiatives and the decisions and resources that 
affect them' (World Bank 1996). 
United The United Nations has developed what is known as the Civil 
Nations Society Organisations and Participation Programme. The 
programme aims to work with a range of partners in civil society, 
government and other bilateral and multilateral organisations 
attempting to provide satisfying alternatives for social change on a 
global level by: 
1) Facilitating the empowerment of people and civil society 
organisations to participate in and initiate action to reduce 
poverty and promote equity as well as influence and manage 
change within their societies 
2) Promoting collaborative initiatives among various development 
partners (government, private sector and civil society 
organisations) to meet the challenges posed by globalisation 
and increasing poverty in developing countries 
The United Nations Human Development Report defines participation in terms of 
people having constant 'access to decision-making and power, ' as well as in terms of 
economic participation (UNDP 1993: 21). Empowering the poor has become an almost 
universal slogan (Thomas 1992). Indeed, from a slightly different perspective many 
NGOs have also forcefully defended the idea that participation in decision-making is 
necessary for all development efforts (GaIjart 1995: 18). Participatory agendas to 
promote empowerment have been directly associated with the voluntary or NGO sector, 
with community organisations and people's movements (Clarke 1991). The idea is that 
even poor people can acquire agency, and they can take part in participatory 
mechanisms to improve their living conditions. The result might be that people with a 
higher social status have a larger say in what is to be done. Finally, participation in the 
sense of joint planning also implies that the NGO has to take local technical knowledge 
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seriously (GaIjart 1995: 18). Although NGOs have been very successful as advocates of 
participation, the concept remains vague. It does not mean that NGOs, or other change 
agents, do the bidding of the target group. Rather that both parties, while seeking 
consensus, have veto power over the other's suggestions. Whatever plan, and thus 
investment, is finally agreed upon, it will almost always combine local with extra-local 
knowledge and practices (GaIjart 1995: 18-19). 
Thus, at a time when governments, both at the national and local levels, seem to be 
struggling for financial resources, participation suddenly appeared as a sort of 'magical 
solution' to the economic crisis affecting official institutions throughout the world. 
Participatory democracy is expected to bring economic benefits to some of the poorest 
areas of the planet, whilst also promoting the political and social values (i. e. educative, 
democratic) discussed earlier. 
Box 2.1 (above) identifies the perspectives of some of the most influential international 
organisations. The four organisations agree that participation could bring positive 
effects to promote development, empowerment, and in general to increase peoples' 
awareness of decision-making processes. For instance, the Organisation of American 
States concluded a summit held in Bolivia in 1996 by declaring: 
The Governments of Latin America, in order to support the development 
and implementation of national policies, programmes and actions aimed at 
expanding the participation of civil society in decision-making for sustainable 
development, instruct the OAS to give priority, through the Inter-American 
Council on Integral Development to the formulation and implementation of an 
Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Citizen Participation in Decision- 
makingfor Sustainable Development (OAS 1996). 
On the other hand, for the OECD in recent years the notion of 'social capital' has gained 
importance to describe those features of societies and communities that facilitate 
collective action and, in particular, the kinds of difficult changes that will be needed to 
ensure environmental sustainability (OECD 2001: 14). The OECD perceives social 
capital as a possible solution to poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
However, it would have to be accompanied by such measures as strengthening decision- 
making, harnessing science and technology and linkages with the global economy 
(OECD 2001: 14). 
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Although the OECD has been promoting the concept of social capital in its participatory 
agenda, it is aware of the limits of this approach. 
In practice the concept of social capital is difficult to make operational 
and to measure. Putnam has developed proxy measures based on statistics of. 1) 
the amount of involvement in community and organisational life, 2) public 
engagement (i. e. voting), 3) volunteer committee activities, 4) infon-nal 
sociability (i. e. visiting friends), and 5) reported levels of personal trust (OECD 
2001: 14). 
The World Bank in its 1996 document The World Bank Participation Sourcebook 
outlincs the diffcrcnt options that govcmments havc for carrying out participatory 
projects and promoting development. In identifying the key steps to be taken to promote 
successful participatory initiatives, the sourcebook highlights the importance of giving 
official support to carry out any participatory agenda: 
Governments' stand on stakeholder participation is critical. Without 
government support, the Bank can do little to initiate, broaden, and sustain 
participation. This does not imply that Bank Task Managers remain passive. It 
does mean, however, that Bank Task Managers must obtain government consent 
to work in a participatory manner (World Bank 1996: 122). 
The UN perceives the involvement of such sexternal' actors as NGOs or the civil 
society as essential for the success of any participatory project. 19 Those civil society 
organisations engaged in the project promoted by the United Nations are expected to 
work towards achieving the following goals: 
1) Improving the management of globalisation, including stronger trade policies and 
fairer rules and terms that allow more vulnerable countries to enter markets and their 
provisions that take into account the concerns of people. 
2) Promoting accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness in governance structures. 
3) Building capacities for more vibrant civil society actions in order to increase 
political participation and collective action. 
4) Increase the linkages between macro/grass-roots movement and macro-level/policy 
structures. 
These principles are expected to help develop a solidarity consciousness within the 
population, and also between governments and members of the private sector to 
establish partnerships that promote development. 
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The participatory agendas of these four organisations demonstrate the international 
enthusiasm for participatory initiatives. Participatory democracy has become a 
'fashionable' way of carrying out programmes to promote sustainable development, 
democracy or simply to protect the environment. ffighlighting the benefits of a sort of 
'do it yourself' culture where globalisation is praised, most of these schemes focus on 
improving the living conditions of those who have not benefited from the positive 
effects of the market economy. 
There is evidence that the Coordinaci6n Presidencial Para la Alianza Ciudadana 
(CPAC), discussed in chapter 1, espouses similar principles to those promoted by 
international organisations such as the RvIF and the WB. Certainly, the withdrawal of 
the state along with the strengthening of the NGO sector are both elements present in 
the core aims of this recently created secretariat. Moreover, in an era where both local 
and national governments are struggling due to a lack of financial resources, citizen 
participation has become a core issue for many Mexican local authorities. In most cases, 
these schemes are used to promote self-help projects where citizens cover partially the 
costs of social projects or collaborate with their labour to finish determined initiative. 
One research question in this thesis is to determine the extent to which the local 
authorities analysed here have been influenced by these international bodies. 
Yet to what extent does this international participatory agenda overlap with that of 
Pateman and other participatory theorists? At first glance, it might seem that 
international organisations are radicalising their position by expressing concern about 
improving the living conditions of the have-nots. However, these organisations also 
state that the cost of these projects should not become an economic burden for the 
governments that carry them out. Implicit in this participatory agenda is that 
governments and international organisations are admitting that they have not been able 
to meet the social needs of the poor. They seem to see participation as a means of 
rolling back the state and sharing the burden of development with the poorest groups. It 
is under these conditions that the role of NGOs becomes crucial to empower 
underprivileged groups of society. The intervention of NGOs as policy deliverers is 
justified to a certain extent, as in many countries these organisations are more trusted 
than the government itself. Linking NGOs to the implementation of a participatory 
agenda becomes an aspect of paramount importance, as it is increasingly through 
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participatory schemes that the most vulnerable groups of society could receive either 
resources or policies. 20 
Some international enthusiasm for this participatory agenda raises questions about the 
decision-making power that international organisations believe they are giving to 
unprivileged groups of society, particularly in countries where governments are doing 
very little to improve the situation of these groups. For instance, why is such a 
traditionally centralist government as the Mexican one suddenly trying to give away 
some power and share it with the citizenry? How far has the participatory agenda 
implemented in Mexico been directly influenced by these international organisations? A 
further consideration is whether the top-down implementation process is appropriate for 
policies that theoretically speaking should be carried out following a bottom-up 
implementation process? Finally, what role, if any, have NGOs played in the 
implementation process of these polices in Mexico? 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the concept of participatory democracy in depth. Derived 
mainly from the participatory literature that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, a 
wide variety of such participatory schemes as citizens' juries and referenda have 
recently been introduced. Two typologies were introduced that could be useful for 
measuring the impact of the participatory schemes implemented in each of the case 
studies. The last section examines the interests that international organisations might 
have in promoting these participatory schemes. Theoretically speaking, the aim of most 
proponents of participation and of the schemes presented in this chapter is to give 
citizens a right to take part in those decision-making processes that affect their daily 
lives; but the extent to which this has happened in each of the participatory schemes 
implemented in our three cases remains an issue to find out. For instance, is 
participatory democracy mainly about promoting democratic values or could it be used 
for particular party or political purposes? What do Mexican authorities and citizens 
understand by participatory democracy? What role have the authorities played when 
carrying out the participatory agendas under analysis? What has been the actual power 
that citizens have received when taking part in these participatory schemes? What 
factors need to be considered when carrying out participatory practices? These are all 
issues that will be addressed in this thesis. 
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More generally, it will be interesting to establish whether these are any links between 
the ways such writers as Pateman perceive participatory democracy and the way in 
which Mexican local authorities have implemented it. Perhaps the educative sense of 
participatory mechanisms so praised by the theorists of participatory democracy is non- 
existent in Mexico. Maybe in each municipality examined here participatory 
mechanisms are perceived primarily as political tools and authorities do not have much 
interest in promoting democratic values. There is also the possibility that, as with 
previous Mexican government initiatives, what is expressed on paper might not 
necessarily take place in practice. 
Chapter 3 introduces Tlalpan, the first case study analysed in this research. 
Notes 
1 See Held 1997. 
2 One of the drawbacks identified in Rousseau's model of communitarian democracy is the fact that he 
fails to clarify in detail how these sessions would be carried out (see Gastil 1993). 
3 See Pierson (1995). 
4 For similar perspectives see Sartori (1962). 
5 Pateman distinguishes between industrial and community participatory types of democracy, but this 
study focuses on the community type. 
6 See also Goodman (1969). 
7 See Greaves (1976), Fromm (1963), Weil (1958) and Crick (1970). 
8 See Gitlin (1970). 
9 Pateman claims that such characteristics would be most effectively developed when individuals take part 
in participatory processes in the industrial sector, and that this would then drive a beneficial impact on 
pniCipation in wider civil society. 
See below for a discussion of some participatory approaches that measure these degrees of citizen 
involvement. For Graham it is not obvious that the impossibility of becoming a polymath implies the 
Im ssibility of far greater involvement, see Graham (1986). 
"S 
M 
Finley (1983) for similar discussions. 
12 For a discussion on inequality see Callinicos (2000). 13 In the view of Cook and Morgan, 'the concept of neighbourhood is not very precise. People use it in 
small towns and the ghetto as well as other smaller urban units' (Cook and Morgan 1971: 211). 34 The Jefferson Centre has conducted Citizens Jury projects since 1974 at the local, state, and national 
levels. Juries have tackled a number of topics including national health care reform, budget priorities, 
environmental issues, and local school district facility needs. Visit: httj2: //www. jefferson- 
center. org/citizens jury. htm. Similar projects can be found at: Lewisham Council in London Visit: 
http: //www. lewisham. gov. uk/NewsAndViews/iury. asl2; South Lanarkshire Council in Scotland Visit: 
htip: //www. step. gb. com/consultation/citizens - 
Jury. htm. 
15 For a discussion on different types of referenda see Butler and Ranney (1994). 16 More recently, the British On-line democracy project has been created to facilitate the access of citizens 
to this type of consultations. UK Citizens On-line Democracy provides information, resources, help and 
guidance on electronic democracy. Not only does it provide access to a range of web services relating to 
electronic democracy, it also provides several of its own forums to discuss political issues affecting the 
United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Through its resource centre it also 
provides access to research, best practice and training in electronic democracy. See, in particularly, the 
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paper produced by the Dutch Ministry of Interior entitled 'Electronic Civic Consultation: A Guide to the 
Use of the Internet in Interactive Policy-making'. Visit: http: //www. democracy. org. uk/. 
17 For more discussions on the utilisation of referenda see Duval, Leblanc-Dechoisay and Mindu (1970). 
18 For examples see Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994. 
19 Recently, the United Nations' perception of citizen participation has been linked to the 
conceptualisation of social capital developed by Robert Putnam (1993) or associationalisin developed by 
Hirst (1993). 
20 At the world development conference organised by the UN and held in Monterrey, Mexico (March 
2002), for the first time NGOs were allowed to participate in the discussions; mainly to discuss issues 
regarding the future financing of development projects (see Reforma 22/3/2002). 
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Chapter 3 
Tlalpan 
Introduction 
1997 was a historical year for Mexico's political system, for the first time 
in Mexico's contemporary history, the party of the president (the PRI) lost the 
majority at the federal congress. In Mexico City, the PRD won the governor 
election and the majority at Mexico City's congress. Just a few days after the 
new administration took office a political reform for the capital was announced 
(La Jbmada 11/10/1998). 
The 1997 Mexico City governor election was the turning point of a debate on the 
democratisation of the capital that had started more than 20 years earlier (see Ramfrez 
2000). Governing the capital represented a golden opportunity for the PRD to show not 
only the inhabitants of Mexico City, but also the inhabitants of Mexico that this political 
party could represent a credible alternative after years of unilateral decision-making and 
corrupt practices by PRI governments. After decades of one party-rule, perhaps this was 
the moment to introduce participatory schemes to the governmental agenda. Mexico 
City was, therefore, a flagship government for the PRD to demonstrate it could govern 
and govern differently from the PRI style. Citizen participation was a critical part of the 
PRD democratisation agenda: the PRD message was that change required the 
involvement of many sectors of the Mexican society. The first elected governor of 
Mexico City, Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas, invited the inhabitants of the City and groups of 
NGOs to participate in the development of new citizen participation legislation, calling 
on them to 'take into their hands the decision-making power. ' Cdrdenas led a ceremony 
held to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the citizen plebiscite -held on 21 March 1993- 
when the citizenry of Mexico City voted 'yes' to openly electing the governor of the 
City' after more than 60 years of PRI hegemony in the government of the capital. In his 
speech, Cdrdenas highlighted the importance that citizen participation had for his 
administration, 'we must open democratic channels of communication between 
authorities and citizens, citizen participation must be direct and we as authorities must 
respect public opinion and be tolerant of views different from ours. Citizen participation 
must be the sign of the democratic process that we have already started in the capital' 
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(La Jomada 21/3/1998). Cdrdenas' motion was seconded by the leader of the PRD 
majority at the Congress of Mexico City, Martf Batres, who observed that 'citizen 
participation is a topic that can be discussed in circles of academics, entrepreneurs, 
community leaders and political parties' (La Jornada 25/01/1998). 
The result of the debates proposed by Cdrdenas was the approval of the 1998 Citizen 
Participation Legislation by the congress of Mexico City. The legislation covers a series 
of participatory practices that range from neighbourhood forums to the implementation 
of referenda. An important aspect to highlight is the fact that the after winning also the 
2000 governor election the PRD has a true opportunity to consolidate a participatory 
agenda. To have a clearer understanding of how this legislation operates, in this chapter 
we analyse how it was implemented in the locality of Tlalpan, one of the 16 
delegaciones or localities in which Mexico City is divided. Located in the southern part 
of Mexico City, it has 650,000 inhabitants and a mix of rural areas, ecological reserves, 
and large shopping centres which proved to be an interesting place for the analysis of 
citizen participation mechanisms, for two main reasons. Firstly, the social differences 
present in Tlalpan, where inhabitants with very different needs are expected to group 
together and solve their problems. Secondly, the active role which informal community 
leaders still play in Tlalpan, and how the principles of the 1998 participatory legislation 
are sometimes ignored even by local functionaries. These two points and other relevant 
issues will be discussed to a greater depth in this chapter. 
The chapter is divided into eight sections. After identifying the main conditions under 
which the 1998 reform took place, the details of the 1998 citizen participation 
legislation are introduced. The third section analyses the main strengths and weaknesses 
identified in this document. The fourth part covers Tlalpan's main characteristics, and 
the fifth section examines the bureaucratic structure responsible for implementing the 
participatory agenda. The sixth section analyses how the participatory agenda works. 
Finally, an overview of all the participatory mechanisms implemented in Tlalpan is 
presented, followed by a conclusion. 
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The context of the 1998 participatory reforms 
Background 
Mexico City's 1998 political reform had three core features: a) electoral legislation, b) 
citizen participation legislation and c) re-organisation of the government of Mexico 
City. Despite the importance of all three topics, the citizen participation legislation 
occupied a primary position in the agenda. As soon as the discussions started, diverse 
points of view began to emerge about what the participatory legislation should provide. 
SOLIDARIDAD became the most immediate point of reference for what the legislation 
should not include. For Sergio Zermeflo, 'the strategy of SOLIDARIDAD was not bad, 
however it was not implemented properly, solidarity committees proved to be isolated, 
weak and legally impeded to challenge the authority exercised by the president. 
SOLIDARIDAD was used as the personal party of the president and all the political acts 
related to this programme became mere political populism' (La Jomada 23/5/1998). 
PRD MP Marco Rasc6n also stated: 
To avoid what happened with SOLIDARIDAD, the new citizen 
participation legislation must organise the citizenry into structures where their 
direct participation is not diminished or manipulated by a totalitarian body. 
There must be a participatory structure per rural area and neighbourhood, where 
the interests of the community are interwoven to dissolve the clientelist 
relationships created by previous pritsta administrations. We need a 
participatory legislation for the citizenry, not for the political class (La Jomada 
14/7/1998). 
A second concern expressed by the intellectuals and groups of NGOs discussing the 
legislation was the possibility of repeating what happened with Mexico City's 1995 
participatory legislation, when people did not participate as expected. The 1995 
participatory legislation aimed to establish an intermediate instrument of consultation 
between authorities and citizens at the local level. This is how the structure known as 
consejeros ciudadanos delegacionales (municipal citizen councillors) emerged. In each 
of the sixteen localities of Mexico City elections were held to choose twenty-two 
citizens who would represent and defend the interests of their respective communities. 
In the view of Sergio Zermeflo: 
When the preceding legislation was implemented only 8 percent of the 
voting list took part in the election organised to choose neighbourhood leaders. 
If we analyse the 1995 document, we will find out that citizen counsellors, 
before being elected were not obliged to give their personal viewpoints publicly. 
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Nothing forced them to exchange points of view with the community they were 
about to represent. The legislation only demanded that someone interested in 
occupying one of the seats could do it when collecting the support of 4 percent 
of the citizens enlisted in his/her neighbourhood's voting list (La Jomada 
28/03/1998). 
In addition to the low turn out in the 1995 neighbourhood election, the relaxed 
framework governing the 1995 participatory initiative allowed the illegal indirect 
involvement of political parties in the election of citizen representatives. For instance, 
during the 1995 election the PRI presented 750 candidates, (through parallel urban 
organisations), the PAN posted 200 candidates representing the NGO Acci6n Vecinal 
(Neighbourhood Action) and the PRD appointed 382 candidates using the structure 
known as Moviniiento Ciudadano (Citizen Movement) (see Safa 1997). The PRD was 
keen not to repeat the mistakes committed by previous priista administrations. PRD 
member Alejandro Ordorica commented, 'the new citizen participation legislation will 
have to define the type of actors, representative bodies, powers of those bodies, and re- 
define the relationship between state and society. The legislation must also include 
issues related to accountability, neighbourhood elections, and forms of decentralisation; 
moreover, the document should offer such participatory forms as the plebiscite and the 
referendum' (La Jomada 14/3/1998). 
One of the main difficulties highlighted by those involved in the discussion of the new 
legislation, is the fact that the people of Mexico City are not used to participating. Ortiz 
Pinchetti (Technical Secretariat for the Citizen Participation Reform) commented that, 
'the great difficulty of the participatory reform is not in the elaboration of laws, but in 
the minds of citizens' (La Jomada 3/5/1998). Pinchetti highlighted four problems that 
the new legislation would face: 
1) The legitimate will of many citizens and organisations to 'have a say' in those 
decisions affecting their respective places of residence, 
2) The immaturity and fragmentation of civil society, 
3) The inevitable problem of having political organisations using the legislation for 
particular party interests, 
4) The need to maintain the governability of the city. 
Pinchetti pointed to three elements that might diminish the impact of these four 
problems. Firstly, people need to know how to demand, as in Mexico the concept of 
accountability is still difficult to understand, 'we still do not understand that authorities 
are our servers, they work for us. ' He proposed the creation of a similar body to the 
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federal electorate institute, which has proven to be a successful independent 
organisation, with sufficient powers to scrutinise Mexico City's politicians effectively 
(La Jomada 3/5/1998). 
Secondly, Pinchetti propose using semi-direct forms of participation, such as 
plebiscites, referenda, popular initiatives, (where citizens would be able to propose their 
own laws) and consultations, which invite large numbers of people to get involved. 
However, these are 'exceptional instruments' for , specific occasions and each is 
expensive, economically speaking, and quite demanding, politically speaking (La 
Jomada 3/5/1998). Finally, Pinchetti identifies participation and parallel power. Parties 
are willing to create new forms of neighbourhood representation, but these will only be 
positive as long as a parallel political pyramid is not constructed in the process: 'We 
must not forget that citizens are already represented in the executive and the legislative, 
and it has already been demonstrated that the establishment of citizen councils fall in the 
hands of political parties most of the time' (La Jomada 3/5/1998). 
Other preoccupations of those involved in the deliberation of the 1998 participatory 
legislation were linked to the size and functions of the new participatory bodies. In the 
view of Sergio Zermeflo: 
One of the positive sides of the discussions dealing with the reform of the 
1998 legal participatory framework is the strengthening of the neighbourhood as 
the main nucleus of participation. Although these units are not quite 
homogeneous, they are still the basic unit of participation ... it is in these 
organisations that several committees should be established and where such 
issues as security, or the introduction of public services must be discussed, it is 
here where citizens must be elected (La Jornada 28/3/1998). 
Zermeho proposes that, on an average, one community representative should be elected 
for every 5 to 10 thousand residents. The role of the five subdelegaciones would be 
crucial as it is through these offices that citizen participation would be channelled and 
co-ordinated. In Tlalpan he proposed that these organisations should co-ordinate the 
efforts of between 20 to 40 neighbourhood representatives (La Jomada 28/3/1998). 
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Political parties and the participatory reform 
Although numerous participatory proposals were emerging, not surprisingly, opposition 
political parties played their role in trying to stop the reform. Ortiz Pinchetti complained 
that: 
The role of the PRI and the PAN has been crucial in slowing down the 
speed of the participatory reform. The PRI denied approval of any motions that 
went beyond local reforms and the PAN, although it showed genuine political 
will at the beginning of the process, modified its position and abandoned the 
negotiation process (La Jomada 11/10/1998). 
The attitudes of the PAN and the PRI jeopardised a process that lasted for nine months 
and such groups of NGOs, academics and political organisations developed more than 
219 proposals (La Jomada 11/10/1998). There were different views about how to deal 
with the problems caused by opposition political parties. On the one hand, people like 
PRD member Alejandro Ordorica, believed that time should not be an issue. In his own 
words, 'we must take maybe all of 1998 and part of 1999 to discuss the legislation ... the 
important thing is to have a positive law that would benefit the participatory practices of 
the city by the year 2000' (La Jomada 11/2/1998). However, there were other groups 
within the PRD that were pushing to approve the reform before 1998 concluded. Thus, 
PRD MP Marco Rasc6n believed, 'the PRD should approve the new participatory 
legislation without the consensus of the PRI and the PAN, as otherwise the document 
could be under the threat of being rejected'. Rasc6n added, 'you know when you are 
going to convince the PRI to approve a legislation that would empower the citizenry? 
Never! To try to reach consensus with the PRI or the PAN would not be useful for the 
PRD, as the party has a responsibility with the citizenry, not with these political 
organisations' (La Jomada 14/7/1998). 
Zermefio also wanted the participatory reform approved by the end of 1998, pointing to 
the postponement of the neighbourhood representative election from November 1998 to 
March 1999. He identified three factors that delayed the approval of the legislation and 
which indirectly affected the neighbourhood election process. Firstly, the legislation 
regarding citizen participation was presented as part of a 'global package, ' which 
included other agreements, transferring the participatory agenda to a secondary level of 
importance. 2 Secondly, in several localities, especially in the poorer and more populated 
ones, the PRI still dominated the local agenda, and could have possibly defeated the 
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PRD in this electoral process. Lastly, the PRI wanted to create a citizen committee of 
neighbours elected in each neighbourhood which would be able to challenge the 
mandate exercised by each mayor (La JomadaionI1998). 
In the event, the new citizen participation legislation for Mexico City was approved on 
26 November 1998, timing that cleverly suited Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas's plan to launch 
his candidature for the 2000 presidential election using the topic of citizen participation 
as a big campaign issue. 
One of the most important aspects of the legislation was the participation of citizens in 
those decisions related to strategic planning and development, as La Jornada columnist 
Emilio Pradilla Cobos stated: 
The law establishes the participatory rights of the citizens of Mexico 
City. The law visualises the possibility of carrying out plebiscites to make it 
possible for citizens to approve or reject any policies to be implemented by 
Mexico City authorities. The legislation also considers the referendum as an 
option for citizens to reject, modify, or create any laws discussed at Mexico 
City's congress. It regulates neighbourhood consultations, where neighbours 
would be able to emit an opinion or to propose projects to solve their respective 
community problems (La Jomada 23/12/1998). 
Pradilla Cobos also stated that the legislation gives citizens the right to present 
complaints and to receive information about any future actions of government. In his 
words, 'the participatory legislation regulates the way neighbourhood committees 
operate; it sets the legal boundaries that citizens have to solve their community issues 
and elect their community representatives' (La Jomada 23/12/1998). Thus the 1998 
participatory legislation offered an opportunity to get involved in the issues affecting 
their respective communities. 
With this law the people from Mexico City have a new participatory 
instrument, although by no means can we state it is a 'perfect legislation. ' With 
the creation of such legislation we are advancing in the establishment of a co- 
ordinated type of government, where citizens and authorities start sharing the 
responsibility of governing (La Jomada 23/12/1998). 
Before discussing these reforms in more detail, it is worth noting that the 2000-2006 
administration of Mexico City remains keen to increase the decision-making power of 
the citizens of the capital, as illustrated by the new budget recently granted - since 
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January 2001 - to neighbourhood organisations. However, the future of this 
participatory agenda might be under threat from opposition political parties. For 
instance, Marfa de los Angeles Moreno, PRI co-ordinator at the Congress of Mexico 
City, recently declared: 'we are not going to allow the consolidation of a fourth power 
constituted by the neighbourhood committees. Now he - the governor of Mexico City, 
L6pez Obrador - is using these structures to make the administration more accountable, 
but we are not going to let him advance any more' (La Jomada 8/3/2001). Similarly 
PRI NW Cuauhtemoc De la Torre observed that, 'L6pez Obrador is trying to give more 
powers to neighbourhood organisations to hide PRD's political intentions. We should 
go back to the idea of having block representatives, we are definitely against the 
strengthening of neighbourhood committees' (La Jomada 8/3/2001). Thus, jumping 
ahead a little, one of the greatest challenges for the 2000-2006 administration is to 
consolidate Mexico City's political reform. The consolidation of various participatory 
practices presented in the CPL depends on promoting, but at the same time, respecting, 
the legal frameworks created for these purposes. It all seems to indicate that the greatest 
dispute will be, not surprisingly, with members of the PRI, over the 'best' participatory 
mechanisms that should take place in Mexico City. Box 3.1 presents some of the 
proposals of the PRD and the PRI. 
Box 3.1 An overview of the future of the t)articiDatorv aLyenda 
Proposals of the PRD Proposals of the PRI 
Strengthen citizen participation co- 9 Return to the figure of the block 
ordination representative 
Substitute neighbourhood committees * Reduce the power of the City governor 
with citizen committees regarding the implementation of 
Establish local constitutions in each of referendums and plebiscites 
the 16 municipalities to implement * To open citizens' elections to political 
local referenda or plebiscites I parties 
While the PRD seems to be willing to give more power to citizen organisations, the PRI 
seems more concerned about openly accepting party political involvement in the 
election of neighbourhood bodies. The reforms proposed by the PRI also stress the 
importance of controlling the use of such participatory instruments as the referendum or 
the plebiscite. By establishing local constitutions, the PRD expects to provide local 
authorities with the opportunity to have their own 'mini-referenda' on local matters. 
Notwithstanding the course that the participatory agenda takes, what is certain is that the 
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utilisation of citizen participation mechanisms sits at the core of Mexico City's political 
agenda. 
To return to the focus of our analysis, the 1998 legislation, it seems that the main 
concern of those PRD members and congressmen involved in the discussions to have a 
new participatory legislation was to finish with the clientelistic practices of the PRI. By 
creating alternative participatory schemes where authorities shared their decision- 
making power with citizens the PRD expected to make an impact on the way policy 
making occurred in each of the 16 localities that compose Mexico City. Theoretically 
speaking, these schemes would avoid dealing with caciques (local bosses) commonly 
found in local governments and would give citizens real decision-making power, but 
was this truly the case? Did citizens think that when taking part in the schemes proposed 
in the 1998 legislation they affected those decisions reached by local authorities? Or, 
did they continue using pre-established channels such as those offered by informal 
community leaders? Did citizens think that these schemes were a truly democratic 
option? More importantly, what was the role of local authorities when implementing the 
new participatory legislation? In the conclusion of this chapter we will return to these 
questions. 
The next section of this chapter outlines the controversial legislation that caused so 
many debates between political parties, NGOs and groups of academics. The legislation 
that is expected to give the inhabitants of Mexico City, and the people of Tlalpan, a real 
chance to participate in decision-making processes at the local level. 
The 1998 Citizen Participation Law 
Permanentforms ofparticipatory democracy 
The legislation can be divided into two sections: permanent participatory bodies, and 
non-permanent participatory initiatives. 3 The primary participatory mechanism in the 
CPL is arguably at the neighbourhood level, where residents are expected to have a 
voice in the issues affecting their respective communities. 
Neighbourhood committees are organisations of citizen representation 
whose main function is to group the citizens within a specific territory to act as 
supervisors, evaluators and negotiators of public demands related to public 
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services, utilisation of public spaces, public security programmes and other local 
issues (Citizen Participation Law 1998: 43). 
One feature of the legislation foresaw a re-division of all of Mexico City's 
neighbourhoods, 4 depending on whether they were constituted as a colonia, barrio, 
pueblo, or unidad habitacional. 5 One major concern of the academics involved in 
designing the CPL was how to balance the roles of the government and the citizenry, 
and where to set the boundaries for each others interaction. Initially, the discussions 
headed in the direction of a type of citizen participation focussed on delegational (local) 
committees that would be above neighbourhood organisations. The scheme would have 
been based on the election of delegational representatives. For instance, in Tlalpan the 
public would have elected neighbourhood representatives for its five sub-divisions. 
However, some academics, such as Zermeflo, believe these organisations would be 
perceived as potentially harmful for local authorities, as they might become a sort of 
parallel administration outside the control of the public, and therefore actually diminish 
the level of citizen involvement in any participatory activities. According to Zermeflo, 
'to have truly representative and responsive participatory units, these bodies should not 
be composed of more than 100,000 inhabitants (La Jornada 23/05/1998). Tlalpan 
authorities decided that the locality should have be divided into 140 territorial units. 
The second step towards a better participatory reform was to elect a new generation of 
community leaders. The CPL establishes that neighbourhood committee elections will 
be held every three years. The neighbourhood representative position is an honorary 
position with no salary. The new legislation states that the election of neighbourhood 
boards will be organised by the Mexico City electoral authority. Candidates cannot 
represent a political party or any other social organisation, 6 and must not have occupied 
a government position in the previous six months. 
The CPL states that each neighbourhood board will consist of between 7 to 15 
members, depending on the size of the unit, and that men and women must be equally 
represented in every board. Those citizens interested in being part of the neighbourhood 
board would be grouped into slates, which would then compete against other slates of 
residents in an election. The members of ihe slate that wins the election will become 
'the majority' in the neighbourhood committee, but proportional representation ensures 
members of the losing slates will also be represented. The slate leader of the winning 
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team will become the neighbourhood committee leader. 7 According to article 98 of the 
CPL the following are the main activities to be performed by neighbourhood 
committees. 
1) Represent neighbours' interests in the neighbourhood that chose them as 
representatives. 
2) Collect, analyse and lead any initiatives presented by citizens of their colonia, 
barrio, pueblo or unidad habitacional. 
3) Inform their representatives about any action performed by local authorities which 
affects their neighbourhood or which could be of special interest. 
4) Follow the course of citizens' demands at the local government office in charge of 
resolving that particular matter. 
5) Motivate the community to participate in developing projects for their benefit. 
6) Elaborate a diagnosis of their main problems, (i. e. lack of services or other basic 
infrastructure projects) to include them in the budget to be spent by local authorities. 
7) Develop programmes channelled to educate and inform the community about the 
importance of participating at the local level to strengthen neighbourhood unity. 
8) Act as a link between local authorities and citizens. 
9) Promote citizen participation. 
10) Organise social investigations or forums about the main problems affecting their 
communities. 
11) Work as a link with other committees involved in similar community projects. 
12) Keep up with the different programmes and services provided by local authorities. 
The functions should be carried out by all the members of the neighbourhood 
committee. However, articles 99 and 100 of the CPL state that neighbourhood 
committee leaders would have the following additional duties: 
Co-ordinate the works of their respective neighbourhood committees 
Call community meetings (at least twice a year; these can be between the members 
of the committee he/she leads or with members of other committees) 
Advertise any agreements reached at community meetings or assemblies 
Promote joint activities with'other neighbourhood committees 
The CPL also foresees the removal of neighbourhood representatives from their position 
when: 
1) When absent without justification more than three neighbourhood meetings 
2) When obtaining personal benefits while carrying out their representative activity 
3) When disobeying the statutes of this legislation 
A member of the neighbourhood board could be removed from his/her position when 
two thirds of the board support the motion, although an investigation must be held prior 
to the removal of a committee member. 
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The functions set out in the CPL are expected to give community representatives 
enough power to command their respective neighbourhoods in co-ordination with 
authorities. The next section examines the non-permanent form of citizen participation 
included in the 1998 citizen participation legislation. 
Non-permanentforms ofparticipatory democracy 
The 1998 legislation offers 9 non-permanent forms of citizen involvement: 
1) Plebiscite 
2) Referendum 
3) Popular Initiative 
4) Neighbourhood Consultation 
5) Neighbourhood Collaboration 
6) Complaints Unit 
7) Public Diffusion 
8) Public Assembly 
9) Official Visits. 
According to article 13, section 3, of the 1998 CPL, a plebiscite can be proposed by the 
Governor of Mexico City when he/she judges that the involvement of Mexico City 
electors is essential for the decision to be taken. A plebiscite might help decide 
controversial initiatives, and legitimate the final outcome. The legislation also gives the 
public the right to ask for the implementation of a plebiscite where one percent of 
Mexico City's electorate demands one and delivers a letter containing the reasons and 
the signature of all the members supporting the motion. However, only one plebiscite 
can take place per year, fiscal matters (especially those dealing with taxation) would not 
be considered for consultation and plebiscites cannot be held in the same year as a local 
or federal election. The result of the plebiscite has to be respected by the authorities, 
who must act according to what the public decides. 8 
The referendum deals with the laws decided by Mexico City's Congress. A referendum 
can be promoted both by authorities and citizens. Where two thirds of the members of 
congress decide that public involvement is necessary to approve, reject, or reform a law, 
then a referendum is carried out. The public can ask for a referendum when one percent 
of Mexico City's electorate delivers a letter stating the reason for holding it. The 
package delivered to congress must include the piece of legislation (i. e. a whole 
legislation or only some articles of a law) over which the consultation would take place, 
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along with the signatures of all the citizens supporting the motion. Again, only one 
referendum can take place per year and fiscal issues aspects would never be 
considered. 9 The result of the referendum would not be linked to the actions authorities 
take. 
A popular initiative is an instrument that can be used by the citizens to create, modify, 
or derogate laws promoted by legislators at the congress of Mexico City. Once a popular 
initiative is presented to the assembly, a verifying commission would discuss the 
changes proposed and give a response no later than thirty working days after its 
presentation. The requirements for accepting a popular initiative are similar to those of 
the plebiscite and the referendum, where at least one percent of Mexico City's electorate 
must sign the petition and also provide a letter stating the main points of disagreement 
and the amendments proposed. 
A neighbourhood consultation is a mechanism for residents to express their opinions, 
proposals or simply to discuss the problems they face. Three sectors of the community 
could get involved in a consultation: a) residents, b) the private sector, (i. e. commercial 
or social organisations) and c) neighbourhood committees in particular areas. 
Significantly, the consultation can only be promoted by official authorities and not by 
residents themselves. According to section 4 article 48 of the citizen participation law, 
the consultation must use one of the following two mechanisms: a) direct consultation 
or b) survey. The conclusions reached by the consultation would be notified to the 
participants but, unlike a plebiscite, the decision reached would not be binding on the 
authorities. 
Neighbourhood collaboration involves a joint co-ordination between authorities and 
citizens and it is intended to conclude a project or complement a budget. The most 
popular form of neighbourhood collaboration is the fideicomiso. Under this scheme, 
authorities would cover the majority of the costs of a deten-nincd project, and residents 
would provide the rest, which would be deposited in bank accounts opened by local 
authorities for this purpose. To request afideicomiso, a letter specifying the reasons and 
the project to be considered should be sent to local authorities which must respond 
within thirty working days. 
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The aim of having complaint units at local authorities' offices is to give citizens the 
opportunity to scrutinise public services, projects, or the performance of civil servants. 
Each delegaci6n is obliged to have a unit and to assign personnel to follow up each 
complaint received. 
Public diffusion is simply a process whereby the authorities inform citizens about 
legislation approved by the Mexico City assembly or congress and those decisions made 
by the govemor of Mexico City. 
Public assembly is a mechanism of citizen participation by which the residents of 
Mexico City can propose that the authorities adopt certain policies, or they receive 
information about laws or decisions affecting their areas of residence. Elected 
representatives (i. e. members of congress), residents affected by a particular decision, or 
members of the private sector can solicit a public assembly. A letter specifying the issue 
to be dealt with and information about the sectors of the population demanding the 
assembly must be presented to local authorities. Once consultation is completed, local 
authorities are obliged to inform about the terms and the conditions of the resolution(s) 
to be taken. Because the solution of the problems discussed at the assembly might not 
be at the reach of those present in the meeting, when this happens, local authorities have 
the duty to inform the branch of government in charge of solving the problem. Those 
local officials present at the assembly must give feedback to the citizenry within seven 
days of the meeting. 
The aim of official visits is to make the governor of Mexico City or any of the 16 
mayors aware of the primary concerns of certain communities. This practice is based on 
the principle that authorities must constantly interact with those they govern. 
Neighbourhood committee leaders or other community representatives can request such 
encounters. During these visits, authorities collect information that is later channelled to 
the department in charge of dealing with the issue(s) raised by the visit. Generally, the 
issues dealt with in these visits are relate to the introduction of basic infrastructure 
public services such as piped drinking water or electricity. 
The nine non-permanent participatory forms presented here will be analysed below, 
along drawing on practical examples. The next section of this chapter analyses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the legislation. 
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Strengths and weaknesses of the legislation 
Pennanent participatory bodies 
The only permanent form of citizen participation proposed in the CPL is the 
neighbourhood committee or board. These committees are intended to 'erase the past' 
and make the public forget the political use to which initiatives such as the jefes de 
manzana (block representatives) were put. 10 Box 3.2 presents the main strengths and 
weaknesses of the pennanent participatory bodies contained in the CPL. 
Box 3.2 'Rtrenpth-. and Weaknesse-. nf Pp. rmqni-nt Pnrtirinntnrv IfIntlipe 
Strengths Weaknesses 
" Limits the functions of neighbourhood 0 Too large territorial units, which could be 
representatives detrimental for the development of the 
" Having newly elected neighbourhood committee 
leaders, in theory without a 'political past' 0 The re-division of the city might have 
" The re-division of the city may have brought disadvantages for some 
brought benefits for some neighbourhoods neighbourhoods (i. e. residents grouped in 
(i. e. more residents united towards the the same territorial unit but with different 
same goals) needs) 
" Attempts to remove clientelist practices * There is no clear explanation of how the 
neighbourhood committees could 
influence the policies implemented in their 
communities 
" The risk of becoming a mere 
informational body 
" No distinction between urban and semi- 
urban areas 
The strengths of the legislation concern setting the boundaries over which the new 
participatory practices would take place, something that had never been done before. 
Bringing the 'freshness' of the views of ordinary people without a political background 
represents a bold step taken by the PRD administration towards achieving a more 
permanent structure of citizen participation. By re-dividing the city, some people might 
have benefited from being joined into territorial units where other citizens share the 
same needs. Grouping people with similar needs, can be a useful move to achieve 
common goals. On the other hand, re-dividing the city could be a weakness if existing 
groups of citizens are broken up. Another weakness is that although the functions of 
these bodies are clearly set out, the legislation does not establish how the 
neighbourhood committees could actually influence the outcomes of those policies 
implemented in their communities. This omission implies the possibility of these groups 
becoming merely informational units without any real power to affect the decision- 
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making process. As stated by one neighbourhood committee leader, Irma Zuchitl 
Ddvila, 'sometimes I feel a bit ashamed because we cannot solve everyone's demands, 
we always tell neighbours that we are only an inten-nediate structure between authorities 
and neighbours and we have no "magic wand" to solve everything' (Ddvila interview 
2/5/2000). 
The legislation also fails to take account of differences between urban and semi-urban 
areas. This issue is highlighted by the 1997-2000 Neighbourhood Participation Co- 
ordinator of Tlalpan's rural areas, Martin Flores, 
The citizen participation law cannot be exclusive. There is no proper division of 
the different regions that are not urban. We are not talking about a democratic 
law when every social group is considered the same. You cannot implement 
urban programmes in rural areas. Customs in rural areas are very different when 
compared to those prevailing in the city (Flores interview 14/4/2000). 
The weaknesses here identified should be clarified once we analyse the empirical 
evidence later in this chapter. The next section analyses the main strengths and 
weaknesses found in non-permanent participatory bodies. 
Non-permanentpadicipatory bodies 
The CPL offers, for the first time, the possibility to get involved in a series of 
participatory practices that a few years ago would have been unimaginable. PRD 
authorities seemed to be genuinely concerned to have a constant interaction with 
citizens. 
From a 'participatory perspective, ' a major strength is the emphasis of these 
participatory bodies on developing constant contact between authorities and citizens, 
and to enable citizens to start certain participation processes. It seems that the PRD was 
seeking to be perceived as an open political organisation that 'genuinely' cares about 
what the average citizen thinks. Perhaps the fact that groups of NGOs and citizens got 
involved in the discussions contributed to the development and approval of a 'large 
menu' of participatory opportunities. However, there are several limitations to the 
legislation. For instance, in eight out of nine non-permanent participatory options, what 
citizens decide is not binding on the relevant authority. Furthen-nore, in all the non- 
permanent bodies the decision whether the participatory activity would take place rests 
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with the authorities. Moreover, the plebiscite or the referendum would only take place at 
the state rather than the local level. Box 3.3 highlights the main strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the nine non-permanent participatory possibilities offered in the 
1998 CPL. 
Box 3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Non-permanent Participatory Bodies 
Initiative Strengths Weaknesses 
Plebiscite a Can be invoked by the * Maximum one per year 
citizenry 0 Cannot take place in an 
0 Authorities must respect electoral year 
what the public decides 0 Can only be implemented at 
the state level not at the local 
Referendum 0 Can be invoked by the * One per year maximum 
citizenry 0 Authorities decide whether it 
* Could be a useful 'defence takes place 
mechanism' against certain 0 Not binding on the 
laws authorities 
0 Cannot take place in an 
electoral year 
* Can only be implemented at 
the state level not at the local 
Popular Initiative 0 Can be initiated by the 0 Authorities decide whether it 
citizenry takes place 
0 Could be useful against 
certain laws 
Neighbourhood Consultation 0 Useful to solve certain 0 Can only be invoked by 
controversies authorities 
0 Not binding on the 
authorities 
Neighbourhood Collaboration 0 Can be initiated by the * Not very useful in poor areas 
citizenry 
0 Useful mechanism to finish 
projects 
Complaints Unit 0 Citizens can speak to 0 Do not have 'real power' to 
someone about their solve the issues raised 
problems 
Public Diffusion 0 Brings greater accountability 0 Could be used for particular 
_'propaganda' purposes Public Assembly -_ 40 Can be initiated by the 0 Unlikely to be useful if the 
citizenry right authorities are not 
" Could speed-up the solution present at the Assembly 
of specific problems 
" Citizens could meet the 
functionary responsible for 
resolving their problems 
Official Visits * People interact with their Authorities could promise 
local representatives solutions they would not be 
" Local authorities learn about able to provide (e. g. due to 
the problems affecting a budget restrictions) 
I particular community 
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Other weaknesses of the legislation concern with the frequency of the practices, as in 
the case of the plebiscite and the referendum, only one per year can take place. It is 
understandable that it would be difficult to be constantly organising consultation 
processes, nevertheless, what would happen if in the same year two very important 
decisions had to be taken utilising such initiatives? Or if authorities wanted to organise a 
plebiscite in an electoral year? A final weakness is that most involve long bureaucratic 
processes, which might result in citizen disenchantment with participation. Later in this 
chapter some examples of these practices will be examined. But how have these 
participatory mechanisms been implemented in Tlalpan? In the next section, an analysis 
of the way in which the participatory mechanisms above discussed have been 
implemented is presented. 
TIalpan's main characteristics 
The municipality of Tlalpan, situated in the southern part of Mexico City is considered a 
rich municipality in terms of natural resources, its total surface covers 30,449 acres, 
representing 20 percent of Mexico City's total territory, and is mainly composed of 
areas of ecological conservation and rural communities. The population of Tlalpan 
increased eleven fold between 1950 and 1980, and as will be discussed later in this 
chapter, it is characterised by zones where affluent and poor people interact. The urban 
area of the municipality covers more than 5,000 hectares, and 8,489 hectares are used 
for agricultural purposes. The disordered way in which Mexico City has grown has 
negatively affected Tlalpan. Thirty years ago only 120,000 people lived there, today, 
more than 650,000 do. As a consequence of this exponential growth, the service 
infrastructure has never been able to cope with the demands of the population. In 1998 
only 57.8 per cent of Tlalpan's inhabitants had sewage and 83.27 percent piped drinking 
water (La Jornada 23/3/1998). Tlalpan is divided into five territorial zones: Centre, 
Coapa, Miguel Mdalgo, Ajusco Medio and Pueblos. There are 181 neighbourhoods, 11 
barrios, 31 unidades habitacionales and 30fraccionamientos. In 1998, Tlalpan also had 
133 irregular settlements occupying 487.7 hectares, in which 7,566 families lived 
(representing about 31,862 people) (La Jornada 3/3/1998). 
One of the main problems that Tlalpan faces is the illegal invasion of large extensions of 
its territory, which in the past were considered as 'normal' under the auspices of prilsta 
administrations. These illegal invasions benefited the PRI, as it continued to win the 
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support of vulnerable groups of the population. These invasions of land were normally 
orchestrated by 'popular leaders' who, with the approval of local authorities, would 
provide 'housing' for the poor. However, once the PRD took office in December of 
1997 things began to change. For instance, two months after the recently elected 
administration started its mandate, the Mayor of Tialpan, Dr. Martfnez Della Roca, 
decided to 'return to the public' an office which belonged to the locality and which was 
used for more than 15 years by the PRI without paying any rent. In the view of Della 
Roca, 'we only did what was expected from us' (La Jornada 31/01/1998). 
Another action to highlight was when a group of 250 houses where more than 700 
people lived in the area known as El Llano was removed. Mayor Della Roca opposed 
the invasion and, escorted by a group of bulldozers, directed the operation to remove the 
invaders from the area and demolish their houses. Such actions increased the tensions 
between the recently elected authorities and groups of prUstas (see La Jornada 
21/08/1998). In fact, it can be argued that the main problems faced during the first 
months of the 1997-2000 administration were linked to irregular land invasions led by 
pritstas: 
In the municipality of Tlalpan former delegados (mayors) and local 
functionaries have been involved in several invasions of Tlalpan's ecological 
reserves. Other measures implemented by the pritstas include the establishment 
of anti-corruption committees in each of the 16 municipalities of Mexico City. 
According to Cuauht6moc Gutierrez, member of the PRI, the aim is to observe 
the way in which Tlalpan authorities perform and also to denounce any acts of 
corruption (La Jomada 16/l/1998). 
Despite the fact that territorial invasions continued throughout 199911 the 1997-2000 
PRD administration was increasingly careful about how it planned the growth of 
Tlalpan. For instance, in 1999 the Congress of Mexico City approved the construction 
of a large project in a rural area of Tlalpan, which include 1,825 houses, a large 
shopping centre, and offices. To 'compensate' the loss of some species of flora and 
fauna, the firm FRISA, in charge of the project, will donate to the government of 
Mexico City an area covering over a million square metres for ecological use. The firm 
will also provide 63 million pesos (around E4.5 million) to improve the sewage 
infrastructure and the drinking water pipelines in some of Tlalpan's less developed 
regions (La Jornada 27/12/1999). 
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Tlalpan's population seems quite concerned about the loss of green areas via invasions 
or private development complexes. Thus, in April 2000, after two months of intense 
promotion in several municipalities, including Tlalpan, which possess the largest 
ecological reserves in Mexico City, a consultation process to discuss the future of the 
green areas was organised. The aims of this democratic initiative were to discover the 
views of ecological experts, authorities and local inhabitants regarding the future 
development of these vast but vulnerable ecological reserves. The consultation process 
was divided into eight discussion tables as follows: 1) Ecological Instruments, 2) 
Productive Programmes, 3) Hydraulic Projects, 4) Interinstitutional Co-ordination, 5) 
Education, 6) Vigilance, 7) Natural Areas Management, 8) Towns and Rural 
Communities (see La Jomada 08/04/2000). 12 As a result of this participatory exercise 
the PRD governor of Mexico City, Andr6s Manuel L6pez Obrador stated, 'I would 
apply rigorously the law to any organisation or group of people intending to invade 
illegally any ecological reserves. ' Yet he also announced an aggressive housing policy 
that would be implemented to provide housing to those who need it the most (La 
Jomada 08/12/2000). 
Land-use has become one of the most difficult problems in Tlalpan. Recently many 
fan-ners have sold their properties to private developers. One PRD advisor, Dr. 
Zermeflo, 13 observed, 'farmers are attracted by the prospect of making a "good sale" of 
their land, they are attracted by the possibility of not working for the rest of their lives. 
On the other hand, private developers benefit from large extensions of territory where 
luxurious flats and shopping centres are built' (Zermeho interview 29/5/1999). This 
contrast between very developed and underdeveloped areas is one of Tlalpan's main 
characteristics. The magnitude of the differences between the rich and the poor in 
Tlalpan, is illustrated by the programme inaugurated by Cuauhtdmoc Cdrdenas in April 
1998, which aimed to provide medical services to around 46 percent of the 650,000 
inhabitants who do not qualify for any type of medical services. 14 
To conclude this brief account of Tlalpan's general background, the main problems, 
can be surnmarised as: 
Lack of appropriate sewage and piped potable water services 
A demand for greater public security 
The need to preserve ecological areas 
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Using the land as designated (i. e. if the land has been declared an ecological reserve, 
then do not use it for commercial purposes) 
Finding the right balance between economic activities and the environment 
The Bureaucratic Structure 
The bureaucratic structures in charge of carrying out the new participatory scheme can 
be divided into two groups, responsible for the non-permanent and permanent 
participatory mechanisms (Box 3.4 below sets out the responsible authorities). For 
obvious reasons the analysis here focuses on the operations of local authorities. In 
Tlalpan, the structure operating the local participatory agenda is the Subdelegaci6n de 
Enlace Territorial (Territorial Link Directorate). The 1997-2000 subdelegado de enlace 
territorial, Mr. Eliseo Moyao, was the citizen participation director responsible for the 
co-ordination of the five territorial zones within Tlalpan. Mr. Moyao observed that 
implementing the participatory agenda had not been easy partly as a consequence of 
preceding prUsta adn-ftistrations: 
After having a one party structure for 70 years, where citizens did not 
have 'a say' in any decisions that affected the locality, it is difficult to decide 
where to start. Undemocratic practices were a constant and there is no trust or 
solidarity within the members of this and other localities. Residents think about 
very specific issues, they are selfish, it is only his/her street that matters. The 
population is totally fragmented, violence is present everywhere, along with 
corruption and all the bad influences of the PRI. We need to build and 
consolidate a democratic structure, we need to put in a lot of effort. There is no 
democratic culture between neighbours and authorities; we are practically forced 
to develop a democratic culture for this city (Moyao interview 10/4/2000). 
Box 3.4 Authorities resnonsible for each ParticiDatorv Practirp. 
Practice Authority in Charge 
Permanent Participatory 
Practice 
Neighbourhood Committees Local Authority 
Non-Permanent 
Participatory Practice 
Plebiscite Government of Mexico City 
Referendum Congress of Mexico City 
Popular Initiative Congress of Mexico City 
Neighbourhood Consultation Local Authority 
Neighbourhood Collaboration Local Authority 
Complaints Unit Local Authority 
Public Diffusion Congress of Mexico City and 
Government of Mexico City 
Public Assern-bly Local Authority 
Official Visits Local Authority in conjunction with 
Grove ment of Mexico City 
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The Subdelegaci6n de Enlace Territorial channels all public demands to the 
governmental area in charge of the problem under consideration. This department plays 
a key role, as it is here where all citizen demands from inferior departments are received 
and filtered. Moyao declared, 'there are no distinctions made between the different 
groups asking for our assistance, we do our best to solve most of the problems we deal 
with- of course, if the solution is within our reach' (Moyao interview 10/4/2000). 
However, he differentiates between the social sectors of Tlalpan and how their needs 
would vary based on class. 
Groups belonging to the lower classes are not going to have the same needs as 
those from middle and upper classes. Nfiddle and upper sectors are more 
concerned about such issues as pollution, ecology or the architecture of the 
neighbourhood. Quite different worries from those of those from groups of lower 
class groups, where basic infrastructure problems will be on the agenda (Moyao 
interview 10/4/2000). 
Under Moyao are five Subdelegados Territoriales, or Citizen Participation Co- 
ordinators; each heads one of the five sectoral offices. The core aim of these offices is to 
function as popular demand reception centres. Jaime Alvarado, Citizen Participation 
Co-ordinator in the Centre of Tlalpan, describes how this office operates, 'this 
department assists neighbourhood committees, independent groups of citizens, political 
parties and NGOs, we try to offer solutions to those demands presented by any of these 
groups' (Alvarado interview 25/4/2000). This branch of the local administration is 
constantly interacting with neighbours and, when possible, Citizen Participation Co- 
ordinators would solve certain problems before sending them to the Territorial Link 
Directorate. 
Co-ordinators play a crucial role in implementing some of the participatory mechanisms 
included in the CPL. It is here where such schemes as neighbourhood consultations, 
neighbourhood collaborations, complaints units, public assemblies and official visits are 
co-ordinated. But above all, it is in this department where intense interaction between 
authorities and neighbourhood committees takes place. At each Citizen Participation 
Co-ordinator office there is a project leader who assists neighbourhood committees in 
the prioritisation of their needs. Project leaders are responsible for following up every 
case they deal with, and are obliged to give feedback to citizens within a determined 
period of time. According to Judith Reyes, project leader for the Centre of Tlalpan, 'we 
aim to provide as much advice as we can. We have to make people aware that there is a 
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limited budget and that their problems are not going to be solved in one go' (Reyes 
interview 27/4/2000). 
The implementation of the participatory agenda has not been as smooth as hoped, 
especially at the neighbourhood committee level. Moyao identifies various problems: 
The principle of the neighbourhood committees is to offer many 
opportunities for discussion, but instead, some political parties have been using 
them as 'political platforms'. Fifty percent of the neighbourhood committees 
installed in Tlalpan have organisational problems. The PRI and the PRD are the 
two main political forces disputing the leadership of these participatory bodies. 
Unfortunately in Tlalpan there are still plenty of caciques operating (Moyao 
interview 10/4/2000). 
Despite these problems, the participatory agenda continues to be implemented; indeed, 
as it will be discussed below, more powers have been given to the permanent 
participatory structure. To have a clearer perspective on how the participatory agenda 
has been implemented, the next section presents some practical examples. 
The participatory agenda in practice 
Permanent participatory practices 
The permanent participatory body visualised in the CPL is the neighbourhood 
committee. This body should enable citizens constantly to interact with their fellow- 
citizens and local authorities. Furthermore, residents are expected to discuss and provide 
authorities with some alternative solutions to their problems. Neighbourhood committee 
members can organise their groups as they wish, meeting as often as they consider it 
convenient, as long as they meet the legal quota of two meetings per year. 
A key factor in the analysis of the neighbourhood committee participatory structure is 
class. The diversity of the neighbourhoods that compose Tlalpan provide contrasting 
perspectives of the problems faced by each of them. Generally speaking, middle and 
upper class neighbourhoods are more concerned about issues such as ecology or 
maintaining living standards. Because upper and middle classes have already covered 
their primary needs (infrastructure wise and materially speaking) they seek little more 
than to 'live in peace. ' As stated by Jaime Alvarado, 1997-2000 Citizen Participation 
Co-ordinator for the centre of Tlalpan, 'most middle and upper class neighbourhoods 
have their own isolated participatory structures' (Alvarado interview 25/4/2000). It is 
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middle and upper class residents who live in the luxurious developments described at 
the beginning of this chapter. In a way, we can say that these classes live in a 'purposely 
built isolated environment' where local authority intervention, apart from being service 
providers, (i. e. rubbish collection, water services) seems unnecessary. 
On the other hand, most working class neighbourhoods need to cover their primary 
needs, so a neighbourhood representative structure becomes an important issue. Two 
choices are available for the poorer sectors, either sticking to traditional leaders ignoring 
the CPL permanent structure, or participating in the reformed neighbourhood committee 
framework. Of course, the aim of the CPL was to dissolve those forms of local 
authoritarianism practised by local caciques by establishing neighbourhood committees 
that would reform local leaderships, promote democratic values, and involve the public 
in decision-making processes. But has this necessarily happened? 
It is true that, theoretically speaking, the CPL provides the legal framework to give 
neighbourhood committees an official status to promote local initiatives and address 
social issues. But certain independent organisations also have more 'informal power' 
than those associations grouped under the formal scheme. For instance, we have 
Julieta's informal association. She represents around 1,500 families, and is recognised, 
by local authorities, as one of Tlalpan's most charismatic informal leaders, she has 
fought for three generations - along with her family - for the construction of basic 
infrastructure projects in her neighbourbood. Julieta and her associates decided not to 
form a neighbourhood committee because from her point of view, the only way to 
achieve progress is by 'pushing' local authorities directly and not through 
neighbourhood committees. In her own words: 
We did not group as a neighbourhood committee because we felt our 
independence threatened. I know those in the delegacion in charge of solving 
our problems and it is easier for me to try to find them than to try to set up one of 
the types of meetings established in the new legislation. Functioning as a 
neighbourhood committee could jeopardise the little power we posses (Julieta 
interview 3/5/2000). 
Another problem affecting the operation of neighbourhood committee meetings is that 
party political preferences have emerged as an element of internal division. The 
Neighbourhood Committee Co-ordinator for Tlalpan's Pueblos region, Martin Flores, 
observed that 'there are cases where PRD committee members would not accept 
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working with PRI or PAN committee mernhcrs' (Flores interview 14/4/21000). 'I'lalpan 
authorities have openly admitted that political interests or partics have corrupted tile 
neutral character of neighbourhood committees. To see some examples of' how local z: 1 
authorities have labelled each committee with a political organisation see Box 3.5 
below. 
Box 3.5 Neiphhourhood Orilanisations and Political Parties 
Name of representative Neighbourhood location Political preference 
Jer6nimo Vdldez Garda SýIll Mi, (, 'Llel TOPHCJ0 PR I 
Mig guel Pichardo 
Galindo Santa CRIZ PAN 
Benjamfn Torres Becen-a San Pedro Martir IIRD 
Marfa Guadalupe Morones Cruz Xochintepec PRD 
Jos6 Alfredo Moreno Los An(geles No political affinity 
Source: Tlalpan local authorities 
So how did this happen? Political parties SLIpported C01111111inity leaders to become 
nei, cY, hhourhood repi-esentatives, or vice-vei-sa, neiliboLii"liooci Icaders offered their zý c 
services to political parties with the promise of working for those organisations in the 
future. These intemal disputes have caused the withdrawal of' independent citizens who 
were interested in participating and who now are disappointed ahout the whole raison z: l 
d', ýtre of the neighbourhood committees. L- 
This political intervention hits negatively affCcted the consolidation of the C, 
neighboui-hood committee framework- as in cf'I'ective citizeii-led participatory Z:, 
mechanism. According to TIalpan Citizen Participation Director, F hisco Moyao, I 
In summer 2000 only fifty percent of' Tlalpan's liclollhoLij-hood l'orunis 
contInUe operating based oil what is established in the 1998 leoislation. Those 
organisations that do not opcratc undcr the lcoal 1'ramcwork of' the new 
legislation keep on channelling tlicir demands throLloll the types of' local I- leadership the legislation amied (Yetting rid ol'(Moyao lite, -view 10/4/2000). 41 1-1 -1 
The next section outlines some examples 01' hOW 'OffiCK11' MId 'LlIlOffiCild' CIMMICIS 01' 
communication operate, to provide a -gencral perspective on how cach branch has 
developed. The presentation also ainis to undcrstand 11101-C LIhOLIt the I'OIC Of p0litiCý11 
parties in both types of bodies. 
III 
a) 'Offieial'neighbourhoodeommittees 
When 'official' neighbourhood meetings are held, these would commonly deal with 
collective problems, although particular issues can also make the agenda. For instance, 
during the meeting held on 2/4/2000 the Belisario Dominguez neighbourhood 
committee discussed stopping celebrating parties in a civic centre built for cultural and 
sport purposes. Neighbours thought it was not fair to rent this communal area for 
weddings and other social events in a residential area that does not have enough parking 
spaces and where the noise is unbearable during each celebration. After discussing the 
main problems surrounding this case, the following agreements were reached: 
1) Residents agreed that the civic centre was built as a space for promoting culture and 
sport activities and not as a 'party-centre'. They also highlighted the fact that the 
centre did not need the safety regulations (fire extinguishers or emergency exits) 
necessary to hold social events. Furthermore, by holding massive events in a 
residential area, the organisers of such events were violating the Urban 
Development Plan of the Federal District. 
2) Neighbours agreed that the community centre should be used as a place for 
promoting education (by having a small library for the neighbourhood), health 
centre (where indoors sports or health consultations could also take place), or as an 
internet-cafe. 
3) It was also agreed that the entrance of vehicles not belonging to any of the 
neighbours living in the neighbourhood would be forbidden. 
4) A final point was that the members of this neighbourhood committee would invite 
the general secretariat of the senate, who is in charge of the operation of the civic 
centre, to inform neighbourhood committee members about the future uses of the 
civic centre. 
The CPL established that neighbourhood committees are obliged to have at least two 
meetings per year. Normally there is no fixed date or time, and the programming of 
these sessions is mostly determined by the issues affecting each neighbourhood. For 
instance, according to neighbourhood committee leader Irma Zuchitl Ddvila, 'we meet 
once every two or three weeks. If something urgent occurs between meetings, then an 
emergency meeting is organised' (Ddvila interview 2/5/2000). Some neighbourhood 
committees take notes or a minute of the issues dealt with in each gathering, while 
others only do so when local authorities get involved. 
The number of participants in neighbourhood committee meetings varies according to 
the issues on the agenda. If the issue affects certain group of neighbours, then they 
would take part, otherwise they would mostly not be interested. Ddvila recalls: 
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The people who take part in the meetings are always different, if the issue 
is important for them then they would participate, if it is not then they would not 
do so. Generally speaking people are apathetic, and if we add to this factor the 
difficult economic situation we are facing, then the indices of participation are 
quite low. For example, a young married couple, they both have to work, and 
once they return back home, they are too tired to get involved in their 
community issues (Ddvila interview 2/5/2000). 
Indeed, an important aspect is the lack of interest shown by young people in taking part 
in these meetings. As neighbourhood committee leader Juan MUjica complained: 'we 
still do not know how to involve young people, participation is dominated by people 
over 30' (M(ijica interview 27/4/2000). 
Security issues, at the core of the neighbourhood agenda 
The problem dominating the agenda in most meetings deals with public security. Prior 
to the implementation of the new legislation, Tlalpan's authorities were already very 
concerned about the high indices of criminality in the locality and attempted to support 
residents' efforts to reduce these figures. The following lengthy extract from Tlalpan 
advisor Sergio Zermeho captures these points effectively: 
If there has been an agreement between the groups discussing the 1998 
participatory reform, this is that the main participatory unit should be the 
neighbourhood, or its equivalent in rural areas. In the municipality of Tlalpan we 
have decided to divide the municipality into 250 units to start a security scheme. 
However, the main problem that we are facing is that when we analyse most of 
the 250 units, there happens to be a spontaneous creation of groups that come 
together to face the city's high levels of insecurity. These groups are much 
smaller than the units we visualised, citizens group by street or even by a 
determined number of houses. And the number of 250 units proposed by 
Tlalpan's authorities could exponentially grow to over a thousand small security 
bodies. When we talk to neighbours, it is difficult to convince them to not fence 
themselves off, or at least not to do so in such small and irrational divisions, 
because in the long run they are going to run out of money to pay the 
surveillance of their 'urban cages... our aim is to find the balance between 
participatory spaces and security spaces, always bearing in mind that the aim is 
to strengthen our associative life and to increase our levels of trust. We cannot 
keep hiding in our 'cage' in front of the television, with that attitude we are not 
going to solve our community problems (La Jornada 13/06/1998). 
In direct relationship to this quote, one of the changes that has been recently introduced 
by the Government of Mexico City is to provide neighbourhood committees with a 
budget. Governor L6pez Obrador, introduced the $participatory budgets' as an means 
for neighbourhood committee members to discuss and decide how best to use these 
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resources. In a survey carried out by the newspaper La Jomada 11/6/2001 the great 
majority of the neighbours living in 14 out of 16 localities that compose Mexico City 
agreed to spend their 2001 'neighbourhood budget' to improve their security (i. e. 
buying police patrols, security lights, hiring more security personnel). The government 
of Mexico City decided to assign 700 million pesos'5 to the neighbourhood committee 
participatory structure that operates in each of the 16 localities of the city. The average 
amount that each committee would receive is around 500,000 pesos, 16 this amount could 
vary depending on the number of citizens in each body, however, none of these bodies 
would receive more than 2 million pesos. 17 
Neighbourhood committee members were given a list of options on how to spend their 
respective budgets, including the cost of such goods as alarms, police patrols, 
motorcycles and other items related to security. Each neighbourhood committee had to 
hold an extraordinary meeting to determine how to use these resources. This process is 
certainly the first attempt to give 'real decision-making power' to these participatory 
structures, as no one before had tried to carry out such an ambitious project with the co- 
operation of neighbourhood committees. 
b) 'Unofficial'forms of participation 
Although one of the core principles of the CPL is to eliminate informal community 
leaders, there are still plenty of them operating. In some cases, these community 
intermediaries continue to exercise more 'real' power than the recently created 
neighbourhood structures. Most of these leaders are known by authorities and are seen 
as a threat to the stability of the locality. This is one of the reasons why authorities, 
generally speaking, always listen to their demands. Normally, this type of leader 
'jumps' the normal channels of communication and would practically invade local 
authorities' offices demanding the solution of a particular problem. They would 
typically turn up with a large amount of people supporting the solution of a problem, as 
they think that the larger the number of supporters accompanying them, the faster 
authorities would solve their problems. 
To see how these informal community representatives operate, we attended a meeting 
held on July 2000 where Mr. Rosas, who is a PRI sympathiser and has been an informal 
leader for more than twenty years, led a group of more than sixty people to put pressure 
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on local authorities regarding the provision of sewage and piped drinking water. Rosas 
turned up at Tlalpan local government's offices to meet those responsible for the 
provision of the services needed by the members of his organisation. During the first 
part of the meeting, Rosas proposed the creation of a commission to follow closely the 
implementation of these projects. He also questioned the competence of the staff 
surrounding the mayor, by saying 'in this administration no one ever sticks to what you 
promised during your political campaign' (Rosas 2000). 
When Tlalpan local officials offered an explanation to the water problem, Rosas 
interrupted them and stated: 'we do not want an explanation, we already know what you 
are going to say, we want to know who is going to solve our problems. Nevertheless 
the Water Commission official Mr Machado, stated that Tlalpan's water authorities had 
already been working to provide water to this particular neighbourhood, but that the 
services have not been fully covered yet. Rosas responded that this was untrue and that 
most of his neighbourhood still did not receive a drop of water (Rosas 2000). 
Rosas also wanted to know what was happening with the construction of the sewage 
system previously promised for the neighbourhood of Achalco. He noted that they had 
covered the necessary legal requirements to start the construction of the network. 
Machado told Rosas that an agreement with a construction company had been reached, 
and that they would start working soon on the construction of the sewage network. 
Rosas made Machado promise a date to start the works in front of the 60 people 
attending the meeting. 
The way Mr. Rosas' organisation operates cannot be compared to the modus operandi 
of neighbourhood committees. During this meeting it was Rosas who set the rhythm of 
the meeting and made authorities promise fixed times and dates for the solution of his 
representatives' problems. Moreover, the mayor participated in the session, giving a 
'higher status' to the meeting. 
What can be learnt from this type of meeting is that authorities do feel threatened when 
dealing with informal leaders. In one sense, informal leaders represent one of the 
greatest obstacles to the CPL agenda according to the 1998 legislation. A deeper 
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analysis of the way in which unofficial leaders operate will be presented in the last part 
of this chapter. 
Non-permanent participatory practices 
a) Referendum and Plebiscite 
The non-permanent participatory mechanism used more frequently is the plebiscite. In 
May 1999 a plebiscite was organised by the government of Mexico City, which aimed 
indirectly to persuade opposition political parties (the PRI and the PAN) to conclude the 
political reform started in 1998. By 1999 a considerable number of issues were still 
unresolved so PRD authorities wanted to involve the public as a sort of 'pressure 
mechanism' to influence the decisions that still needed to be approved at the Federal 
Congress. The plebiscite was based on the following questions: 
1) Do you agree that Mexico City requires its own constitution? 
2) Do you agree that the government of Mexico City must have the legal capacity to 
decide its own budget? 
3) Do you agree that Mexico City should receive federal funds for poverty 
programmes? 
4) Do you agree that the congress of Mexico City should have the legal power to 
remove the governor of the city and not the senate? 
5) Do you agree that the congress of Mexico City should decide over the City's gender 
issues, and not the federal congress? 
6) Do you think it is necessary to re-define the functions of each of the 16 mayors of 
the City? 
7) Do you think it is necessary to establish a plural body of political parties as a 
counterweight to the authority exercised by each of the 16 mayors of the City? 
8) Do you agree that is necessary to establish an external body of independent citizens 
to scrutinise the finances of each of the 16 localities of Mexico City? 
9) Do you agree that the Judicial Secretariat and the Security Secretariat of the City 
should by appointed by the governor of Mexico City? 
2,820 ballot boxes were installed throughout the 16 localities of Mexico City, and 
163,000 citizens took part (La Jomada 17/5/1999). The plebiscite was criticised by 
opposition political parties (PRI and PAN) as being 'biased and expensive' (La Jomada 
14/05/1999). 18 Most citizens who took part in the process voted in favour of the 9 
initiatives proposed, and their responses were sent to the federal congress for discussion 
(La Jornada 17/5/1999). 
The second example of a consultation took place in January 2001. The aim of this 
process was to discover what the public thought about creating new legislation 
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governing protest marches in Mexico City. When the consultation was initiated there 
were disputes between the Government of Mexico City and the Congress of Mexico 
City, to decide which body should lead the process. In the end it was decided that the 
congress directed the consultation, which lasted for 5 days (between 26 and 30 January 
2001). Some 56,000 people participated and 90 percent supported legislation to regulate 
protest marches in the capital (La Jomada 01/02/2001). 
b) Neighbourhood Collaboration, Neighbourhood Consultation and Complaints Unit 
According to the 1998 legislation neighbourhood collaborations and neighbourhood 
consultations are mainly organised by local authorities, however, members of 
neighbourhood committees, NGOs and other external actors have played a key role to 
setting up these gatherings. The case below is an example of how citizens from diverse 
backgrounds contributed to try to rescue a green area in Tlalpan. It is an example of how 
neighbourhood collaboration, neighbourhood consultation, and a kind of complaint unit 
were assembled in one big participatory experience. 
In 1939 President Cdrdenas declared the Fuentes Brotantes Park a natural protected 
area. One of the most important aspects of this declaration was that it did not allow 
anyone to build houses or live in the park. The original extension of the park covered 
129 acres, and its main attraction was the water source and lake running from the upper 
section of the park downhill. Unfortunately, by the year 2000 there were only 20 acres 
remaining of the original 129 protected by Cdrdenas, most of them lost due to the 
disordered growth of the city and currently used for farming or as shopping centres. 
Mexico City's disordered growth is the main argument for the virtual extinction of this 
green area. During the summer of 2000 a group of people interested in saving what is 
left of the park gathered to discuss alternative regeneration projects. For such a titanic 
task, groups of ecologists, neighbourhood committees, schools, and a commission of 
Tlalpan officials got involved. Neighbourhood collaboration was perceived as essential 
to save the park, because residents living near it were to become permanent vigilantes. 
Neighbourhood consultation played an important role in the agenda, as through 
residents' visions, those interested in saving the park were able to get a clearer idea of 
the social conditions surrounding Fuentes Brotantes. Meetings were held on a weekly 
basis, and to give the reader a brief idea of the sorts of issues dealt with at meetings, 
here is the agenda discussed in the meeting held on 19/05/2000: 
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Open-school (a proposal that the park is used for educational purposes by the 
schools involved in the project). The proposal includes building a greenhouse and 
growing vegetables and fruits in a pre-determined area of the park. 
Consolidating an investment fund, by inviting local entrepreneurs and other large 
companies to cover part of the restoration costs. 
Establish as soon as possible the territorial limits of the park (as there is confusion 
about its cur-rent boundaries). 
Create a scientific committee, to deal with all the environmental aspects surrounding 
the restoration of the park. 
" It was agreed that only the neighbourhood committees adjacent to the park would be 
those with voice and vote in the park's trust. However, if other committees would 
like to get involved, they could do so but would not have voice or vote in the trust. 
" Start promoting 'small' actions (i. e. rubbish collection) while awaiting the final 
report about the total territorial extension of the park. 
" It was agreed to create a park's partnership trust for co-ordinating the restoration 
effort. 
A 'save the park' commission was established and its members soon realised that co- 
ordinating the efforts of so many organisations was not going'to be easy. 19 In addition 
to the co-ordination efforts other problems emerged as the discussions intensified. For 
instance, the fact that some of the neighbours collaborating and being consulted lived in 
areas considered to be part of the ecological reserve delayed the process. The first 
sessions were characterised by a participative audience, all groups involved seemed to 
realise that to achieve such an ambitious project self interest and other differences must 
be left aside. However, once Tlalpan's legal team found that some families were living 
in, or rather invading, a section of the park, then the spirit of the sessions changed. 
According to the law, these families had to be relocated outside the park, but public 
pressure stopped this from happening. Residents put pressure on the 'save the park' 
commission to stop the discussions and, after asking for official advice from Tlalpan's 
legal team, members of the park commission had to inform pressure groups that those 
families living in the park would continue doing SO. 20 Although the meetings continued 
taking place, more problems arose, as some members of the trust began defending their 
personal interests, and forgot about the original aims of the gatherings. The case of 
Samuel Moreno who was representing one of the neighbourhood committees is 
illustrative. He owned a small restaurant in the park and during the sessions he hinted 
about the necessity of building easier access facilities for the restaurant area, so he could 
sell more. 
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These problems fragmented the park commission and the original aims of the project 
were postponed. Time constraints also had a negative effect on the whole initiative, as 
Tlalpan's 1997-2000 PRD local authorities were about to finish their mandate when the 
rescue process began, and once the 2000-2006 administration took office the project 
was forgotten. 
c) Public Assemblies and Official Visits 
The aim of public assemblies is to give citizens the opportunity to demand greater 
information about a particular matter, as well as making proposals for determined 
policies. During these assemblies, residents would provide authorities with a general 
background of the problem they face, along with records of previous responses they 
might have received. Normally, after the residents' exposition, authorities then offer 
alternative possible solution(s) to the problem(s) presented. Residents would then 
proceed to ask the details (office phone number, beeper, or mobile phone number) of the 
local official to be reached in case the agreement is not respected. 
One meeting took place on 27 May 2000 in TlalPan's central meeting room between 
Chichicaspa residents and authorities, with more than 100 residents from the 
neighbourhoods of Chichicaspa, Bosques del Pedregal, and Contreras present. The 
problem in this part of Tlalpan is that residents are being charged for water services that 
they do not receive. The water network that is supposed to supply this region is empty; 
nonetheless neighbours punctually receive their water-bills. The core point of the 
meeting was a very simple one, why is the Tlalpan water commission charging for a 
service that is not being provided? Since 1989 the residents of Chichicaspa and Bosques 
del Pedregal had to carry water in buckets or when possible hire a lorry with a water 
tank and collect the water from a water source located in the neighbourhood of 
Contreras, not far from where they live. The whole operation is time consuming and 
exhaustive. So it is vital for them to know when the water network would work 
properly. 
As a proof that authorities did not stick to what they promised, a group of residents 
showed Mr. Machado, of Tlalpan's Water Commission a letter signed by him in 1997 
promising that the water network would work normally that year. Unfortunately for the 
residents, three years later the water network was still not working. A week before this 
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meeting, residents delivered a letter explaining the situation, and authorities' response to 
the missive was that all residents, in this particular area, were already receiving water. 
This claim was denied during the meeting; indeed, according to some neighbours, 
personnel from Tlalpan's water commission did not even bother to turn up and check 
what the current situation at Chichicaspa was; the authorities took for granted that water 
services were already provided. 
During the first part of the meeting neighbours heavily criticised the local authorities, 
especially the water commission, for doing such an inefficient job. The first to speak 
was Chichicaspa neighbourhood committee leader Mr. Juan Upez, followed by a group 
of neighbours who expressed their concerns about being fooled again by their local 
authorities. The response provided by the local authorities centred on explaining that the 
main problem is that there is not enough water in the region. Although the construction 
of five water tanks was planned to solve all the water needs of this area, only two of 
them had been built by 2000. According to Machado, 'the network is properly designed, 
but a water network without water cannot work, we must also consider that there are 
water leaks throughout the network, preventing the water from reaching all the 
neighbourhoods in the zone. We must think of building new networks that could help 
this region' (Machado 2000). Mr. Machado stressed the importance of solving this 
problem together with residents, pointing out that Tlalpan's authorities do not have the 
resources to solve such problems immediately. Finally, Mr. Machado promised that the 
water infrastructure was going to be modified to facilitate residents' immediate access 
to water. After Mr. Machado's explanation, residents accepted the proposal and the 
meeting concluded, however, they stated that they were going to keep a close eye on 
Tlalpan's authorities to check whether they stuck to their word or not. Despite the fact 
that the changes promised by Machado were fulfilled, the water problem persisted and 
was 'inherited' by the 2000-2006 administration. 
Analysis of Citizen Participation Mechanisms 
Neighbourhood Committees 
Neighbourhood committees operate permanently, so their complexity is greater than any 
of the non-permanent mechanisms. The problems start from the way in which the 1998 
legislation divides the city. According to one of Tlalpan's informal leaders, Socorro 
Hmenez, 'travelling long distances and differences between each neighbourhoods' 
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needs have contributed to the lack of interest showed by the public to get involved in the 
initiative' (Hmenez interview 18/5/2000). Furthermore, Tlalpan informal leader Julieta 
also adds, 'the government of the city made a very uneven division of some 
neighbourhoods and in some cases divided neighbourhoods having very similar 
problems and joined them with others which did not have the same demands at all' 
(Julieta interview 3/5/2000). The 'division problem' is in a way related to class. For 
instance, it would be illogical to put in the same participatory unit an upper class 
neighbourhood that has got all their basic infrastructure problems solved with 
neighbourhoods facing such problems as lack of piped drinking water or electricity. 
A second problem concerns the promotion of the legislation. According to Julieta, 'the 
government did not effectively promote the citizen participation law, the general public 
do not participate because they do not know what the benefits of doing so in a 
neighbourhood committee are' (Julieta interview 3/5/2000). For instance, Tlalpan 
resident, Alfonso Garcfa Sdnchez stated, 'whenever I have a problem I go directly to the 
local authorities because I do not know the functions that my neighbourhood 
representatives have' (Garcfa Sdnchez interview 5/11/2001). This view was also 
supported by Gustavo Carrizales and Fabiola Kmenez, who also live in Tlalpan, but 
who do not believe that through their neighbourhood representatives they could expect 
to solve the problems of their respective neighbourhoods. 21 It seems that Tlalpan - and 
Mexico City's local authorities in general - need to promote more clearly the capacities 
of these participatory bodies, else the average citizen will keep addressing his/her 
community problems directly to local officials, ignoring the potential of the 
neighbourhood representative scheme. 
A third issue is that very high expectations were created by the operation of these 
neighbourhood bodies. Pueblos Neighbourhood Committee Co-ordinator Martfn Flores 
recalls: 
During the first three months that the legislation operated, neighbourhood 
committees worked according to the programme and to the law. After people 
began to realise the true limitations of the legislation, people lost their faith in 
this structure and stopped participating. A reform that can guarantee greater 
empowerment of the citizenry is required (Flores interview 14/4/2000). 
A fourth factor is that in some circumstances the local functionaries dealing with the 
neighbourhood committee structure give priority to the needs of those groups 
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represented by informal leaders. Committee leader Samuel Moreno comments, 'I would 
say that our performance is highly based on how good or bad relationship we (as a 
neighbourhood representatives) have with official authorities. In some cases 
neighbourhood organisations are given less importance than informal leaders' (Moreno 
interview 16/5/2000). 
A fifth element deals with the reform promoted by the 2000-2006 governor of Mexico 
City L6pez Obrador. Although the initiative to provide citizens with a budget seems a 
positive one, not all citizens agree. For Samuel Moreno, 
I personally think that should not happen, (providing neighbourhood 
committees with a budget) it could be a good campaign plan, but that would 
definitely bring corruption. If currently we are having problems to start the 
initiative imagine once you speak about money, neighbours would start almost 
killing each other to gain these positions. We should not manage resources, but 
neighbourhood committees should have enough faculties to operate as truly 
democratic structures (Moreno interview 16/5/2000). 
The idea of providing neighbourhood committees with a budget could affect negatively 
the unconsolidated structure of the neighbourhood committees. In the view of Juan 
Mdjica, having a budget can be considered as being under cross fire, as there are plenty 
of people who misuse public budgets. If they do so, (provide neighbours with a budget) 
corruption is going to definitely take place (see Mdjica interview 2000). For other 
neighbourhood leaders the initiative should be about giving more legal attributes rather 
than providing a budget. Thus G6rman Gdzman believes 'we would like to have more 
faculties in decision making processes, because the law limits our deliberation and 
participation power' (Gdzman interview 27/4/2000). After listening to these views one 
might think that perhaps the initiative should be about giving more powers to this local 
structure of community participation rather than attaching it to the monetary element of 
a budget. 
The last point deals with the involvement of political parties through neighbourhood 
organisations. Although the CPL forbids the involvement of political parties, they did 
participate, especially during the neighbourhood election process. It is true that the 
PRI's influence in neighbourly based organisations has diminished, however it is also 
true that other political institutions have replaced those spaces left by the official party. 
As commented Coapa Neighbourhood Committee Co-ordinator Alejandro Pdrez: 
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The PRD and the PAN saw an opportunity to 'fill-in' those spaces left by 
the PRI. Neighbourly based organisations will always be a good forum for 
representing community interests and a good platform for future political 
careers. In some neighbourhoods the influence of political parties has been 
evident as some leaders counted on the support of these organisations to reach 
the neighbourhood leader position (P6rez interview 24/4/2000). 
Other views collected admit that they had to get involved in a political institution to 
gain experience as a citizen representative, neighbourhood committee leader Maurilio 
Vdzquez affirmed: 
I began working in the community 15 years ago, and when you work at 
the community level you realise that everything is ruled by structures and one of 
those structures is the one constituted by political parties. If you want to perform 
any social activity at the local level you need to be involved in a political force, I 
tried to avoid it as much as I could but for the last three years I became a 
member of the PAN. But I do not expect to receive any personal benefits. In San 
Pedro the PAN had no presence and this is what motivated me to become a PAN 
member, we need to accept different postures and ideologies and that is why I 
joined an opposition party. Having options is part of a democracy (Maurilio 
Vdzquez interview 12/5/2000). 
During the 2000 presidential election some organisations were defending very specific 
political interests, mainly supporting one of Mexico's three major political parties: PRI, 
PAN, or PRD. According to 1997-2000 Coapa Neighbourhood Committee Co-ordinator 
Alejandro Perez, 'during the 2000 general election there were committee leaders who 
openly supported political parties and who were even receiving a salary for doing this 
promotion' (P6rez interview 24/4/2000). In such a politicised environment perhaps the 
idea of the PRI to give neighbourhood organisations party support is simply realistic. If 
political parties are going to take part in the election of neighbourhood organisations 
anyway, then it might be better to have them officially represented. 
Informal Neighbourhood Committees 
Local authorities play an important part in strengthening neighbourhood committees, 
because if they continue giving preference to infon-nal organisations, then 'official 
neighbourhood organisations' would not be perceived as having the necessary strength 
to solve community issues. Local authorities have to get used to applying the CPL and 
not do what informal leaders do, which is to 'jump' any type of official regulations and 
tackle issues directly at local authorities' offices. One of the aspects that has caused 
confusion within Tlapan's population is that there is not enough information about the 
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advantages and disadvantages of organising through the CPL participatory mechanisms. 
This lack of information contributes to public scepticism about the way in which 
participatory mechanisms operate. As informal neighbourhood leader Julieta observes: 
I would like to ask any of the 16 delegados if they promoted the 
initiative? I would like to ask them if they gave enough information about it? I 
did not know what the initiative was about, and this was only a few days before 
the neighbourhood committee leader election took place (Julieta interview 
3/5/2000). 
Not surprisingly, many citizen organisations remain independent, According to informal 
community leader, Socorro Jfmenez, the reasons for not joining the neighbourhood 
committee are the following: 
I do not know the programme (neighbourhood committees) and most 
people in the municipality do not have a clue about it, this is why we preferred to 
stay as an independent organisation. If local authorities were to guarantee us that 
under the new scheme we would have the same benefits, then we will form a 
neighbourhood committee otherwise I do not see any reason to do so (Jimenez 
interview 18/5/2000). 
These informal organisations have created their own networks within the governmental 
apparatus, these contacts have been developed through a long-term sort of labour 
relationship. The mediator role puts this type of leaders in a privileged position. In some 
cases, it allows to ask for political favours as a condition for maintaining the stability of 
the neighbourhood. 
I know the channels of communication between authorities and citizens I 
write the letters some other neighbourhood committees write for local 
authorities. They (committee leaders) sign all the documents, but I'm the one 
pushing them to keep track of what is happening with all the initiatives 
presented. Me and my mum do everything, I do not want to take the credit for 
doing all these, I just want to work for the community, but these people use my 
experience to achieve their goals (Julieta interview 3/5/2000). 
If working class citizens prefer to conduct their demands in a neighbourhood committee, 
they have three possible scenarios. Firstly, they could find a neighbourhood committee 
led by someone with very specific political interests, 22 which would not be very useful, 
Secondly, they could find a committee divided by personal or party interests. Finally, 
they could find a committee working properly, but without strong legal bases to giving a 
rapid response. As stated by neighbourhood committee leader Maurilio Vdzquez: 
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All social policies are co-opted by the previous political system, and 
when you want to take an active role within the neighbourhood committee, 
according to the law, you are only authorised to be a channel, but no more than 
that. We should have more legal faculties, it should be a public thing to decide 
and to take a more active role regarding different policies implemented by local 
authorities (Vazquez interview 12/5/2000). 
Referendum and Plebiscite 
The first case presented in this chapter suggested several criticisms of the way in which 
the consultation was implemented. Although the ten questions presented in the process 
were relevant to the development and further consolidation of the participatory agenda, 
the whole purpose of the consultation does not seem very clear. The CPL establishes 
that when a plebiscite (this consultation was promoted as a plebiscite) takes place, then 
authorities must act in accordance with what the people decide. However, in this 
particular case, the result of the consultation could not have influenced in any way the 
authorities' decision over the ten issues covering the agenda., because it would still have 
to be voted at congress. The result of this consultation was given to congressmen in an 
attempt to influence their decisions over the political reform of the city; it was like 
saying, 'if the public says it, then you as their representatives must approve it'. To date 
the reforms proposed in the 1999 consultation are still under discussion, and although 
the majority of the public supported the proposed reforms, their participation did not 
have a direct impact in the outcome. 
The second participatory process was simpler. It is true that protest marches constantly 
disrupt the traffic of the city, but we believe that the motion to create a protest march 
law was necessary and did not need to be put to the public. Although this consultation 
process lasted longer than the previous one, the number of people who participated was 
less. Not surprisingly, the majority of the people who took part in this process thought 
that a protest march law was essential for the city. 
If the PRD keeps on implementing participatory processes where citizens do not see an 
immediate impact on the outcomes of the issues they are asked to participate in, then it 
may be putting at risk its political capital. When citizens do not perceive the result of 
their participation immediately, then they could be demotivated and stop taking part in 
these processes. Although the PRD has been openly promoting the utilisation of 
participatory mechanisms, they could be misunderstanding the role of these processes. 
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They should perhaps take more care when implementing these processes to stop what 
has been identified in Mexico City as 'consultitis'. The term has been developed by 
some members of the PRI, and it refers to PRD's apparent will to consult the population 
about almost every issue related to the City. Consultation processes carry a high 
political and economic cost that can influence the 'normal' election process. 
Neighbourhood Collaboration, Neighbourhood Consultation and Complaints Unit 
In the example presented in this chapter, neighbourhood collaboration and consultation 
transformed from practices of preservation to practices of self-protection. The weekly 
meetings held at the Fuentes Brotantes Park began as a good example of how 
neighbourhood organisations can play a key role in larger networks involving a wide 
variety of actors. The information provided by the neighbours taking part in the 
meetings served as an important database, especially regarding the main problems 
surrounding the area of the park. Both neighbourhood collaboration and consultation 
were at the core of the weekly agenda, which also covered ecological and public 
security issues. However, once the legal team determined that some neighbours taking 
part in the meetings were living in parts of the park that they should not, then the tone of 
the meetings changed. The willingness with which neighbours were co-operating with 
the members of the 'external' groups interested in saving the park changed to display a 
greater interest and unity in keeping their own houses. 
It appears that the positive side of neighbourhood collaboration and consultation is that 
through any of these processes citizens do receive information before a decision is 
taken. Although in the case of the Fuentes Brotantes Park, it was through these 
mechanisms that the initiative to save the park was halted, we can say that both 
practices worked as a sort of 'defence-mechanism' for those groups not wanting to be 
relocated. This example of neighbourhood collaboration and consultation therefore 
highlights the relevance of informing before acting, which seems to be one of the 
greatest concerns of the PRD in Mexico City. 
Public Assemblies and Official Visits 
In the case presented above, authorities managed to divert the attention of the 
neighbourhood committee by providing alternative solutions to their water problem. 
The authority was in the last months of the 1997-2000 local mandate, so it was easy to 
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promise 'express solutions' to problems that need months, if not years, to be solved. 
This is a point that needs to be addressed by authorities, because if neighbourhood 
committee leaders are not taken seriously or are fooled, then people's interest in 
participating in these bodies could be diminished. If neighbourhood committees are not 
given the importance accorded by the CPL, then informal leaders (i. e. local caciques) 
will continue dominating neighbourhood organisations. Neighbourhood committee 
leaders need the support of local authorities to consolidate as a genuinely influential 
force in the municipality. As stated by neighbourhood committee leader Maurilio 
Vdzquez: 
The government has the faculty or the capacity to make us strong or not 
making us strong. Why? Because the citizen who takes an active role in the 
neighbourhood committee knows the problems he/she is facing and could do 
something to put pressure on authorities. But those controlling the political 
power have the last word. Whether they will use neighbourhood committees as 
part of a 'political machinery' or whether they will give citizens the possibility 
to influence the outcome of essential political decisions is the authorities' choice 
and we have little to say (VAzquez interview 12/5/2000). 
Condusion 
Seeking an alternative style of government to previous prUsta administrations, the PRD 
established the CPL to offer the public real participatory opportunities where their say 
would be part of those decisions reached at the local level. Tlalpan represents an 
interesting 'participatory laboratory, ' not only due to the creation of the 1998 CPL - 
which as discussed above encompasses a wide range of permanent and non-permanent 
mechanisms - but also based on the way this participatory agenda has been 
implemented. One of the most important aspects identified deals with the fact that the 
cession of power promised in the CPL has not necessarily taken place; the data collected 
in Tlalpan shows that citizens have not experienced a genuine transfer of power. Indeed, 
it must not be forgotten that one of the main concerns of the PRD in Mexico City and in 
Tlalpan was to get rid of pre-existing PRI clientelistic structures that operated at the 
local level. However, it seems that local authorities underestimated the possibility that if 
the public does not feel empowered then, the poor in particular are practically forced to 
use whichever channels are available to improve their living conditions. Citizens 
(especially lower class ones) still feel that the channels of communication represented 
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by informal community leaders can be more effective in some circumstances, thereby 
reducing the potential of the participatory schemes proposed in the CPL. 
Creating a 'citizen participation system' proved to involve more than simply providing a 
legal structure or the adequate channels of communication between authorities and 
citizens. As even if the most empowering participatory schemes are outlined on paper, 
the way theses mechanisms are implemented is crucial in determining their success or 
failure. Despite the PRD's democratic aims, the way Tlalpan authorities have 
implemented their initiatives has considerably limited their potential. 
The case also shows that class is an aspect that has to be considered when participatory 
mechanisms are implemented, - especially in an environment where upper middle 
neighbourhoods are built next to working class ones - as the needs faced by both social 
groups vary widely. The upper classes arc more concerned about such issues"as 
pollution or traffic, whilst the lower classes still confront basic infrastructure problems 
dealing with sewage or piped drinking water. The high involvement of political parties, 
especially in permanent participatory structures, is an issue that will have to be 
addressed, and perhaps the idea of the PRI to allow political parties to participate in 
these elections is a possible solution. 
Despite the criticisms presented above, the implementation of the participatory schemes 
in Tlalpan did bring greater transparency to the local administration. And, in some 
cases, these mechanisms (e. g. neighbourhood committees, neighbourhood 
consultations) proved effective 'self-defence' mechanisms against the unilateral 
decision-making that characterised most local administrations in Mexico. But are these 
trends the same elsewhere? The next chapter introduces the case of Puebla, where 
political changes at the local level have affected the way the participatory agenda has 
been carried out by the last three administrations. 
Notes 
1 Previously the governor of Mexico City was appointed by the President. In the 1993 plebiscite 331,376 
citizens participated and the great majority voted to the democratic election of the governor of the City 
(La Jornada 21/3/1998). 
2 Some of the reforms include the establishment of Mexico City as the 32 nd state of the country, and also 
the 'official' municipalisation of the 16 delegaciones that form the capital (see La Jornada 16/2/1998). 3 For more details about non-permanent and permanent forms of citizen participation see chapter 2. 
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4 Replacing the division used by the 'block representatives' initiative implemented during the 1980s and 
throughout most of the 1990s. 
5 These are the four territorial divisions found in Mexico City: a colonia and a barrio are commonly 
known as a neighbourhood, a pueblo is used to define a town or a rural area and a unidad habitacional is 
an area composed of purpose built groups of flats. 
6 Candidates would not be permitted to use any particular colour during their campaigns, instead the law 
establishes that numbers should be used (see article 94 of the 1998 Citizen Participation Law). 
7 See articles 91,92 and 93 of the 1998 CPL. 
8 There has only been one plebiscite implemented, the case will be discussed later in this chapter. 
9 For further details see 1998 CPL. 
10 For more information regardingjefes de manzana see Safa 1997. 
11 For example, 250 people led by the prit'sta local MP Mr. Humberto Serrano tried to invade an 
ecological reserve of the municipality. Luis G6mez, the judicial secretariat in Tlalpan threatened that the 
municipality will sue the Agrarian Confederation of Mexico, political arm of the PRI, for the illegal 
action and also for damaging some official vehicles ( La Jomada 12/8/1999). 
12 The NGOs involved in the consultation were: Frente Unitario Progresista de Tlaltengo, Comuneros 
Productores de San Francisco, Tlalnepantla, Xochimilco; Campesinos Ejidatarios Independientes de San 
Gregorio Atlapulco, Circulo de Madres Trabajadoras Campesinas, Asociaci6n Interdisciplinaria de 
Ciudadanos de Sta Cruz. 
13 Advisor of Cuauht6moc Cirdenas during the 1997-2000 governor mandate. 
14 This means that more than 90 percent of the population is not covered by any type of medical services. 
15 Around f 50 million. 
16 Around f 35,500. 
17 Around f 143,000. 
18 In fact the consultation costed 4.5 million pesos (approximately; E 320,000). 
19 The commission was constituted by the following members: Representing the neighbours: Fuentes 
Brotantes, Cantera, and Camisetas neighbourhood committee co-ordinators. Representing the ecologists: 
Dr. Luis Sdnchez (Altavista NGO). Representing Tlalpan's legal depertment: Mr. Rene Cervantes. 
Representing Tlalpan's hydraulic commission: Mr. Hector Machado. Trust leader: Mr. Emilio de 
Antuftano. The schools: Lancaster School representative, Peterson School, representative, British 
American School representative, Jos6 Azueta School representative, 163 Technical School representative. 
Secretary: Ms. Olivia Araujo. 
20 Political reasons could have also influenced this decision, as elections were about to be held during the 
summer 2000. 
21 See Carrizales interview 5/11/2001 and Jfmenez interview 8/11/2001. 
22 San Pedro Martfr provides an example. Where there is a so called community leader that has been 
working for twenty years and he wanted to use the neighbourhood structure as a step to get an 
independent candidature to represent his local constituency (cited from interview with Jaime Alvardo 
2000). 
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Chapter 4 
Puebla 
Introduction 
Although participatory schemes are generally intended to generate confidence and 
openness, in an environment characterised by political scandals and untrustworthy 
politicians, this is not necessarily always the case. The municipality of Puebla, currently 
governed by the PRI, offers one of the most interesting scenarios for the analysis of 
participatory initiatives in Mexico, especially bearing in mind the circumstances under 
which such participatory programmes as the Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN were 
developed. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the participatory initiatives that have 
been recently implemented in Puebla, focussing on three projects: Ley Bartlett- 
COPLADEMUN, the PAN-UN initiative, and the participatory schemes implemented 
by the 1999-2002 local administration. This case is of great interest for our research 
purposes, as it represents a good example of how the 'volatility' of local politics may 
see the rapid replacement of initiatives whenever administrations change. Yet the 
'replaced' schemes have not simply disappeared. Puebla is fascinating because there are 
participatory initiatives from different levels of government and different parties 
existing at the same time. COPLADEMUN was a state government initiative whilst the 
PAN-UN scheme emanated from municipal government. Indeed, Puebla was practically 
transformed into a participatory 'battleground' by the PRI and the PAN, which itself 
indicates the contested nature of the participatory agenda. These characteristics 
underline the importance of increasing the various political uses to which participatorya 
agendas might be put. 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. It starts with an overview of Puebla's main 
characteristics, followed by a section that reviews the controversial Ley Bartlett- 
COPLADEMUN initiative. The third section introduces the PAN-UN participatory 
scheme, and the next analyses the implications of the decision of the Supreme Court 
regarding the implementation of the Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN initiative. The fifth 
section evaluates both the Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN and the PAN-UN schemes. 
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Finally, the sixth part covers the participatory agenda that has been carried out since the 
PRI re-gained control of the municipality of Puebla in the 1999 local election, and the 
last section analyses the three schemes discussed in this chapter. 
Overview of Puebla 
Puebla is the capital city of the state of Puebla. The municipality is divided into 514 
territorial units (i. e. neighbourhoods, villages, or rural areas) and the population, as 
stated by Puebla's (1999-2002) citizen participation director Alejandro Armenta-Mier: 
'is quite heterogeneous, there are sectors of the population with high income and levels 
of education, and on the other hand we also find rural areas mainly inhabited by 
illiterates' (Armenta-Mier interview 23/6/2000). According to the 2000 census, Puebla 
has a population of 1,250,000 inhabitants, a figure that represents about thirty percent of 
the total population of the state. The average growth rate of the population of 
municipality is 2.79 percent per year; almost double the 1.44 percent national average 
growth rate. ' There are 17 juntas auxiliares in the municipality, and similar to Tlalpan, 
in 11 of them there are still people engaged in agricultural activities. As a consequence 
of the disordered way in which most urban centres have been developed, many rural 
areas are now within big cities. 
Puebla is strategically positioned between the port of Veracruz and Mexico City, a 
factor that has motivated an increasing number of companies to establish their industries 
there. Formerly dominated by the Volkswagen plant situated in the state, which still has 
a strong impact on its economy, in recent years the steel industry - represented by the 
conglomerate HYLSA - and other productive activities have been developed (e. g. 
INDEPENDENCIA Chemical company). Industrial parks where all the facilities are 
given to national and international manufacturers have been built, and a considerable 
number of assembly plants have been established within these spaces. To improve the 
growth of the city, a 20 year urban development programme has been established to 
plan the adaptations that would have to be made for the coming years (see La Jornada 
de Oriente 28/9/2000). After this brief overview of the main characteristics of Puebla, 
the next section introduces the controversial Ley Bartlett participatory scheme. 
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The Ley Bartlett Scheme 
Background 
The so-called Ley Bartlett scheme was an initiative of the prilsta governor of Puebla 
Manuel Bartlett in response to changes in the distribution of federal resources to states 
and municipalities. Previously, federal funds to municipalities came through the state 
governor who then decided on their distribution to municipalities in the state. However, 
following criteria established in the 1995-2000 National Development Plan, in 
December 1997 a new fiscal co-ordination law was approved by the federal congress. 
Using mathematical distributions, 2 the new legislation was intended to provide greater 
financial resources to the country's poorest municipalities, and included mechanisms to 
make those resources more accountable. In this way the legislation sought to avoid the 
problem associated with Salinas' main social programme, PRONASOL, where 
resources intended to alleviate poverty were redirected to political purposes (i. e. 
financing political campaigns). The document allowed for fairer economic resource 
distributions, based on the number of inhabitants and such indicators as income and 
primary needs, 3 rather than using the governor's personal criteria as it happened in the 
past. 
However, these changes provoked a political row. It involved an 'obscure' arrangement, 
commonly known in Mexico as concertacesi6n, 4 between the national committees of 
the PAN and the PRI, where finance secretary Guillermo Ortiz played a key role', 
promising PAN legislators greater resources for those municipalities governed by their 
party, provided they voted in favour of the initiative (La Jornada 28/l/1998). Ironically, 
this initiative promoted by the finance minister benefited the PRI's main political 
enemies. It favoured the PRD's social demands as it increased welfare expenditure by 
10 percent whilst it also benefited the PAN by boosting the resources sent to states and 
municipalities throughout the country, a sort of 'effective federalism' (La Jornada 
14/11/1997). Indeed, President Zedillo (1994-2000) was widely criticised by some PRI 
members, as the arTangement was perceived as handing power to the PAN (La Jornada 
28/01/1998). Zedillo tried to rebuff those criticisms stating, 'it is absolutely false that by 
strengthening our federalism this administration is favouring certain political parties' 
(La Jomada 21/2/1998). 
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Few pritsta governors welcomed the initiative, as all resources were to be allocated 
under federal formulas and not by state governors, as had normally happened before. 
Some PRI governors were also concerned that by allocating greater resources to some of 
the country's poorest municipalities, the new scheme was benefiting areas under 
opposition party rule. A third concern was that in 1998 ten governors (including 
Puebla's governor and all of its 217 mayors) were to be elected, so if the distributors of 
all federal resources were to be pre-determined before being received by state 
authorities, there would be no possibility of reallocating federal resources to the PRI's 
state finance departments, a common practice in Mexico under prilsta administrations, 
particularly in the run-up to elections. 
One of the most ferocious opponents of the initiative was Puebla's governor, Manuel 
Bartlett. In an attempt to gain national exposure, (he then hoped to become the PRI's 
presidential candidate for the 2000 presidential election), Bartlett launched his own 'true 
federalism' initiative. As La Jomada observes: 'Bartlett has recently shown a 'true 
federalist' spirit and this has inevitably helped him to be in the national media. He has 
used his position (as governor) to fight for direct access to those federal resources in 
order to 'inject' them into this year's governor campaign' (La Joniada 28/l/1998). 
Bartlett's 'true federalism' emerged in another piece of legislation, the Law for New 
Federalism of the State of Puebla (LNFSP), or what was later known as Ley Bartlett. 
The initiative led to the formation of Municipal Planning Committees 
(COPLADEMUNS) that would be in charge of prioritising and deciding where these 
resources are spent (La Jornada 28/l/1998). Highlighting the need for a truly 
distributive and more balanced allocation of federal funds, Governor Bartlett introduced 
legislation enabling economic resources to be received and redistributed by state 
authorities, rather than, as proposed in the 1997 fiscal co-ordination law, directly from 
federal authorities to municipalities. A 'democratic touch' was also included, as the 
COPLADEMUNs were expected to work as decision-making forums, involving the 
participation of authorities and citizens. These initiatives were discussed at Puebla's 
State Congress amidst a chaotic atmosphere, 5 but in the end Bartlett's project prevailed. 
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Ley Bartlett 
Ley Bartleu targets the improvement of social infrastructure at the municipal level, 
based on what the Zedillo presidential administration defined as 'new federalism. ' The 
aim of new federalism was to strengthen state and local government finance 
departments: 
Mexican New Federalism contributes importantly to strengthen national unity, 
by highlighting the federal pact. It is by activating the relationships between state 
and local actors that federal authorities expect to transfer more responsibilities for 
achieving a greater political, economic, regional and administrative development 
where citizen participation will become an important civic activity (Diario Oficial 
28/1/1998: 4). 
According to the commission that developed the Ley Bartlett, the main objectives of the 
legislation were: 
1) Protecting those programmes installed for building piped water networks or sewage, 
rural electrification, education, health, housing improvement, rural roads and rural 
productive infrastructure. 
2) To make sure that the resources available for these initiatives are applied through 
programmes where the community takes an active decision-making role. 
3) To guarantee that all municipalities receive more economic resources than the 
previous year. 
4) To ensure the execution of all those social projects and programmes included in 
each local development plan. 
5) To increase the amount of economic resources allocated for public security 
programmes. 
6) To apply all economic resources available to combat poverty. 
7) To establish a transparent management of economic resources. 
A core element of the legislation is the involvement of the community in decision- 
making processes. In accordance with federal and local planning legislation, this, law 
encourages the state, in co-ordination with municipalities and juntas auxiliares, 
(community boards) to promote the involvement of local actors in discussing and 
executing social programmes (Diario Oficial 28/l/1998: 6). 
The body created by the Ley Bartlett for deliberating local matters is the 
COPLADEMUN (municipal planning board). COPLADEMUNs are the forums where 
authorities and citizens would gather to discuss the best ways for improving the living 
conditions of their respective communities. 
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The legislation guarantees that the participation in these forums 
(COPLADEMUNs) is open and consequently democratic. Not only local official 
authorities take part, but also those representatives elected in each 
neighbourhood, rural area, or sector of the city with compelling social needs 
(Diario Oficial 28/l/1998: 6). 
The initiative stresses that the strengthening of juntas auxiliares (community boards) is 
essential for the success of the programme. Precisely the juntas auxiliaries had little 
influence over resources and were therefore unable to respond effectively to any 
demands. Now in accordance with article 72 of Ley Bartlett, juntas auxiliares would 
have the right to demand that municipalities allocate resources to those projects 
previously prioritised and debated by citizens. It will be the juntas' responsibility to use 
their newly allocated federal resources to execute all those projects approved by 
COPLADEMUNs. It is also their responsibility to be accountable to their respective 
local authorities. Article 45 requires that: Juntas auxiliares must present their local 
authorities and later the state congress, under the terms and conditions stated in the 
municipal law, with an account of how all their resources were used (Diario Oficial 
28/l/1998: 8). Ley Bartlett stated that juntas auxiliares will work closely with local 
authorities in administering the resources available within each locality. It also 
emphasised the important role of juntas in revising and executing municipal projects. 
From the budget allocated to municipalities, juntas will receive a share according to the 
number of inhabitants andjuntas auxiliares in each municipality, distributed thus: 
a) Five percent when the municipality has from one to five juntas. 
b) Ten percent when the municipality had from six to ten juntas. 
c) Fifteen percent when the municipality has 11 or more juntas. 
Juntas are obliged to apply their resources to those projects approved by 
COPLADEMUNs and to provide a report on how those resources were used. The report 
will be directed to the state congress, under the terms and conditions mentioned in 
6 Puebla's municipal constitution. 
Federal funds can be used for five purposes: 
1) Education. 
2) Health. 
3) Social infrastructure. 
4) Strengthening municipalities and the federal district (Mexico City). 
5) Multiple use fund. 
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According to Article 8 of Ley Bartlett these funds will be administered by state 
authorities, although the decision on how to spend those resources will be taken at 
COPLADEMUNs. 7 State authorities will take into account all those decisions taken 
within each COPLADEMUN and also will consider the viewpoints of such 
organisations as academic institutions, groups of entrepreneurs, workers unions, and 
farmers who could also take part in these gatherings. 8 
L----, v Bartlett emphasises several ways to strengthen and expand the capacity of 
municipalities: 'a boost will be given to those programmes aimed at strengthening each 
municipality, to make them more responsive to solving each community's needs' 
(LNFSP 1998). Article 19 of the document establishes that state economic resources 
and responsibilities will be transferred to municipalities, as a measure to improve their 
capacity to respond to those social sectors of the population where development has not 
yet arrived. 9 Municipalities will also be obliged to present a report including the amount 
of resources received and invested in communitarian projects. 10 
In theory, Ley Bartlett offers the opportunity to participate in local politics through 
COPLADEMUNs as a means of improving the living conditions of the most deprived 
groups of society. The next analyses the legal basis of the COPLADEMUN. 
COPLADEMUNs: An open spacefor participation? 
Ley Bartlett's main democratic feature is the involvement of the community in the 
COPLADEMUNs. Within these organisations, groups of citizens, local officials and 
other participants interacting at the municipal level were expected to participate in 
debates prioritising the projects to be implemented in their respective localities. Articles 
25 and 26 of the Mexican Constitution" were used to justify the creation of 
COPLADEMLJNs. According to article 3 of the COPLADEMUN statutes, state 
resources will be allocated to COPLADEMUNs through the Sistenia Estatal de 
Coordinaci6n Hacendaria (State system for Fiscal Co-ordination) and not through the 
1997 Federal Fiscal Co-ordination agreement. The funds available through this scheme 
were mainly to be used for investing in health services and education. 
COPLADEMUNs operate on a project base, where community interventions would not 
be regular, as meetings would only take place whenever there is a budget to discuss. The 
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projects had to be approved by the local authority in agreement with officials from the 
state finance department, and resources would then be provided on a monthly basis. 
Each COPLADEMUN had to be composed of the following members. Firstly, the 
mayor, who would be the president, with the power to decide over any controversies 
taking place during the deliberating process. Secondly, a member of the state 
administration (finance department) was present to follow how each of these projects 
develops, with the right to speak but not to vote. Thirdly, neighbourhood representatives 
had to take part in each meeting, with the right to express their opinions and to vote on 
any of the issues on the agenda. Finally, for each project the community elected a 
committee project leader, whose main duty was to act as a watchdog until the project is 
concluded, with the right to speak and vote in each meeting. 
These bodies were required to meet at least every three months or, if an issue emerges 
between meetings, whenever the president of the COPLADEMUN considers it 
convenient. The meeting calendar was divided as follows: during the first three months 
of the year each proposal or project were to be analysed. During the second and the third 
trimester an analysis of the current situation took place, concluding with the final 
evaluation and a financial report of the expenditure throughout the year. Each year, the 
secretary of social development was in charge of presenting a report of all the projects 
executed, a document that for accounting purposes was attached to the government's 
expenses report presented to the local congress. 
A key aspect of the COPLADEMUN initiative is citizen's participation, not only in 
decision-making processes, but also by providing different types of support for the 
accomplishment of projects. According to article 33 of the COPLADEMUN 
constitution: 
a) Each COPLADEMUN will define the form in which the beneficiaries will support 
each initiative. They could do this by providing economic resources, labour or 
construction materials. 
b) For each project, the budget will be constituted entirely by fiscal resources, although 
citizen's support will also be required for accomplishing projects. 
C) All resources coming from the community should be kept separately from those 
resources coming from fiscal sources and mayors are responsible for presenting a 
report on the way in which these resources are spent. 
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According to article 34 of the initiative, whenever the community provides economic 
resources, a project committee will have to be created, to analyse how those resources 
or other type of aid provided by the community are used. 
Another important aspect is the way in which the budget is controlled within this 
participation body. For every project, a budget was assigned by the state finance 
department and all the members of the COPLADEMUN had access to the account 
details. Mayors played a crucial role, as they are responsible for opening the accounts 
and have a close relationship with state finance departments. 12 The mayor was also 
responsible for registering and controlling the flow of economic resources available. 13 if 
a project needed to be modified, then the municipality had to inforin. state authorities, 
specifically the secretary of social development, about these changes required. 
Ley Bartlett's strengths and weaknesses 
On paper it seems that, Ley Bartlett and COPLADEMUNs seek to increase people's 
decision-making power, to make authorities accountable and to promote a more 
democratic environment. Some of the advantages of the scheme include the provision of 
greater financial resources to Puebla's less developed municipalities, along with the 
involvement of all those official and unofficial bodies interacting at the local level in the 
institutions known as COPLADEMUNs. However, the motives of Governor Bartlett in 
promoting the Ley Bartlett and COPLADEMUNs have been questioned. 
Two key features of the scheme highlight both its advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, 
the power that is given to juntas auxiliares to administer and deliver resources for their 
respective communities. It is true thatjuntas auxiliares are composed of citizens elected 
to represent the interests of their localities, that is the positive side, as theoretically 
speaking, juntas auxilaires would have an active role in COPLADEMUNs and could 
push local authorities to deliver economic resources faster. On the other hand, thejueces 
auxiliares have previously played an important political role supporting the PRI during 
election processes. Consequently, there is no guarantee that these local bosses would not 
continue to favour the interests of the PRI which through the state finance department is 
in charge of all the economic resources allocated via COPLADEMUNs. 
The second point deals with the flow of resources from federal authorities, via the state, 
to each municipality. One advantage is that state authorities would probably have a 
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clearer understanding than federal authorities of the problems affecting each localitY. 
However, allocating using governor's personal criteria could result in a similar scenario 
to PRONASOL, where state authorities and local elites struggled over the control of 
budgets that should have been used for development projects, and which often ended up 
supporting political campaigns (see Kaufman and Trejo 1997). How could it be 
guaranteed that under Ley Bartlett's statutes this would not happen again? 
Thus it would seem that 'all that glitters is not gold, ' moreover, there were also legal 
aspects of Ley Bartlett which are not very clear, or which apparently contradicted the 
participatory principles included in the Mexican Constitution - these two points will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Reactions to Ley Bartlett 
Once Ley Bartlett was approved by Puebla's local congress, it provoked a series of 
reactions, especially from opposition political parties who criticised the legal basis of 
the new legislation. The main argument used against Ley Bartlett was that it was 
unconstitutional. Immediately after its approval by Puebla's priista majority, a protest 
march to Mexico City was led by panista local and federal congressmen and also by 
Puebla's 21 opposition mayors (La Jornada 28/1/1998). The case acquired national 
recognition as the press publicised it, and panista mayors from different parts of the 
country showed their sympathy to the cause. 14 The reaction from legislators at the 
federal congress was firm, according to Carlos Medina, PAN's congress leader in 1998: 
'Ley Bartlett goes against municipal autonomy, it creates parallel institutions to local 
authorities and a fourth level of government. By establishing municipal planning 
committees, the legislation gives them powers to decide on how resources are spent, 
violating the constitution' (La Jornada 28/l/1998). 
The PRD also strongly criticised Puebla's legislation. According to Eduardo Espinoza, 
PRD's municipal issues representative at the Federal Congress, 'Bartlett is rebelling 
against allocating federal resources to those municipalities which in accordance with the 
1997 Fiscal Co-ordination Law require it. We are seriously analysing taking the case to 
the Supreme Court, as Mr. Bartlett is definitely violating the constitution' (La Jonzada 
28/l/1998). 
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Not surprisingly, the PRI showed its support for Bartlett's motion, arguing that the 
governor only exercised his 'freedom and sovereignty' when promoting Ley Bartlett 
which was expected to bring benefits to the poorest people of Puebla and also important 
advantages to those municipalities inhabited by indigenous people. Priista federal 
congressman Jos6 Luis Flores observes, 'Ley Bartlett is going to mainly benefit 
indigenous municipalities, furthermore, the legislation is not only going to increase 
resource allocation to priista municipalities, but also to those governed by the PAN (La 
Jornada 29/l/1998). 
The struggle to find alternatives to Bartlett's initiative lasted a couple of weeks. The 
constitutional struggle over the legal basis under which COPLADEMUNs were 
established was, effectively, a political battle between pritstas and panistas. According 
to PAN's national leader, Felipe Calder6n, 'the best formula to assigning resources for 
all states and municipalities is by creating a Federal Council, formed by the three levels 
of government (local, state and federal) and the legislative' (La Jomada 08/2/1998). 
Panistas agreed that with the formation of such a body, resource distribution would not 
fall under any political party's label, so it would be better distributed. Even without a 
Federal Council, Calder6n called for the 1997 Fiscal Co-ordination Law to be respected, 
'in the 1997 Law the criteria to assist all vulnerable groups in society is clearly 
delimited, with indicators considering health, education, poverty and unemployment; 
these indexes should be respected by all, especially by state governors' (La Jonzada 
08/2/1998). 
On 20 February 1998 a group of 12 panista mayors headed by Diego Femdndez de 
Cevallos, who was also trying to become presidential candidate for the PAN, presented 
the case at the Supreme Court. Mr. Femdndez justified their action by stating, 'Puebla's 
governor is violating the constitution by establishing intermediate institutions that 
interfere with municipal autonomy. Governor Bartlett is assuming responsibilities that 
are municipal (i. e. planning, prioritising and allocating resources)' (La Jornada 
21/02/1998). PAN's national leader, Felipe Calder6n also declared, 'article 115 of the 
constitution clearly states that intermediate authorities between states and municipalities 
cannot be created. Ley Bartlett creates COPLADEMUNS, which obstruct municipal 
actions of government and the functions performed by the finance department of 
Puebla' (La Jornada 21/2/1998). 
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In spring 1998 the Supreme Court announced a temporary suspension of Ley Bartlett in 
the 13 panista municipalities 15 that protested against its implementation. It is important 
to state that the suspension only covered those articles related to receiving, 
administering and delivering federal resources presented in the legislation. Despite the 
suspension emitted by the Supreme Court, Ley Bartlett was fully implemented in the 
rest of Puebla's 204 municipalities. A final decision was not reached at this time, as the 
forty articles at the centre of the controversy had to be scrutinised by Mexico's most 
important legal institution, which, eventually, decided to ban Ley Bartlett in April 2000 
(see below). 
The PAN and the UN 
While the controversial Ley Bartlett was discussed on a national level, and the Supreme 
Court considered its final verdict, the 1996-1999 panista municipality of Puebla 
developed its own participatory strategy. The inspiration for the PAN citizen 
participation project was a 1997 document published by the United Nations entitled 
Goberriabilidad y Desarrollo Sostenible (Governance and Sustainable Development). In 
an attempt to publicise a 'new participatory culture, ' based on the various community 
projects promoted by the United Nations, the panista municipality organised a 
conference entitled: Foro de Gobemabilidad y Desarrollo Huniano Sostenible (Forum 
of Governance and Sustainable Human Development) in September 1998. The explicit 
aim of the conference was to highlight the importance of citizen involvement at the 
community level, but it also served to justify implementing the panista participatory 
agenda. The conference was led by participatory experts 16 and some of Mexico's most 
influential political figures. 17 In effect, the intended message was, 'if the experts say it, 
then we (as authorities of Puebla) have the responsibility to carry out similar initiatives. ' 
The conference had a positive outcome as the UN decided to choose Puebla to 
implement the participatory project, and by January 1999 economic resources started to 
flow for this purpose. According to Puebla's citizen participation director 1996-1999 
Carlos Albicker, 'during the first stage of the project the UN assigned the municipality 
of Puebla one million dollars for participatory purposes' (Albicker interview 
27/4/2001). Puebla's participatory scheme was put in practice based on the following 
agenda: 
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1) Creating groups of citizens with a social commitment to improve their respective 
communities. 
2) Finding housing solutions through self-constructing citizen's properties under 
qualified supervision. 
3) Providing advice for nutritional purposes. 
4) Establishing methods for developing children's character. 
5) lEghlighting the importance of the environment through environmentally friendly 
policies. 
6) Involving citizens in decision-making processes. 
7) Creating groups for the elderly, to dignify the last stage of their lives. 
8) Implementing projects that aim to improve women's and children's self esteem. 
These aims provided the guidelines needed by Puebla's authorities to develop their own 
strategy for enhancing participatory projects. In a document entitled Carpeta de 
Desarrollo Comunitario (Community Development Guide), Puebla's municipal 
authorities established the steps necessary for neighbourhoods, rural areas or villages to 
form groups and take part in decision-making processes. The core idea behind the 
panista neighbourhood forum scheme was to involve the public in decision-making 
processes, where authorities and citizens would decide on the matters that affect their 
respective communities, it can be argued that the PAN had political motives as well as 
democratic ones to develop this scheme: 
The PAN's proposal for citizen participation was to establish a social 
network based on Mesas Directivas (neighbourhood boards) and other interest 
groups. None of these organisations would have absolute decision-making 
power, but the government should provide opportunities to allow them to 
participate in those decisions taken by the cur-rent administration. Authorities 
should not tell neighbourhood organisations, 'gather together deliberate and 
decide; ' they should tell them 'let's decide together' (neighbours and citizens). 
The government should not quit its decision-making power, but should take 
decisions collectively with citizens (Rodrfguez-Regordosa Puebla's 1996-1999 
Community Promotion Sub-director interview 1/5/2001). 
However, in addition to these democratic aims, the PAN scheme also had wider political 
motives. Specifically, the strategy was intended to remove the archaic local prUsta 
clientelistic 'participatory structure' that operates in most municipalities of Mexico. 
The Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario (Community Development Guide) 
The carpeta de desarrollo comunitario (CDC) includes several definitions (i. e. what a 
community is, what a community plan is etc. ) and instructions on how neighbours 
should elect their neighbourhood representatives. The document sets a series of 
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measures that should be taken by communities to achieve development in an ordered 
and democratic way. 
The Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario (CDC) is a compendium of the 
basic tools needed by those citizens who think there is a possibility of having a 
better world. The aim of the document is to help these enthusiastic citizens to 
improve their environments grouped in small units, avoiding dependence on 
governments to achieve social progress (CDC 1998: 1). 
According to the CDC, these 'enthusiastic citizens' would be grouped in Mesas 
Directivas (Neighbourhood Boards) that would represent the interests of their fellow- 
citizens with private or public institutions. A neighbourhood board is composed of a 
president, a secretary and a treasurer who have the capacity to appoint street or block 
representatives. 
The CDC does not establish a fixed term for neighbourhood board elections, however, 
neighbourhood boards are recommended to consult the local community, regarding their 
performance, on a two yearly basis (under the supervision of the local authority). The 
CDC does not provide a uniform neighbourhood board election process, as it accepts 
that practices will vary in each neighbourhood, rural area or village. For example, some 
neighbourhoods are used to having open elections or assemblies, while in others, 
especially in places with low indices of citizen involvement, the same person remains as 
a neighbourhood board president for prolonged periods of time. What is clearly stated, 
is the fact that local authorities have the power to appoint those members taking part in 
neighbourhood boards, though any such designation made by local officials would have 
to be confirmed through a neighbour consultation (see CDC 1998: 14). The CDC also 
states that neighbours can ask local authorities to replace neighbourhood boards where 
their members do not perform as expected. 18 
The stated aim of creating these neighbourhood boards is to establish a long-term local 
development vision, that avoid dependence on governmental projects or on the federal, 
state or municipal authorities. The document argues that it is better to plan the 
development of each community from within itself, rather than from a governmental 
office -after all, citizens will continue living in their neighbourhood, village or rural 
area long after federal (6 years) or local Q years) governmental terms are finished (see 
Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario 1998: 14). 
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An element to highlight is the relevance that the community acquires as a planning unit, 
implying that the governmental level becomes less important. According to the author 
of the CDC, its rationale was straightforward: 
The SEDESOL (Social Development Secretary) was created in Mexico 
as a political tool, neither Salinas nor Zedillo were concerned about 
development. Their idea was to create mechanisms that would help the PRI to 
stay in power, starting from the block representative and finishing with the 
President. We discovered this network and in 1996 we tried to establish a true 
participatory scheme, one where all the interests of the community would be 
truly represented and where they had a voice (Rodrfguez Regordosa interview 
1/5/2001). 
From the PAN's viewpoint there was a need to implement forms of citizen involvement 
that provide an alternative to the prevailing clientelist structure. The CDC wanted the 
neighbourhood boards to have the following attributes: 
1) Appointing neighbours as representatives for specified functions (i. e. informational 
purposes, collecting residents' fees) within their locality. 
2) Appointing street or block representatives to improve communication with their 
representatives. 
3) Writing letters to authorities demanding their support for community projects. 
4) Organising assemblies or meetings for consulting, informing or reaching agreements 
with neighbourhoods regarding local matters. 
5) Implementing any agreement reached at assemblies or meetings. 
6) Making sure that the law is respected by their neighbours. 
7) Having continuous communication with authorities to implement joint actions. 
8) Developing work programmes that allow citizens to improve their communities 
without involving governmental authorities. 
9) Keeping close communication with neighbours regarding any actions currently 
implemented in the locality. 
10) Charging fees (whenever necessary) for specific projects, and to be accountable to 
all those who participate under these schemes. 
11) Acting as an accountant for the locality. 
12) Keeping the CDC and upgrading it whenever necessary. 
The CDC states that neighbourhood boards are residents' representative bodies. To 
avoid what happened with such schemes as SOLIDARIDAD, the CDC establishes that 
neighbourhood boards would not have the capacity to impose any type of sanctions or to 
force neighbour participation in schemes (CDC 1998: 15). 
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The CDC laid great emphasis on the accountability of the neighbourhood organisation. 
Chapter VII of the document provides a 'transparent guide' setting out different options 
enabling citizens to make their respective boards accountable to their fellow-citizens. 
Table 4.1 (below) demonstrates how the CDC recommends that residents keep records 
of the resources received and spent by each neighbourhood board. Such categories as 
residents' fees, income from raffles or parties and paying the maintenance of a green 
area, are some of the most common transactions taking place within these local 
participatory bodies. According to the CDC, citizens should be informed as often as 
possible about the state of the neighbourhood finances, thereby giving them the 
confidence to keep on co-operating with their local representatives: 'the more often the 
community is informed about their finances, the more they will trust their 
representatives and the more they would keep on co-operating with local initiatives' 
(CDC 1998: 40). It is a line of reasoning that is reminiscent of Pateman's notion of 
learning to participate by participating. ' 
Table 4.1 CDC Examnle of Accountabilitv 
Date Item Money IN_ Money OUT Balance 
1/4/1997 -500.00 
30/4/1997 Residents' Fees 1,215.00 715.00 
30/4/1997 Parties, Raffles 522.14 1,237.14 
30/4/1997 Other earnings 18.32 1,255.45 
30/4/1997 Paying Vigilantes 568.00 687.46 
30/4/1997 Park's maintenance 325.46 362.00 
30/4/1997 Stationary and Transport 18.60 343.40 
30/4/1997 1 Diverse payments 5.30 338.10 
Amounts in Pesos, approximately 14 pesos = 11 
One of the most interesting features of the CDC is the establishment of a community 
plan for developing each neighbourhood, rural area, or village. According to the 'plan- 
guide' presented in the CDC, all community plans should involve four steps: 
1) Diagnosis, to identify the needs to be covered; 
2) Formulation, when the objectives are set, along with the necessary actions to 
achieve them; 
3) Execution, when the plan is put into practice; 
4) Evaluation, when the actions performed are compared to those objectives previously 
set. 
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The 'community plan' is defined as a plan made by the community for improving their 
living conditions. It is called a community plan because the aim is that all those 
inhabitants of a particular rural area, village, or neighbourhood get involved in its 
elaboration. The community plan is a tool that neighbourhood boards can use to 
determine the current state of their respective localities, infrastructure-wise, and also to 
set medium and long term goals for improving their living conditions (CDC 1998: 51). 
The community plan would operate following the steps presented in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Steps to carry out a Community Plan 
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Adapted from CDC 1998: 52 
The CDC states that in developing the community plan, the involvement of the majority 
of citizens is essential, to contribute all their valuable opinions and to provide a 'total 
perspective' of all the key issues within a specific locality (CDC 1998: 59). Following 
the steps presented in figure one, the community is expected to gather, discuss, plan, 
implement and evaluate the outcomes of all the projects carried out in their respective 
neighbourhood. There are two points that are important to highlight. Firstly, the fact that 
all the community should be involved in the process of prioritising its needs. Secondly, 
that citizens are expected to create their own budgets to implement projects, in order to 
reduce dependence on authorities for implementing community initiatives. However, 
financial support from the authority would be required if residents cannot cover the 
totality of a project. According to the CDC there would be three types of resources 
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available to citizens for carrying out social projects: human resources, economic 
resources, and material resources. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the PAN- UNparticipatory initiative 
The primary aim of the PAN-UN participatory initiative was to dismantle the pHista 
caciquil structure prevailing at the local level by increasing transparency. The scheme 
visualises an active citizenry, grouped in neighbourhood committees, who would elect 
their representatives in open processes. The project is an initiative that focuses on 
looking beyond the three years which each local administration lasts to encourage 
individuals to achieve development by themselves, without depending on federal, state 
or local functionaries to implement social projects. In agreement with the panista 
managerial tradition, the guidelines to implement this policy are set in the carpeta de 
desarrollo comnunitario, which is a goal oriented 'business-like' booklet with the 
necessary information to make one's community organisation successful. Thus the PAN 
hoped that the establishment of successful community organisations would remove the 
incentive to use traditional PRI caciquil networks. 
The main advantage of the PAN-UN participatory project is that the rules under which 
the strategy would be implemented are clearly defined, including the functions of the 
participatory units and the conditions under which their representatives would be 
elected. The CDC emphasises accountability and the importance of 'accountable 
actions, ' in increasing the confidence of the community in their neighbourhood 
representatives (such as the presentation of a monthly account of neighbourhood 
finances). Perhaps the most important idea in the document is the step-by-step 
elaboration of a community plan. 
The disadvantages of the PAN-UN project are primarily related to its legal aspects. 
Firstly, the CDC does not have a legal framework supporting its operations, as it is only 
based on a booklet that was never sent to the local congress for approval. The absence 
of a strong legal structure made it a tool highly 'volatile' to any political changes, as 
will be discussed below. Secondly, establishing that citizens would fund their own 
projects meant that the CDC was unlikely to perform 'big actions of government, ' 
especially as the CDC targeted the poorer sectors of the population who would not have 
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the capacity to contribute large sums of money. On the other hand, because the middle 
classes were not facing any major infrastructure problems, they did not take part in this 
scheme and continued using their neighbourhood organisations. Moreover, the 
introduction of accountable mechanisms to regulate those resources used in the CDC 
was not a novelty for the middle classes, as they were already used to report the income 
and expenses of their neighbourhood organisations on a regular basis. 
Although the UN supported the initiative, the resources that the UN provided were to be 
used to promote democracy, and not to finance social projects. This is why panistas 
were forced to search for economic resources in other state programmes, which 
ironically they found in the COPLADEMUNs. For the panistas, the only means of 
delivering social projects through their participatory agenda was to implement a hybrid 
of the PAN-UN initiative and COPLADEMUNs a procedure which will be discussed 
more extensively later in this chapter. 
The Constitutional controversy: the Supreme Court decision 
According to Governor Bartlett, COPLADEMUNs was an attempt to create more 
democratic and accountable government institutions. Yet the opposition parties claimed 
it threatened the authority of both state and local government, as COPLADEMUNs 
acted as an intermediate body of political decision-making. Headed by the PAN, a 
petition questioning the legal status of COPLADENITJNs was presented to the Supreme 
Court. The controversy was based on the establishment of intermediate decision-making 
bodies that might have more influence than local authorities. The fact that during 
COPLADEMUN meetings the destination of federal resources was decided was a key 
issue motivating PAN's energetic opposition. 
The PAN argued that COPLADEMUNs violated article 115 of the constitution, as they 
impede the municipalities' right to decide freely how to spend their budgets. Article 115 
states: 'it is the "free municipality" that constitutes the base for the territorial division 
and political administration of each state and each municipality will be governed by a 
freely elected group of citizens' (Mexican Constitution 2000). 
State authorities are creating intermediate decision-making institutions 
that operate between local and state authorities. COPLADEMUNs and juntas 
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auxiliares have been given powers that go against what is stated in article 115 of 
the constitution. It compromises the position of municipalities, as these bodies 
diminish their authority, especially regarding decisions on how federal resources 
would be spent. The powers given to the bodies known as COPLADEMUNs go 
beyond analysing and deciding on how budgets are spent, and focus on taking 
unilateral decisions that affect the stability of local authorities (Diario Oficial 
12/4/2000: 40). 
According to the PRI, COPLADEMUNs did not violate article 115, quoting articles 
twenty-five and twenty-six of the federal constitution to argue that COPLADEMUNs do 
not constitute a threat to local authorities' leadership and decision-making power, as 
they operate under their domain. Priistas stated that COPLADEMUNs only operate at 
the municipal level and therefore do not interfere in state matters. They claimed that the 
decision-making process taking place within these organisations cannot be considered 
as unilateral, as a large number of actors with different political ideologies are involved 
in each session. Moreover, COPLADEMLTNs do not have the budget totally under their 
command, as the municipality is in charge of deciding how to spent it. 19 
Finally, pritstas argued that the COPLADEMUN's function is limited to planning, 
discussing, analysing and selecting the projects or government actions to be 
implemented, all in accordance with national and state development plans. 
After listening to both sides involved in the conflict, the verdict was deliberated at the 
Supreme Court for more than two years, and in April 2000 it finally decided the 
following: 
COPLADEMUNs do not only act as planning and co-ordination 
institutions, as their functions include the prioritisation of programmes to be 
implemented by municipal authorities. Therefore ... COPLADEMUNs do 
constitute an intermediate body between state and local authorities, as municipal 
authorities depend on these institutions to perform certain actions of government 
(Diario OJI"cial 12/4/2000: 99). 
The decision reached at the Supreme Court did not completely annul Ley Bartlett, it 
only banned those articles related to citizen participation and resource distribution, as 
presented in Box 4.1 (below). 
The motion was received with joy by panistas in different parts of Mexico and was a 
prelude to a series of serious electoral defeats including the 2000 presidential election 
suffered by the PRI throughout 2000. But the defeat went beyond punishing Manuel 
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Bartlett or the PRI, for the Supreme Court's decision also threatens the future of all 
citizen participation programmes intended to give citizens more decision-making power. 
Citizen participation can be promoted at the state and municipal levels 
for planning and prioritising programmes or projects as long as the final decision 
is taken by local authorities (Diario Oficial 12/4/2000: 103). 
Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court diminishes the influence of participatory 
mechanisms established by local authorities. The whole democratic sense of community 
initiatives is questioned by stating that these mechanisms can operate 'as long as the 
final decision is taken by local authorities'. If citizens know that authorities can impose 
their own decision on whatever is discussed in these forums, then it is worth asking, 
what is the purpose of participating in these 'democratic' forums? 
Box 4.1 Articles banned hv the Sunreme Conrt 
Article "at it states 
13 Each municipality will have a COPLADEMUN as the mechanism to discuss, 
plan, analyse, select and execute those demands of the population previously 
stated in the state and national development plans. 
14 COPLADEMUNS will be composed of the following members: 
1) The Mayor of each municipality 
2) The totality ofjuntas auxiliares in each municipality 
3) Community representatives elected in each neighbourhood, rural areas or 
villages and those project committees previously elected 
4) State Finance Department representatives 
44 Juntas auxiliares will apply those resources mentioned in article 43 of 
LNFSP, only after these have been approved at each COPLADEMUN. 
57 When those resources referred in this section of the LNFSP are destined for 
public projects, state and local authorities will present these projects to those 
authorities who will be in charge of executing them, to analyse its feasibility. 
All projects will be subject to meeting those conditions set by state and local 
authorities. 
73 State authorities will administer and provide economic resources to 
municipalities on a monthly basis, as long as these resources are invested in 
projects that benefit the poor. To do so, municipalities' projects will have to 
be previously approved at the COPLADEMUNS. 
74 Municipalities will present to state authorities, for their analysis and approval, 
all those pr *ects previously agreed at COPLADEMUNS. 
75 Once state authorities authorise each Pr-oject, they will proceed to provide 
municipalities with those resources based on what is stated on article 73 of 
this legislation. 
82 fraction 11 Municipalities will promote citizen participation under the COPLADEMUN 
scheme within those municipalities benefited by social initiatives. The 
members of each COPLADEMUN will be involved in the execution, 
vigilance and evaluation of those projects taking part within their 
communities. 
97 If municipalities are not able to provide juntas auxiliares with economic 
resources, state authorities will do so directly. 
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If the constitution considers any citizen participation body as an intermediate institution 
between state and local authorities, then similar initiatives involving the public in 
decision-making processes also violate article 115. The requirement to leave the 
ultimate decision to authorities seems to go against the spirit of the 'new federalism' 
proclaimed by the Zedillo administration. Whilst citizen participation has become a 
central part of local government's political agenda, these mechanisms, in most cases, are 
limited or dominated by state and federal authorities, leaving municipalities and their 
citizens in a dilemma, in a sort of 'legal limbo. ' 
COPLADEMUNs and the PAN-UN initiative: an evaluation 
In the previous section we have presented the principles of two different participatory 
initiatives; the first promoted by the party in power at the state level, the PRI, and the 
second presented by the local PAN administration. Ley Bartlett was promoted as a 
response to the 1997 fiscal co-ordination law, and the PAN-UN project was a response 
to Ley Bartlett. Each initiative has both positive and negative aspects and while carrying 
out the fieldwork it became clear that, as expected, the political preference of those 
functionaries or citizens interviewed was an important factor to consider in such a 
politicised environment. As far as possible, a range of perspectives was obtained in 
order to provide a balanced analysis. 
Puebla's panista 1996-1999 administration benefited considerably from the 1997 Fiscal 
Co-ordination Law, as the amount of resources for the poor increased significantly. The 
1996-1999 community promotion sub-director Pablo Rodrfguez Regordosa recalls that: 
The first year the 1997 Fiscal Co-ordination Law was put into practice, 
almost 150 million pesos were assigned to the municipality of Puebla. To give 
us an idea of what those extra funds represented we can compare them to the 
total budget for the municipality in 1996, which was around 300 million. It 
meant that the municipality was going to receive an additional amount that 
represented half of the budget spent a year before (Rodrfguez Regordosa 
interview 1/5/2001). 
Ley Bartlett and COPLADEMUNs were perceived by opposition party members as a 
way of injecting resources to preserve the PRI's power. Rodrfguez Regordosa put it 
bluntly: 'the truth about COPLADEMUNS is that they were created for political 
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purposes, a structure that had been created for delivering economic resources to the 
priista machine present in each locality of the state of Puebla' (Rodrfguez Regordosa 
interview 1/5/2001). He linked economic resources and political purposes: 
Bartlett created Ley Bartlett when he saw that the federal congress really 
wanted to decentralise economic resources, and not only resources, but also 
decision-making processes over the application of federal resources to states and 
municipalities. Bartlett said, no! This is why in Ley Bartlett we identify an 
intermediate body, the COPLADEMUN, furthermore, the state finance 
department had the last word in either approving or rejecting each project 
analysed at the COPLADEMUNs (Rodrfguez Regordosa interview 1/5/2001). 
Despite the efforts of the Puebla 1996-1999 panista administration to carry out their 
participatory agenda and not to implement Ley Bartlett's principles, realistically 
speaking, COPLADEMUNs was the only way to get hold of economic resources to 
deliver social policies. Although the UN assigned the municipality one million dollars 
for implementing the Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario(CDC), this project was put in 
practice only to promote participatory principles and not to finance social initiatives. 
The panista administration was forced to negotiate with the priista finance department 
to gain access to the economic resources needed to deliver a specific infrastructure 
projects. Rodrfguez Regordosa recalls: 
We had to reach some agreements with the priistas to keep having access 
to economic resources. We told them: you accept our community organisations 
in some COPLADEMUN projects and you insert some of your groups in a 
specific amount of our initiatives and we all benefit from this' (Rodrfguez 
Regordosa interview 1/5/2001). 
It seems that the panista scheme, the Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario, was used as a 
4practice session' before discussing community projects at a COPLADEMUN meeting: 
'we would gather at the neighbourhood municipal council on a monthly basis, in this 
meeting the mayor was present and we would discuss the projects that were later going 
to be discussed at the COPLADEMUN' (Rodrfguez Regordosa interview 2001). Thus it 
appears that Puebla's 1996-1999 local authorities were forced to implement a hybrid of 
COPLADEMUNs and the carpeta de desarrollo comunitario. The lack of a strong legal 
framework, mainly for financial reasons, negatively affected the full accomplishment of 
the PAN-LJN participatory agenda, and panistas were obliged to negotiate their 
infrastructure projects at COPLADEMUN meetings. 
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COPLADEMUN meetings would take place in a controlled atmosphere, where 
everyone taking part knew what he/she was supposed to say, and where the statutes of 
this participatory initiative were left aside. In theory, during each COPLADEMUN 
meeting functionaries and citizens are asked to prioritise and then approve a specific 
number of projects that would be carried out during the year. However, this depiction 
does not reflect what happened in practice: 
What really happened is that we decided which were the most important 
projects, and elaborated a scheme where all participants had at least one project, 
giving priority to the most urgent demands, for example sewage or electricity. 
Once we had the list, we compared our list to the list presented by state 
authorities and I would personally check both lists and square the numbers with 
state representatives from the finance department and we would then sign an 
agreement before the COPLADEMUN meeting took place. During the meeting I 
would control the panistas and people from the state finance department would 
control pritstas and all had to vote in favour of the projects we had previously 
approved. In the end it was not a true participatory experience, it was a 
masquerade presented as a participatory experience (Rodrfguez Regordosa 
interview 1/5/2001). 
There was total control over the way in which resources were spent by each 
COPLADEMUN, and citizens had only limited impact on those decisions reached. 
Political parties led the negotiations, adding to the controversy over the operation of this 
pseudo-citizen participation scheme. For members of opposition political parties - 
especially those belonging to the PAN- it seemed that the democratic sense of this 
$participatory initiative' was nothing more than a political charade. In principle, Ley 
Bartlett appears as a document that sets the basis for a new relationship between 
authorities and citizens. In reality, according to Puebla's 1996-1999 panista citizen 
participation director Carlos Albicker, an enormous discrepancy between theory and 
practice existed: 
In practice the COPLADEMUN initiative was pure clientelism, it was 
swapping projects for votes. When COPLADEMUNS were operating, we 
realised that most neighbourhood representatives did not exercise a true 
leadership, most of them were pseudo-neighbourhood representatives with 
strong links to the official party (Albicker interview 27/4/2001). 
Unfortunately when the fieldwork for this project was carried out, it was not possible to 
examine how the PAN-UN carpeta de desarrollo comunitario was implemented, as the 
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framework for this scheme had already been dismantled by the 1999-2002 priista 
administration. Despite lacking legal recognition, 280 neighbourhood forums were 
established following the bases of the Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario, but although 
there was a large number of neighbourhoods interested in applying the PAN-UN 
participatory agenda, the scheme was not consolidated. There were several reasons for 
this failure. Firstly, the PAN lost Puebla's 1998 local election and the flow of economic 
resources provided by the UN for participatory purposes stopped. Secondly, and directly 
related to the previous point, political interests eclipsed the panistas democratic 
intentions. According to Albicker, 'pritstas did not want any programmes that smelt of a 
panista administration and renounced the LTN's financial support, and also a long term 
participatory strategy that would have benefited many citizens. In return they kept on 
implementing the same old clientelist approach' (Albicker interview 27/4/2001). Carlos 
Albicker recalled that UN officers tried to defend the project: 'UN functionaries realised 
that our project was successful and tried to persuade the recently elected mayor, Mario 
Marin, to continue implementing the project, but he rejected anything that looked or 
sounded like the PAN' (Albicker interview 27/4/2001). 
Once the panista 1996-1999 administration left office, the PRI was able freely to 
implement a 'pure' COPLADEMUN agenda, without using the CDC at all. Although 
COPLADEMUNs operated in Puebla only for approximately a year, they had an 
immediate impact on the delivery of social services and infrastructure projects. 
According to Puebla's north-east delegado Mr. Medina, during the first year of the 
(1999-2002) priista administration, between Februaryl. 999 and April 2000, one 
thousand projects were discussed and implemented through this participatory scheme. 20 
Mr. Medina also commented that when the Supreme Court announced its decision 
regarding the future of this citizen participation programme, official authorities were 
forced to look for alternative programmes to keep up with the high demand to cover 
social needs (Medina interview 23/6/2000). According to the 1999-2002 Mayor of 
Puebla, Mario Marfn, 'during the first 100 days of the 1999-2002 administration, the 
Council for Municipal Development of Puebla COPLADEMUN was established and 
operated with 144 community representatives and 800 committee projects, within this 
period 461 projects were implemented mainly with federal resources' (Marfn 2000). 21 
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According to Puebla 1999-2002 south-west delegado Mr. VdIdez, the exercise of 
participating in COPLADEMUNs helped develop a 'communitY-feeling' between those 
involved. Because people prioritised projects, they then became less selfish, as in some 
cases, those taking part realised that there were some projects that were more important 
than their own (Vdldez interview 17/7/2000). These meetings took place four times 
during the year, in the first meeting we would prioritise, then in the second we checked 
the advances, and in the third and fourth next year's proposals were made (Vdldez 
interview 17/7/2000). This positive 'community-feeling' mentioned by Mr. VAIdez 
contrasts with the views of Rodrfguez Regordosa: 
What happens in practice when you involve people to prioritise their 
needs is that they do not behave as 'innocent' human beings. Each of the actors 
participating at COPLADEMUNs meetings takes a party, and there is a lot of 
ignorance, it is impossible to have 200 people discussing the destiny of 150 
million pesos, and why is this impossible? Because each of the 200 has a very 
particular demand to fight for, and he/she knows that ceding his/her project 
would mean that it would not take place, in the end they all have their interests, 
it was impossible to manage (Rodrfguez Regordosa interview 1/5/2001). 
After the COPLADEMUN initiative was invalidated by the Supreme Court, these 
bodies were transformed into social development committees. These committees are 
fon-ned by groups of people elected by their respective communities (neighbourhoods or 
rural areas). The aim of these bodies is to present projects to local authorities, mainly to 
cover citizens' basic infrastructure needs, and also as a way to avoid unilateral decision- 
making. The performance of this scheme is still under scrutiny, as it has proven not to 
be that efficient. According to social development committee leader Mr. Ramfrez: 
It is really difficult to introduce services through the development 
committee, you have to fill in some forms and then once your project is analysed 
it could take even years to introduce it. In the neighbourhood next to this one, 
they have been demanding services for more than 10 years without any success. 
For me it was easier because we were only asking for two streets to be paved. If 
you want to introduce electricity it is the same, as you need to see many people 
and to insist in order to be taken into account. They should create a less 
bureaucratic structure (Ramirez interview 21/7/2000). 
All decisions that used to be taken within COPLADEMUNS are now taken unilaterally 
by local authorities, according to Mr. Vdldez 1999-2002 south-west delegado 'some 
authorities expressed their concern regarding the creation of "true" citizen participation 
structures where citizens have a say'. Mr. Vdldez recalls, 'COPLADEMUNS are not 
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working any more, now the municipal authority decides. There is not an alternative 
structure, we need one to legitimise and make accountable all social projects carried 
out' (Vdldez interview M12000). 
The following section shows that the post-COPLADEMUN era has been characterised 
by efforts to involve the citizenry into different schemes where they would be allocated 
some decision-making power, but where the final decision will always rest with the 
local authorities. 
The Participatory Agenda of the PRI since 1999 
The Bureaucratic Structure 
Once the Supreme Court decided to void Ley Bartlett's core principles, in April 2000, 
different participatory options had to be developed to replace the COPLADEMUNs. 
Since his mayoral political campaign, the priista Mario Marfn, has developed new 
strategies for involving citizens. According to 1999-2002 priista citizen participation 
director, Alejandro Armenta Mier, Marfn's perspective varies widely from the 
managerial tradition under which community projects were managed by the previous 
administration. 
The mayor, during his campaign, presented a project that is the basis of 
this administration. The municipal development plan foresees four core 
principles: 1) government with a social duty, 2) services and quality of life, 3) 
progress with social justice and 4) promotion of economic development 
(Armenta-Mier interview 23/6/2000). 
The bureaucratic structure in charge of promoting citizen participation in Puebla is the 
Citizen Participation Directorate. The aim of the directorate is to channel all social 
demands to the responsible departments. The Directorate is composed of four 
geographically-based delegaciones, or citizen participation departments. 
Each office has the responsibility for acting as a channel between authorities and 
citizens, as stated by south-west delegado Mr. Vdldez: 'We are in charge of promoting 
citizen participation and establishing links between the different departments of 
government and citizens, so government actions do not simply remain on paper' 
(Vdldez interview 17/7/2000). 
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The citizen participation directorate, co-ordinates the participation efforts of around 800 
neighbourhoods, and 17 juntas auxiliares, (citizen boards), 22 altogether this office 
assists approximately 2,000,000 poblanos [Puebla's citizens]. According to 1999-2002 
citizen participation director, Alejandro Armenta-Mier, 'the aim of this directorate is to 
give attention to the lower sectors of the population, and to take progress and 
development to deprived areas. By promoting social participation, we open channels to 
help citizens reach the wishes and aspirations all members of the community have' 
(Armenta-Mier interview 23/6/2000). Through each of the four delegaciones the citizen 
participation directorate receives information about those needs faced by the 
community. Each delegado works with a group of promoters who have constant contact 
with the community, they organise people to participate, they co-ordinate efforts with 
neighbourhood leaders, and in rural areas with other bodies. According to Mr. Armenta- 
Mier, through these various channels the citizen participation directorate received 4,000 
demands during the first five months of 2000. 
Mr. Armenta-Mer claimed that the current PRI administration, when compared to the 
preceding one (the panista) is innovative and much more active. The comment was 
complemented by south-west delegado Mr. Vdldez: 'in three years the panistas 
completed 800 projects, this administration in one year has finished 1,500. The public 
has responded positively, as all sectors (urban and rural) have been involved in some 
kind of social activities (Vdldez interview 17/7/2000). 23 
The mayor, Mr. Mario Marfn, is transforming the way politics is done, 
everyday he visits different neighbourhoods, (three to four per day). He has 
made more than 650 visits since he is mayor. This means that there is a constant 
presence of local authorities in the municipality and of course that throughout 
these visits the mayor constantly receives demands for services or other 
community projects (Armenta-Mier 23/6/2000). 
Delegados are responsible for promoting citizen participation within their respective 
designated areas, in some cases they have to provide technical assistance, as some 
projects involve managing economic resources. As stated by delegado, Mr. VAIdez: 
We set up project committees, so the public can get involved. These 
committees operate under a scheme where resources are provided by federal 
authorities to be used by citizens. People receive some training, so they can 
follow all projects. We also developed social participation committees, which 
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are committees that operate even without resources, but they still perform 
communitarian activities without a budget. We have a close relationship with all 
neighbourhood boards and with all those persons wanting to participate at the 
local level (Vdldez interview 17/7/2000). 
The structure of the municipal delegaci6n is based on community promoters whose duty 
is to find those needs prevailing in each neighbourhood. Each promoter is in charge of 
between twenty to thirty neighbourhoods. According to delegado, Mr. Medina, a 
promoter's main activity is to visit neighbourhoods, rural areas or villages to find out 
which are the projects required for improving citizens' living conditions. The north-east 
promoter, Felipe Upez, outlined the steps citizens or neighbourhood representatives 
need to follow to receive the benefits of a social project as follows: 
1) Direct a letter to the mayor, Mario Marfn Torres; 
2) Send a copy to the Delegado Antonio Medina; 
3) Then delegados give a copy to the promoters; 
4) Promoters channel it to the public services department; 
5) Finally, once promoters have an answer from authorities, they will tell neighbours 
the estimated time it would take to accomplish the petition. Normally minor projects 
take between a week and ten days and major projects (paving, electricity, sewage 
etc. ) could take an indefinite period of time. 
According to delegado, Mr Medina, 'neighbours also approach the delegaci6n and what 
we do then is that we personally channel citizen's problems to the area that can best 
solve them' (Medina interview 23/6/2000). Citizen participation director, Alejandro 
Armenta-Mier agrees that 'promoters play a key role, as they would be the link between 
delegaciones and neighbourhoods' (Annenta-Mier interview 23/6/2000). 
Juntas Auxiliares are another channel within the citizen participation direction. This role 
is defined by Alejandro Armenta Mer as follows, 'a junta auxiliar works as an 
alternative organisation to the municipal one, in its own way it is an organisation of 
social participation' (Annenta-Nfier interview 23/6/2000). According to the prevailing 
municipal regulation, juntas auxiliares are elected for a period of three years. Political 
parties cannot take part in this election process, however, they do get involved, people 
speak about 'red circle, ' 'green circle, ' and 'yellow triangle' (Armenta-Mier interview 
23/6/2000), a reference to the 'underground' participation that political parties have in 
these processes. For instance, certainly both the PRONASOL and COPLADEMUNs 
6 participatory schemes' are characterised by strong links between the official party and 
citizen's representatives, thereby undermining the non-partisan nature of each policy. 
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Alongside juntas auxiliares, citizen participation committees also operate in Puebla. 
Citizen participation committees assist the work performed by the citizen participation 
directorate, but are entirely managed by citizens. They are elected on an annual basis 
and their main activity is to prioritise their most vital needs. In the view of Armenta 
Mier, prioritisation is a key element for their department, 'in order to determine when 
we will have resources available for solving those needs. This is why citizen 
participation is so important, because we need to organise with neighbours in order to 
know which needs are most important' (Armenta-Mier interview 23/6/2000). Citizen 
committees are also involved in implementing certain programmes, as stated by 
delegado, Mr. Medina, 'we are implementing some public security initiatives and we 
are supervised by the municipal police director. The aim is that people in each 
neighbourhood can implement those programmes in their communities (Medina 
23/6/2000). Currently, the main activity performed by committee leaders is when they 
represent their neighbourhood at the social development committee meetings. Most of 
these committees do not have a defined structure and meets regularly, when local 
authorities involve them or when something urgent arises. 
Puebla's Current Citizen Participation Schemes 
Despite the enthusiasm with which bureaucrats working for the 1999-2002 participatory 
department defined the functions performed by them, there seems to be a general 
feeling, amongst the average citizen, that they have not received the participatory 
options they deserve. For instance, one resident Nallely Estrada, believes that her 
participation in any of these mechanisms would have no effect in the decisions taken by 
local authorities, in her view: 'there is no point in taking part in such processes, 
authorities already know in advance the ultimate decision' (Estrada interview 
7/11/2001). This view was also seconded by resident Edith Cruz, who stated: 'in my 
neighbourhood we do not take part in any of the participatory schemes promoted by 
local authorities, there is no point, whenever we have a problem, we prefer to go 
directly to the office of the mayor' (Cruz interview 8/11/2001). Furthermore, after 
speaking to some neighbourhood representatives, they admitted that neither the previous 
PAN (1996-1999), nor the current priista (1999-2002) administration has created the 
participatory opportunities required to have an impact on those decisions reached at the 
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local level. According to community leader, Mr. Caso, 'when Puebla was ruled by a 
panista administration, we were totally ignored, mainly because the PAN is a party 
mostly composed of the upper classes. Panistas did not care about the main problems 
affecting our neighbourhoods. Mr. Hinojosa [the former mayor] told me, that his 
administration did not want to deal with us because we were poor' (Caso interview 
19/7/2000). On the other hand, from the perspective of neighbourhood leader Mr. 
Ramirez, things have not evolved that much, politically speaking, since the priista 
administration recovered the municipality of Puebla. 
Here we live in a cacicazgo 24 and I keep telling the delagado that more 
educated people should occupy political positions, and that the system should 
not be based on 'hereditary politics. ' I do not understand why politicians want to 
keep power in a few hands, they want to dominate the economic, political and 
social scenarios. They do not want to listen their own people, they want to keep 
their power at any price. Nepotism should not take place at all (Ramfrez 
21nI2000). 
The municipality of Puebla continues operating under the scheme known as Jefes de 
Manzana, (block representatives) which was implemented throughout the 1980s in 
different municipalities of Mexico. Repressive community leaders still dominate the 
local scene and strong bonds between local authorities, the PRI and popular leaders are 
common. Dishonest practices are also frequent amongst community leaders, as 
accountability is something unknown for most of them. 
For example with the leader working near here, he keeps money and 
works without any community interests. He asked neighbours to give him 
money for paving the street, when in reality, those resources were provided free 
by local authorities. We are talking about 700 neighbours who paid 300 pesos 25 
each- imagine the amount of money he is going to receive. The problem goes 
further because the government is supporting him. He is not an educated person, 
there are many preferences within the municipality. When I met him I was 
supporting him but he disappointed me. He was a speaker when Labastida 26 
came. In the near future he could occupy a position within the administration, 
but imagine how someone like him would act in the government (Ramfrez 
interview 21/7/2000)? 
Populist practices are normal, especially in those areas inhabited by people with 
economic needs or low degrees of education. In deprived areas, people do not seem to 
realise that they are used as 'political cattle, ' as observed by community leader Mr. 
Caso: 
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When the party (PRI) needs our support for an event in Mexico City, 
they send us two coaches and we start at 5am waking up people for these 
occasions. Once we gather for the event, around thirty families, we collect 
money from everyone, if we manage to collect 200 pesos we eat, otherwise we 
only enjoy the trip without eating. On some occasions the delegaciones support 
us, Mr. Antonio Medina, he will send someone to give us some cash for buying 
refreshments or fruits for everyone, that is why people are so happy with us, 
because they say, we support, we eat and we have fun (Caso interview 
19/7/2000). 
Puebla did not experience the social awakening that took place, for example, in Mexico 
City during the 1980s and is still permeated by traditional forms of leadership, 
especially at the local level. According to 1999-2002 citizen participation director, 
Alejandro Armenta-Mier, all actions regarding communitarian involvement are based 
on a pamphlet developed by the directorate under his command, which provides broad 
guidelines to carry out citizen participation schemes. Delegado, Mr. VdIdez, admitted 
the need to develop adequate citizen participation legislation and his respect for Mexico 
City's citizen participation legislation, 'in Mexico City there is a good citizen 
participation law, but here unfortunately there is no such document' (Vdldez interview 
OnI2000). Under the current local 'participatory scheme', the city is divided into 
neighbourhoods and within each of these bodies, citizens are expected to organise by 
themselves and elect a neighbourhood leader. The elected citizen would act as a channel 
between authorities and citizens, and would also represent his/her community at project 
committee meetings, whenever these take place. All neighbourhood boards are elected 
on an annual basis, and are expected to receive support from their delegado (VAldez 
interview 17/7/2000). 
The way in which a project committee meeting functions is that whenever local 
authorities carry out a project within certain neighbourhoods, delegados have to make 
sure of involving those elected community leaders to act as watchdogs until the project 
is concluded. Neighbourhood leaders do not have any decision-making power within 
project committees and it can be established that their function is merely to be 
accountable. One of the most common forms of setting up a project committee is via a 
fideicoMiso. 27 In a fideicomiso citizens would estimate the cost of a project and then 
would take the quote to local authorities. Local authorities would then study the 
proposal and decide how much of the total cost would be covered by them. In the view 
of some community leaders, whenever they use this mechanism there is very little co- 
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operation from authorities and citizens are practically left on their own. According to 
community leader Mr. Ramirez, 'in this neighbourhood one has to ask, otherwise 
authorities will completely ignore us. We created a project committee for paving a 
street, 70 percent is paid by the municipality, and 30 percent is paid by neighbours, but 
because we do not have an estimate of the costs, we estimated costs using other 
projects' (Ramfrez interview 21/7/2000). The implication of having unqualified citizens 
estimating values might seriously underestimate costs, with a possible detrimental effect 
when an accurate quote is subsequently presented, as it could increase the financial 
burden on the residents. Especially in the poorest sectors of the population, this could 
negatively affect the promotion of any local initiatives. 
The main reason why many citizens get involved as community representatives is to 
solve their basic infrastructure needs, as stated by committee leader Josefina Andrade: 
I got involved as a community representative because we did not have 
any services. For three years I worked without official recognition, but after that 
we began an election process and I got elected. Since then the sewage network 
was finished, now we also have piped potable water, a sports area, a health 
centre and we also received our property titles (Andrade interview l8n12000). 
Another example is Mr. Ramirez, who was not even formally elected, but who still 
maintains his position as a community representative, based on the achievement of 
several 'community goals, ' 
Well I cannot say that I was democratically elected, I installed myself in 
this position and the community supported me. Since then we have achieved the 
introduction of sewage and paving in several streets and electricity. We have 
participated with the delegacion to work in communitarian initiatives, mainly 
related with the introduction of services (Ramfrez interview 21n12000). 
There is not a settled schedule for community meetings, and whenever they take place, 
attendance varies widely depending the issue to be dealt with. Neighbourhood leader 
Josefina Andrade said, 'we normally meet on a monthly basis, but there is not an 
established date for these reunions. The number of people also varies, but I would say 
that on average between 45 to 50 persons attend the meetings. Attendance is directly 
related to the issue to be dealt in the meeting' (Andrade interview 18n12000). 
Although authorities did not admit it, a very close relationship exists between the 
delegados and some local community representatives. According to neighbourhood 
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leader Mr. Ramfrez, there have been cases where leaders keep their position as a 
community representative based on their friendship with the delegado or the current 
mayor. These types of relationships have resulted in the promotion of some former 
community leaders as local MPs or to other positions within local administrations. 
Neighbourhood leaders can also get involved in games of interests: 
A street has not been paved because the leader had interests in installing 
a type of concrete which was provided by a company owned by the former 
mayor, which was bad quality and more expensive. This proves the type of 
relationships that motivate persons not to trust their neighbourhood 
representatives. The average people have little to say about all these, as they 
would benefit from any position (s) these representatives occupy in the future, 
they see it as a possible future contact (Ramfrez 21/7/2000). 
Juntas auxilaires play a key role in Puebla's citizen participation scheme. In rural areas, 
juntas auxiliares can function in some cases as alternative 'mini-municipalities, ' 
especially when the mayor's head office is far from certain communities. Each junta 
auxiliar is formed by 5 or 6 inspectorias that will be in constant interaction with 
citizens. Inspectorias perform the same functions carried out in urban areas by 
neighbourhood committees. According to citizen participation director Mr. Armenta- 
Mier there is a big difference between the way juntas auxiliares' and neighbourhood 
committees' members interact, 'that is the main difference between a rural community 
and an urban society. Within rural communities there are still many traditional customs 
taking place, there is a lot of interaction between all its members as families also get 
involved' (Armenta-Mier interview 23/6/2000). Similarly to the case of Tlalpan, the 
disordered way in which Puebla has left former villages within the periphery of a city. 
This is one of the main reasons why authorities have to be aware of creating alternative 
scheme for these particular regions, where the 'normal' neighbourhood participatory 
schemes would not function. 
What Puebla's authorities did not mention is that juntas auxiliares are also considered 
the easiest places to implement populist practices and where dominant leaders are more 
common. Most presidents of juntas auxiliares are appointed by municipal or state 
officials, and are rarely elected in an open process. These semi-functionaries and semi- 
community representatives are still active in many municipalities of Mexico and are part 
of the citizen participation structure. These pseudo-representatives play a key political 
role, especially during elections or at times when unpopular measures are to be 
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announced by local or state authorities (see Alvarez and Castro 1999). These community 
leaders are used, mainly by the PRI, as an instrument of local political control and, as 
will be discussed later, maybe this is why Ley Bartlett gave these structures so much 
power. 
The authorities admitted the involvement of political parties in some of the local 
participatory structures. This party involvement was confirmed with most community 
leaders interviewed, who even felt proud of belonging to such institutions as stated by 
Mrs. Andrade, 'my party is the PRI and I'm in charge of the provision of services, 
health centre and a little school we have nearby. ' Although most community leaders 
interviewed accepted their party involvement, they denied receiving any economic 
support from their respective political institutions for performing their communitarian 
activities. 
Thus, Puebla's local authorities have implemented various alternative solutions to 
deliver social projects. By strengthening the capacity of neighbourhood committees or 
juntas auxiliares, authorities hope to involve the citizenry and at the same time cope 
with most of their demands. However, there is no citizen participation legislation 
supporting any of these community activities, and they take place in a disordered 
manner. What has proven to be true, according to delegado Mr. Medina, is that 
& neighbours only care about receiving the benefits of social programmes and do not 
mind the title(s) given to these initiatives' (Medina interview 23/6/2000). 
In order to have a better understanding of the way the current participatory agenda 
operates, in the next section we will present the three types of meetings taking place in 
Puebla. 
Types of MeetingS28 
There are three types of neighbourhood meetings currently taking place in Puebla. Each 
has its own characteristics, and they will vary widely depending on the social group 
where they take place. A constant that can be identified though is that they take place 
under loose citizen participation structures, as there is no legal framework supporting its 
operations. The first type of meeting takes place within the poorest sectors of the 
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population. These meetings are under the command of neighbourhood leaders (in urban 
areas), or presidents of juntas auxiliares (in rural areas). The aim of these encounters 
would be mainly to discuss the introduction of services, but also particular needs can be 
analysed by community leaders. As Mr. Caso commented, 'if someone with a physical 
problem or a disease comes to me, then I will put his or her relatives in touch with 
someone working at the Health Social System to provide help, otherwise we take them 
to the health centre' (Caso interview 19/7/2000). 
Community leaders 29 are expected to get involved in time-consuming processes to 
achieve their respective community goals as a result of not having a clear 'manual of 
procedures' for lobbying community projects. For example, if a neighbourhood lacks a 
basic public service like piped drinking water or sewage, community leaders would be 
in charge of developing a proposal and taking it to the corresponding authority. This 
process is very bureaucratic and often affected by the social class of the citizen, as 
neighbourhood leader Mr. Ramfrez recalls, 'yesterday I waited for four hours to be 
received by a bureaucrat at the municipal office, this should not happen. Local 
authorities discriminate against people coming from the lower sectors of the population, 
young public servants should take courses on how to treat people' (Ramfrez interview 
21n12000). 
Strong bonds are created between community leaders and citizens once a service is 
introduced. As a result of this interaction, the community feels as if they owe something 
to the leader and promise their support for any further political or party activities. 
Neighbourhood representative Mr. Caso commented, 'once we achieve the introduction 
of a service or when we do someone a favour, they (neighbours) tell us that they now 
feel as if they just signed a contract and that they would help us in case we need their 
help for any further political purposes' (Caso interview lqn12000). One resident Ms. 
Rosalia Lira affirmed, 'once we receive a service, we thank our community 
representative and we try to help him or her whenever he or she needs our support; 
although we are not forced to do so, we feel a strong link with our community 
representative' (Lira interview 26/11/2001). 
The above structure is not well organised, as meetings are inconsistent and whenever 
they take place '30 are mostly dominated by community leaders. No minutes are taken, 
and although elections should be held every year, this does not necessarily happen, as 
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neighbourhood leader Mr. Mendoza observed, 'we haven't had neighbourhood 
representatives elections for a couple of years' (Mendoza interview 20/7/2000). 
The second type of meeting is the project committee meeting. It also takes place in the 
lower sectors of the population and although it has certain similarities with 
COPLADEMUNs, nevertheless, it is important to note that it was not conceived to 
substitute it. Project committee sessions take place to discuss progress in projects 
previously lobbied for by community leaders. Once local authorities receive federal or 
state resources to carry out a range of projects, then they analyse which are feasible. 
Authorities give priority to those projects expecting to have a greater impact on a large 
sector of the community, and citizens have little say about those decisions taken. 
Neighbourhood representatives are invited as watchdogs to check project progress and 
its expenses. Project committee members are expected to give their representatives this 
information. However, despite the fact that committee members are constantly 
monitoring the way projects are carried out, they do not have any powers to complain if 
a project falls behind schedule or is wrongly completed. 
Due to the scarcity of resources facing most Mexican local authorities, the 
implementation of projects where the community covers part of the project's costs is 
increasingly common. Puebla is no exception, as commented by delegado Mr. VdIdez, 
'the mayor started a few weeks ago the project of obras por cooperacOn' (Vdldez 
31 interview 17/7/2000). Similarly to a fideicomiso, obras por cooperaci6n are projects 
that are concluded with the active support of citizens. Their co-operation could be 
provided either through financial resources or via their labour. This particular scheme is 
similar to the types of initiatives promoted by such international organisations as the 
WB or the IMF, and which are discussed in chapter 2. 
The third type of meetings takes place within the upper class areas, where there is 
unlikely to be a dominant leader or any explicit ideological content. They would mainly 
address the provision of services such as street lighting, rubbish collection or 
constructions that could affect the living standards of these neighbourhoods. Within the 
upper sectors of the population, citizens organise by themselves and do not need any 
guidance from authorities to establish their committees: 
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Socially speaking, the population organises according to the level and 
needs they have. In residential, upper class areas they focus their energy towards 
demanding better public services as they have their basic infrastructure needs 
already covered. In the upper sectors of the population there is not such a co- 
operative community, people are more individualistic (Armenta Mier interview 
23/6/2000). 
To sum up, we can say that two out of the three types of meetings curTently taking place 
in Puebla are tightly controlled by local authorities. Neighbourhood and project 
committee meetings would be strongly dependent on the amount of resources available. 
In neither we perceive a 'real' will from local authorities to share their decision-making 
power with citizens. According to the people interviewed (neighbourhood leaders and 
some members of the public), they are highly dependent on what authorities decide. On 
the other hand, and similarly to the trend found in chapter 5, the upper sectors of the 
population do not need the support of local authorities to decide whether or not a 
neighbourhood meeting should take place. As the middle and upper classes have already 
covered their basic infrastructure needs (i. e. piped drinking water, electricity), we can 
say that the only relationship of these sectors with local authorities is based on making 
sure that such core services as rubbish collection are delivered properly. The next 
section analyses the three participatory schemes that have been presented in this chapter. 
Analysis of the Three Participatory Schemes 
Ley Bartlett 
Ley Bartlett is a good example of how democratic measures can be interpreted 
differently depending on who promotes the initiative, and the political, economic and 
social circumstances under which they are implemented. In this case, the debate over the 
legitimacy of Ley Bartlett became a crude political dispute between the PRI and the 
PAN. We must not forget the context under which the controversy took place, as it 
happened in a period when Manuel Bartlett of the PRI and Diego Femdndez de Cevallos 
of the PAN were trying to become party candidates for the 2000 presidential election. A 
local issue that under a different context would perhaps not have been publicised on a 
national scale became a big issue throughout Mexico. 
Ley Bartlett was created as a response to the 1997 fiscal co-ordination law, which would 
have diminished the amount of economic resources received by the state government of 
Puebla and increased those resources destined for local authorities. This is why Bartlett 
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elaborated a project firstly to recover Puebla's state government financial strength and 
consequently to dominate the pseudo-participatory structures (COPLADEMUNs) 
created through local networks that had previously worked for the official party. In 
many respects Ley Bartlett became mere clientelism, as claimed by some members of 
the PAN, who stated that negotiations took place before meetings, and that the destiny 
of financial resources was allocated depending on authorities' preferences. The 
implementation of this initiative demonstrated once more, that in a Mexican context, 
there is a big difference between ideals on paper and what is put in practice. 
Bartlett's conflictual reputation 32 was another factor that contributed to the widespread 
mistrust of the decentralising and democratic aspects covered by Ley Bartlett. Maybe if 
another politician had promoted the reform, it would have gone through with fewer 
problems, but Bartlett's machiavellian procedures were viewed with suspicion and 
scrupulously analysed. The fact that Bartlett promoted his initiative in an electoral year 
was another element that was also added to the controversy. If resources had been 
distributed in the state of Puebla according to the 1997 Fiscal Co-ordination Law, the 
state authorities' capacity to deliver social projects would have been diminished; it is a 
common practice by federal, state and local authorities in electoral years to increase 
social expenditure, especially during the months before the election. The intention is to 
promote any projects concluded within this period as the 'great actions' performed by 
the party in power, as a means of winning electoral support. 
Despite the fact that some articles of Ley Bartlett were banned, according to some 
political analysts (see La Jornada de Oriente 14/2/2000) it accomplished Bartlett's 
political purposes. 
Ley Bartlett briefly had a true federalist spirit, but at the same time it was 
an electoral tool created and used by Governor Bartlett for political purposes. 
The results of the 1998 local election can prove this, as the PRI recovered the 
state capital and Melquiades Morales, also representing the PRI, was elected 
governor for the 1999-2005 term (La Jornada de Oriente 14/2/2000). 
Whether Manuel Bartlett was really concerned about promoting citizen participation 
schemes without any personal or political interests remains uncertain, albeit unlikely. 
What seemed to have happened in Puebla is that a scheme which in theory could have 
brought openness and a genuine participatory opportunity for citizens to get involved in 
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decision-making processes, was obscured by a political dispute involving Mexico's two 
main political forces. 
The PAN- UN Initiative 
The PAN claimed that its participatory initiative would have brought important social 
benefits to deprived areas. With the introduction of accountable and democratic 
practices the panistas were expecting to get rid of pritsta local bosses, as well as 
diminishing the range of clientelist activities carried out by the official party. With the 
primary needs of the middle classes already covered, and also bearing in mind that most 
were already grouped in neighbourhood organisations, it can be argued that the initiative 
primarily foresaw bringing benefits to the poorer sectors of the population. Despite 
having the support of an international organisation such as the UN, the panista initiative 
did not receive financial support, and it passed the heavy burden of collecting financial 
resources to citizens. It seems that panistas overestimated the economic capacity of the 
majority of Puebla's population, who - especially the poorest classes - did not have the 
financial capacity to sustain this project over a prolonged period of time. This class 
aspect has already been touched upon in the previous chapter and it emerges again in 
chapter 6. It appears that when participatory schemes are conceived by local or state 
administrations, they do not consider the basic infrastructure conditions surrounding 
each neighbourhood, which may influence whether or not citizens are interested in 
joining participatory schemes when they are not tailored to their needs. This point will 
be discussed further in the conclusion of the thesis. 
The panista proposal to promote citizen participation is the simplest to follow. It 
provides clear definitions and guidelines on how to proceed under different 
circumstances, and it even includes guidelines to facilitate the presentation of monthly 
statements, an accountable practice non-existent under most priista participatory 
schemes. The project was also used as a political response to Ley Bartlett and 
COPLADEMUNs, although when compared to Ley Bartlett, it perhaps did not have the 
necessary legal support to succeed, especially as the lack of a budget to deliver social 
projects weakened it. Ironically, the panistas therefore were forced to reach agreements 
with a veteran of the Mexican political system, Manuel Bartlett. The implementation of 
the Carpeta de Desarrollo Comunitario was not consolidated because the PAN was not 
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able to retain Puebla's local government for a consecutive term. Despite its limited 
powers the returning PRI administration removed an initiative that could have been an 
effective response to citizen's interest in joining participative bodies at the local level. 
Perhaps in a less politicised environment this initiative would have succeeded. 
Current participatory initiatives 
Under the current priista administration there is no clearly defined plan for the 
implementation of participatory initiatives. Instead, there are five or six different 
channels through which citizens can get involved in the issues which affect them, and 
despite having a whole department dedicated to the promotion of citizen participation, 
these activities are still dominated by local bosses and municipal bureaucrats. Poor 
people are practically forced to have a good relationship with bureaucrats and 
neighbourhood leaders in case they need to obtain a paved street or potable water. The 
current administration has strengthened the power of juntas auxiliares, when research 
has shown that these organisations have close links with the PRI and that most of them 
defend the political interests of this organisation (see Agenda para la Refionna 
Municipal). Most presidents of juntas auxiliares are appointed by municipal or state 
officials, and are rarely elected in an open process. These pseudo-representatives play a 
key political role, especially during elections or at times when unpopular measures are 
to be announced by local or state authorities (Alvarez and Castrol999). In the view of 
Alvarez and Castro, juntas auxiliares should be either reformed or disappear, as they 
have been mainly used by the PRI for political purposes: 
In urban municipalities juntas auxilaires act as municipal authorities and 
they represent citizens regarding bureaucratic work and will have a large amount 
of political control. In rural areas, these authorities act as channels of 
communication between authorities and citizens, sign official documents and 
have a direct contact with the mayor, obviously they have a considerably 
influential position within their localities (Alvarez and Castro1999). 
An interesting argument highlighted by Alvarez and Castro can be applied directly to 
the way in which COPLADEMUNs were conceived. Most citizen participation reforms 
have not taken into accountjuntas auxiliares for three main reasons: 
1) They are considered obsolete and antagonistic to any democratic principles. 
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2) They are perceived as institutions that sooner or later are 4(0111" to be absorbed by 
municipalities and will become part of that bureaucratic apparatus. 
3) They are expected to be elected and to have a budget assigncd fOr Community 
projects. 
Ironically, certain participatory reforms have tried to incorporate julaus aitiiliares, 
thereby increasing their influence and legitimising their corj? oratist practices. And when 
authorities create alternative structures, they tend to repcat the same practices performed 
by juntas; as happened with COPLADEMUNs, where most 'elected leaders' were 
representing interests, linked to the official party (PRI), or to local oovernnient officials. Cý C- 
The first months of the post-COPLADEMUN were characterised by a search for 
alternative options of citizen involvement. In a disordered way, authorities left citizens 
fi, s th, malizima, ge responsibilities and such 
forms of 'citizen participation' asjt, with larg 
or even local caciques continued operating normally, see HOUrc 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 Steps to follow when carrying out current Participatory Schemes 
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The process presented in Figure 4.2 has proven to be time-consuming and contact based. 
Especially when moving from step 1 to step 3, the self-organised and not entirely 
democratically elected neighbourhood leader structure struggles to achieve their needs, 
and if the community leader does not have the contacts, then his/her projects could be 
ignored indefinitely. There is no determined number of meetings that should take place 
during the year, and the functions of these community representatives are not clearly 
defined by any legal statutes. Most local government officials interviewed recognised 
the importance of creating a citizen participation law, with clear statutes and functions 
for citizens and authorities. Box 4.2 offers the main strengths and weaknesses of the 
three schemes analysed above. 
Box 4.2 Comparison of the three schemes analysed 
I Ley Bartlett- COPLADEMUN I 
Strengths 
Strong legal backup 
Budget assigned in open meetings 
Open election of community leaders 
Weaknesses 
" Simulated Deliberation 
" Uttle power to influence local decisions not included in 
the scheme 
" 7lie average citizen is powerless, as everything is 
negotiated at the top of the political pyramid 
Strong links between local bosses (i. e. jueres auxitiares or 
neighbourhood representatives) and municipal authorities 
PAN-UN initiative 
Strengths 
" Introduces accountability as a clue aspect to be considered 
in any neighbourhood schemes 
" Provides a set of clear rules for both authorities and 
citizens 
" Open election of community leaders 
" High degrees of deliberation between authorities and 
citizens 
Current Schemes 
Weaknesses 
Lack of a legislation behind its operations 
Despite having the support of the UN, high dependency on 
state authorities to receive a budget for its operations 
Heavy economic burden for citizens 
LA)w impact on schemes not run through this initiative 
Strengths 
Involvement of citizens in project committees 
Operates under a department specifically established to 
promote citizen participation 
'lleoretically speaking, equal treatment to upper and lower 
class citizens 
Weaknesses 
" Time-consuming 
" Contact-based 
" No legal framework supporting its operations 
" No certainty regarding election processes of community 
leaders 
" Especially in the lower sectors of the population, prone to 
be used for clientelistic purposes 
High dependency on promoters and delegados to achieve 
community projects 
Simulated deliberation in most cases 
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In our view, if clear bases are not established, clientelist or corporatist practices will 
persist in Puebla. Especially the poorest sectors of the population seem destined to keep 
on playing the clientelist game unless structural reforms giving true influence to 
vulnerable groups in deciSlon-making processes are carried out. 
Conclusion 
The participatory initiatives presented in this chapter show clearly that political or party 
interests have played a key role in their development in Puebla. The case demonstrates 
how the PAN and PRI have sought to gain political advantage by using participatory 
schemes more as a 'political weapon' than as accountable or democratic mechanisms. 
Put differently, both parties were seeking political advantage by using a participatory 
discourse, which in practice was not that participatory or democratic. Thus, at risk of 
simplification, at least in part Bartlett was pursuing his personal political agenda, the 
PAN was trying to undermine established PRI caciquil structures while the current PRI 
regime seems to be using participatory schemes to re-cstablish traditional PRI caciquil 
structures. This case raises important questions regarding the true intentions behind 
participatory schemes as well as highlighting the relevance that implementation has 
when these mechanisms are carried out in a highly politicised environment; these points 
will be discussed to a greater depth in the conclusion of this thesis. 
The chapter also depicts Puebla's contact based network where populist practices are 
still common. Similarly to Tlalpan, in Puebla poor people remain most vulnerable to the 
clientelist practices performed by informal community leaders. Social classes play a key 
role when participatory schemes are implemented. Whilst the middle classes do not 
seem to be bothered about taking part in participatory schemes to introduce such 
services as piped drinking water or sewage, the poorer sectors generally hope to 
maximise any potential benefits that could be received when taking part in such 
schemes. This 'class' issue is an aspect that seems to have been forgotten by the 
developers of participatory schemes in different parts of Mexico, and will be discussed 
more extensively in chapter 6. 
Puebla is also a good example of the facility with which local projects are reformed or 
discontinued, especially whenever there is a change of party at the local level. A major 
issue raised here is the uncertain future of citizen participation mechanisms in Mexico. 
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It seems that any type of participatory initiative implemented at the state or municipal 
level will always be limited by article 115 of the Mexican constitution, which avoids the 
establishment of intermediate decision-making bodies where citizens take the ultimate 
decision. If article 115 of the constitution prevents the establishment of intermediate 
bodies with powers to decide on public matters, then it is worth asking what is the sense 
of all those participatory programmes currently being implemented by local authorities 
in different parts of the country? Are all these programmes also violating the 
constitution? If the project for new federalism proposed by the Zedillo administration 
foresaw an active citizenry participating at the local level, then there is some doubt 
whether he realised that he was promoting an initiative that goes against article 115 of 
the constitution. Perhaps the aim is to always keep decision-making power within 
authorities and only share it in a very limited way with citizens. Maybe the goal of 
political parties is to undermine the policies of their opponents using a participatory 
rhetoric, but in reality carrying out schemes that circumscribe genuine participation. The 
creation of quasi-decision-making units is a means for authorities to tell citizens that 
they have a right to express their thoughts and get involved in decision-making 
processes, but at the same time, legally and economically speaking, these units will have 
few real powers. The next chapter introduces the case of San Pedro which is of interest 
because it differs from Puebla in three important ways. First, it has been marked by the 
continuity of the same policy in power for four consecutive terms. Second, the absence 
of strong political competition so that structures of local representation and participatory 
initiatives have not become politicised in the same way. Third, the primary 
infrastructure needs of the population have largely been satisfied. So, how have 
participatory initiatives developed in this very different context? 
Notes 
1 This data was provided by the Head of Puebla's Urban Development Secretariat, Rufino Martfnez 
Bruno, see La Jornada de Oriente (28/9/2000). 
2 According to Boltvinik (cited in La Jornada 14/11/1997) the method is one of the most advanced for 
measuring poverty and it was developed by Foster. For further information see United Nations 1997 
Human Development Report. 
3 For more information about how these indicators are used to assign economic resources see Nolan and 
Whelan Resources, Deprivation and Poverty (1996). 4A concertacesi6n is the name given to those political negotiations that took place between the PRI, 
opposition political parties and social movements throughout the 1990s. The aim of the PRI was to reduce 
the force of these organisations negotiating political concessions. See chapter I for examples. 5 The night before the discussion and approval of the legislation around 90 members of the PAN 
including some mayors, obstructed the Congress' main access, forcing PRI congressmen to enter 
Congress by the back door. Once the session started and the new reforms were read by a priista 
congressman, a signal was given by Felipe Puelles, and a large number of panistas, wearing caps with the 
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slogan 'we want stronger municipalities, ' started hitting priista congressmen. Only one priista legislator, 
Joel L6pez Cuevas, was seriously injured. PAN members constantly interrupted the session, and security 
guards intervened to take them out. At the end of the session, the prilsta majority at Puebla's Congress 
approved the initiative (La Jornada 28/l/1998). 
6 See articles 44 and 45 of the LNFSP. 
7 Article II establishes that state authorities in co-ordination with municipalities and juntas auxiliares 
would invite the community to participate in the prioritisation of their needs (Diario Oficial 
28/l/1998: 12). 
8 See article 15 of the LNFSP. 
9 For more examples see articles 20,21,22, and 23 of the legislation. 
10 For more details see article 82 of the LNFSP. 
"Article 25 can be interpreted as a mechanism for involving the general public in decision-making 
processes and as a way to promote democracy and equality. It is a state's responsibility to promote 
egalitarian and integral development that can help strengthen the nation's sovereignty and democratic 
regime. It is through economic growth and employment that a more equal wealth distribution can be 
achieved. Also article 26 states that the incorporation of the public is important to achieve development. 
The state will organise a system of democratic planning for achieving national development based on the 
following characteristics: strength, dynamism, and equality, as well as independence and political 
democratisation (Cited from the Mexican Constitution, edited in 2000). 
12 See articles 21,22,23 and 24 of COPLADEMUN's statutes. 13 For more details see articles 25,26 and 27 of COPLADEMUN's statutes. 
14 Those facing similar circumstances, such as panista mayors from Coahuila, complained about a similar 
situation under the government of Rogelio Montemayor Seguy (La Jornada 28/1/1998). 
15 The 13 municipalities are Puebla, Acajete, Atlixco, Chapulco, Nopalucan, San Andrds Cholula, San 
Gregorio Atzompa, San Martfn Texmelucan, San Matias Tlalantaleca, Tehuacan, Santiago Mihuatlan, 
Aljojuca and San Pedro Cholula (source, La Jornada 6/3/1998). 
16 For example, Rocio Lambera Gonzalez (advisor for several NGOs) and Vicente Arredondo Ramfrez 
(UNESCO researcher). 
17 President Zedillo (1994-2000) inaugurated the venue, while Governor Manuel Bartlett and Governor of 
Guanajuato Vicente Fox (currently president of Mexico) also took part. 
18 The document is not clear about what this really means, but we can interpret it as getting involved in 
party issues, or looking after their personal interests rather than the interests of their neighbours. 9 COPLADEMUNs are bodies intended to promote citizen participation in decision-making processes, 
but these decisions are taken by all the members that are involved in each of these institutions, and not as 
argued by panistas [unilaterally]. The objective of COPLADEMUNS is to make budgets accountable to 
citizens, and at the same time to collect all those demands presented by the different groups composing 
each community (Diario Oficial 12/4/2000: 49). 
20 Despite the large number of projects discussed and implemented via COPLADEMUNs, Mr. Medina 
did not comment on the way in which these meetings took place. It remains uncertain whether the 
meetings were 'pre-fabricated' as happened under the panista administration, or if these meetings were 
not pre-arranged. 
21 See Marin 2000 at www. puebla. com. mx. 22 Eleven of thesejuntas auxiliares are located in rural areas. 23 We have to bear in mind that both opinions cited here come from bureaucrats working for a priista 
administration and that they could, very possibly, have a biased perspective. 24 Meaning that local politics is dominated by an 'old fashioned' type of leadership based on threatening 
the population 
25 Approximately f 20. 
26 PRI 2000 presidential candidate. 27 Under this scheme, the authorities would cover the majority of the costs of a project, and the residents 
would provide the rest, which would be deposited in bank accounts previously opened by local authorities for these purposes. 
28 As mentioned in chapter 4, unfortunately could not attend any of these meetings so I had to base my 
analysis on the views provided by those citizens who took part in these processes. 29 Community leaders do not receive an 'official' salary from local authorities, and most of them rely on 
neighbours to pay those expenses generated by their lobbying activities. According to Mr. Ramirez, 'I 
never ask people for money, only when I go to the central office to do some paperwork. I do it to make 
them aware that in order to receive one has to first give' (Ramirez 2000). 30 While the fieldwork was carried out, not a single one of these meetings took place. 
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31 'Projects by co-operation' is the translation to Obras por cooperaci6n. 
32 Manuel Bartlett is considered a dinosaur (see Fuentes in La Jornada 14/10/1997) of the Mexican 
political system and became notorious in 1988, with the phrase 'the system broke down'. The phrase 
refers to the computer system installed for receiving electoral data during the 1988 presidential election. 
The story goes that once he noticed that the official party (PRI) candidate, Carlos Salinas, was losing the 
election, he faked a failure in the computer system and altered the result of the election to favour Carlos 
Salinas. Perhaps a clearer description of this politician is the one provided by PAN's 1998 national leader 
Felipe Calder6n: 'when Bartlett was in charge of the 1988 presidential election, he was responsible for the 
largest electoral fraud in this country's history. He was also allegedly involved in the assassination of the 
journalist Manuel Buendia and cannot visit the United States, as California's Tribunal is waiting for him 
to respond to accusations which link him with drug-trafficking activities and the assassination of DEA 
agent Enrique Camarena' (La Jomada 30/l/1998). 
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Chapter 5 
San Pedro 
Introduction 
San Pedro is considered the most developed municipality of Mexico. According to 
President Vicente Fox, 'a few years back, in San Pedro there were not many resources 
to promote development, however, today it is one of the greatest urban centres of 
Mexico. The people of San Pedro are leading the way, they are very advanced and have 
the best quality of life' (El Norte 28/8/2001). Governed since 1989 by the PAN, the 
municipality of San Pedro is the first in Mexico to have been ruled for more than ten 
years by the country's entrepreneurial elite. The inhabitants of this prosperous 
municipality are used to having the best services and the best places to go out, but have 
they got the best citizen participation mechanisms? This chapter analyses how the 
participatory agenda has been carried out in the most developed municipality of Mexico. 
It examines the main challenges faced when implementing participatory mechanisms 
where the population has already been provided with its basic infrastructure needs (i. e. 
electricity, piped drinking water). 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. It starts with an overview of the conditions of 
San Pedro, which include a brief history of the main participatory schemes and some 
constitutional reforms that have been discussed by state authorities. The second part of 
the chapter covers the presentation of the current citizen participation legislation. In the 
third section the strengths and weaknesses of the legislation are analysed, and the next 
part examines San Pedro's bureaucratic structure. The fifth section covers the way the 
participatory agenda has been put in practice and it is followed by a short analysis of 
other participatory activities that have been also implemented. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the participatory activities in San Pedro. 
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San Pedro's Characteristics 
An overview of an efficient municipality 
Since it was established more than 400 years ago, the richest families of the industrial 
northern state of Nuevo Le6n found in San Pedro Garza Garcfa their favourite place of 
residence. This prosperous municipality has a population of 130,000 inhabitants, and a 
territorial extension of 6,968 hectares. The municipality is divided into 140 
neighbourhoods inhabited, broadly speaking, by two social classes: la residencial 
(upper class) and la popular (lower class) with around 65,000 inhabitants each., 
However, 70 percent of the properties in the municipality are owned by the upper class 
and 30 percent by the lower class. According to the Social Development Secretariat, San 
Pedro is considered the most developed municipality of Mexico, as it has the lowest 
index of marginality in the country (see El Norte 23/9/2000). The municipality has 
covered all its basic infrastructure needs. Both upper and lower sectors of the population 
have piped drinking water, sewage, electricity, natural gas, and paved streets. 
San Pedro has become one of the most important bastions of the PAN in Mexico. Since 
1988 the PAN has won every local election, allowing it to consolidate a 'panista 
entrepreneurial mentality' within San Pedro. 
The private sector has played a key role in San Pedro's successful development. Several 
leading industrialists live there, such as Dionisio Garza Medina (ALFA steel industry), 
Eugenio Garza Laguera (VISA beer industry), and Adrian Sada Gonzdlez (VITRO glass 
industry) .2 The last five mayorS3 that have been elected are linked in one way or another 
to Monterrey's industrial group, Monterrey is the capital of the state of Nuevo Le6n, 
where San Pedro is also situated. This group of entrepreneurs has introduced their 
philosophy to the public sector, initiating a different style of local politics. Two points 
worth highlighting about this 'new-style' are, firstly, the performance based provision 
of public services, and, secondly, the bridges that the ruling class have built with the 
lower sectors of the municipality. In fact some of the poor neighbourhoods that have 
been established in San Pedro were created to provide the upper classes with the labour 
needed to build their mansions or to work at their homes. The citizen participation 
minister for the 2000-2003 administration recalls that, 'the popular sector (lower class) 
of the municipality was built as housing for immigrants who used to work for the 
cement industry. Currently these neighbourhoods are occupied by workers that carry out 
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most of the 'unpopular' jobs performed in the rich areas of San Pedro (i. e. gardeners, 
drivers, maids etc. )' (Zubieta y Landa interview 27/3/2001). The upper sector of San 
Pedro seems keen to develop within the lower classes an entrepreneurial and 
participatory mentality, so that, as discussed below, most social projects implemented in 
San Pedro are intended to develop the lower social classes of the municipality. 
Brief history of citizen participation mechanisms implemented in San Pedro 
It is difficult to determine the exact date when participatory mechanisms emerged in San 
Pedro. Certainly, since the 1960s there have been neighbourhood boards that have been 
established to deal with local problems. One of the main characteristics of these 
permanent participatory bodies is that they have been set up by affluent residents in the 
'rich part' of the locality. Perhaps these mechanisms influenced local authorities when 
developing later participatory initiatives. However, more recently, it was under the 
Mauricio Femdndez (1989-1991) administration that citizens first took part in the 
elaboration of San Pedro's municipal development plan, and according to the 1997- 
2000 mayor, Teresa Garcia de Madero, the idea to involve San Pedro's citizens was 
brought by Ferndndez from the neighbouring state of Texas. The first consultation took 
place on 27 February 1990, after which another participatory process was organised on 
25 March 1990.4 The main issue dealt with in this consultation was to ask citizens their 
opinion regarding the future urban development of San Pedro. The major concern 
expressed by citizens throughout the consultation was the chaotic way in which San 
Pedro was being developed. Neighbours feared that the value of their properties would 
diminish if residential areas continued being used for commercial purposes (i. e. 
establishing commercial centres). As a result of this participatory exercise, from March 
1990 until February1991 no new petitions for a construction permit within San Pedro 
were authorised. During the eleven months that this suspension lasted, there were two 
citizen encounters organised by external organisations to discuss the future urban 
development of San Pedro. The first meeting was organised by the CANACO (National 
Chamber of Commerce Monterrey branch) and the second by groups of ecologists, 
urban development specialists, academics, and neighbours. Despite the fact that 
alternative strategies of development were proposed in both forums, the discussions did 
not seem to influence the local authority and the original plan remained unchanged (El 
Norte 8/2/1 991). 5 
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A change introduced by the Femdndez administration modified the way in which jueces 
auxiliares (auxiliary citizen judges) were appointed. Throughout previous priista 
administrations, jueces auxiliares were appointed directly by local officials and their 
function was primarily to support the official party with their clientelist practices. 
However, under the Ferndndez administration, for the first time, citizens were consulted 
about the most suitable person to occupy this position. Local authorities carried out a 
survey within each neighbourhood, and then local officials made a choice between the 
two or three names that were nominated the most by local residents. Whilst the process 
was not entirely in the hands of citizens, at least citizens had a say in the process. 
One of the greatest concerns expressed by the inhabitants of San Pedro deals with the 
use of residential areas for commercial purposes. In fact one of the most controversial 
issues raised by citizens during the second year of the Rogelio Sada (1991-1994) 
administration was their opposition to the refurbishment and further expansion of a 
commercial centre located in a residential area. 6 The PAN authorities soon realised that 
governing a highly demanding population was not an easy task, and this is why they 
thought that having closer contact with citizens was an important part of implementing 
any projects in the municipality. This is why the Sada administration created the San 
Pedro citizen councils. This new citizen participation scheme was introduced as an 
option to involve citizens who would work as 'advisors' for the local authority. The 
core principle supporting this initiative was to provide each local ministry with a 
watchdog that would be constantly revising all municipal policies before they were 
implemented. Each watchdog would be chosen by the mayor and would occupy this 
position for a six month period, with the possibility of being re-confirmed in this 
position every six months (see discussion below). Moreover, because the authorities 
chose those citizens involved in these forums, the structure of the citizen council was 
highly criticised by opposition party members. For instance, 1991-1994 PRI municipal 
party-leader, Jos6 Luis Castellanos Campa, questioned their neutrality when these 
bodies analysed the approval of a new urban reglamento (local law) for San Pedro (El 
Norte 3/12/1992). Despite the criticisms, these bodies have continued operating up to 
the present day. 
Sada also introduced three important changes to increase the channels of interaction 
between authorities and the public. Firstly, he created the citizen participation 
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directorate. According to the first citizen participation director of San Pedro, Mrs. 
Rebeca Clouthier, 'Sada established the citizen participation direction in an attempt to 
interact with all San Pedro's inhabitants through jueces auxiliares and neighbourhood 
boards. Covering all poor and rich neighbourhoods with neighbourhood boards and 
jueces auxiliares is one of his greatest achievements' (Clouthier interview 6/4/2001). 
The second Sada initiative was the establishment of the 1994 Citizen Participation Local 
Law, which still regulates citizen participation today. This local legislation provided the 
first legal support for such forms of participation as neighbourhood boards and for 
establishing consultation processes at the municipal level. 
The third scheme introduced was the SAC Sistema de Atenci6n al Ciudadano (Citizen 
Attention System). According to Mrs. Clouthier: 
We created the SAC because we wanted to create a computerised 
database and a network to follow every social demand. The SAC was basically 
established to tell citizens whether their demand was proceeding or not. In the 
Sada administration we covered around 90 percent of citizens' demands and in 
the Fernando Margain administration (1994-1997) we covered all social 
demands. We thought that citizens should always have an answer, even if it is a 
gno' citizens should always know what happens to what they asked for 
(Clouthier interview 6/4/2001). 
The system created a 'demand-database' of every petition presented by citizens. All 
local ministries are on-line and have access to every demand previously introduced to 
the system. The aim of the SAC is to follow every demand until the citizen knows if 
his/her petition is to be accomplished or not. Each citizen received a demand number, 
and had a specified period of time to know the final verdict. These three schemes will be 
discussed more extensively below. 
This 'tradition' of involving the residents of San Pedro in decision-making processes 
continued during the 1997-2000 administration of Mrs. Teresa Garcfa de Madero. She 
perceived citizen participation as essential for the development of the municipality: 
I am convinced that citizens should get involved in decision-making 
processes and take the decisions that affect them directly in order to ensure good 
government. Governments where the community and each citizen have a say. 
Democracy is not about just voting on election day, democracy is about taking 
decisions on a daily basis and it is not possible that any government takes 
decisions without taking into account their governed. In my personal opinion, I 
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think citizen participation is a requisite in order to have a good government, it is 
a principle of a good administration, if one wants to govern 'properly', one, as 
an authority has to involve the community (Garcfa de Madero interview 
18/5/1999). 
Public consultations were one of the most recurrent participation processes promoted by 
Garcfa de Madero. These mini-referenda took place to discuss and decide about the 
actions that needed to be taken regarding specific controversial issues affecting the 
municipality. She also introduced other participatory exercises, one of the most 
successful ones being the creation of kids-clubs. The aim of these institutions is to 
involve children in participatory activities to improve the state of their communities. 
Kids-clubs and other schemes will be discussed later. 
The hegemony of the PAN since 1989 has been crucial for consolidating these 
participatory initiatives. Governing a demanding community has proven to be a 
challenge that required several structural changes that included establishing more 
channels of communication between authorities and citizens. 'Asking before acting' 
now seems to be in the mind of most of San Pedro's functionaries -a 'participatory 
fever' that has reached the state level where further structural changes have also taken 
place. 
Participatory Innovations at the State Level 
The state of Nuevo Le6n has been considered an innovative state 7 for industrial 
initiatives and since the PAN won the 1997 state election these innovations have also 
reached the political arena. One of the main concerns expressed by the 1997-2003 state 
administration is the involvement of the community at times other than election 
processes. According to the referendum and plebiscite initiative promoted by Governor 
Fernando Canales, 'it is government's and society's duty to work together to construct 
more democratic institutions, and to bring the common good. Democracy is a source of 
legitimacy in modem political systems, today citizens require new semi-direct 
participatory mechanisms' (Canales 1999). 
In order to achieve these purposes, Governor Canales decided to include in the 
constitution of Nuevo Le6n such direct participatory forms of citizen involvement as the 
referendum and the plebiscite. According to Governor Canales the referendum has the 
following advantages: 
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a) It is a dynamic method to respond to citizens' needs. 
b) It allows citizens to certify the content of those laws promoted at the local congress. 
C) It puts citizens and state representatives at the same level. 
d) It is a valuable channel of communication to promote citizens' views. 
e) It promotes collective responsibility and a feeling of solidarity between the members 
of society. 
f) It would give our political system new forms of plurality, forcing authorities to 
engage in the challenge of popular intervention. 
A referendum would be organised following these criteria: 
1) A referendum would take place when at least five percent of citizens inscribed in the 
state electoral list suggest it, when the governor considers it convenient or when two 
thirds of the local congressmen consider it adequate. 
2) Whenever a referendum takes place, in order to cancel the legislation under 
discussion, at least fifty percent of citizens on the electoral registrar must vote. 
3) Fiscal laws would not be discussed in a referendum. If following the referendum, 
the original legislation under discussion prevails, the matter could not be put to 
another referendum for three years. 
In the November 1999 petition to Nuevo Le6n's state congress, Canales also pointed out 
the convenience of approving the plebiscite as a form of citizen involvement for 
discussing general issues affecting the interests of the community. Canales suggested 
that the state constitution should give the capacity to the governor or to any of the 51 
mayors in Nuevo Le6n to invoke a plebiscite whenever there is a controversial decision 
to be discussed. 
Both the referendum and the plebiscite would be organised by an independent body 
created for these particular purposes. The functionaries taking part in this commission 
would be citizens chosen by the state congress (which currently has a panista majority). 
In order to promote a plebiscite, five percent of citizens on the state electoral list, the 
governor, or members of congress could ask the organisation created for these purposes 
to carry out one. The result of the plebiscite would directly influence the course of 
action taken by authorities. As of July 2002, this initiative is still under discussion in the 
state congress. 
The Citizen Participation Legislation of San Pedro (SPCPL) 
Neighbourhood Boards: permanent participatory bodies 
According to the legislation approved under the Sada administration, neighbourhood 
boards are the main permanent citizen participation forums. Article 6 states that for 
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legal recognition, these neighbourhood boards have to be registered at the municipality. 
When constituted, each neighbourhood board is obliged to present the legal statutes8 of 
their organisation, along with the minutes of the session where the members 
representing it were elected. The territorial area represented by each body varies, but the 
maximum number of houses that can constitute one neighbourhood board is 400. On the 
other hand, there is no minimum number of houses required to establish a 
neighbourhood board (see article 9 of SPCPL). All neighbourhood boards have a 
president, secretary and treasurer, although, more residents could be appointed to 
collaborate with those occupying these three positions where the size of the 
neighbourhood or circumstances require it. Once a neighbourhood board is elected, this 
institution can operate for any period between one and three years (see article 15 of the 
SPCPL). 
The SPCPL states that citizens would determine the functions of their respective 
neighbourhood boards, however, the purposes of each board should be within the 
boundaries set in the legislation. Neighbourhood boards should only be established to 
discuss and improve the living conditions of each neighbourhood. The legislation states 
that if any of these organisations was used for different purposes (i. e. to promote a 
political party) from those for which it was originally established, then the municipality 
would have the capacity to annul the board as such. 
According to the SPCPL, the functions of each neighbourhood board are to: 
1) Represent their neighbours with local authorities and follow each of the community 
demands until they are either accomplished or rejected by the municipality. 
2) Represent their neighbourhoods in any of the different types of consultations that 
take place within the municipality (e. g. urban development or ecological issues). 
3) Implement actions that contribute to citizens moral, cultural and civic development. 
4) Facilitate the establishment of permanent consultation mechanisms, also to promote 
democracy and increase citizen's awareness about the importance of communitarian 
actions. 
5) Evaluate the quality of public services provided by local authorities. Neighbourhood 
boards are expected to contribute to improving the services provided by the 
municipality. 
6) Promote a 'communitarian feeling' within their respective neighbourhoods and also 
to plan actions to take in case of emergency or natural disaster. 
Neighbourhood boards are the main bodies that perform constant citizen participation 
activities, although the next section describes other ways in which the community can 
take part in decision-making processes at the local level. 
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Non-permanentfonns of citizen participation 
The SPCPL establishes three non-permanent channels of citizen participation that can 
be implemented in the municipality, 1) audiences, (either public or private) 2) 
consultations, (open or closed); and 3) written petitions. Article 22 establishes that 
audiences will be the participatory instruments through which residents can demand that 
the municipality reaches particular agreements or to present information about specific 
activities performed by local authorities. The mayor, any local minister, or the citizen 
participation director, can convoke public audiences. Each encounter must be publicised 
three days in advance and local authorities are expected to contact neighbourhood board 
leaders for 'publicity purposes'. Although most public audiences are proposed by 
citizens, these consultations can also be requested by local entrepreneurs, NGOs, and 
other types of associations (see article 23 of the SPCPL). Private audiences take place 
when a citizen presents an individual petition to the local authority. In this type of 
session, the mayor could also invite other local ministers to participate (see articles 26 
and 27 of the SPCPQ. 
Consultations allow citizens to express their views about possible solutions to a 
municipal or specific neighbourhood problem. The mayor and the local minister in 
charge of solving the problem will invoke open consultations, and the participation 
process will have to be publicised seven days in advance. Authorities are expected to 
use such channels of communication as radio, television and local newspapers for 
promoting the consultation, but also neighbourhood board leaders would play a key role 
for these purposes. There are three different channels through which neighbourhood 
views can be collected: 1) surveys, 2) presentations in exhibitions, (where stalls would 
be dispersed throughout the municipality) and 3) citizen forums. The SPCPL requires 
the conclusions reached after the open consultation to be made public along with the 
actions that the local authority will carry out. Closed consultations are those where local 
authorities convene a group of specialists to discuss a specific subject or project. 
Citizens would not have access to this type of consultation. 
The SPCPL states that the results of open and closed consultations will not determine 
the course of action to be taken by local authorities. However, when deciding which 
actions to take, local officials must fully consider citizens' or experts' opinions (see 
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Article 36). The SPCPL also states that citizens will be consulted whenever any of the 
following documents are modified: 
a) Urban development plans 
b) Reglamentos Municipales (local laws) 
Written petitions must be addressed to local authorities in 'pacific and respectful' terms 
-a rather ambiguous phrase- accompanied by a copy of the original document. Local 
authorities are obliged to inform the petitioner, within a reasonable period of time, about 
the outcome of his/her demand (see Article 40). 
The three non-permanent forms of citizen participation presented in this section 
represent some of the most widely used participatory mechanisms introduced by San 
Pedro's panistas administrations. Each of these forms of consultation has been used to 
help legitimise a wide range of controversial decisions reached at the municipal level 
(see below). 
Consejos Consultivos Cfudadanos (Citizen Councils) 
Each local ministry operates under the scrutiny of a citizen council. These bodies act as 
a decentralised advisory body, having the following responsibilities: 
1) Acting as an advisor for the municipality, the mayor, and all local ministries. 
2) Expressing an opinion regarding local legislation. 
3) Proposing new laws or reforms of law within the municipality. 
4) Expressing an opinion regarding the municipality's urban development. 
According to the San Pedro Citizen Council Legislation (SPCCL) -a chapter of the 
SPC! PL- each citizen council will be composed of a president, an executive secretary, a 
delegate and up to eight councillors. The president must be an honourable citizen with a 
good professional and civic reputation, and preferably someone who is well known 
within his/her neighbourhood. The mayor will appoint the president, and the executive 
secretary and delegate will be members of the local administration. The mayor will also 
be in charge of recommending those who he/she believes are honourable citizens that 
can act as councillors. Each commission lasts for six months, but the councillors can be 
reappointed as many times as the local authority wishes. 
The citizen council must meet at least once a month. Meetings are organiscd by the 
mayor. The agenda will be co-ordinated by the president or the executive secretary and 
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all members of the citizen council will have a right to speak and vote. The legislation 
establishes that each citizen council president will receive a salary, but it does not 
specify the amount. The other members of the council receive no remuneration, as they 
are already municipal employees. The position of the councillors is honorary. 
Jueces Auxiliares (Auxiliary Judges) 
The San Pedro Juez Auxiliar Legislation (SPJAL) - another part of the SPCPL - defines 
jueces auxiliares as collaborators of the local administration. Local authorities appoint 
each juez auxiliar after implementing a survey within the jurisdiction for which he/she 
will be responsible. Jurisdictions are different from those of neighbourhood boards, 
usually covering more than one neighbourhood. The position of juez auxiliar is 
honorary and can only be occupied by those citizens fulfilling the following 
requirements: 
1) A Mexican citizen. 
2) 25 or older. 
3) Literate. 
4) An honourable and honest citizen. 
5) Having lived at least for one year in that jurisdiction. 
6) No criminal record. 
Jueces auxiliares are appointed when a new administration takes office for the same 
period of three years as the local administration. However, jueces auxiliares can be 
removed from their position if they incur any of the following faults: 
1) When abusing their authority, not sticking to the functions established in this 
legislation, or promoting a political ideology while carrying out their functions. 
2) When disobeying the local authority's orders. 
3) When committing a civil offence (e. g. robbery). 
4) When moving to a different jurisdiction. 
5) When showing mental or physical incapacity. 
6) When neighbours sign a petition asking for his/her removal as ajuez auxiliar. 
7) When not willing to participate with local authorities. 
8) When acting against the policies of the municipality. 
9) When not managing properly the issues for which he/she was appointed. 
In effect, jueces auxiliares are responsible for maintaining a peaceful environment 
within their respective jurisdictions, 9 as according to the SPJAL a juez auxiliar will 
have the following responsibilities: 
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1) Make sure that all his/her fellow citizens under his/her jurisdiction respect local laws 
and also any agreements reached with local authorities. 
2) Be supportive to local authorities whenever they require it. 
3) Work hand in hand with judicial authorities whenever their support is required (this 
is mainly for informational purposes). 
4) Attend the jueces auxiliares' monthly meeting, as well as take part in any of the 
courses regularly organised by local authorities. 
5) Whenever required by local authorities, write a report of all activities performed. 
6) Address recommendation, proof of residence or other types of letters to neighbours 
when asked for, these documents will have to be certified by local authorities as 
well. 
7) Denounce those who violate the law, and ask for the support of the police whenever 
required. 
8) Report any failures in the delivery of public services. 
9) Inform authorities when clandestine activities (i. e. toxic wastes disposal) take place 
within their jurisdictions, and also collaborate when health campaigns (i. e. 
vaccination campaigns) are organised by the municipality. 
10) Act as a local authority representative when neighbourhood board meetings take 
place. 
11) Create a directory with all the posts and telephone numbers of every local official. 
12) When required by any of the families living in their jurisdiction, intervene as a 
mediator to facilitate the solution of the 'family issue' dealt in any particular case. 
Finally, although in two (citizen councils and jueces auxiliares) of the four schemes 
here, citizens are given very little say, these schemes were still included in the citizen 
participation legislation. This is a good example of how the definitions of citizen 
participation vary widely between different local authorities. As noted in chapters 3 and 
4, the interpretation that authorities give to these mechanisms becomes crucial when 
implementing any local participatory agenda. 
Strengths and weaknesses of San Pedro's 1994 citizen participation legislation 
San Pedro's 1994 Citizen Participation Legislation was explicitly intended to develop 
citizens' and authorities' participatory responsibilities. In the legislation, San Pedro's 
authorities divided the opportunities for citizen involvement into four categories: 
neighbourhood boards, consultations, citizen councils, and jueces auxiliares. These 
options were expected to satisfy the participatory impetus of San Pedro's demanding 
population, but how effective was this legislation? 
A strength was the establishment of permanent independent bodies such as 
neighbourhood boards. In San Pedro's prosperous environment, these participatory 
groups are free to create their own statutes, giving citizens total control over their 
organisations and the neighbourhood agenda. An example of this independence is the 
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way in which residents from the neighbourhoods of Valle San Angel, Villa Chipinque, 
San Patricio, Lomas del Valle, Veredalta, Jer6nimo Siller and Bosques del Valle have 
combined to promote reforms of the urban development legislation of San Pedro. The 
core aim of this initiative is to prevent local authorities from making reforms to local 
legislation without the approval of those residents who would be affected by the 
construction of new commercial or housing projects (see El Norte 28/11/2001). 
A second positive aspect of the legislation is the opportunity for citizens to open 
consultation processes whenever they believe the issue needs discussing, as with the 
recent controversy caused by the possible construction of El Forum a large shopping 
centre. The project faced two main problems: firstly, the lack of vital infrastructure to 
receive more vehicles driving into the shopping area; and secondly, that local legislation 
has allocated this area for low-density commercial areas and not large shopping 
complexes (see El Norte 31/8/2001). As a result of public pressure, the municipality had 
to open a consultation process which took place on 23 October 2001, and which resulted 
in the local authority cancelling the project (see El Norte 31/l/2002). Authorities seem 
to have realised the importance of having constant open channels of communication 
between themselves and citizens, for three main reasons. Firstly, to know what people 
want; secondly, to know what people think of them; and thirdly, as it will be discussed 
in the disadvantages section, as a 'facilitator' of government. 
Another positive aspect of the legislation is that it encourages the development of better 
neighbourhood leaders, as these community representatives are invited to take part in 
courses to improve their leadership or personal skills. These courses are mainly directed 
to community leaders from the lower sectors of the population, and although the topics 
may vary (e. g. self-esteem, motivation or numerical skills), whenever they take place 
they seem to be highly appreciated by the participants. AsjuezaaxiliarLcticia Vargas 
commented, 'by taking these courses we are growing as persons, we all want to become 
better citizens, I have learnt many things by taking part in such schemes. I really thank 
the municipality for giving me the opportunity to engage in such activities' (Vargas 
interview 29/3/2001). 
A final strength of the legislation is the way it conceives the role of citizen councils in 
scrutinising the performance and those decisions reached within each local ministry. 
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These advisory bodies are expected to provide an important input to every decision 
taken at the municipal level. It is like having a permanent watchdog looking after the 
interests of his/her fellow citizens. 
San Pedro's authorities created four channels of communication or interaction between 
themselves and citizens as a way to improve their own performance, but also as an 
essential democratic measure. Yet, the disadvantages of the legislation are linked to the 
extensive influence that local authorities have over most of these mechanisms. Apart 
from neighbourhood boards, which are entirely managed by citizens, in the rest of the 
cparticipatory' activities included in this legislation, the authorities play a key role in 
activating each of these bodies. For instance, when consultations are proposed, it is the 
authority that decides whether the process takes place or not, or whether the process 
would be open or closed. Moreover, even after asking the citizens' opinion, the 
authorities have the last word over the steps to take after the consultation, thereby 
diminishing the importance of the whole process. If the local authority's decision 
always prevails in the end then it is worth asking, what is the reason for involving 
citizens? 
A second disadvantage can be found in the way in which citizen councils are 
established. Whilst citizens can perform as advisors they are appointed by local 
authorities, but perhaps if citizens were elected, we would expect these community 
advisors to act more freely. If the mayor proposes members of citizen councils, then 
their scope to scrutinise each local ministry is somewhat restricted, because the citizen 
chosen to perform this activity might feel compromised by their relationship with the 
mayor. This problem is accentuated by the short six months duration of citizen 
counsellors in office. It seems to have been carefully planned so that is a councillor 
strongly criticises the local administration, then he/she can be quickly removed form his 
position. 
Even though that authorities implement a survey involving all community actors before 
deciding who to nominate as a juez auxiliar, again the final decision lies within local 
authorities. Indeed, it is ironic that San Pcdro's panista administration did not alter the 
priistajuez auxiliar structure, but instead increased its capacities and influence over the 
community. On the one hand, it is useful to have jueces auxiliares within each 
jurisdiction, as they have direct contact with both local authorities and citizens. But, on 
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the other hand, local authorities seem to have gone a bit too far in their relationship with 
jueces auxiliares. With the organisation of courses to improve the leadership and 
personal skills of these community representatives -which admittedly are appreciated 
by jueces auxiliares - it is worth questioning whether the apparent independence of 
these community representatives has been corrupted by a 'dangerous liaison' with local 
authorities. Who decides the limit between exercising an excessive control over citizens, 
or letting them carry out their community activities independently? Especially in lower 
class neighbourhoods, it appears to be an excessive control over residents. As discussed 
below, the continuity that local authorities have given to mostjueces auxiliares seems to 
have contributed to the social stability experienced in a municipality where the gap 
between rich and poor is quite considerable. Perhaps the consecutive victories of the 
PAN have been based on executing a political project hidden behind the implementation 
of tightly controlled participatory schemes, where citizens believe their participation 
does count, but where in reality they have little impact in the final outcome of local 
policies? 
The 'strengths' and 'weaknesses' mentioned above will be expanded upon below, when 
interviews and a more detailed analysis of each situation is included. Before that, what 
the panista municipality of San Pedro has provided (on paper) are some options for 
citizen involvement, nevertheless, it is important to examine how these initiatives have 
been implemented. 
The bureaucratic structure 
In San Pedro unlike the previous case studies, a quite small department controls citizen 
participation. The size of the municipality and its social, economic, and cultural 
conditions, facilitate the work done by the citizen participation directorate. The 
directorate has four main aims: 
1) Promoting and revising the functioning of all neighbourhood forums for their 
participation in the activities taking place in the municipality. 
2) Co-ordinating and channelling those petitions made by the population to the 
body(ies) in charge of solving them. 
3) Ensuring that the functions performed by jueces auxiliares are in accordance with 
what is stated by law. 
4) Co-ordinating the meetings between the mayor with the neighbourhood boards and 
the public offices operating in the municipality. 
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It is important to note that the citizen participation directorate has recently been 
upgraded to a ministry. The decision to elevate the status of the directorate to a ministry 
was taken by the mayor for the 2000-2003 municipal term, Mr. Gerardo Garza Sada. He 
claims to be a strong supporter of citizen participation: 
We in the PAN believe in democracy, democracy is participating in 
decision-making processes constantly and the better-organised citizens are, then 
the better we will govern. Governors are only facilitators of those actions and 
projects needed by the community. It is very important to have a constant 
interaction with them (Garza Sada interview 12/9/2000). 
Another factor that contributed to Garza Sada's decision to elevate the rank of the 
citizen participation directorate was the huge difference between San Pedro's rich and 
poor neighbourhoods. According to him, solidarity plays a crucial role when wanting 
poor neighbourhoods to reach a higher level of development. Garza Sada highlighted 
the way in which the neighbours of the San Pedro 400 neighbourhood [lower class] 
developed their community by taking part in participatory programmes promoted by 
previous administrations. 
San Pedro is one of the richest municipalities of Mexico, but one third of 
the municipality lives in poverty. San Pedro 400 is a good example of how when 
the public participates you can see how the community develops. One of the 
main principles of the PAN is the principle of solidarity and we subsidise these 
poor neighbourhoods from the taxes collected from better off neighbourhoods, 
poor neighbourhoods always receive more resources than they provide (Garza 
Sada interview 12/9/2001). 
Not surprisingly, the comments made by Mayor Garza Sada were fully supported by the 
recently appointed citizen participation minister Jorge Zubieta y Landa: 
The neighbourhood San Pedro 400 is a neighbourhood properly planned, 
where all basic infrastructure was included since it was built. We built some 
gyms, football pitches, swimming pools and also cultural spaces for this 
community. We want to develop in them a 'Community feeling, ' and during 
Gerardo Garza's political campaign he realised the importance of citizen 
participation. This is why he decided to upgrade the citizen participation 
directorate to a ministry (Zubieta y Landa interview 27/3/2001). 
There are three key positions in the municipality's citizen participation ministry. Apart 
from Zubieta y Landa, Mrs. Carmen Bremer is the jueces auxiliares co-ordinator and 
Mrs. Patricia Lozano is in charge of organising the neighbourhood boards. 
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Zubieta y Landa stresses the importance of having a constant interaction with citizens 
and offering solutions for their needs. He claims that 'at least three days per week we 
visit different neighbourhoods and we ask the community about their main needs. The 
mayor is present during these visits and he would tell neighbours which projects are 
feasible and which not' (Zubieta y Landa interview 27/3/2001). Zubieta y Landa also 
highlighted the benefits of the programme known as 'viemes ciudadano' (citizen 
Friday) which is basically a public audience where all local functionaries are present, 
including the mayor. The programme aims to involve local authorities directly in 
solving the problems presented by citizens, and tries to ensure that citizens know who is 
going to deal with their problem. 
Every Friday we have a public audience, but also we can have special 
visits to neighbourhoods with a very specific need (e. g. paving a street). What 
we do in these cases is that we determine the cost of the project and then we tell 
citizens how much we can contribute for the project and how much citizens will 
have to contribute (Zubieta y Landa interview 27/3/2001). 
As the basic infrastructure needs of the municipality are provided for, in this case there 
are no negotiation processes taking place between authorities and citizens or between 
particular interests that under different circumstances might have developed. Petitions 
are quite straightforward, and because citizens and authorities are less likely to owe any 
favours to each other, then the interaction between authorities and citizens is more open. 
Zubieta y Landa recalls: 'whenever we involve the community in participation 
processes, their response has been very positive, because we always tell them the truth, 
we always tell them the "whys" the "whens" and the "hows" of every demand they 
present' (Zubieta y Landa interview 27/3/2001). In some cases citizens have even 
financed projects. For example, 'when citizens are worried about security, they can 
gather together and co-operate to buy a police patrol car. The municipality would pay 
the salaries of the officers, and neighbours would be in charge of looking after the patrol 
car and repairing it when necessary' (Zubieta y Landa interview 27/3/2001). Of course, 
this is more likely in upper class neighbourhoods than in lower class ones. 
Although the department in charge of implementing the participatory agenda has been 
upgraded, its functions have remained almost identical. Their core aims are still to open 
channels of communication between authorities and citizens and to prioritise those 
projects to be implemented in deprived neighbourhoods. 
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One of the most important areas of the citizen participation ministry is the co-ordination 
of jueces auxiliares. The aim is to keep control of every juez auxiliar working in the 
municipality. All jueces auxiliares have a monthly meeting to receive and to give 
feedback to local authorities about their activities. One of the key issues promoted in 
this department is to give continuity to these community representatives. The reasoning 
behind this policy is that over time jueces auxiliares get to know their communities and 
the main problem affecting their jurisdictions. It would be time-consuming and less 
productive for the municipality to be constantly changing jueces auxiliares 
administration after administration. According to juez auxiliar co-ordinator Mrs. 
Carmen Bremer: 
The idea is that they (jueces auxiliares) keep performing this activity for 
a prolonged period of time, because we invest in their preparation to become 
jueces and we would like them to stay as such. We are interested in their all 
round development, we do not want them to become caciques, we try to educate 
them to not take advantage of their position, and if they start doing so (taking 
advantage of their position) then they are immediately removed. They are aware 
of this situation. The great majority of jueces auxiliares are well behaved, if 
there is a problem with any of them, then he or she would be immediately 
removed from occupying that position (Bremer interview 29/3/2001). 
According to Mrs. Bremer she only recalls two cases where jueces auxiliares were 
removed after using their position for particular party purposes (basically in favour of 
the PRI). Both cases occurred during the first years of the PAN in office (Bremer 
interview 29/3/2001). 
The claim is that the juez auxiliar post is reserved for people with a genuine 'civic 
spirit' and for those who do not look to benefit from the position. The surveys applied 
before choosing these representatives play an important role in selecting each juez 
auxiliar. As Carmen Bremer puts it, 'after applying the survey, we would then choose 
the candidate who is more positively perceived within his/her community' (Bremer 
interview 29/3/2001). The authorities are constantly interacting with these community 
representatives so they would quickly know when one of them is trying to take 
advantage of its position. Because the municipality has a 100 percent coverage of their 
basic infrastructure needs, it is very difficult to have the 'classical' local leaders found 
throughout the country, who would offer to lobby for the introduction of public services 
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if during election processes citizens vote for a particular candidate. In San Pedro, we 
can say that there is nothing material to offer. 
In the upper classes jueces auxiliares are also selected based on residents' opinions. 
Because upper class people have, generally speaking, busier lifestyles and would not 
have enough time for community activities, these positions are mostly occupied by the 
same person for long periods of time. 
In residential areas, there we ring neighbourhood boards and then the 
members of these bodies would recommend someone for the position. We also 
contact people with a high 'serving spirit' and we would then ring them and ask 
them whether they are interested in occupying the post. In a way it is easier to 
choosejueces auxiliares in residential areas, than in lower sectors, because in the 
lower sectors you have more conflicts between neighbours wanting the post 
(Bremer interview 29/3/2001). 
The person who co-ordinates San Pedro's neighbourhood boards is Mrs. Lozano. 
According to her the problems which affect upper and lower class neighbourhoods vary 
widely: 'poor areas and rich areas have quite different demands. Poor neighbourhoods' 
main problems are related to drugs and public security, in rich neighbourhoods they are 
mainly concerned about keeping their green areas' [but when compared to those 
problems affecting other municipalities of Mexico, they are all much easier to solve] 
(Lozano interview 5/4/2001). 
According to Mrs. Lozano, these bodies have total independence when constituting and 
electing their representatives. The role of municipal authorities is only to witness these 
processes, not to influence the way in which sessions are carried out or the principles of 
the organisation. 
Citizens manage the whole process, we do not intervene in the formation 
of these bodies. Neighbours create their own statutes (i. e. meeting-wise and 
function-wise). Election processes vary, in some places they do it every year, in 
others every three years and in others they stay for more than that, as long as this 
is accepted by neighbours, then we do not see a problem doing so (Lozano 
interview 5/4/2001). 
Local authorities encourage citizens to establish community organisations, furthermore, 
whenever a new neighbourhood is erected, authorities meet with neighbours and 
highlight the importance of taking part in decision-making processes. Mrs. Lozano 
recalls, 'whenever a neighbourhood wants to establish a Mesa-Directiva, 
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(neighbourhood board) we provide a list with all the benefits that it could bring to the 
municipality and to them and we encourage them to create their own representative 
body' (Lozano interview 5/4/2001). In the view of neighbourhood board advisor Mr. 
Juan Ignacio Duran, these boards were conceived as a solution to the high number of 
demands presented to local authorities by the inhabitants of San Pedro. 
In San Pedro the authorities decided nine years ago that due to the large 
number of demands posed by citizens, they should use neighbourhood boards as 
a channel to process those demands. This is why neighbours were motivated to 
create their own neighbourhood boards, which they would registrar with 
municipal authorities (Duran interview 4/4/2001). 
It might seem that three full-time co-ordinators are not enough to cope with the 
participatory needs of the municipality, however, the recently upgraded ministry has 
proven very effective. These neighbourhood co-ordinators keep a daily contact with 
jueces auxiliares and neighbourhood representatives, and their job is facilitated by the 
fact that the municipality has totally covered its basic infrastructure needs. Ironically, 
one of the structures that have been strengthened throughout the panista years is thejuez 
auxiliar, which traditionally was linked to the PRI's clientelistic activities. This concept 
seems to be effective when implemented in areas where all the basic infrastructure 
needs of citizens are covered, as the possibility to negotiate or blackmail citizens is 
considerably reduced if their primary needs are already solved. 
How do San Pedro's participatory bodies work? 
Neighbourhood boards 
The way in which neighbourhood boards are organised in San Pedro is directly linked to 
class. While upper class neighbourhood boards are highly organised and have their own 
budgets, lower class neighbourhoods generally have less developed organisations and 
gather to discuss community issues sporadically, only when a problem affecting their 
neighbourhood arises. A good example of an upper middle class ncighbourhood 
organisation is the Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood board. Founded in 1969, this 
neighbourhood board was established to achieve the following purposes: 
1) Defend the interests of the neighbourhood. 
2) Represent the interests of any particular individual living in the neighbourhood. 
3) Scrutinise the quality of the services provided by the municipality. 
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4) Participate actively in events organised for improving the conditions of the 
neighbourhood. 
5) Whenever required, intervene with local authorities to protect the value of their 
properties. 
6) Co-operate with political bodies when required. 
7) Stimulate the development of programmes or policies intended to improve the living 
conditions of the neighbourhood. 
8) Provide a forum for discussing freely any public issues affecting the neighbourbood. 
9) Co-operate with charitable causes. 
10) Deal with any legal aspects that could affect or benefit the association. 
There are 40 articles in the statutes of the Fuentes Del Valle neighbourhood board. The 
core issues covered in this 'neighbourhood constitution' are the board's main functions, 
the rules governing the election and functions of neighbourhood representatives and the 
different types of meetings organised by the board. 
Transparency is one of the main concerns for these neighbourhood organisations. Every 
month, most boards publish a bulletin that includes a financial report of their monthly 
income and expenses. Table 5.1 has been adapted from the bulletin published by the 
Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood board in April 2000. 
Table 5.1 Fuentes Del Valle Neip-hbourhood Board Statement 
Revenues February-2000 
Neighbours' fees 48,705.00 
Municipal contributions 0.00 
Diverse sources 2,500.00 
Total In 51,205.00 
Expenses 
Salaries (Accountant, secretary) 4,887.50 
Water (to water the parks) 1,224.90 
Emplovees Social Security 1,899.25 
Office bills (water, electricity and telephone) 2,002.00 
Gardeners' salaries 6,853.17 
Valeria Park expenses 1,000.00 
Office expenses 1,807.78 
Other expenses 219.66 
Stationery 1,4 1.79 
Gardening expenses 1,595.51 
Special services (fee collectors) 3,226.50 
Bulletin 0.00 
Street lights for the neighbourhood 10,000.00 
Loans to employees 400.00 
Total Out 36545.06 
Amount remaining this month 14,659.94 
Neighbourhood board savings 25,034.53 
Total amount 39,694.47 
Amounts in resos, approximately 14pesos =LI 
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The Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood board monthly bulletin is a cost-free publication 
financed by banks or businesses that have been established near or in the 
neighbourhood. The publication includes a detailed list of all the actions performed 
throughout the month, and also the dates and the issues to be dealt with in any future 
neighbourhood meetings. According to the Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood board 
secretary, Guadalupe G6mez: 
Through the bulletin we try to promote our meetings and we are 
constantly trying to find sponsors. We mainly try to find sponsors that are 
situated within the neighbourhood (banks mainly). The idea is to inform citizens 
about the dates of the meetings and also of any relevant changes taking place in 
the neighbourhood (G6mez interview 29/8/2000). 
Most upper class neighbourhood boards have a voluntary monthly fee, which as Table 
6.1 illustrates, represents the main income received by the Fuentes del Valle 
neighbourhood board. G6mez observes, 'we collect a 50 pesos (around f 3.20) fee from 
neighbours on a monthly basis, but because this payment is voluntary, most neighbours 
do not pay it, there are approximately 1,500 houses in the neighbourhood and on an 
average only around 700 pay' (G6mez interview 29/8/2000). 
This organisation's main expenses originate from paying the salaries of the personnel 
working at the neighbourhood board headquarters and of employees such as gardeners. 
An important of upper class neighbourhood boards, is that most have an 'operation 
centre. ' The Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood board, has an operational office located 
near the entrance to the neighbourhood. 10 The neighbourhood board uses this office to 
hold their internal and general meetings. It also houses a small library where office 
services (e. g. photocopying) are available. 
Although Table 5.1 shows no registered financial support from the municipality, these 
representative bodies do receive a symbolic contribution from local authorities. The 
Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood board received a 12,000 pesos (around E 850) grant in 
2000, which was used to pay the salaries of some gardeners hired by the neighbourhood 
board (G6mez interview 29/8/2000). 
A point emphasised by G6mez was that there is no space for political organisations, in 
their neighbourhood board: 
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The members of this neighbourhood board do not have a political 
interest, in fact we stated in the statutes that no party or religious interests could 
be promoted in any of the meetings taking place in the neighbourhood board. 
When we have local elections, political parties contact the board and then a 
meeting is set to listen to a determined candidate, we have no political 
preference, all parties are treated the same (G6mez interview 29/8/2000). 
By contrast, lower class neighbourhood boards do not have such developed 
organisations or strategic planning, and only gather when issues that affect them arise. 
The fact that the lower sectors of San Pedro have their primary needs covered has 
contributed to the relaxed way in which their neighbourhood boards are organised. 
Neighbourhood board leaders do not need to collect a monthly fee from citizens; they 
only do so when their co-operation is required to finish a local project. 
An interesting feature of working class neighbourhood boards is the way in which local 
authorities try to 'invest' in their leaders to make them better representatives. One 
example is Mr. Isafas Ramfrez, who has been re-elected several times as neighbourhood 
board representative for the Del Monte (working class) neighbourhood. According to 
Mr. Ramfrez, 'the municipality is always inviting me to participate in courses to 
improve my neighbourhood representative skills' (Ramfrez interview 28/3/2001). The 
courses given to improve neighbourhood representatives' skills are mainly directed at 
the poorer sectors of the population and in the view of local officials, such as Zubieta y 
Landa, have helped increase their awareness about the importance of their role in 
society. 
Because the municipality has already provided all the basic infrastructure services 
required by residents, citizens are more concerned about other types of issues affecting 
their respective neighbourhoods. In the view of neighbourhood board advisor, Mr. 
Duran, " most communities present a large number of proposals, despite the fact that 
generally speaking, they know little about municipal statutes: 
Neighbourhood boards are generally quite active demand-wise. But the 
types of demands solicited here are generally unjustified. This is caused by the 
lack of knowledge that characterises most of the inhabitants of San Pedro. 
Neighbourhood boards last for one year and there is a lot of apathy about 
studying the law; It is also because neighbours participating as community 
leaders do not get paid, there are a few incentives to make people community 
representatives. Most upper class citizens demand local authorities to implement 
actions without reasoning. For example, if they would like to have a more 
frequent collection of rubbish, they do not think about the costs this would 
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imply, or they would not think to make a comparison between the taxes they pay 
and the services they receive (Duran interview 4/4/2001). 
The PAN has been under the scrutiny of a highly educated and demanding population, 
in an environment where it is difficult to implement populist practices of government, 
and where even in poor neighbourhoods, citizens have their basic infrastructure needs 
covered. However, having an 'educated' and demanding population does not necessarily 
mean that citizens know their rights. According to neighbourhood board advisor Mr. 
Ignacio Duran, there are some cases where the inhabitants of San Pedro ask for services 
or for the solution of a determined problem without knowing the limits of local 
authorities' areas of influence. 
We demand that authorities get involved in issues that are not their 
responsibility, here it is a very common practice. Let me give you a very 
common example, most of our neighbourhoods are built on a pre-sale basis. 
Private construction companies develop a project for a determined area 
specifying the dimensions of the roads, type of electrical wiring etc., but this 
specific neighbourhood has not been handed over to the municipality. Once the 
developers of the project sell all the spaces available, neighbours realise that they 
have been cheated, and there is nothing that they can do, or who to complain to 
about these types of issues. Then once neighbours start living in the new 
neighbourhood, they complain about the quality of the roads or other issues, but 
it is not the municipality's fault, it is the company that sold all the properties that 
is to blame. Then neighbourhood boards fight with municipal authorities for an 
issue that is not their fault, this is what I was telling you in reference to the lack 
of information neighbours have regarding the functions of local authorities 
(Duran interview 4/4/2001). 
Due to such problems, the municipality has recently tried to involve the community 
more in decision-making processes, as will be further discussed in this chapter. Cases 
like the one presented above are some of the most common problems faced in the 
'developed' municipality of San Pedro, Nuevo Le6n. 
Internal organisation of neighbourhood boards 
The main deliberative activities in San Pedro take place within neighbourhood boards. 
Again, class plays a key role for the internal organisation of these meetings. For 
instance, most upper class meetings are, generally, organised months in advance and the 
issues on the agenda are also of common knowledge. As commented by San Pedro 
resident Mr. Antuan Kuri: 
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In our neighbourhood we have a pre-set agenda. We always start our 
gatherings reading the minutes from the previous meeting, and then we move on 
to discuss the main issue(s) to be dealt with in the present meeting. The third part 
of the session covers a section dedicated to the analysis of the issues dealt with 
throughout the meeting and also we discuss any suggestions presented by the 
public. In the last part, we might have 'mini-voting processes' over particular 
topics before the neighbourhood leader announces the main agreements reached 
(Kuri interview 26/22/2001). 
Attendance at these sessions would be directly related to the issues dealt in the agenda, 
and one of the most important characteristics of these meetings is that citizens interact 
in an 'equal-environment, ' there are no dominant leaders exercising blackmailing 
methods over the residents. As commented by (2000-2003) neighbourhood board co- 
ordinator Mrs. Lozano, 'it would be very difficult to find clientelist practices in 
neighbourhood meetings, even within the lower sector of the population. As unlike 
other municipalities, in San Pedro neighbourhood leaders have not got anything to offer 
(i. e. the introduction of services)' (Lozano interview 5/4/2001). 
In the poorer sectors of the municipality meetings are not organised in advance and as 
noted above, they take place only when necessary. But, as in the richer areas, 
deliberation takes place openly and all citizens have a chance to express their views in 
these gatherings. Neighbourhood board leader Isafas Ramfrez reflects: 'in our meetings 
everyone has the opportunity to participate, the sessions are open and all views are 
respected. Sometimes the mayor attends these gatherings and promises the solution to 
problems that affect us. These meetings are a good way to learn more about our 
communities and also to learn more about the people we live with' (Ramfrez interview 
28/3/2001). 
Despite these positive views about the internal operation of both upper and lower class 
neighbourhood boards, there are citizens who would not necessarily agree with these 
perspectives. For instance, Mr. Felipe Luna, had lived for more than three years in San 
Pedro and was not even aware of the existence of ncighbourhood boards. Luna was 
ignorant of the advantages of such bodies, and of taking part in meetings. More 
importantly, when Mr. Luna has a problem in his neighbourhood he goes directly to the 
local authority and demands action. Luna would not bother deliberating with his 
neighbours and would just point out his problem to local authorities, in his view: 'local 
authorities are there to solve our problems, that is why we elected them, I see no point in 
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deliberating in ncighbourhood boards, as the effects of these talks are not felt 
immediately in actions of government' (Luna interview 23/11/2001). On the other hand, 
another resident Mr. Roberto Garcfa, believes that neighbourhood boards are necessary 
to have a more direct channel of communication between citizens and authorities. In his 
opinion, 'neighbourhood boards promote the interaction of residents and authorities, we 
have solved many problems through this scheme, it is a good way to promote 
deliberation and democracy' (Garcfa interview 27/11/2001). It seems that there is no 
unanimous view about the internal operation of neighbourhood boards, as each citizen 
has a different perspective depending on his/her personal experience. However, it does 
seem that these organisations have sometimes proven to be useful instruments outside 
these organisations. 
External effects of neighbourhood boards 
The aim of this section is to provide a better perspective on the main issues raised by 
neighbourhood boards. One of the most common problems faced by upper class 
neighbourhood boards concerns the construction of new roads that could increase local 
traffic or noise. Based on a survey of local newspapers, it was found that the issues dealt 
with in lower class neighbourhood boards do not receive the same media attention, as 
no cases were found in the local press. For example, the Colonial de ]a Sierra 
neighbourhood protested against the use of the Bosques del Encino Street as an entrance 
for the American Institute School. According to the protestors, local authorities should 
intervene and force parents picking up their children to use Perseverancia Street - as 
previously - reducing the traffic and noise caused by the amount of vehicles driving 
through their neighbourhood (El Norte 16/9/1994). As a result of the protest, the school 
was forced to use the original entrance to pick up the children studying there. 
Another example of neighbourhood board intervention, quite similar to the one above, 
took place when neighbours from the El Rosario neighbourhood protested against the 
construction of a new road that would 'destroy' their privacy. The aim of the road was 
to connect the exclusive sector to one of the main roads of the municipality. The project 
was conceived as an alternative exit for traffic from the neighbourhood. The role of the 
neighbourhood board was critical in stopping the project, Mrs. Emestina Lozano de 
Salas, neighbourhood board leader, and San Pedro's 1997-2000 citizen participation 
director, Mrs. Alejandra Medina, planned a consultation process. Neighbours from El 
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Rosario neighbourhood delivered 229 questionnaires throughout the neighbourhood, 
which were collected four weeks later. Seventy-six percent of the neighbours that 
participated in the consultation voted against the construction of the road. As a result of 
the survey, authorities decided to suspend this project. The resources that were allocated 
for this project were used instead for improving other roads within the municipality (El 
Norte 10/8/1998). 
The second most common claim of upper class neighbourhood boards deals with 
cancelling the construction of commercial spaces in residential areas. For example, 
neighbours from the Carrizalejo neighbourhood protested against the construction of a 
comer shop. According to the neighbours, the shop should not be built in a residential 
area and they stopped the construction when they took the case to the municipality in 
1995. Residents also considered that the establishment of the shop would bring traffic 
and pollution problems to their neighbourhood. Two years after the legal dispute began, 
the municipality decided in favour the commercial chain and the construction of the 
comer shop was completed in August 1997 (El Norte 27/8/1997). In this case citizens 
were unsuccessful and had to accept the decision reached at the municipality, which 
followed the statutes stated in the local urban development legislation. 
The way in which each neighbourhood board operates varies, and as shown above it 
seems that the main difference between each of these organisations is based on class. 
While upper class organisations have a well-structured set of legal statutes and quite 
clear objectives, lower class boards are more informal organisations which organise 
whenever there is something to discuss. The main strengths and weaknesses of these 
community institutions will be discussed later in the chapter. 
When neighbourhood organisations are ignored 
Although in most of the cases presented above, the authorities seem to have been 
receptive and respected what the majority of the population decided, there are also cases 
where even when the community shows its opposition to a project, the authorities do not 
bother consulting them. A recent controversy concerns the construction of a bridge that 
would unite the municipalities of Monterrey and San Pedro (both governed by the 
PAN). At a cost of 550 million pesos (approximately E38 million) (distributed as 
follows: 120 million from the Municipality of Monterrey, 60 from San Pedro and the 
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remaining 370 million from state authorities) the project represents a heavy burden on 
both state and municipal finances. At the core of the controversy is the fact that the 
community was never informed about the construction of the project and, more 
importantly, of its cost. As Cesar Garza Livas representative of the Alianza por San 
Pedro (Alliance for San Pedro: this organisation represents a group of neighbourhoods 
of San Pedro) comments: 'we have the right to "have a say" because the project would 
be funded with public resources. Through a public consultation we could reach an 
agreement that would be beneficial for solving both the traffic problem, and moreover, 
also to reduce the cost of the project. I invite state and local authorities to listen to what 
their governed have to say regarding this matter' (El Norte 21/12/2001). 
The state authorities asked for the elaboration of two projects, one was developed by a 
local University (Universidad Regionzontana), and the other by CEMEX 12 At a cost of 
420 million pesos (approximately E30 million) the Universidad Regiomontana proposal 
foresees six traffic lanes and the possibility of expanding it if necessary. On the other 
hand, despite the fact that CEMEX's project looks more stylish, it has only four traffic 
lanes, with no possibility of expansion. Moreover, it is 130 million pesos more 
expensive than the project of the University. According to some experts, the 
government is looking for a 25 years traffic solution, when the project proposed by the 
University foresees a 75 years option (see De Zamacona Escandon in El Norte 
20/1/2002). 
Despite these differences, the state authorities favoured the second project and did not 
bother organising a public consultation to discuss the issue. The only contact with 
citizens was when they were informed -but given no opportunity to deliberate or 
influence the decision- of the 550 million pesos project by the chief of the urban 
development secretariat, Oscar Bulnes, in a meeting with members of some 
neighbourhood organisations. Bulnes defended the project stating: 'we have a duty to 
search for the best options for our citizens, the fact that the other project was cheaper 
does not mean that it was better. In the long run we believe that this project would be 
cheaper than the other option, as it will be constructed following international standards 
of quality' (El Norte 15/1/2002). According to Bulnes, Garza Livas' demand for 
information regarding the project was outside the law, in his view, 'we are not going to 
give any information to him, we do not know why he is so interested in the project, 
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maybe because he is a constructor and perhaps he has some hidden interests behind the 
project' (El Norte 15/l/2002). 
On 31 January 2002 the construction works for the 'Unity Bridge' (as the project has 
been christened) were symbolically initiated by Governor of Nuevo Le6n, Fernando 
Canales. He defended the construction of the bridge by stating that: 'whenever there is a 
project of this magnitude there are always controversies around it, there was a time for 
us to analyse all the possibilities, we took a decision and now we have to stick to what 
we decided. I know the cost of the bridge could have been reduced, however, 
architecturally speaking I'm sure this is the better option' (El Norte 1/2/2002). 
The case presented above is a good example of how local authorities do not always 
listen to what citizens have to say regarding certain projects. Some questions raised by 
this case are why did the 'democratic' authority of San Pedro decided not to listen to the 
views of the public, and why did they favour a more expensive project, which in the 
view of the experts would not offer a practical solution to the traffic problem? 
Consultations 
Each time a new administration takes office in San Pedro, the local authority initially 
seems to be highly concerned about the view of citizens before implementing any 
policies within the municipality. When Fernando Margain took office in 1994, he stated, 
'I am indebted to the community of San Pedro, this is why I am going to consult them 
about any possible amendments to the urban development plan, and to other local laws' 
(EI Norte 28/8/1994). Although some consultations did take place, not surprisingly, 
most of these processes did not convince opposition parties, especially the PRI. Some 
members of the PRI criticiscd the fact that amendments to the citizen council local 
legislation were not openly discussed with the public, as promised by the mayor. 
According to San Pedro's (1994-1997) legal representative, Mr. Sdnchez Guti6rrez, he 
respected the views of the critics but he thought their comments were unjustified. Ile 
defended the local authority autonomy and stated that the law gave it the option to 
decide on its internal procedures without opening them up for general discussion on a 
regular basis (EI Norte 12/11/1994). 
Despite the criticisms, the municipality continued its consultation agenda and organised 
another process to receive citizens' proposals regarding the 1994 citizen participation 
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legislation. The consultation was inaugurated by the 1994-1997 mayor, Fernando 
Margain, who stated: 'the forum is taking place to provide a solid base for establishing 
the citizen participation legislation for the municipality' (EI Norte 5/10/1995). In this 
consultation process 24 people participated in the discussions and 19 provided written 
proposals. Local authorities stated that all the views of those who participated were 
going to be seriously considered when elaborating the new legislation (EI Norte 
5/10/1995). 
Mayor Fernando Margain (1994-1997) also organised another open consultation to 
discuss possible reforms to San Pedro's urban development plan. The consultation 
targeted the general public but special emphasis was stressed on inviting groups of 
experts. Those who took part in the consultation were divided into six groups, each one 
led by an expert on the subject, with the aim of facilitating the interaction between 
authorities and citizens. The results of the consultation were presented on the second 
day of the process (EI Norte 8/8/1995). This consultation was, again, highly criticised 
by some NGOs, who questioned the speed at which the workshops took place and also 
the way in which the whole consultation was organised. According to Francisco Leal, 
director of ADVIC (an NGO that promotes development projects): 'my organisation 
could not analyse in depth the different reforins that were introduced because they were 
not notified sufficiently in advance about the sessions, hence most of the members of 
the organisation were not present' (EI Norte 7n11995). Another criticism of this open 
consultation came from pritsta Mrs. Yvonne Salazar who considered the whole process 
appalling: 'it is a shame that the discussion of such important reforms was not 
publicised properly, Sampetrinos 13 should have been informed sufficiently in advance 
about this consultation. Local authorities should not limit access to only a few' (EI 
Norte 7MI995). 
One of the most publicised recent consultations dealt with a possible extension to the 
closing time of nightclubs. The initiative to discuss nightclubs' closing time was 
promoted Mayor Teresa Garcfa de Madero in August 1998. San Pedro's nightclubs had 
a closing time of 3: 00 am, and the consultation was to decide whether this closing time 
should remain or if nightclubs should close at 4: 00 am instead. In a survey promoted by 
the municipal authorities before the consultation took place, 59 percent of the parents, 
76 percent of youngsters and 68 percent of the general public was in favour of the one- 
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hour extension to closing time. Furthermore, 77 percent of parents, 66 percent of 
youngsters and 72 percent of the general public affirmed they would take part in the 
consultation process. 
This consultation process was openly publicised in the most important newspapers and 
by authorities themselves. According to Mayor, Garcfa de Madero, 'it is very important 
that the civil society produce an opinion regarding this subject, we all together can take 
the decisions which affect us the most in this municipality' (El Norte 6/9/1998). Mayor 
Garcfa de Madero was convinced that the consultation was the best way to solve 
conflicts between authorities and citizens: 'this is a democratic process that we will see 
more often, not only in San Pedro but all over the country. Citizens have the decision in 
their hands' (EI Norte 6/9/1998). 
On 'consultation-day' the polling stations remained open from 8: 00 am until 7: 00pm. 
However, citizen participation in this consultation was low, only 9.9 percent of San 
Pedro's 25,000 citizens enlisted participated and the absence of those who do most of 
the night-clubbing was rather evident. Parents had the highest turnout, mostly in favour 
of keeping closing time at 3: 00am. The result of the referendum was 77: 23 in support of 
keeping closing time the same. The total number of votes was 2,481, from which 1,925 
were against expanding the closing time and 556 votes in favour of the one-hour 
extension. Despite the low index of citizen participation, local functionaries thought it 
was a good civic exercise, as authorities did not unilaterally impose a decision regarding 
this subject. Mayor Garcia de Madero stated, 'citizens must know to participate when 
authorities give them the possibility to do so, it is a good way for us to know what 
citizens want' (EI Norte 7/9/1998). 
Another consultation exercise was organised in 1999 to ask the community of San 
Pedro about their most important needs (see Table 5.2 below). 14 These examples of 
consultation processes are a good parameter to understand better the procedures and the 
issues dealt with in each of these participatory forums. Clearly, none of the 
consultations is perfect, but there is an apparent desire by the authority to involve 
citizens in these exercises. The advantages and disadvantages of the way in which the 
municipality of San Pedro organise their consultations is discussed below. 
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Table 5.2 Result of San Pedro's 1999 Community Survey 
Road construction 
Motorways 18 percent 
New Roads 21 percent 
Fixing the paving 61 percent 
Urban equipment 
Street light post 33 percent 
Public parks 20 percent 
Pedestrian bridges 49 percent 
All of the above 2 percent 
Building Construction 
Libraries 20 percent 
Education Centre 12 percent 
Health Centre 22 percent 
Schools 18 percent 
Gymnasiums 14 percent 
Sports Centre 14 percent 
None of the Above 2 percent 
Citizen Councils 
Although these watchdogs have been constantly criticised, (primarily because they are 
appointed by the mayor), they have continued operating in San Pedro for more than 
three administrations. According to San Pedro's 2000-2003 mayor, Gerardo Garza Sada, 
'the role that citizens perform in these representative bodies is crucial to achieve all 
municipal plans. They are here to watch closely all the actions we caffy out, so they 
play a key role in the municipal scheme' (EI Norte 3/30/2001). 
Yet citizen councils are hardly open to the 'average citizen. ' Most are municipal 
employees. The fact that a small number of citizens already chosen by authorities 
perform this activity leaves serious doubts about the independence of this institution. It 
is true that it is useful, accountability-wise, to have a permanent watchdog scrutinising 
all the activities performed by local authorities. However, maybe if citizens were able to 
promote the candidature of their own counsellors this would help bring even greater 
transparency to the way in which this body operates. 
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Jueces A uxiliares 
The activities performed by jueces auxiliares are different from those of neighbourhood 
boards. It is a more 'isolated activity, ' but those who perform it have more authority 
than neighbourhood board presidents. Juez auxiliar Mr. Amulfo Briones recalls: 
As a juez auxilar, I do not share this activity with other community 
members it is only myself. We work along with neighbourhood boards on 
community issues, but we have a different function. The neighbourhood board's 
function is to look after the structural needs of the neighbourhood, and our 
function is more related to supporting the community regarding bureaucratic 
processes (i. e. recommendations, official documents) or personal problems (i. e. 
marital problems). We are like the 'local authority' of our respective 
neighbourhoods (Briones interview 28/3/2001). 
The method for selecting these municipal representatives is based on citizens' opinions, 
although municipal authorities have the last word. In some cases the citizens that are 
recommended by their neighbours to become a juez auxiliar do not even know they 
were recommended for such activity, as juez auxiliar Mrs. Dfaz Ibarra recalls: 
When they asked me in the municipality if I would like to become a 
judge, I thought thoroughly about it because I had no clue about the function that 
I was going to perform, I did not even know that my neighbours suggested me as 
a candidate. Once local authorities explained to me the functions I would carry 
out, I agreed to participate as ajuez auxiliar (Dfaz Ibarra interview 29/3/2001). 
According to some jueces auxiliares, political preferences do not play an important role 
when local authorities decide whom they would appoint as a juez. According to juez 
auxiliar Amulfo Briones: 
Our function is with the members of the community and with municipal 
authorities, it is a social service we give the community, we do not have a salary. 
In fact political preferences do not matter, for example I belong to a different 
political party from the PAN and I have been re-confirmed several times in the 
same position. Political preferences do not matter (Briones interview 28/3/2001). 
The type of problems dealt with by these community representatives varies, but most 
are related to problems with noise, or personal problems between ncighbours. Juez 
auxiliar Lcticia Vargas recalls: 
Most people contact me when they have problems with other neighbours, 
for example recently I was visited by someone who complained about a 
neighbour who was throwing water on to the street and was affecting all the 
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street because rubbish was accumulating outside her front door (Vargas 
interview 29/3/2001). 
In order to improve the security of a specific neighbourhood, jueces auxiliares could 
also co-ordinate with the police when required. According to juez auxiliar Mr. Gaytdn, 
6we also aim to work in co-ordination with the police, we do it to improve our public 
security, we are constantly in contact with local authorities regarding aspects of public 
security' (Gaytdn interview 2/4/2001). Another juez auxiliar, Mrs. Diaz Ibarra, 
comments on the main activities performed by her: 
I have done some community work, especially with children who 
unfortunately do not have the support of their family. I have acted as judge in 
several neighbourhood problems related with rubbish collection or family issues. 
I also write down recommendation letters or letters to prove residence (Dfaz 
Ibarra interview 29/3/2001). 
One of the most important aspects that has helped to consolidate the figure of the juez 
auxiliar in the municipality of San Pedro is their continuity in the post. Most of the 
jueces auxiliares interviewed have been performing this activity for 10 to 12 years. 
Since the Mauricio Ferndndez administration (198 8-199 1) panista local authorities have 
followed the same policy in an attempt to not having to start from 'zero' their 
interaction with the community. Juez auxUar Mr. Gaytdn recalls, 'I was appointed by 
Mauricio's administration, (1988-1991) and I have been reconfirmed each new term 
since then' (Gaytdn interview 2/4/2001). 
The 'participatory' structure of the juez auxiliar seems to have been positively accepted 
by San Pedro's community, and although it was devised by the priistas to perform a 
different function - to win votes - the panistas have made a quite effective use of it; as 
it has become one of the main channels of communication between authorities and 
citizens. The fact that those citizens participating as jueces auxiliares do not meet with 
their respective constituents on a regular basis may not have impeded their 
representative function. By enrolling mostjueces auxiliares in human relations courses 
to improve their personal skills, local authorities seem to have created an invisible bond 
between these neighbourhood functionaries and the local administration. Furthermore, 
although the SPCPL states that these individuals are not supposed to receive an 
economic contribution for their activities, off the record we were told that they receive 
some food vouchers as an incentive for the activities they perform. This only happens 
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with lower class jueces auxiliares, and the payment is they receive is approximately of 
250 pesos per month (around f 16). It is a minimal contribution if we compare it to the 
social stability that these bodies seem to helped bring to different sectors of the 
municipality. 
There are also differences between lower and upper class jueces auxiliares. While 
interaction between these representatives and neighbours is constant in lower class 
neighbourhoods, in upper class neighbourhoods this does not necessarily happen. In 
lower class neighbourhoods, and as a consequence of the current economic situation, 
arguments between couples (husband and wife) are more common and noise related 
problems are also frequent. There are greater public security problems and close 
interaction between jueces auxiliares and the police is constant. On the other hand, in 
upper class neighbourhoods, these local representatives are not often solicited, they only 
sporadically take part in personal problems, and as almost every neighbourhood has a 
private security body, their interaction with the police is not necessary. 
Other participatory activities 
Kids-Clubs 
The municipality of San Pedro is also concerned about children's participation in their 
respective communities. Mayor Garcfa de Madero: 
In San Pedro the community participates mainly in the neighbourhood 
boards, but we also have participatory groups of children. We have 17 Tids- 
clubs' where approximately 1,200 kids participate and learn that in order to 
develop their respective communities, everyone must get involved to accomplish 
their neighbourhood goals, and most importantly, we inculcate them to respect 
the environment (Garcfa de Madero interview 18/5/1999). 
The activities performed by these organisations are mainly related to ecological 
activities and are mostly carried out in popular (lower class) neighbourhoods. On 25 
August 1998 a group of children collected plastic, glass and paper disposals from the 
'Fratemity-Park' in San Pedro. All of them belonged to different kids-clubs and the 
Ministry of Ecology was in charge of this particular event. The aim of organising events 
like this one is to educate children to preserve their green areas. In the long run, the 
project is expected to develop more environmentally friendly citizens, aware of the 
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importance of citizen participation, but also about the contribution that working together 
can make to improving their living conditions. 
In the San Pedro 400 neighbourhood, groups of children have been organised to look 
after their green areas and walls. This neighbourhood has been affected by 'graffitiers, ' 
who in conjunction with local gangs have devastated some green areas and 
'redecorated' the walls of the neighbourhood. The aim of the children patrol is to 
denounce anyone who sprays the walls with paint or who destroys the green areas of the 
neighbourhood (El Norte 25/8/1998). Each kid-club operates under a similar scheme to 
the neighbourhood board. A children board is elected on an annual basis and there are 
also three key positions, a president, a secretary and a treasurer. Mayor Garcfa de 
Madero claims, 'the programme has been accepted by the community of San Pedro as 
an important participatory and educational activity, and in some neighbourhoods the 
number of walls painted has been reduced' (Garcfa de Madero interview 18/5/1999). 
Wernes ciudadano 
The aim of the viemes ciudadano (Citizen's Friday) initiative is to give citizens the 
possibility to express directly their problems to local functionaries, including the mayor. 
The idea was brought from the municipality of Leon in the state of Guanajuato, where 
the programme was pioneered by the 1988-1991 mayor Carlos Medina Plasencia. The 
logistics of the encounter are as follows: firstly, citizens are required to fill a numbered 
form that includes the solicitor's personal details, preceeded by a brief description of the 
problem and its location. After personnel at the reception desk have decided which 
department would be responsible for solving the problem, citizens are asked to discuss 
their issue with the local functionary responsible for that particular area and a tentative 
date of response is also provided by the local officials. According to local authorities, 
the exercise has proven successful because citizens realise that their demands are 
analysed directly by authorities. 
It is about receiving citizens without an appointment, the mayor and all 
cabinet members are here. Each citizen fills a form and depending on the 
problem he/she wants to solve we will take him/her to the person in charge of 
solving that need. Citizens and functionaries exchange views about the problem 
and a date is established for giving citizens an answer about the subject dealt 
with during the visit. The authority will also give citizens a telephone contact 
number, in case neighbours would like to approach them regarding that 
particular matter. All the data collected in these encounters is included in the 
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SAC and is followed until it is concluded. Each demand has a number and this is 
the number that we use to find out about the status of the problem (Zubieta y 
Landa interview 27/3/2001). 
The process does not finish with the presentation of the problem to authorities, but each 
citizen demand is placed in a queue and included in the SAC. Depending on the issue to 
be dealt with, authorities' response could take around a week or two, when it does not 
require a large amount of economic or human resources to be solved, and more than that 
when the issue requires a large budget. 
During the first weeks the programme was implemented, a considerable number of 
people visited local authorities demanding the solution of their different problems. The 
number of citizens taking part in this particular programme diminished a few months 
after its initial implementation, because a few months after taking office, local 
authorities have learnt which are the main problems affecting the municipality. 
According to Rebeca Clouthier, who was the first citizen participation director (between 
1994-1997) and who brought the programme from the municipality of Guanajuato: 'the 
first weeks an administration is in office, it is normal to have a couple of hundred 
citizens in these sessions, however, once each administration settles down the number of 
people attending these gatherings reduces considerably' (Clouthier interview 6/4/2001). 
The future of citizen participation in San Pedro 
Local authorities asked citizens to participate in the elaboration of the 2000-2003 
development plan. Several workshops were organised and the final document is said to 
reflect the views of most Sampetrinos. One key point stressed is the commitment to 
citizen participation and to promoting participatory values in San Pedro. The 
development plan says the aim of citizen participation is to promote solidarity and 
community development in a responsible environment (SPDP 2000: 36). The strategies 
for achieving these aims spell out: 
a) Promote a 'citizen feeling. ' 
b) Promote citizen co-responsibility. 
c) Facilitate communication and feedback between authorities and citizens. 
Each of the strategies visualises an active citizenry engaged in different participatory 
activities to improve their living conditions, but also to promote community values. The 
steps suggested to promote a 'citizen feeling' are, firstly, through citizens' surveys 
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which would take place both in upper and lower class sectors of the population to 
discover the main problems affecting the population. The second step is to monitor 
constantly the citizenry for any aspect(s) that might affect them. The third point deals 
with promoting 'citizen awareness' and it is mainly directed at the upper sectors of the 
population with the objective of making them aware that not all the individuals living in 
the municipality have the same economic resources and to promote a feeling of 
solidarity towards the less privileged. 
There are two strategies for promoting citizen co-responsibility. Firstly, in all of San 
Pedro's primary schools participatory values are going to be promoted, to 'educate' 
children to participate in decision-making processes within their respective 
communities. The main channel available for children's involvement in participatory 
activities is through the kids-clubs. Secondly, in partnership with local construction 
companies, inhabitants from deprived areas would be subsidised to refurbish the facade 
of their houses. University students would support citizens from poor neighbourhoods, 
who at the same time would benefit from carrying out this activity, as it is expected to 
raise students' humanitarian awareness. 
The strategies promoted to facilitate the communication and feedback between 
authorities and citizens are quite straight-forward: 
1) Continuous communication with the community. 
2) Continuous contact with neighbourhood boards andjueces auxiliares. 
3) Regular encounters between citizens and authorities. 
4) Diffusion of those activities performed by all the secretaries. 
5) Open communication with the press (television, printed and radio). 
6) Promotion of municipal activities and projects. 
This list of activities is intended to make people aware of the importance of taking part 
in those projects aimed at improving their living conditions. Most of these initiatives are 
directed to support the less developed areas of the municipality, and to enhance a 'social 
awareness' and a feeling of solidarity between the members of the upper classes about 
the 'social compromise' they have with the less privileged. These steps are intended to 
consolidate San Pedro's citizen participation structure, bringing greater transparency 
and democracy to the municipality. 
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Another initiative 15 mentioned by the 2000-2003 mayor of San Pedro, Mr. Gerardo 
Garza Sada, deals with the possibility of letting citizens decide how to spend a budget 
assigned by the municipality: 
One of my core projects is to return to each neighbourhood around 25 
percent of the council tax they pay letting them decide how to spend this 
amount. This is why I perceive citizen participation as something very 
important, because these projects would be based on what citizens want, and not 
on authorities' preferences (Garza Sada interview 12/9/2001). 
In his view this initiative could help consolidate the participatory agenda of the 
municipality. It could be a good participatory experience, although close attention 
would have to be kept regarding the efficient utilisation of those resources spent by 
citizens. The project has not yet been implemented, as its feasibility is still under the 
scrutiny of state authorities. 
The role of technology and citizen participation 
In the modem municipality of San Pedro, technology is soon to be linked to citizen 
participation schemes. Initially used to facilitate the provision of municipal services (i. e. 
paying council taxes) the access to technological advances is expected to be a useful 
tool for participative purposes too. Currently, the municipality of San Pedro has 
engaged in a partnership 16 with several parties to bring modem technology to deprived 
areas. In April 2001 municipal authorities inaugurated the first of eight 'cyber-kiosks' 
that will be built between 2001 and 2003. The project is targeted at poor 
neighbourhoods within the municipality and is expected to increase citizens' interest in 
the community and also to facilitate their participatory activities. The project also aims 
to 'educate' adults and children in the use of new technologies and to make them more 
productive citizens. 
Analysis of citizen participation mechanisms 
Neighbourhood Boards 
Because the municipality has already provided its basic infrastructure needs and also 
due to the large number of wealthy inhabitants in San Pedro, the problems dealt with in 
these units seem to not be that profound. Fighting to stop the construction of a 
commercial centre, banning the construction of a road or noise related problems are 
some of the most 'scandalous' troubles raised by neighbourhood boards in the richest 
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municipality of Mexico. There are contrasts in the way in which neighbourhood boards 
are organised in upper and lower class neighbourhoods. While upper class 
neighbourhoods have an independent budget and a well-structured meeting schedule; 
lower class boards do not have a budget and meet only when an issue affecting their 
neighbourhood arises. 
Although these bodies operate with a great degree of internal independence, their scope 
for external action is limited by local officials. Consequently, in some cases, even if 
legally speaking the representatives of these organisations are correctly defending their 
rights, they could be ignored by local officials and the 'municipal will' will prevail. 
Local authorities could be playing a key role by reducing the potential development of a 
more politically aware community. One of the positive aspects of these organisations is 
that citizens seem to be able to freely express their thoughts during meetings, a point 
distinguished by both authorities and neighbourhood board leaders. However, there are 
also some members of the general public who are not aware about the exact advantages 
of participating in this scheme. 
Consultations 
These encounters are the most popular forms to involve the community in local 
decision-making processes. However, close scrutiny of each process is necessary to 
determine whether authorities are influencing, or even biasing, the process or not. 
Consultations can be targeted at a particular group of the population, so if those 
independent experts explaining the pros and cons of a determined project are biased, 
then the consultation could take a pre-determined direction and not necessarily what the 
majority of the population wants. Another point to stress is the possibility of using these 
mechanisms only to legitimise decisions that have been already taken beforehand. 
Suspicion can be raised when the general public receives an extremely short notice to 
participate, which makes citizens doubt the real intentions behind these processes, as 
they think that maybe authorities want to speed-up the process for a particular reason 
(e. g. as in the consultation organised by Mayor Fernando Margain). 
Finally consultations do not necessarily always take place, even when the majority of 
the population is in favour of them. In the case of the controversial bridge, the local and 
state authorities ignored the views of the public regarding this matter and a decision was 
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taken without any apparent concern. Perhaps the aim of consultations is to use them in 
uncontroversial matters, furthermore over issues that would not affect previously 
reached agreements between different groups of power. 
Citizen Councils 
This is the first of the two 'citizen participation mechanisms' which are not that 
participative. Establishing citizen councils is a measure that can bring greater 
transparency to government actions. What seems dubious here is the way in which these 
counsellors are chosen. The fact that citizen counsellors are appointed by the mayor and 
not openly elected constitutes the main obstacle to having a truly independent 
'watchdog body. ' Its statutes seem to have been purposely created to avoid a long stay 
of its members as public scrutinisers. For instance, there is a critical difference between 
the way in which jueces auxiliares and citizen counsellors are appointed. While jueces 
auxiliares are re-confirmed every three years, citizen counsellors are re-confirmed every 
six months. These six monthly re-confirmations are quite controversial, in the sense that 
if a counsellor questions or obstructs local authorities plans, then he/she could be 
immediately removed after the six months period expires, leaving the position to 
someone who fully agrees with local authorities' agenda. This is not to recommend that 
the relationship between counsellors and local authorities should be a tense or 
conflictual one, but to note that impartiality may be less likely if these councillors have 
to be re-confirmed on such a short-term basis. This 'selection procedure' diminishes the 
potential of a structure that could bring more benefits if, perhaps, the average citizen 
had a greater say in the whole process. 
Jueces A uxiliares 
These positions cannot be considered a genuine citizen participation body. It is ironic 
that the panista administrations of San Pedro have strengthened a position created by 
prilstas for clientelist purposes. The figure of the juez auxiliar as employed by the 
panistas has proven to be a useful channel of communication between local authorities 
and citizens. Jueces auxiliares interact regularly with the community and for local 
authorities it is like having a permanent correspondent in each neighbourhood. The 
majority of these representatives have been involved as jueces auxiliares for a 
prolonged period of time, as most of them have been re-confirmed in their position since 
1991. These representatives are constantly invited to participate in courses to improve 
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their personal skills. However, local authorities have a strong control over the activities 
these neighbourhood representatives perform. Jueces auxiliares meet on a monthly basis 
to discuss with local officials the main problems affecting their neighbourhoods and 
municipal functionaries have the legal capacity to dismiss any of these community 
representatives if they misuse their functions. In short, anyone not following the 
cmunicipal-script' will lose their position. 
Perhaps jueces auxilares represent a useful tool when employed under conditions where 
clientelist practices are less prevalent. As the basic infrastructure needs of San Pedro 
have been covered there is less potential for populist practices. Consequently, the 
authority can focus on the functions they were created for, which is simply to act as a 
channel of communication between authorities and citizens, along with performing 
minimal bureaucratic duties. 
Other participatory initiatives 
Kids-clubs represent the hope that the children of the municipality will get involved in 
one way or another in participatory initiatives from a young age. These bodies are 
visualised as a sort of education institution that will have a positive input in each 
neighbourhood. As long as they do not repeat patterns found in other participatory 
organisations (i. e. dominant leaders), there much to commend them. The 'viemes 
ciudadano' programme complements the rest of the participatory channels available as 
it enables residents to chat to the person in charge of solving their problems, and helps 
functionaries become more sensitive to people's needs whilst allowing citizens to 
identify who is in charge of their problem. 
The future of citizen participation in San Pedro looks to be dominated by the use of 
modem technologies to facilitate citizens' service provisions and also their involvement 
in community issues. Authorities have also stressed the importance of caring about the 
less privileged groups of the municipality and to get involved in different participatory 
or developmental initiatives for these purposes. 
Conclusion 
After analysing the participatory mechanisms that have been implemented in the most 
developed municipality of Mexico, we can conclude that despite the apparent concern of 
218 
local authorities to provide participatory schemes for their citizens, the impact of these 
practices on local authorities' decision-making processes remains limited. All the 
mechanisms presented above, except internal neighbourhood meetings, require the 
intervention of local authorities, so the scope for influence is totally dependent on the 
authorities. Moreover, in such schemes as the citizen councils, authorities decide who 
their scrutinisers will be, diminishing the impact of a policy that, theoretically speaking, 
is supposed to bring greater transparency to the local administration. 
Given the limited powers and functions made available to citizens through these 
participatory schemes, what are the San Pedro authorities hoping to achieve with them? 
In practice, it seems that the authorities are more interested in maintaining social order 
and avoiding confrontations than in any genuine sharing of decision-making with the 
public. Thus the consultations are rarely on contentious issues. Neighbourhood boards 
and jueces auxiliares seem to function as a form of demand management for the 
municipality, by shifting out many demands and complaints before they go to the 
authorities. At times the whole process seems paternalistic, especially when dealing 
with the poorer sectors of the community; here it is about 'improving' and 'educating' 
the lower classes. 
Thus an element of paternalism that characterises the participatory structure of San 
Pedro is that local authorities have involved local leaders, especially from deprived 
areas, in courses to improve their self-esteem or their skills as community leaders. 
Indeed, despite the apparent 'good' intentions behind this scheme, with such actions 
authorities could be creating links that go beyond the 'proper' citizen-authority 
relationship, and which could potentially be used for electoral purposes - in a traditional 
Mexican clientelist fashion! However, no evidence was found to support this 
speculation. Nonetheless, the paternalistic way in which San Pedro's local authorities 
implement their participatory agenda further suggests that the authorities are using 
participatory mechanisms that are closely controlled by authorities, mainly to prevent 
social conflicts from developing, but leaving little space for genuine democratic 
intervention by the general public. This may have positive benefits for citizens, 
particularly the affluent property-owning classes, but it does not give them decision- 
making power. 
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Similarities can be drawn between the way in which San Pedro's neighbourhood boards 
and the PAN-LTN initiative analysed in chapter 4 function, as they both include 
accountable practices as one of their main priorities. Perhaps the aim of the PAN is to 
introduce schemes that have proven to be efficient - at least in the middle and upper 
class areas - and disseminate the same sorts of principles in the lower classes as a way 
to educate the population. However, an aspect that does not seem to have been 
considered by the panistas before transferTing middle upper class initiatives to the 
working classes, is that the lower sectors of the population face very different needs and 
earn much less. Indeed, if we compare the amounts presented in Tables 4.1 and 5.1 
respectively, it becomes rather obvious that there is no way that the lower classes could 
expect to match the amounts collected by the middle and upper classes, who on top of 
that have already covered their primary needs. This issue of class will be discussed to a 
greater extent in the conclusion of the thesis to which we now turn. 
Notes 
1 See interview Zubieta y Landa Citizen Participation Minister of San Pedro (2001). 
2 All three personalities appear in FORBES 2001 list of the richest 500 people in the world. 
3 The last four mayors are Mauricio FernAndez (1989-1991), Rogelio Sada (1991-1994), Fernando 
Margain (1994-1997), and Teresa Garcfa de Madero (1997-2000). Gerardo Garza Sada (2000-2003) is the 
current mayor. 
4 El Norte-INFOSEL CD (1986-199 1). 
5 The main dispute centred on the territorial limits of future housing projects built on the Sierra Madre, 
see El Norte 8/2/199 1. 
6 The shopping centre is called Plaza Fiesta San Agustin, and unfortunately for the protestors the 1990- 
2010 urban development plan, which in those days was still under scrutiny at the local congress, 
visualised the expansion of the commercial area, consequently, protestors did not succeed in their efforts 
to stop the enlargement of the commercial centre see El Norte (28/8/1992). 
7 See President Fox cited in Reforma 28/8/2001. 
8 'Legal statutes' refers to what is known in Mexico as Acta Constitutiva, which is a document with legal 
validity that would include the main aims of the organisation and its members. 
9 According to article 52 of the SPJAL, each juez auxiliar is also in charge of looking after the morality 
and local traditions of their respective jurisdictions. 
10 This office was the first construction built when the developers of the project started to sell the 
properties included in Fuentes Del Valle. 
Mr. Juan Ignacio Duran works as an advisor for several neighbourhood boards, NGOs and the private 
sector. 
12 CEMEX is the third largest Cement Company in the world. 
13 Inhabitants of San Pedro. 14 The survey was carried out by Mireya GuzmAn who asked 500 inhabitants of San Pedro about their 
most important needs (source El Norte 3/l/1999). The source does not specify the background of the 
citizens interviewed. 
15 This initiative is not included in San Pedro's 2000-2003 Development Plan. 16 The parties involved in building each cyber-kiosk are the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank 
Microsoft, Starmedia, and the Committee for Democratising Information of Brazil). The municipality of 
San Pedro is financing a small part of the project. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis has demonstrated the recent growth of participatory initiatives in Mexico. 
But why are these policies implemented? In whose interest (s) are participatory 
mechanisms being promoted? What is the impact of citizen participation on Mexican 
politics and its people? The two main theoretical claims made on behalf of participatory 
democracy, as discussed on chapter 2, are that it will bring citizens together to become 
the participants in those decisions that affect their daily lives and that the process of 
participation will educate people in the advantages and desirability of extending 
participation throughout society. How far has this happened in Mexico? What is the 
relationship between the theoretical principles of the participatory democrats and the 
way the participatory agenda has been implemented in Mexico? This chapter analyses 
the links between the participatory initiatives in Tlalpan, Puebla and San Pedro and the 
participatory aims discussed in chapter 2 and assesses the role of citizens participation 
in the wider Mexican political context as examined in chapter 1. 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section covers the sources of 
inspiration from where these mechanisms were brought and also the main theoretical 
principles behind the three participatory agendas here analysed. The second section 
analyses the forms of participation in each of the case studies. The third part highlights 
the relevance that taking into account the basic infrastructure and the class conditions of 
each locality before implementing participatory schemes. The fourth section deals with 
issues of implementation and the fifth with issues of empowerment. Section six 
discusses the overall argument of the thesis, and the last section covers the contribution 
and avenues for further research identified in this thesis. 
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Sources of inspiration and main theoretical principles 
Where did the idea of a participatory agenda come from? 
Chapter 2 showed that participatory democratic theory draws inspiration from many 
sources, including 'classical' political philosophers such as Rousseau and Toqcueville, 
and contemporary academic theorists such as Pateman and Macpherson. However, it is 
difficult to detect any direct influence of the vast body of participatory democratic 
theory on recent participatory initiatives in Mexico. During the 1960s and 1970s such 
writers as Pateman or Macpherson saw in the establishment of citizen participation 
mechanisms a response to the problems (mainly social inequalities) produced by a 
liberal democratic system. It must not be forgotten that the liberal democratic system 
was attacked in two fronts: the first questioned the 'free and equal' status of citizens 
promoted by the liberals, and the second challenged the effectiveness of representative 
democracy. Although in the cases analysed here no direct links with these ideologies 
were found, as discussed in chapter 1, social movements and political parties did have 
an impact on the way participatory mechanisms have been developed in Mexico. But 
where did the idea to carry out participatory mechanisms in each of the localities of 
analysis come from? 
Although the 1995-2000 National Development Plan highlights the importance of 
implementing citizen participation mechanisms to bring greater transparency, 
democracy and a feeling of belonging to each locality, it does not set any guidelines to 
follow. We can say that the document stresses more the importance of implementing a 
national decentralisation strategy, ' rather than focussing on providing guidelines for the 
implementation of a participatory agenda. However, citizen involvement in decision- 
making processes is expected to receive more direct positive incentives during the 
current (2000-2006) presidential administration. With the creation of the Coordinaci6n 
Presidencial Para la Alianza Ciudadana (CPAQ federal authorities expect to increase 
the number of participatory practices of government. Suddenly, it seems that a federal 
participatory strategy has become a core issue on the governmental agenda. 
The first locality that promoted an alternative to the previous pritsta jefe de manzana 
(block representative) structure was San Pedro (although this structure still operates). 
Since 19892 the PAN has introduced a wide variety of participatory options giving the 
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citizenry 'a say' in those issues affecting their lives. This is how the community got 
involved in the discussion of the local development plan and later in referenda or 
plebiscites dealing with local problems. San Pedro's geographical proximity to the state 
of Texas played a key role during this process, as it was from this state that the 1989- 
1991 mayor Mauricio Femdndez brought the idea to implement the first participatory 
schemes. 
In a similar vein, the 1996-1999 panista local administration of Puebla, took the 
principles to establish an alternative participatory agenda to the prevailing jefie de 
manzana structure from a UN document. A difference between San Pedro's and 
Puebla's participatory agendas is that in the case of Puebla, the aim was to substitute the 
jefie de manzana structure by introducing the UN participatory agenda. This particular 
issue caused them political tensions with groups of prilstas leaders who were local 
representatives under the 'traditional' clientelistic scheme. Parallel to the panista local 
refon-n, and in opposition to the 1997 Fiscal Co-ordination Law, the 1993-1999 pritsta 
Governor Manuel Bartlett developed a piece of legislation (Ley Bartlett) allegedly to 
protect his political interests. There was a twofold aim in this political manoeuvre, 
firstly, to get hold of more resources that the state government would have discretion to 
distribute and secondly, to diminish the power of the PAN at the local level, bearing in 
mind the 1999 local election. The structure known as the COPLADEMUN was at the 
core of Bartlett's project, and within it, in appearance, a series of democratic practices 
of government. However, when the policy was implemented those principles had 
nothing to do with the way they were carried out. We can say that in a way the PRI 
produced a participatory agenda as a reaction to the panista initiative to substitute the 
old corporatist structure of local pseudo-participation. We can clearly identify that the 
motivations of the PAN were to end with the clientelistic practices of the PRI, while the 
motivations of the PRI behind Ley Bartlett and COPLADEMUNs seem to have been 
merely for particular political purposes. 
The result of all these controversies has left Puebla without a legal document supporting 
the participatory agenda currently implemented there. The pril'sta 1999-2002 
administration reversed the PAN-UN participatory agenda and based its participatory 
operations in three or four isolated policies. 3 
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Similarly to the cases of San Pedro and the panista side of Puebla's story, the PRD 
developed a participatory agenda trying to end with the corporatist practices of the PRI. 
After their historical electoral victory at the government of the capital in 1997, the PRD 
initiated a participatory reform based on discussing and creating a citizen participation 
legislation. The approval of such legislation was perceived as essential to get rid of the 
pfilsta local structure, and this is how the 1998 participatory law emerged. In this case, 
the idea to carry out a participatory agenda came from the government of the city (the 
equivalent to a state government), and although several local forums took place to 
discuss the contents of this document, the whole responsibility of approving the 
legislation was in the hands of congressmen at the ALDF (Congress of Mexico City). 
The document includes diverse aspects of the agendas followed by some Latin 
American leftwing parties -Brazilian and Uruguayan to be more specifC. 4 For instance, 
there are similarities between the ways the participatory units are divided, as well as 
providing the 'open opportunities' for citizens to have a say via referendums or 
plebiscites. There are also similar elements that can be found in the legal structures, and 
in the way which meetings are organised. 
Three are two main conclusions about the origins of the participatory initiatives in the 
three case studies: 
" There is no national participatory strategy setting out the guidelines to follow when 
implementing participatory mechanisms at the local level. 
" In designing participatory schemes, local politicians have drawn on a wide variety of 
influences, including neighbouring countries and the UN, but each scheme is mostly 
'home grown' and designed for the specific local political context. 
The philosophy behind the participatory agenda: principles and main purposes 
The first impression gained from the three cases is that it seems that participatory 
mechanisms were established more as a response to wider party and political factors 
than in an attempt to follow a particular participatory philosophy. When comparing the 
principles behind the participatory agendas analysed here, it was not difficult to discover 
that the main 'philosophy' that seemed to be shared - especially in those localities 
governed by the PRD (Tlalpan) and the PAN (San Pedro) - was to deactivate the 
clientelistic local structure that favoured the PRI for so many years. Clearly, the PRD 
and the PAN were motivated by political ends - undermining PRI political bases - as 
well as democratic ones. On the other hand, in Puebla, the purpose of participatory 
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schemes (at least on paper) was to promote accountability, democracy and greater 
interaction between local politicians and citizens. Yet Puebla's participatory agenda also 
proved to be driven primarily by political, rather than democratic or accountable 
objectives (see Box 6.1 below). 
ISOX 6.1. Participatory Principles Underpinning theThree Cases 
PRD in Mexico City 
" Establish participatory schemes that would not repeat the clientelistic practices of pritsta 
administrations (i. e. SOLIDARMAD or Jueces A uxiliares) 
" Redefine the type of actors, representative bodies, the power of these bodies and the 
relationships between state and society. 
" Issues related to accountability, neighbourhood elections, decentralisation and such 
participatory fon-ns as the plebiscite and the referendum. 
Ley Bartlett in Puebla 
" Seeks to increase people's decision-making power, to make authorities accountable and to 
promote a more democratic environment. 
" The scheme includes the provision of greater financial resources to Puebla's less developed 
municipalities, along with the involvement of all those official and unofficial bodies 
interacting at the local level in the institutions known as COPLADEMUNs. 
PAN UN in Puebla 
The strategy was intended to remove the archaic local pritsta 'participatory structure' that 
operates in most municipalities of Mexico. The core idea behind the panista neighbourhood 
forum scheme was to involve the public in decision-making processes, where authorities 
and citizens would decide on the matters that affect their respective communities, with the 
issue of accountability paramount. 
Current priista participatory schemes in Puebla 
The aim of the current participatory schemes is to develop channels of interaction between 
authorities and citizens to offer solutions to those necessities faced by the lower sectors of 
the population. 
PAN in San Pedro 
" As a measure to diminish the influence of the PRI in the structure known as Jueces 
Auxiliares operating in the municipality. 
" Involve the community in decision-making processes at the local level (especially in the 
discussion of the local development plan). The interaction of local politicians and citizens is 
perceived as essential to achieve a better government. 
The absence of a dominant theory behind any of the participatory agendas analysed 
here, meant that in each case it was important to identify theoretical trends and link 
them to the approaches presented in chapter 2. For instance, one of the main concerns of 
each of the administrations analysed in this study is the implementation of accountable 
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and democratic participatory mechanisms where citizens and politicians interact. In a 
way, these principles can be linked to the writings of the new left, which stress the 
importance of a two-way process involving three actors: governments, political parties 
and citizens. In the view of these writers (see Pierson 1995) the state should be 
democratised by being more open and accountable to citizens, and on the other hand, 
citizens (through diverse organisations) must ensure that society and the state are 
subject to procedures that ensure accountability (Held 1997: 266). Stoker adds, 
'opportunities for political participation matter because they help reduce inequalities in 
the redistribution of power and encourage a responsiveness to individual and collective 
needs' (Stoker 1996: 188). 
Although the three localities might appear to share the same sort of left-wing concern 
for accountability, differences can be identified in their participatory theoretical 
principles. For instance, in the PRD's (Tlalpan) participatory agenda - although it 
cannot be affirmed that it was influenced by it - there are similarities with the ideas 
promoted by Pateman (1970) and Macpherson (1977). In both approaches, the social 
differences created by the liberal economic model are the problem identified as needing 
a solution. The core idea is that if citizens are not taken into account in any decisions 
dealing with the economy, which has led to their impoverishment, then at the very least 
unprivileged groups could participate in those decisions affecting their localities. In the 
view of Pateman, 'if authorities provided the lower socio-economic sectors with the 
possibility to participate in the democratic control of those key institutions in which 
most people live out their lives, they would feel taken into account' (Pateman 
1970: 104). 
We must not forget that a main issue for the new left is to what extent the concept of the 
'free and equal' individual praised by the liberal theory of democracy actually exists. 
Since its foundation in 1989, the PRD has manifested its rejection of the implementation 
of the neoliberal economic model carried out in Mexico. Furthermore, when we analyse 
the bases of the 1998 citizen participation legislation, it is not difficult to detect the aim 
to empower the less advantaged. However, what Mexico City PRD did not seem to take 
into account are the series of 'caciquil practices' that still exist at the local level, and 
which prevented the consolidation of the PRD participatory agenda; (see below). It is 
also notable that in Mexico City (PRD) only one participatory scheme - neighbourhood 
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collaboration or fideicomiso - seems to share the principles promoted by such 
international organisations as the UN, WB, or OECD, where the costs of social projects 
are shared between authorities and citizens. 
Due to the changes of administrations that took place in Puebla, their participatory 
mechanisms have been in constant flux and no distinctive theoretical trend was 
identified. In the three schemes analysed here, Puebla's local participatory agenda has 
encompassed a strange mix of 'Rousseau style meetings' with 'pure' prilsta caciquil 
practices (i. e. Ley Bartlett-COPLADEMUN). There are also traces of Pateman and 
Mapherson's influence, in the sense that authorities seem to be concerned to provide 
participatory opportunities for Puebla's deprived groups, as the principles of the three 
initiatives presented in Box 6.1 (above) show. The PAN-UN initiative saw citizen 
participation (financially speaking) as essential for the implementation of their 
participatory agenda; a characteristic that international organisations seem keen on 
promoting, as observed by Craig and Mayo: 'citizen participation is perceived as a 
strategy to promote savings and to improve the living conditions of those who 
desperately need it. More importantly, the aim is to shift costs from the public sector 
onto communities' (Craig and Mayo 1994). However, once the PRI recovered Puebla in 
the 1998 local election, the participatory agenda shifted back to implementing priista 
'traditional' participatory schemes (i. e. juez auxiliar), that do not seem to be influenced 
by any set of participatory principles. Nevertheless, as in Tlalpan, in Puebla the 
fideicomiso scheme also operates, and which can be associated to the principles above 
highlighted by Craig and Mayo. 
Not surprisingly, the right-wing panista local government of San Pedro has not drawn 
inspiration from the new left in carrying out its participatory programme. Like Tlalpan, 
San Pedro's authorities have sought to open up opportunities for the interaction of local 
politicians and citizens, but, unlike Tlalpan this interaction is based on installing 
accountable mechanisms and not on countering the impact of the neo-liberal system on 
the Mexican social culture. Perhaps by coincidence, some of San Pedro's 
neighbourhoods have been implementing since the late 1960s similar agendas to those 
proposed by such international organisations as the World Bank or the IMF. In this 
prosperous municipality the withdrawal of the state has become rather evident, and as 
discussed in chapter 5 even allegedly accepted, as partnerships with the private sector 
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are increasingly common. In a way, these policies indirectly admit the failure of the 
state to meet those social demands faced by deprived groups of the society. 
One common feature in all three case studies is that local authorities retain a high degree 
of control over all participatory initiatives. This way of proceeding has diminished 
considerably the possibility of affecting the outcome of local policies, because the 
decisions taken within most of the participatory schemes analysed here continue to be 
taken by a few people, when theoretically speaking they should be shared with the 
majority of the population (see below). 
However, an important difference to highlight between the agendas of the three 
localities is that in San Pedro alone there is a connection between their programme to 
improve the skills of their community leaders and the 'educative sense' of participatory 
democracy highlighted by Mill or Pateman. As observed by neighbourhood board 
representative for the (working class) Del Monte neighbourhood, Mr. Isaias Ramfrez, 
'the municipality is always inviting me to participate in courses to improve my 
neighbourhood representative skills' (Ramfrez interview 28/3/2001). In neither Tlalpan 
nor Puebla were such schemes identified. Nevertheless, despite the apparent good 
intentions of San Pedro's local authorities, we cannot affirm that those citizens involved 
in these courses are being 'educated' through participation itself, but instead at least 
some representatives seem to be educated through the courses provided by local 
authorities. This issue reflects the paternalistic and top-down way in which the 
participatory agenda is implemented in San Pedro. 
The following conclusions can be reached after analysing the main theoretical principles 
behind the three participatory programmes: 
There is no coherent set of theoretical principles underpinning any of the 
participatory programmes. 
The main objective of the PAN and the PRD participatory agendas was to get rid of 
the pritsta local clientelistic pseudo-participatory structure (i. e. political ends). In 
Puebla, the PRI used these mechanisms as a tool against its political rivals. 
International organisations such as the UN have had little impact on these 
participatory initiatives, with the exception of the panista scheme in Puebla. 
Local administrations irrespective of political complexion maintain tight control 
over all their participatory initiatives. 
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Despite the paternalistic way with which they carry out their participatory agenda, 
only in San Pedro are the authorities concerned about promoting the educative 
advantages of participatory democracy. 
Forms of Participation 
Legislation and types ofparticipatory units 
During the analysis of the three case studies, it was discovered that there is a great 
diversity in forms of citizen participation schemes. In fact, the legal statutes of the cases 
analysed here offer a wide variety of schemes that range from permanent forms of 
participation to non-permanent ones such as plebiscites or referenda. As stated in 
chapter 2, in permanent participatory units, citizens meet on a regular basis to discuss 
community issues, whilst in non-permanent units, authorities organise discussions with 
citizens as a 'one-off' event dealing with a specific matter and for a designated period of 
time. In non-permanent forms, once the matter is discussed and the course of action to 
be taken decided, then the structure created for this particular purpose is dismantled. In 
the next section we compare the main characteristics of each legislation here analysed. 
a) Characteristics of non-permanent participatory mechanisms 
Legally speaking, the locality that provides most non-permanent participatory options is 
Tlalpan, followed by San Pedro and Puebla. In the participatory legislation of Tlalpan 
and San Pedro, there is a clear definition of what non-permanent participatory bodies 
stand for. Mexico City's 1998 legislation offers nine non-permanent participatory 
options, ranging from plebiscites to referenda and official visits. Although the 
municipality of San Pedro does not include such a large variety of non-permanent 
participatory options, in practice the three options offered in their local legislation - 
public audiences, consultations and written petitions - cover the same functions as in 
Mexico City's legislation. In both Tlalpan and San Pedro the legislation regards these 
mechanisms as a tool to be used mainly under three circumstances: when authorities are 
dealing with a controversial issue, when citizens believe that authorities are performing 
badly, or have not informed the community about a particular issue; and when 
authorities have implemented policies that oppose citizens' interests. In Puebla, none of 
these mechanisms has been implemented by local authorities. 
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However, in both Tlalpan and San Pedro the legislation gives authorities the last word 
whenever a non-permanent participatory mechanism is implemented, thereby 
diminishing the actual input of citizens on the outcome of public policies, an issue 
discussed later in this chapter. One of the main characteristics that we identified in the 
non-permanent agenda is the fact that in some schemes (i. e. fideicomiso) local 
authorities are promoting the principles of the UN or the WB which highlight the 
importance of citizen cooperation (in some cases financial) to finish community 
projects. 
b) Characteristics ofpermanent participatory mechanisms 
In Tlalpan and San Pedro, the permanent participatory unit that takes the burden of the 
participatory agenda is the neighbourhood committee or neighbourhood board. Aiming 
to offer an alternative non-partisan structure of citizen involvement, neighbourhood 
committees or boards are expected to offer a real democratic alternative to the previous 
clientelist role performed by local caciques. Ideally speaking, through neighbourhood 
boards there would be a constant flow of information between authorities and citizens 
regarding local matters. Yet, in San Pedro such prilsta participatory structures as jueces 
auxiliares have continued operating along the new participatory agenda, apparently 
producing a positive effect in the community. The clientelistic purposes with which the 
PRI used this pseudo-participatory structure were changed by the PAN to create a group 
of citizens that receive incentives for informing authorities about any problems in their 
areas of residence. It can be argued that the jueces auxiliares structure has been 
transformed into a sort of 'alarm mechanism' that prevents social problems from 
reaching local authorities' offices. 
Once the PRI recovered the municipality of Puebla, the PAN-UN project introduced by 
the panista 1996-1999 administration was abandoned and the jefes de manzana scheme 
was re-introduced. Although this permanent participatory initiative is perhaps not the 
most democratic option, it is still the main participatory mechanism of many 
municipalities in Mexico. Especially when used within the lower sectors of the 
population, the jefes de manzana structure maintains the traditional practice of 
mobilising informal leaders for particular party or electoral purposes. 
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In Tlalpan and San Pedro, there was great concern to create alternative permanent forms 
of citizen participation to the prevailing clientelist structure of the jefe de manzana or 
juez auxiliar. Tlalpan's permanent participatory agenda is based on the structure of the 
neighbourhood committee or board, and those interested in leading these bodies must be 
voted in by open election. The election processes vary. In Tlalpan, citizens form slates 
and the slate that receives most votes would occupy the majority at the neighbourhood 
committee. However, as losing slates are also represented on a proportional basis this 
three yearly election process has effectively instituted permanent internal divisions 
within most neighbourhood committees. Due to the political preferences generally 
professed by most members of each of the competing slates, once the winning slate 
takes office, its actions are often obstructed by members of slates sympathising with a 
different political party. Political preferences play a crucial role when particular actions 
are achieved by any neighbourhood committee as committee leaders could claim those 
actions as the responsibility a particular political party. 
In San Pedro things operate differently, as the system is based on individual 
candidatures. Citizens can run as candidates to occupy the positions of president, 
treasurer and secretary of each neighbourhood board, also for a three-year tenure. In 
both San Pedro and Tlalpan, the legislation states that none of these neighbourhood 
organisations can be used as a forum to promote a specific religion or party ideology. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 3, political parties have been involved in 
neighbourhood election processes and play a crucial role for the internal operations of 
each committee. The San Pedro local authorities try to avoid possible political conflicts 
by only letting individuals and not slates stand for the positions contested within each 
neighbourhood organisation, nevertheless this is not a guarantee of having conflict free 
citizen structures. 
In Puebla, jefes de manzana and jueces auxiliares are also elected in an open process 
over a three year period, however, there were cases where election processes did not 
take place and community leaders occupied this position for a longer period of time. It 
is in such situations where not having a legal document supporting the implementation 
of a participatory agenda becomes a problem; because political parties and infon-nal 
community leaders could take advantage of these circumstances to use neighbourhood 
representative positions for purposes other than promoting participation or democratic 
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values. Some of these problems are illustrated in chapter 4 where - especially among 
the poorer classes - there seems to be strong political utilisation of the 'pseudo- 
participatory mechanism. ' For instance, the open political support which community 
representatives give to the official party when asked by local officials (see chapter 4). 
Rules governing the frequency of neighbourhood meetings vary too: in two out of the 
three cases, citizens have the liberty to meet as often as they consider it convenient. The 
exception is Tlalpan where the 1998 legislation establishes that at least two meetings per 
year should take place. But, in practice, in each case the internal organisation of the 
participatory bodies is left to citizens' consideration, with meetings taking place 
whenever there is something important to discuss and attendance varying depending on 
the issues dealt with in the agenda. Although nowhere does the legislation distinguish 
between the use of neighbourhood committees, neighbourhood boards, or jefes de 
manzana, by different social groups, there are important differences that will be 
highlighted below regarding how different social groups constitute these bodies. 
Despite the internal independence that is experienced within permanent participatory 
mechanisms, like non-permanent participatory mechanisms, the impact of these 
organisations is limited because there are legal restrictions which prevent citizens 
influencing those actions of government that affect their daily lives (see below). 
Types of participatory forms 
When comparing the types of participatory mechanisms implemented in Mexico to 
those presented in chapter 2, we find that they are represented by versions that vary, but 
which maintain the 'consultative' essence highlighted by writers such as Cook and 
Morgan (1971) and Stewart (1996) (see Box 6.2 below). The perception of the 
neighbourhood as the most important permanent participatory unit prevails in the three 
cases analysed; however, there are important differences from the way Cook and 
Morgan (1971) or Kotler (1969) perceive these bodies. In Tialpan and San Pedro the 
authorities developed legal frameworks that contain the sorts of issues that can be dealt 
with in these units, with characteristics that clearly vary when compared to those of 
rule-implementation or rule-making authority presented in chapter 2. For instance, in 
Tlalpan, the functions of neighbourhood committees remain more like those of a 
representative body with few powers to promote local change. The examples discussed 
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in chapter 3 reflect some of the most important conflicts that neighbourhood 
representatives face, especially when local authorities give priority to informal leaders. 
In San Pedro, too, although citizens have independence to arrange their neighbourhood 
organisations internally, the impact on the outside is highly dependent on authorities. 
Box 6.2 TVDeS Of DartiCiDatorv units found in each of the case studies 
Type of Initiative Tlalpan Puebla San Pedro 
Neighbourhood organisations x x x 
Citizens'Juties - x 
Consensus Conferencing x - x 
Standing citizens'panels - x 
I Referenda xI - x 
In Puebla, the absence of a participatory legislation leaves citizens, especially the poorer 
classes, without a real opportunity to influence decision-makers. Political bargaining 
and blackmail are still a constant presence, an issue ignored by participatory theorists. 
The impact of these organisations, especially in Puebla, seems to be based on the quality 
of the relationship that individual neighbourhood board leaders have with local 
authorities. 
Although no citizen juries were found, one body that operates under similar principles is 
the citizen council in San Pedro. In San Pedro's citizen council, citizens scrutinise local 
projects and produce a decision that is given to local authorities regarding the pros and 
cons of a particular initiative. However, one initial difference is that authorities appoint 
directly those citizens taking part as jurors, showing little regard for such factors as their 
gender, race, or level of education. San Pedro's legislation simply establishes that 
citizen counsellors have to be 'honest' citizens with a proven will to help their 
respective communities. Another difference is that these 'functionaries' do not have to 
present their conclusions to the public. Finally, the citizen counsellors also receive a 
salary. There is nothing similar to a citizen jury in Tlalpan or Puebla. 
Consensus conferences are known as neighbourhood consultations under the principles 
of the 1998 Mexico City participatory legislation. Although neighbourhood 
consultations have very similar principles to those defined by Joss and Durat (1994), 
again, there are differences, especially related to the selection process of those taking 
part in them. While Stewart (1996) recommends an open selection process to determine 
those who would lead the consultation, in Mexico City the consultation is led by 
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authorities, and citizens receive the information from the experts selected by them. In 
Mexico City, these panels have been established mainly to discuss environmental 
issues. In San Pedro, 'informational conferences' have taken place as a mechanism to 
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air the views of citizens dealing with controversial matters (see El Norte 15/1/2002). 
Although authorities do not have any legal obligation to translate citizens' thoughts into 
actions of government, these processes appear to be democratic exercises of citizenship. 
Nonetheless, San Pedro's local authorities retain control of these processes and the 
decisions reached by these mechanisms are not necessarily shared with the general 
public and generally do not influence any governmental policies. 
The principles of standing citizens' panels are similar to those of the citizen councils 
that operate in San Pedro. The aim is to have a group of citizens acting as permanent 
watchdogs. The main difference between Stewart's proposal and the way this body 
operates in San Pedro deals with the number of citizens taking part in it, as Stewart 
proposes that around 100 to 200 representative members of the community would be 
selected to perform this activity. In the case of San Pedro, there are only 11 people who 
constitute this body, all selected by the local authority; which clearly reduces the 
independence with which these bodies are likely to operate. 
Regarding non-permanent participatory bodies, it is clear that the way referenda and 
plebiscites are implemented in Mexico does not match the guidelines established by 
Stewart (1996) or Held (1997). One of the key controversies concerns the rules 
governing their use. In Mexico City and San Pedro, there are problems with the 
interpretation of when is the 'best moment' to implement a referendum, as authorities 
do not seem to know which issues should be consulted in such processes. There are also 
problems with the types of questions asked, as the plebiscites and referenda 
implemented so far are quite elaborate and not based on a simple yes/no format, as well 
as complications regarding the time and the place of each consultation. In some cases 
the community does not seem to be well informed or given enough warning of the 
referendum which probably contributes to low indices of participation. Another feature 
is the frequency with which such processes should be carried out, as the Mexico City 
legislation is quite permissive, as it requires just 1 percent of the population to sign a 
petition to secure a referendum compared to the 3 percent recommended by Held 
(1997). Nonetheless none has been called using this clause. 
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The establishment of all these mechanisms in the Mexican local context demonstrates 
the variety of participatory practices that have been introduced. Yet, despite the wide 
number of opportunities, citizens still frequently possess little power to influence the 
outcomes of decisions taken by their respective local authorities. On paper, these 
mechanisms appear to open up local decision-making processes to participation. 
However, in practice these mechanisms operate not as presented on paper, but according 
to the way they are implemented by local authorities, which retain total control over 
them. 
The three cases reflect a diversity of participatory mechanisms that range between non- 
permanent ones to permanent ones. In the three cases it seems that the main motivation 
behind its implementation has been to get rid of the clientelistic practices of the PRI. 
Unlike the original motivations of the participationists, who aimed to struggle against 
the inequalities of the neo-liberal capitalist system, in the cases analysed here the 
struggle seems to be motivated by different goals. The three political parties under 
scrutiny seem to have used these mechanisms to promote a pseudo-democratic 
environment, perhaps to keep their respective organisations in power and effectively 
leaving aside the original aims for which these mechanisms were supposedly created. 
Although the core aim of the different participatory schemes presented in chapter 2 is to 
involve citizens in those decisions that affect their daily lives, in these cases there is 
little evidence of happening. Despite the diversity of participatory mechanisms 
introduced in each case, it can be argued that neither the liberal nor the radical views of 
participatory democracy have been implemented in any of them. The authorities retain 
close control over all the participatory mechanisms and there is little scope for citizen 
control. 
The key conclusions to be drawn from this section are: 
There is an enormous diversity across the three case studies in the legislation and 
policies underpinning participatory schemes and the types of mechanisms which 
include numerous permanent and non-permanent forms. 
The role of local authorities is critical: they are responsible for introducing the 
participatory schemes and they retain tight control over their operation. 
The keenness of local authorities to retain control probably reflects their limited 
ambition for democratic reform and their real underlying political aims. 
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Infrastructure Conditions and Class 
In the 1960s and 1970s, participatory mechanisms were often conceived as a radical 
response to the social differences characterising capitalist liberal democracies, but the 
participatory theorists in that era gave little attention to the social differences in each 
locality. However, in Mexico, class has proven to be a crucial issue that needs to be 
considered before implementing any participatory scheme. Previous participatory 
programmes like SOLIDARIDAD were created mainly to solve the basic infrastructure 
needs of the poorer classes. However, in most of the schemes analysed here people from 
all social backgrounds are expected to take part in participatory processes even through 
the outcomes might not benefit a particular social class. Politicians seem to develop 
each participatory programme without considering the needs faced by each 
neighbourhood and the type of citizen living there. In particular, as demonstrated in 
chapter 3, the upper middle classes might not necessarily need or agree to participate in 
mechanisms which would not be of any direct use for them. This research found out that 
such issues as basic infrastructure conditions, neighbourhood conditions and class 
differences play a crucial role when carrying out any participatory agenda. 
It was found that the basic infrastructure conditions of each locality are directly related 
to the way the participatory agenda has been carried out. While the local governments of 
Tlalpan and Puebla are still dealing with population which lack such basic infrastructure 
services as sewage or electricity, the municipality of San Pedro has already covered its 
primary infrastructure needs. 6 This initial difference makes Tlalpan and Puebla more 
susceptible to the presence of informal community leaders that could obstruct the 
'official' participatory agenda. 
Due to its size Tlalpan has traditionally experienced frequent illegal invasions of land. 
Throughout the years that the PRI was in office, illegal invasions became accepted and 
were even promoted by local authorities, indeed, they were used as ways to control the 
population or to offer concessions to win citizens' support during electoral processes. 
Development plans were not an issue for pritsta administrations, and the disordered way 
in which Tlalpan developed is the main source of the problems currently faced there 
(i. e. lack of sewage, electricity or piped drinking water). Another factor that has 
contributed to Tlalpan's uneven development is the mix of urban and rural traditions 
within the same locality. There are some places where still farming takes place and 
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where the needs of this sector of the population are very different when compared to 
those faced by groups living in the urban parts of the locality. The PRD 1997-2000 
administration visualised citizen involvement as necessary to create a community 
consciousness and to solve some of the main problems faced by the locality. Attempting 
to reduce the proliferation of irregular settlements, perredistas have tried to prevent land 
invasions and any new housing projects are thoroughly studied by special commissions 
that measure the ecological impact of these developments as well as its social pros and 
cons. 7 
Puebla is also a large municipality that includes mixed zones (urban and rural) and 
where a lack of basic infrastructure services exists. Puebla has most of the industrial 
activities in the state. With the proliferation of several industrial parks, the municipality 
constantly demands labour, which attracts migration from other parts of the state to the 
capital, as people seek to improve their living conditions. This migration creates a 
demand for housing, which in a way links Puebla's and Tlalpan's problems, as land 
invasions are also at the core of Puebla's governmental agenda. It is common to find at 
the outskirts of the municipality groups of people who would invade land, build their 
houses and only then worry about who owns it. Authorities play a crucial negotiating 
role in this situation as they have to deal with the original owner of the land, sometimes 
buy the land from him or her, and then sell it or rent it to the new residents. The main 
issue behind this confused process is that authorities cannot introduce any public 
services if the neighbourhood has not been officially recognised as such. 8 Although in 
Puebla's city centre the majority of the population has already covered its primary 
needs, 9 on the edge of the municipality this is not always so. Providing sewage, water, 
and electricity for these less developed areas is still one of the core issues at Puebla's 
local agenda. This problem has been dealt by the pritsta administration as most 
problems were dealt in the past, through local leaders who negotiate with authorities 
about the best ways to cover the lack of services needed by citizens. 
One of the advantages of San Pedro over Tlalpan and Puebla is that the authorities of 
this rich municipality have already managed to cover its basic infrastructure needs. Even 
in the poor part of the municipality, citizens have all their basic infrastructure services. 
Irregular invasions of land are absent, and urban development planning is at the core of 
the local agenda. Out of the three case studies, San Pedro is the locality that has been 
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better planned, and where the existence of a long-term vision has proven positive for its 
development. 10 Thus, it can be argued that neighbourhoods where the basic 
infrastructure needs are provided are less prone to the influence of informal community 
leaders. This aspect is directly related to the way the participatory agenda has been 
carried out in each the three cases, as a correlation between uncovered infrastructure 
needs and the presence of informal community leaders was found. Whilst in San Pedro 
informal community leaders have little presence, in Tlalpan and Puebla there are still 
plenty of them offering their services, especially to the poorer classes. 
The second characteristic identified in this research deals with the neighbourhood 
conditions where each of the participatory mechanisms is implemented. For instance, 
one of the main characteristics of Tlalpan is the mix between rich and poor 
neighbourhoods, an aspect that complicates the implementation of the participatory 
agenda. Due to the differences between poor and rich neighbourhoods, it would be 
difficult for authorities to expect citizen interaction to try to solve common needs if they 
do not share the same problems. Rich people have less need to participate in the 
mechanisms promoted by the local authority, because (mostly) they live in isolated 
neighbourhoods that do not have any infrastructure problems, and their 'private 
participatory agendas' deal mainly with issues of noise or the environment. ', On the 
other hand, the poor areas of the municipality face such basic infrastructure problems as 
the introduction of basic public services, and probably have little direct interest in the 
environment. 
In Puebla, rich and poor zones are clearly delimited, and it is very rare that they interact 
with each other. Indeed, both the PAN-UN initiative and COPLADEMUNs were 
entirely dedicated to solving the needs of the poorer sectors of the population, as 
authorities realised that the upper classes had already covered their basic infrastructure 
needs. In Puebla, authorities take for granted that upper class citizens would not use 
participatory mechanisms. Usually when the richer sectors of the population face a 
problem, they would confront authorities directly to seek a solution. On the other hand, 
the poorer sectors of the population living in both the urban and the rural part of the 
municipality seem to be condemned to have a mediator between them and authorities, a 
role that local informal leaders normally assume. 
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As the richest municipality of Mexico San Pedro is a more homogeneous locality, in the 
sense that better off citizens do not interact with lower class ones, due to the fact that a 
natural landmark (the Santa Catarina River) divides the two areas. This factor facilitates 
the implementation of the participatory agenda, as in both rich and poor areas people 
share the same problems, there are few contrasting conditions that could create tensions 
if citizens interact when taking part in participatory activities. It therefore seems easier 
for authorities to develop programmes for either region, because there is certainty over 
the conditions that would prevail during their implementation. Another factor that 
contributes to San Pedro's smoother implementation of the participatory agenda is the 
fact that it does not have any rural areas, so all its problems are urban in nature. 
Indeed, one of the most revealing findings identified when comparing the way each 
municipality carries out its participatory agenda is the importance that class has for the 
participatory organisational process. In each of the three municipalities there are 
important differences between the way the upper classes and the lower classes organise 
their respective participatory agendas. When getting involved in permanent 
participatory activities, the affluent sectors of the population non-nally possess a budget 
and in some cases even have offices to organise their community meetings. On the other 
hand, in the poorer sectors of the population, neighbourhood organisations generally 
operate under a 'project basis, ' and residents gather whenever it is required, with 
meetings mainly organised to discuss unfinished projects or an unexpected problem that 
requires a rapid solution. 
In Puebla and San Pedro, the authorities are aware of the differences between the upper 
and lower sectors. For instance, in Puebla, both the PAN-LJN initiative and the 
COPLADEMUN project, were designed for the lower sectors of the population, 
assuming that only those neighbourhoods that would require the introduction of basic 
infrastructure projects would follow these schemes. In San Pedro, as it is clear that the 
municipality is only divided into two areas (rich and poor), it becomes easier to design 
specific policies for both sectors. Nonetheless, because in Tialpan rich and poor areas 
are mixed, it is difficult for residents to interact, and the creation of specific 
programmes becomes harder. To deal with these problems, authorities usually work on 
a project basis, so even if the 'rich part' of particular area would not require the 
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introduction of a basic infrastructure project, the 'poor part' would be able to engage in 
the activities required to solve the addressed problem. 
Although the creation of specific programmes could be a solution to the marked class 
differences prevailing in each of the three cases, analysis of the participatory laws, 
uncovers no mention of these contrasts. The 1998 CPL and San Pedro's legislation takes 
for granted that both the permanent and non-permanent participatory options would be 
unaffected by these differences. Yet, one of the most interesting issues perceived in San 
Pedro is that whenever a plebiscite takes place, generally the lower sector of the 
municipality does not get involved; in fact, all the non-permanent participatory 
processes presented in this research project were promoted by the upper classes. The 
uniformity with which authorities seem to be carrying out the participatory agenda 
jeopardises its success, as all issues are 'seen through the same lens. ' This, distortion of 
reality (i. e. perceiving all localities as the same) seems to be one of the main problems 
faced by local administrations. Although recently the Agenda para la Refionna 
Municipal stresses the importance of differentiating between types of municipalities for 
a successful participatory agenda, this perception has not yet influenced the 
participatory agendas implemented all over Mexico. 
If the three aspects highlighted in this section are not considered by local authorities, it 
might affect the operation of participatory mechanisms. Ignoring the infrastructure or 
social differences prevailing in each locality might, especially amongst the poorer 
classes, allow local caciques or politicians to abuse the ignorance of these classes to 
exploit participatory mechanisms to serve their own interests. Whether implementing a 
referendum or a neighbourhood committee, consideration of the basic infrastructure and 
social classes of each locality are important aspects of implementing any participatory 
mechanism. In the next section we will discuss further how the participatory agenda has 
been implemented in the three localities of research. 
The main findings in this section are: 
Considering the basic infrastructure conditions of each locality where participatory 
mechanisms are implemented can play a crucial role in avoiding the proliferation of 
local caciques. 
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There are important differences between the way middle and upper classes and the 
lower classes organise their respective participatory agendas. Whilst the middle and 
upper sectors are concerned about issues such as pollution or ecological problems, 
lower class ones aim to solve their basic infrastructure needs. 
The 'issue of class' is an important aspect to be considered when carrying out any 
participatory scheme. 
Implementation in the Mexican Local Context 
When analysing any public policy, it is always important to examine the political 
context in which these policies are implemented, especially when electoral factors may 
play a crucial role. For instance, in San Pedro, the fact that panista administrations have 
been in office since 1989 has been crucial for the consolidation of a 'panista mentality' 
within the municipality. There has been greater continuity to all the participatory 
programmes and citizens are used to the way the participatory agenda is carried out. The 
inhabitants of San Pedro know how to proceed when facing a problem and which 
department is in charge of solving it; in short, they know what to do and who to go to. 
In Puebla, a new participatory agenda was initiated by the 1996-1999 panista 
administration, and although the PAN-UN project was implemented in most of the 
municipality, once the PRI recovered power in 1999 the local citizen participation 
agenda changed. As a result, the PRI fell back on the previous participatory agenda, 
based on the jefe de manzana structure, and so far no legislation has been developed in 
this municipality. On the other hand, in Tlalpan, the victory obtained by the PRD in 
1997 played a crucial role in activating a new participatory legislation. Without this 
electoral triumph, the participatory agenda would still be dominated by pritsta schemes. 
The top-down way in which authorities carry out participatory mechanisms leaves 
limited scope for citizens to control or at least to have some impact on the outcomes of 
schemes, which on paper appear to be a genuine participatory option, but which in 
practice do not operate in this way. Both non-permanent and permanent participatory 
mechanisms follow the typical top-down implementation pattern characteristic of most 
governmental agencies. For instance, one of the first characteristics identified with the 
implementation of non-permanent participatory mechanisms is the repetition of the 
'federal pattern. ' Under this pattern, decisions emanate from the top of the political 
pyramid - in Tlalpan from the government of Mexico City and in San Pedro from local 
authorities - and the input of other authorities or citizens is practically non-existent. 
Indeed, the government of Mexico City, contrary to the participatory principles 
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discussed in chapter 2, has promoted all the consultations that have taken place there, 
(none has been initiated by the public) simply assuming that the issues dealt with on the 
agenda are important for citizens. In San Pedro the situation has been similar. 
Nonetheless, because the government of this municipality is dealing with a highly 
educated and economically powerful electorate, the pressure exercised by this sector 
through the press has played a crucial role in the implementation of several 
consultations. Box 6.3 illustrates the types of consultations that have been promoted in 
both localities. 
Rny 6-3 Tvnes of consultation imDlemented in Tiainan and San Ppdrn 
Type of Consultation Alms Number of participants 
Plebiscite (Government To persuade indirectly opposition political 163,000 citizens took part 
of Mexico City) parties (the PRI and the PAN) to conclude 
the political reform started in 1998 
(May 1999). 
Plebiscite (Government The aim of this process was to learn what 56,000 citizens took part 
of Mexico City) the public thought about creating a new 
legislation for protest marches in Mexico 
City (January 2001). 
Consultation (Municipal Introduce reforms to the participatory 24 Citizens took part 
Government) legislation (May 1995). 
Referendum (Initiated Determine whether the closing time of 2,481 Citizens took part 
by citizens through nightclubs should change or not 
public pressure and (September 1998). 
seconded by local 
authorities) 
An important observation about the processes presented in Box 6.3 is that only one had 
a direct effect on government policy - the referendum promoted in San Pedro regarding 
the closing time of nightclubs. In the other consultations, despite strong citizen interest 
in concluding the political reform of Mexico City, their concern to create a protest 
march legislation or to introduce reforms to San Pedro's participatory legislation, none 
of these processes had a direct impact on the way authorities proceeded. As the issues 
consulted were not entirely in the hands of local authorities, there was little that could 
have been done to act immediately, according to the outcome of the consultation. In 
both cases, there were other governmental bodies involved in the possible approval of 
the topics raised by local authorities, reducing considerably the immediate impact of 
each consultation process. 
In both consultations promoted in Mexico City, it would not have been difficult to guess 
the outcome. Considering that a political reform for the capital is necessary, and also 
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that the number of protest marches increases year after year, it seems that both processes 
could have been avoided. Perhaps the authorities - bearing in mind that only one 
plebiscite can take place per year - might have 'saved' both consultation processes for 
more controversial issues? Similarly, in San Pedro, especially the consultation regarding 
possible reforms to the participatory legislation, surely the views of 24 citizens are not 
representative of the views of 130,000 people and that perhaps the consultation should 
have been invalidated. In this case, again, authorities implemented a participatory 
mechanism that maybe should have not taken place. In both cases, local authorities - 
perhaps purposely - used participatory mechanisms in situations that were not that 
controversial, or where an immediate impact could not be felt. With the implementation 
of non-permanent participatory mechanisms entirely in the hands of authorities, there is 
little that citizens could do to stop such processes, which have proven expensive to carry 
out. One obvious inference is that the final decision of each consultation had already 
been made, prior to the consultation, so that citizens were invited to participate just to 
legitimate those decisions. 
Comparison of the way the permanent participatory agenda is carried out in each of the 
three localities finds a similar pattern to that identified in non-permanent mechanisms. 
Despite the fact that citizens can control the internal organisation of permanent forms 
such as neighbourhood committees, the impact that these organisations might have is 
still highly dependent on a yes or no given by local authorities. In each of the three 
cases the determination of local authorities to retain their power is evident and will be 
discussed more fully in the citizen empowerment section below. 
The relevance of having a top-down implementation model 
One feature of each case is that politicians are not taking the lessons of the participatory 
literature seriously. Instead, they seem to be obsessed with keeping tight control over 
the different mechanisms they implement. Furthen-nore, on some occasions it appears as 
if policy implementers did not really understand the nature - or perhaps did understand 
but used for particular party purposes - of participatory policies. When this dissertation 
was started, it was assumed - wrongly - that the authorities had a clear understanding 
about how participatory mechanisms should be implemented. According to both the 
Tlalpan and San Pedro legislation the reason for establishing consultations (e. g. 
plebiscites or referenda) should be to aid a decision of government over a controversial 
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local issue. The issue might deal with such aspects as traffic, pollution, or a specific 
construction, and in theory, through their participation citizens would 'have a say' in the 
decision to be taken by local authorities. Yet, in the cases analysed here this seems to 
not have been the case. For instance, the 'bridge controversy' in San Pedro is a good 
example of how authorities could have implemented a participatory scheme yet, for 
unknown reasons, it did not happen. Despite the interest in the consultation exercise 
shown by the community, the state and local authorities stuck to their decision and 
ignored what the public wanted. 
After years of corruption and unilateral decision-making by the governing PRI, the 
inclusion of non-permanent forms of participation was widely perceived as a necessity. 
Political parties played a crucial role, as illustrated by the participatory legislation 
promoted by the PRD and the PAN in these cases. However, although both legislations 
set out the different criteria that authorities should follow to carry out a referendum'or a 
plebiscite, the cases show these processes are not necessarily implemented in practice. 
As the decision whether to organise a consultation or not is left completely in the hands 
of authorities, - something that is not necessarily the ideal - perhaps three out of the 
four consultations presented in Box 6.3 could have been avoided. Authorities seem to 
be obsessed (especially the non-prUsta ones) with using these mechanisms to show 
public opinion that their administrations are open to public opinion, via sharing their 
decision-making power with citizens. However, it seems that authorities find it difficult 
to determine when it is or when it is not convenient to use such mechanisms. With the 
consultations presented in Box 6.3, common sense should have told the authorities that 
finishing the political reform of the capital was necessary and that a protest march law 
should have been included. Perhaps the real aim was to consult the population over an 
issue which was not that controversial, thereby preventing or delaying a referendum 
over a truly controversial issue as only one mechanism can be implemented per year in 
Mexico City. Thus, local authorities seem to be keen on presenting themselves as open 
and democratic, whilst avoiding controversial issues or actually taking the final decision 
before the consultation even takes place. 
In the case of San Pedro, the number of consultations is not an issue, as the legislation 
does not limit them to one per year, but as in Tlalpan there seems to be confusion as to 
when to implement participatory schemes. Furthermore, the small number of people that 
244 
participate in such processes seems hardly representative of the whole locality, so 
perhaps a minimum percentage of citizens taking part should be required to legitimise 
each process. 
The way in which participatory policies have been implemented has often failed fully to 
inform, the population when such mechanisms take place. Lack of information is another 
characteristic of the top-down implementation process followed by each local authority. 
For instance, when authorities perceived that a consultation process was needed to 
decide over a specific issue, they did not necessarily promote it. In both San Pedro and 
Tlalpan, people commented that sometimes authorities give insufficient warning to 
citizens about these processes. For instance, when San Pedro (1994-1997) Mayor 
Margain organised an open consultation to discuss possible reforms to San Pedro's 
urban development plan, it was heavily criticised by members of NGOs and opposition 
political parties. As commented by Mrs. Yvonne Salazar: 'it is a shame that the 
discussion of such important reforms was not publicised properly, Sampetrinos 
(inhabitants of San Pedro) must have been informed sufficiently in advance about this 
consultation. Local authorities should not limit access to only a few' (El Norte 
7/7/1995). 
In Tlalpan, residents claimed that authorities usually do not inform them when a 
consultation process takes place. Community leader Julieta comments, 'there is a 
tremendous lack of information regarding issues dealing with citizen involvement, we 
are never informed on time about any consultation processes' (Julieta 2000). A related 
issue is that authorities could provide information about the consultation taking place, 
but not provide the information about the issue dealt with. Not surprisingly, this may 
translate into low indices of participation, or into having a community that participates 
over issues which are not necessarily what people think they are. Clearly, infon-ning the 
locality about times and forms is a crucial element of a successful consultation process. 
Perhaps one of the greatest temptations faced by local authorities when carrying out 
participatory mechanisms in a top-down way is to shape the outcome of any 
consultation. Especially when dealing with highly controversial issues, authorities could 
obviously be tempted to bias the process to favour a preferred position. For instance, 
both consultations presented in Box 6.3 were used by the PRD to tell the PRI and the 
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PAN that reforms were necessary. One of the recommendations given by Stewart (1996) 
is the establishment of panels with experts defending opposite positions to take place 
before any consultation is carried out. Whether such bodies could be established in 
Mexico is highly questionable, especially in such a complex political environment. 
Another aspect related to the bias point is that when authorities implement a highly 
controlled participatory agenda, many of the issues included might not necessarily 
interest the majority of citizens. When authorities decide to involve the community in 
what they regard as inessential matters, in the long run, these 'tactics' could have a 
negative effect for the development of participatory practices of government. For 
instance, in Mexico City, the authorities did not consult the population on essential 
matters so that perhaps the turnout of people would have improved considerably if they 
involved different issues. 
In San Pedro, most of the consultations have dealt with issues that affect the richer 
sector of the municipality, and are unimportant for the rest. For example, poorer sectors 
of San Pedro do not possess expensive properties that would lose value with the 
construction of particular shopping centre(s). If the authorities genuinely want to give 
greater legitimacy to these mechanisms they must raise controversial issues over which 
the decision of the 'all' the members of the public could have an immediate impact. 
Although chapter 2 identified a trend to involve NGOs in the implementation of 
participatory schemes, in none of the cases analysed here was this the case. For instance, 
in the 'save the park' initiative in Tlalpan, the involvement of NGOs was limited to 
attending community meetings. Overall, these organisations have played a minor role in 
the implementation of schemes and have had little direct impact on their outcome. In 
San Pedro, NGOs have participated more as spectators than as implementers or 
assistants in carrying out participatory schemes. Despite a considerable number of 
NGOs operating in San Pedro, like Tlalpan, their intervention has been limited when 
participatory schemes are implemented. Yet, it is understandable that local authorities 
do not accept the involvement of external actors such as NGOs in participatory 
mechanisms, especially bearing in mind the top-down way in which they are 
implemented. 
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The use of a top-down implementation process when carrying out a participatory agenda 
is not ideal as it has allowed citizens participation mechanisms to have been used for 
legitimation purposes rather than to nurture genuine participation. 
The key implementation findings: 
The use of a top-down implementation process enables local authorities to use 
participatory schemes primarily as a means of legitimation rather than as genuine 
participatory tools. 
However, the flaws in the top-down implementation process have limited the 
effectiveness of this legitimation strategy. 
Citizen Empowerment 
Barriers to participation 
Although on the surface the value of participation seems obvious - as it provides a 
broad source of legitimation for policy change - two core difficulties were worth 
considering in this thesis. Firstly, the process of canvassing a wide spectrum of opinion 
and incorporating the interests that they represent into the decision-making process can 
lead to information overload and make decision-making slow and cumbersome. 
Secondly, open conflict between competing groups ultimately leads to clientelism and 
the privileging of certain elite groups. A sectional interest or alliance of sectional 
interests will ultimately win the war of ideas and there would then be a mobilisation of 
bias in favour of that sectional interest or alliance of sectional interests. This could lead 
to more limited participation. 
The merit of a participatory view of decision-making is really a normative question and 
may be couched in terms of elitist versus participatory views of democracy. The fonner 
is a realist theory that emphasises a belief in the inevitability of elite rule and the limits 
to public participation in public affairs. In this minimal conception of liberal 
democracy, apart from the process of voting, political participation is not taken to be an 
important measure of the quality of democratic life. Political representation or elite 
responsiveness to the ruled is considered more important, what Giovanni Sartori (1987: 
156) has termed the 'responsiveness of the leaders to the led'. This elitist or 'top-down' 
conceptualisation of democracy would include the following forms of political 
institutions and processes -a majoritarian or 'first-past-the post' electoral system, 
executive dominance over the legislature, limited access to govemmental infonnation, 
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low levels of participation in the system of government, persistent inequalities in power 
resources, a centralised unitary state, and a media system that is vulnerable to 
manipulation by government. 
By contrast, a participatory view of democracy would take as its key aim the 
establishment of pluralism through a societal-led conception of the national interest and 
the creation of open, decentralised and democratic political institutions and processes 
based upon popular control and political equality. Examples of institutions and 
processes which would reflect a 'bottom-up' or participatory view of democracy would 
include - the protection of individual rights, freedom of information and other forms of 
open government, electoral systems based on proportional representation, the 
decentralisation and territorial devolution of power, and, high levels of participation in 
the system of government anchored in the twin concepts of popular control and political 
equality. The decisive test of a democracy lies in its capacity to encourage its population 
to play an active role in its government. 
Moreover, technological advances and mature consumerism should make participatory 
decision-making more feasible and help: 
" with problems of information overload; 
" provide basic information about rights and responsibilities of citizenship; 
41 infonn and educate about politics and about issues of public concern; 
help voters to make up their mind about candidates, parties and issues in election 
process; 
promote/offer opportunities for citizens to deliberate on public issues, on draft 
(in preparation) laws, social problems (allow experience of analysing 
complicated issues); 
promote/offer communication between citizens and politicians; 
guide citizens through the growing jungle of publicly available government and 
other official information; and, 
offer citizen participation in real decision-making. 
The contrast between these rival conceptions of democracy and the way in which they 
underpin approaches to decision-making is illustrated in Figure 6.1 below. 
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Figure 6.1 Participation and Decision-making 
Although the discussion above focuses on two core barriers to participation, in this 
thesis we also found linkages to the seven obstacles identified by Stewart (attitude of 
some elected representatives, raising expectations, apathy, lack of information, practical 
problems, democratic exclusion, and inappropriate use of particular approaches). The 
following sub-sections examine these similarities. 
Perceptions of Participation 
The comparison of the three localities found different perspectives about how 
authorities and citizens see these participatory mechanisms. The authorities seem to 
perceive any participatory practice beyond normal election processes as providing a 
'value added policy' for citizens. When authorities were questioned about the reasons 
for carrying out a participatory agenda, not surprisingly, they responded that they were 
engaged in democratic practices of government because these mechanisms would, 
almost automatically, bring positive benefits to their citizens. As Puebla's citizen 
participation director Alejandro Armenta-Mier put it, 'the aim of this directorate is to 
give attention to the lower sectors of the population, and to take progress and 
development to deprived areas. By promoting social participation, we open channels to 
help citizens reach those wishes and aspirations that all the members of this community 
have' (Armenta-Mier 2000). In Tlalpan and San Pedro, authorities perceived citizen 
participation as a means of getting rid of the pre-existing pritsta caciquil structure 
operating at the local level, in the hope that the PRI would lose its political strength 
once these mechanisms were implemented. Whilst the participatory theorists speak 
about achieving greater transparency, democracy, or even development, it is apparent 
that in Mexico, many other things will need to change if participatory mechanisms are 
to achieve such an outcome. 
One factor is that just as the constitution is Inot applied as it should be, these 
participatory mechanisms are often not applied according to the book either. In a 
country where institutions are struggling to keep pace with the series of recent structural 
changes, it is difficult to consolidate such participatory schemes in a short period of 
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time. There is a tremendous lack of information within bureaucratic bodies about what 
participatory mechanisms stand for or how these initiatives should be carried out. For 
instance, in Tlalpan residents complained about the short notice they were given when 
neighbourhood elections took place. In San Pedro, NGOs have questioned the way 
diverse consultation processes, mainly dealing with local development planning, have 
been implemented by authorities, as these processes appear to be biased. 12 Perhaps one 
of the best examples of how citizen participation mechanisms can be misused is the way 
Governor Bartlett implemented the COPLADEMUN initiative. It was a policy that on 
paper aimed to bring greater transparency to local administrations, but which in practice 
became a political tool just like SOLIDARIDAD. 
On the side of citizens, whenever a participatory mechanism is implemented, it usually 
generates a high expectation within each community. Especially in the lower sectors of 
the population, a participatory process can be perceived as a 'divine policy' that would 
have an immediate impact on the lives of those taking part in it. This perception has 
been spread mainly because when politicians present a participatory initiative they do 
not mention its limitations; instead authorities focus only on explaining the benefits it 
would bring for each community taking part in such processes. As neighbourhood 
committee leader of Tlalpan, Irma Zuchitl Ddvila observed, 'citizens think that we have 
the power to solve all their problems, they are not aware that our scope of action is very 
limited. This is one of the reasons why there are still so many infon-nal leaders operating 
here, because they know about the limitations of the legislation' (Ddvila 2000). 
In each of the three cases analysed participatory mechanisms are presented as a 
democratic solution that would inevitably open up decision-making processes for 
citizens to 'have a say' on those issues that affect them. Yet, authorities have designed 
the legal frameworks to avoid losing their political control. To illustrate, Mexico City's 
citizen participation law contains a series of conditions that limit citizen involvement in 
decision-making processes. The twelve functions that can be performed by 
neighbourhood committees in practice allocate citizens very little power over decisions 
reached at the local level. As stated by neighbourhood committee co-ordinator Martfn 
Flores, 'people participating in neighbourhood committees want to have more faculties, 
they would like to propose and to decide, they would like to participate in the projects, 
but it seems that this legislation does not contemplate this to happen' (Flores 2000). 
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Consequently, rather than using participatory bodies, people still fall back on traditional 
methods of influence; for instance, Tlalpan resident, Alfonso Garcfa Sdnchez stated, 
'whenever I have a problem I go directly to the local authorities' (Garcia Sdnchez 
interview 5/11/2001), a view echoed by fellow residents Gustavo Carrizales and Fabiola 
Rmenez, who do not believe that their neighbourhood representatives could be expected 
to solve these problems. The same happens in San Pedro, where the role of authorities is 
paramount for the implementation of the whole participatory agenda, and in Puebla, 
where after the controversies surrounding the PAN-UN initiative and 
COPLADEMUNs, the prospect of a new participatory legislation has not even been 
discussed. 
To sum up, there are still many issues that need to be addressed dealing both with 
authorities' and citizens' perceptions of what participatory mechanisms stand for. If the 
hopes of both are dashed, it might lead to rapid disillusionment with these schemes that 
could result in even less effective mechanisms and to having low indices of 
participation. 
Low indices ofparticipation 
The indices of participation of these mechanisms can be reduced considerably if they 
are misused by local authorities. The criticisms identified in chapter 2, especially those 
dealing with citizens having more interesting things to do, seem pertinent. However, 
authorities also play a crucial role in motivating or dernotivating citizens to take part in 
consultation processes. If the population perceives the authorities as not acting as 
expected, nor implementing the results of the consultation process, then the number of 
people taking part in future consultations could be reduced. If citizens are not informed 
in enough time in advance about the consultation, then the turnout might be low. For 
instance, in the consultation organised by the PRD in May 1999, although 2,820 ballot 
boxes were installed throughout the 16 localities of Mexico City, only 163,000 citizens 
took part (see La Jomada 17/5/1999). This consultation was heavily criticised by 
opposition political parties (PRI and PAN) as being 'biased and expensive' (see La 
Jomada 14/5/1999). There is also the consultation that took place in San Pedro in 1995, 
where only 24 people participated. As Barber has observed: 'people are apathetic 
because they are powerless, not powerless because they are apathetic. There is no 
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evidence to suggest that once empowered people will refuse to participate' (Barber 
1984: 272). It seems likely that there is a direct relationship between not informing the 
community with enough time in advance, the types of issues raised and the levels of 
participation. 
Costs of Participation 
In the three case studies analysed local authorities did not seem to be very concerned 
about the costs (economic or temporal) of participatory democratic initiatives. However, 
not surprisingly, one element that was identified in those localities under political 
dissent (Puebla and Tlalpan) was that the party that was not in power criticised the 
implementation of participatory mechanisms. For instance, the plebiscites organised in 
Mexico City in 1999 and 2001 13 were criticised by opposition political parties (PRI and 
PAN) as being 'biased and expensive' (La Jomada 14/5/1999). The cost of the 1999 
consultation was 4.5 million pesos (approximately f 320,000) over an issue that perhaps 
was not that controversial or which could have been decided by authorities without 
being consulted. Mexico City PRD authorities showed little concern for the costs of 
these processes and seemed more interested about the political impact that the 
implementation of these mechanisms might have for future election processes, as these 
mechanisms show a 'democratic PRY to the outside. Cleverly, the PRD promotes in 
the media their consultations, but minor local issues are not given the same coverage. 
Such consultations (i. e. plebiscites) are not time consuming, as citizens are only asked 
to vote for a yes or no and do not have to 'waste' their time for days or weeks attending 
several meetings or holding discussions with other members of the community. 
In the case of San Pedro, where a tight top-down participatory agenda seems to prevail, 
and where the PAN has practically no opposition, the economic costs of these 
consultations do not seem to be relevant for local authorities. However an aspect to 
highlight is that, unlike other places where participatory initiatives have been carried 
out, 14 in San Pedro middle and upper classes do not seem to mind spending their time 
defending the value of their properties organising public debates or consultations. This 
research showed that middle-upper classes - if necessary - have the time and the will to 
defend their interests and to promote participatory initiatives that might oppose the 
views of government. Overall, it can be argued that the costs of participatory democracy 
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(economic or temporal) are not going to stop the 'participatory willingness' shown by 
Mexico's three main political forces. The costs of participatory democracy in the 
Mexican context are an aspect worthy of analysis to a greater depth in further research. 
Limited Empowerment 
Obviously, a core issue in all three cases is the limited decision-making power given to 
citizens in these processes. This trend is easier to identify in permanent participatory 
mechanisms. For instance, throughout the years of PRI dominance, the neighbourhood 
was perceived as a 'power keeping body' where the interaction between local politicians 
and infon-nal community leaders played a key role. A simple reason why the PRI 
managed to keep certain localities under its control for so long was that these localities 
required the intervention of informal leaders such as caciques, and the clientelistic 
relationship between authorities and citizens was seen as normal. Greater political 
competition - triggered when the PAN and the PRD started occupying more positions 
of government - brought a series of changes, which included an attempt to establish a 
different relationship between authorities and the participatory organisations operating 
at the neighbourhood level. The core aim of the PAN and the PRD was, and in some 
localities still is, to eliminate the local corporatist networks under the dominance of the 
PRI. Significantly, citizens played a key role pushing for the introduction of more 
transparent forms of interaction between authorities and the general public, as is evident 
in such affluent municipalities as San Pedro, where citizens had no need to maintain 
clientelistic relationships with informal groups of power representing the PRI and 
decided to express this desire for change in the ballot box. 
In San Pedro, the PAN has won the last five local elections. Yet, rather than get rid of 
such permanent priista participatory units as jueces auxiliares, instead, panista local 
authorities have strengthened these positions, but have managed to remove the political 
functions formerly performed by these community leaders. Currently, jueces auxiliares 
play a key role as contacts for local authorities and are encouraged to take various 
courses for improving their personal skills. Because municipal authorities have already 
introduced most of the basic public services required by the citizenry, these community 
leaders have been removed from the main sources of protest (i. e. a fight for the 
introduction of a public service). Another factor is that jueces auxiliares are appointed 
directly by local authorities and that if any act against the functions for which they were 
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appointed, they would be forced to resign. Thus the PAN in San Pedro has managed to 
transform its former worst enemies into their best allies. 
The other two permanent channels included in the legislation deal with the figure of the 
citizen counsellor and neighbourhood boards. Although citizen councils are at the core 
of the participatory governmental agenda, objectively speaking it would be very 
difficult to define them as 'genuine participatory mechanisms' because the local 
authorities choose who will occupy these positions, (diminishing their capabilities 
considerably) as personal compromises can be created. 15 It cannot be argued that 
citizens are empowered when taking part under such scheme. 
Neighbourhood boards are the third permanent participatory mechanism implemented in 
San Pedro. Although there are great differences between upper and lower class 
neighbourhood boards, in San Pedro this mechanism has become the main 
representative instrument at the neighbourhood level. For example, rich neighbourhoods 
generally have a well structured yearly agenda, possess a budget and even some offices 
to hold meetings; on the other hand, poor neighbourhoods meet whenever there is 
something to discuss and would not possess an internal budget. It is difficult to calculate 
the average attendance that takes part in these meetings, however a characteristic that 
was emphasised by both functionaries and citizens, is the fact that attendances vary 
depending on the issue dealt on the agenda. 
When we compare how the opposition governments of Tialpan and San Pedro managed 
the previous pseudo participatory body, they operated quite differently. While the PAN 
in San Pedro strengthened the jueces auxiliares structure, the PRD followed two 
different routes: either, confronting the political influence of pre-existing pritsta forms 
of local participation, or, making them work for their political organisation. One of the 
main issues during the discussion of the 1998 participatory legislation concerned 
banning the intermission of political parties in permanent forms of neighbourhood 
participation. However, due to the large number of informal leaders operating for 
particular political organisations, there has inevitably been party involvement in these 
forums. Even the 1997-2000 administration admitted that for their own records they 
catalogued how different neighbourhood committees have particular political 
preferences. 16 
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Although the statutes of the 1998 legislation ban all type of party involvement when 
neighbourhood election processes take place, perhaps the idea of the PRI, 7 to legalise 
the intervention of political parties in neighbourhood elections is more realistic? If 
citizens are going to get involved in political organisations anyway, then perhaps it is 
better to bring it out into the open? As a consequence of the problems mentioned above, 
currently only around 50 percent of these forums are still meeting on a regular basis. 
Half of the forums have been involved in controversies dealing with political parties or 
the role of such influential community leaders as local caciques. 18 
In Puebla, there has been a return to the clientelist route. When the PAN was in office 
(during the 1996-1999 administration), the PAN-UN participatory agenda was 
promoted, but once the PRI recovered the capital in the 1999 local election, any hopes 
of finishing with the corporatist practices of government vanished. The permanent 
participatory agenda operates under a loose structure where meetings are held whenever 
there is something to discuss, and where citizens' only chance of implementing a 
community project would be through a fideicomiso, which cannot be defined as a 
permanent form of participation. Citizens complained that neither the PAN nor the PRI 
has provided the permanent participatory agenda they deserve, there are still plenty of 
informal leaders operating at the local level, and close relationships between officials 
(co-ordinators and promoters mainly) and informal community leaders sometimes 
obstruct achieving any community development. 
The examples presented in this section show that citizens have been empowered in a 
very limited way. Even when taking part regularly in participatory schemes, realistically 
speaking the impact on the outside is limited. The next section uses the typologies 
presented in chapter 2 to measure the level of empowerment that citizens received when 
taking part in the participatory schemes here discussed. 
Measuring Empowerment 
The aim of this section is to apply Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett's model to measure 
empowerment in the three case studies. Firstly, Tlalpan's participatory agenda ranges 
between the non-participation and the citizen participation sections of the ladder. It 
would be difficult to place it on a specific rung because the locality performs some 
activities that put it high on the ladder, but others that place it on the lower rungs. 19 For 
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instance, the new governor of Mexico City has introduced a series of measures that can 
be identified as delegated control. The motion of the presupuesto participativo 
(participatory budget) is at the core of Andr6s Manuel Upez's participatory agenda, a 
measure that empowers citizens to decide how to spend a budget assigned by local 
authorities. On the other hand, when neighbourhood committees operate, there is often 
poor levels of information and civic hype. Moreover, both consultations promoted by 
the PRD in Mexico City can be categorised as cynical consultation processes. 
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Figure 6.2 Level of empowerment of the three cases in Burns, Hambleton and 
Hoggett's ladder 
Puebla can be placed on the non-participation section of the ladder. When the panista 
1996-1999 administration governed the municipality, and introduced the PAN-UN 
participatory agenda, the aim was to develop practices that could bring greater 
transparency and democracy to local government. At that time the locality was engaged 
in activities that could have been placed in the participation section of the ladder. 
However, when the PRI returned to power in 1999, the programme was stopped and 
everything went back to 'normal' under the implementation of the same old prifsta 
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schemes. When COPLADEMUNs were operating, it would have been placed on the 
second rung of the ladder, as a type of cynical consultation. The current participatory 
agenda, based on the block representative scheme, could be placed on the lower rungs 
of the ladder, as the clientelistic way in which it is normally carried out does not even 
promote citizen participation in an open way (see Figure 6.2 above to find the location 
of each locality in the ladder). 
The practices in San Pedro could be placed in the participation zone of the ladder, as 
genuine consultation processes take place, but responsibilities are not shared between 
authorities and citizens. Because most of the agenda and even the outcomes of 
consultation processes are in the hands of authorities, we cannot place San Pedro higher 
up the ladder. The reality of a highly directed participatory agenda becomes evident 
where authorities say they share the power with citizens, but which the practices or 
government seem to indicate exactly the contrary. 
Although this typology can help us to understand better the levels of power given to 
citizens by local authorities, it has its limitations. Most important, it is only a typology 
and can provide no explanatory power. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 2, whilst this 
model has been used in other countries, we cannot say that the reality of local 
government in different parts of the world is the same. 
Citizens: truly empowered orpolitical instruments? 
A key aspect to consider when analysing the impact of participatory mechanisms in the 
Mexican context is the role that citizens themselves are expected to take when getting 
involved in such processes. In the view of Ramfrez, 'in the case of Mexico, the series of 
changes recently introduced to several participatory legislations (i. e. Mexico City) are 
ignored by the majority of the population. There is only a limited number of citizens 
who are fully aware of the magnitude of the changes introduced' (Ramfrcz 2000: 19). 
Consequently, the 'informed ones' have become a limited group - mainly led by 
political parties - who in many cases will fight against each other via the courts to stop 
specific reforms, similar to the way the PAN proceeded with Ley Bartlett. 20 History tells 
us that traditionally, authorities have taken advantage of citizens' ignorance to 
implement specific policies, so could this be happening again? 
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The main claim by the authorities regarding the implementation of participatory 
practices of government was that citizens would be truly empowered. For the PRD and 
the PAN administrations in particular, the declared aim of the policy was to involve 
citizens in decision-making processes that would directly influence future actions of 
government. Nonetheless, when we analyse the participatory legislation it is clear that in 
each case the role of citizens is very limited. In short, it involved no significant shift of 
decision-making power from the authorities to citizens. Although it has been 
demonstrated that opposition administrations have indeed introduced some changes, 
they continue to retain total control over the way all participatory mechanisms are 
implemented. This characteristic puts at risk the implementation of the whole 
participatory agenda, as these policies may become merely legitimation instruments. 
Although the theory of participatory democracy perceives the role of citizens at the local 
level as crucial in bringing transparency and democracy to local administrations, this 
has not occurred in these Mexican examples. 
In some cases citizens have been called to participate in consultations over non- 
controversial matters or which could have been directly decided by authorities, without 
any citizen intervention. For instance, the plebiscites that have taken place in Mexico 
City and which are related to the electoral and political reform of the capital cannot be 
considered as processes that empowered considerably the community over a decision- 
making process. In fact, if so inclined, the authorities might have avoided both 
consultations and 'saved' them for a time when a more controversial issue was raised. 
The views aired by those citizens who took part in the processes were not even followed 
by an immediate action of government that could have 'legitimated' the aims of the 
consultation and the participation of citizens themselves. In San Pedro, there have also 
been some rather non-transparent processes which, as in Mexico City, only worked as a 
means of legitimating specific actions of government. In these circumstances, the 
implementation of participatory mechanisms becomes an issue that needs to be heavily 
scrutinised, because patterns from the past could be repeated (as with SOLIDARIDAD) 
and the government could be tempted to use determined policies for particular political 
purposes. 
One of the main problems faced throughout the research has been to define what it 
means to empower citizens. In Mexico there are some politicians who believe that the 
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people should be fulfilled just by taking part in free elections and that any policy which 
goes beyond the normal election process is a sort of a bonus. Moreover, politicians seem 
to be prepared to bias the outcome of what would later become governmental decisions 
discussed in open forums. For instance, both consultations promoted in Mexico City 
were motions that would, hypothetically speaking, benefit the PRD. 
Despite the reduced level of empowerment enjoyed by citizens when taking part in any 
of the participatory schemes analysed here there are still some positive aspects that can 
be highlighted. By participating in permanent or non-permanent schemes, citizens can 
vent their views regarding local matters and it is undeniable that greater interaction 
between authorities and citizens has taken place. It is more common to have authorities 
willing to be scrutinised by their citizens or citizens demanding greater information 
about such issues as public spending. Authorities can also receive feedback regarding 
the quality of the public services they provide. In the long-run it can be argued that these 
mechanisms would have a positive impact in Mexico's overall democratic process. 
Similarly to what happened with the social movements discussed in chapter 1, which 
later became the source of the implementation of participatory policies, the current 
participatory agenda could become the springboard for the introduction of more 
empowering policies in the future not only at the local, but perhaps at the state or 
national level. 
The main findings found in this section are the following: 
" Authorities play a crucial role in motivating or dernotivating citizens to take part in 
participatory schemes. 
" The level of empowerment citizens received when taking part in any of the 
participatory schemes was minimal. 
" Nonetheless, the citizen participation mechanisms implemented here might 
potentially bring a series of advantages that can help Mexico's overall democratic 
process. 
Overall Argument 
This research establishes that there is limited evidence of citizen participation bringing 
about the kinds of changes anticipated by the participatory literature in terms of 
empowering citizens, bringing decisions closer to local level or educating them. 
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However, some positive benefits were identified. During the implementation of each of 
the three participatory agendas, citizens, realistically speaking, had little input in these 
processes. Most issues consulted through these mechanisms are part of agendas already 
set by authorities, and only on very few occasions (especially with non-permanent 
participatory practices) were citizens able to influence authorities to implement 
mechanisms where their voice could be heard. These cases were mainly in San Pedro, 
where the middle and upper classes of the municipality used the media as a pressure 
mechanism. By contrast, in Tlalpan, the main input of citizens to the participatory 
agenda comes through getting involved in activities promoted by 'unofficial 
participatory leaders. ' Due to the limitations of the 1998 participatory legislation 
residents are still inclined to exercise pressure primarily through these community 
leaders. Circumventing the official channels of communication has sometimes proven to 
be more effective than sticking to the participatory mechanisms. It still seems preferable 
to confront authorities rather than to work with these powerless participatory structures. 
In Puebla, the input of citizens to the participatory process is practically non-existent. 
Especially within the lower sectors of the population, residents are expected to use their 
community representatives to promote particular projects. This process has proven to be 
time-consuming and contact based, and there are many political interests at stake. The 
absence of participatory legislation makes the consolidation of a truly participatory 
agenda even more uncertain. 
Although we could say that the input of citizens in permanent participatory mechanisms 
such as neighbourhood forums is constant, they are still highly dependent on 
authorities' decisions to solve most of the issues raised in such agendas. While residents 
are free to organise their respective committees, set the agendas, and discuss any matters 
that affect them, the impact outside these organisations depends on whether or not the 
authorities regard the issue as a priority. 
In the three case studies, the participation of citizens is limited to discussing issues and 
proposing solutions to local problems, however, the extent to which these discussions 
are effective or not remains uncertain. There were no mechanisms where citizens shared 
control with authorities, or where they possess total control of it. However, there are 
some schemes where citizens could get involved by using their labour or financial 
support to finish specific projects (i. e. fideicomiso). The functions of citizens in both 
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permanent and non-permanent participatory bodies seem to be more as a means of 
legitimating the actions that authorities will take after the process is finished. Even if 
citizens show their willingness to introduce policies through participating in a 
referendum or a plebiscite, the changes consulted may not be made effective 
immediately after. Furthermore, in the case of San Pedro, authorities will have the last 
decision even after a policy was favoured, jeopardising the whole sense of any 
consultation processes. 
For the reasons above discussed, we need to look at the themes discussed in chapter I to 
understand the role that these initiatives play in contemporary Mexican politics, as these 
mechanisms seem to have been used mainly as consultative rather than as 'true power 
sharing' participatory units. One initial finding is that despite the longstanding pressure 
from a diverse range of social movements for greater citizen participation in 
government policy making, there was little evidence of social movement involvement in 
the implementation of the participatory mechanisms in the three case studies. Rather, in 
each case, it was the political parties that designed and implemented the participatory 
initiatives. In the case of the traditional opposition parties - the PRD and the PAN - the 
main aim of the participatory initiatives was to undermine pre-existing PRI local 
structures of power. Both parties saw participatory initiatives as part of a wider process 
of democratisation and wished to demonstrate their capacity to govcm in a more 
democratic manner than the old PRI system. However, in practice these mechanisms 
have been used primarily to legitimate their position by giving a democratic image to 
their regimes, rather than genuinely share power with the citizens - as illustrated, for 
example, by the limited powers allocated to these diverse mechanisms to validate 
decisions effectively already made by authorities. If neither the PAN nor the PRD 
seemed genuinely committed to effective participation, this conclusion was even more 
apposite for the PRI in Puebla. It is hard not to conclude that the Ley Bartlett was little 
more than a cynical attempt to further Bartlett's personal political agenda, and the 
subsequent PRI authorities seem to be more interested in reinforcing traditional 
informal mechanisms of mediation. This thesis has demonstrated (especially in the cases 
of Tlalpan and Puebla) that divided government, political tradition and the nature of 
Mexico's political institutions are key barriers to participation. 
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Obviously, these conclusions are based only on these three case studies, so it is difficult 
to be certain whether these are representative of broader patterns in Mexican politics. 
Nonetheless, at the very least, the extensive interest in participation at the local level is 
playing its part in ensuring that the issues of accountability and citizen participation 
continue to be part of broader national debates on democratisation. Moreover, although 
the overall flavour of these conclusions may be rather negative for the cause of 
participation, it is possible to draw more positive messages. Public policies frequently 
have unintended consequences. Even if political parties are currently insincere in their 
public support for participation, by setting up new democratic mechanisms which give 
people some opportunity to influence policies, then as Pateman might argue, people 
might develop a taste for participation, simply by participating. Moreover, they may 
also demand that these supposedly democratic mechanisms be implemented properly, so 
that citizens are given genuine power and influence over local decision-making. In this 
way, it is just possible that the use of participatory mechanisms could evolve to become 
true instruments of accountability and democracy. But only time - and further research 
- will tell. 
Contribution of the Study and Avenues for Further Research 
This section presents the main contributions and possible avenues for further research 
identified in this study. The first point to highlight is it includes three detailed empirical 
case studies that uncover what is really going on with the participatory agendas of three 
localities governed by Mexico's main political parties. The study analyses the 
relationship between political parties, citizens, and authorities and also the role that each 
of these actors has taken in the implementation of different participatory schemes. This 
thesis offers an overview of three localities with very different problems and it shows 
that irrespective of which political party is in power, citizen participation mechanisms 
today play in important role in the governmental agenda of many Mexican localities. 
The study highlights the diversity of participatory schemes implemented in each of the 
three case studies analysed. Whether participating in a referendum, plebiscite or in 
neighbourhood forums, citizens now have a wide variety of options available to 
participate in those decisions that affect their daily lives. Nevertheless, the extent to 
which this diversity has been translated into a true empowerment of the public remains 
doubtful. This shows that authorities have been really thinking about offering alternative 
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forms of participation, but there have been such problems as the fact that the basic 
infrastructure or social conditions of each neighbourhood have not been taken into 
account before implementing each of these schemes. 
One key contribution of the thesis is to highlight how the socio-economic and social 
context influences the implementation of participatory mechanisms. This point is of 
paramount importance because citizens of different social backgrounds face very 
different problems and by no means can it be argued that authorities should develop the 
same participatory schemes for everyone. Whilst the upper classes seem to be more 
concerned about problems such as pollution or the construction of shopping centres, the 
lower classes are preoccupied with solving their basic infrastructure problems. Although 
there might be occasions when upper and lower are classes are affected by the same 
problem, and take part in the same sort of participatory scheme (e. g. a referendum), 
there will still be differences that local authorities would have to take into account when 
such schemes take place. More specifically, the issue of class discussed above does not 
seem to be considered by the participatory theorists. Whilst participatory theorists are 
concerned about the positive benefits of participatory democracy (e. g. the educative 
impact), they have ignored the different conditions that prevail in each neighbourhood 
which means that citizens from different backgrounds do not necessarily react similarly 
to the implementation of participatory schemes. In Mexico clientelistic relations have 
developed between politicians and poorer communities seeking solutions to basic 
infrastructure problems. Participatory democratic theory has not addressed the ways that 
clientelistic practices may be either used within participatory mechanisms or to bypass 
them. Clearly, both class and clientelisin are aspects that would have to be considered 
for the establishment of participatory mechanisms in the future. 
The research also questions the way the participatory agenda has been implemented in 
Mexico. While participatory theorists recommend carrying out participatory schemes 
where citizens take a central role, the three cases presented here show that a top-down 
implementation process prevails in Tlalpan, Puebla and San Pedro. Despite the apparent 
intention (on paper) of authorities to share some of their dccision-making power with 
citizens, the examples introduced in this thesis demonstrate that this has not necessarily 
been the case. The top-down way in which the participatory agenda has been carried out 
in Mexico contradicts the principles of the participatory democrats and raises important 
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questions about the role that citizens are expected to take. Moreover, it also brings to the 
participatory discussion such aspects as authorities' interpretation of the best uses that 
can be given to participatory schemes. As the cases show, the democratic principles 
behind these schemes could be manipulated for particular party or political purposes. 
There are three avenues for further research identified in this thesis. Firstly, it would be 
interesting to determine the impact of continuing democratisation or political change on 
citizen participation initiatives. The more frequently that participatory initiatives are 
implemented, the more that these schemes could be improved, and as a result, contribute 
positively to the whole democratic process of Mexican politics. But would this 
necessarily be the case? Although currently the implementation of participatory 
schemes has not been really reflected the vision of the participatory democrats, perhaps 
in the future the way participatory agendas are carried out might genuinely give greater 
power to citizens. On the other hand, it is also possible that citizens may become 
increasingly disillusioned by supposedly democratic initiatives that promise much but in 
practice deliver very little. 
Another aspect that would be interesting for the analysis of participatory initiatives in 
Mexico is to show the participatory realities of other localities. This study has 
demonstrated that within the same country there are regional differences that play an 
important role when participatory schemes take place. For instance, studies analysing 
the participatory agendas of indigenous municipalities would probably provide a very 
different perspective on the way participatory schemes arc implemented in a non-urban 
environment. It can be argued that the more participatory schemes are analysed the 
richer the discussion of the Mexican participatory democracy would be. 
Finally, it be useful to explore more about the role that civil society and social 
movements can have in pressing for citizen participation mechanisms to become more 
participatory. The argument behind this avenue for further research is that civil society 
and social movements have played a crucial role in the past for the establishment of 
more transparent practises of government. Nevertheless, the extent to which the civil 
society or social movements can influence the way local participatory agendas are 
carried out remains uncertain as they were not very significant in the three cases studicd 
here. Currently, there are a wide range of participatory practises taking place in Mexico 
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and perhaps civil society and social movements can put pressure on authorities 
genuinely to share more decision-making power with citizens? 
Notes 
1 This under the banner of El Nuevo Federalismo (the New Federalism). 
2 Although the current participatory legislation was approved in 1993, before its approval there were a 
series of participatory practices that were promoted (see chapter 5). 
3 See chapter 4. 
4 See interview with Zermefto (1999). 
5 The case of the conference that took place to defend the 'union bridge' discussed in chapter 5 can be 
mentioned as an example. 
6 There are also differences we must point out in the sense that each of these municipalities have different 
budgets. In San Pedro only 30 percent of their resources come from federal sources, and the remaining 70 
percent is collected from local forms of taxation. Puebla is highly dependent on state or federal 
overnments to receive economic resources. 
See La Jornada 27/12/1999 for examples. 
See chapter 4 for a discussion to a greater detail. 
9 According to the CEDEMUN (1999) 2.59 percent of the population does not count with electricity, 
12.03 percent does not have piped potable water and 8.30 percent does not count with sewage. 
10 See 2000-2003 San Pedro Local Development Plan. 
11 See interview with Zermefio (1999). 
12 See chapter 5. 
13 See chapter 3. 
14 See INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK www. iadb. org 
15 See chapter 5 for examples. 
16 See interview with Eliseo Moyao (2000) and chapter 3. 
17 See chapter 3 for more details on this prUsta initiative. 
18 See interview with Eliseo Moyao (2000). 
19 See chapter 3 for examples. 
20 See chapter 4. 
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Appendix 1 
Research Framework and Methodology 
Introduction 
In this appendix we present the research framework and methodology that was used in 
this thesis. The appendix is divided into six sections, beginning by setting out the 
research questions that shape the study. The second part briefly examines the role of the 
implementation process in the analysis of Mexican policy and politics. The next 
sections explain the use of qualitative methods and of the comparative case study 
method. The fifth section justifies the selection of Tlalpan, Puebla and San Pedro as 
case studies. The appendix finishes by outlining the way in which case study findings 
were presented. 
Research questions 
The research questions that drive this study emerge from both the discussion of the role 
of citizen participation in Mexican politics discussed in chapter I and the theoretical 
literature on participatory democracy analysed in chapter 2. It must not be forgotten that 
- as has already been pointed out in the introduction of this thesis - the literature on 
participatory democracy is used here normatively. The participatory democratic models 
are presented as ideal types, as a benchmark against which to measure the participatory 
programmes of the three case studies analysed. 
The overall aim of the thesis is to examine why political parties and authorities have 
shown such interest in citizen participation and what these initiatives have actually 
achieved. These overall aims can be broken down into the following research questions. 
What do political parties hope to achieve by introducing participatory mechanisms? 
What are the sources of inspiration and principles underpinning these initiatives? To 
what extent have they drawn on the principles of participation as set out in the 
literature or have been influenced by external actors? 
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What forms of participation have been introduced? What functions and powers have 
been given to these mechanisms? 
How significant is social context in shaping the design and use of participatory 
mechanisms? 
* How have these participatory mechanisms been implemented? 
* How do local actors - politicians, bureaucrats, citizens - perceive these participatory 
initiatives? 
* How far have citizens been empowered by the participatory mechanisms? 
These broad questions are supplemented throughout the thesis by a range of 
supplementary questions (e. g. barriers and costs of participation, real intentions behind 
the implementation of these mechanisms). For instance, in trying to discover the 
motivations behind these participatory initiatives, it is clearly vital to determine whether 
political parties are genuinely committed to extending citizen participation or whether 
they are simply paying lip-service to the language of democracy and accountability. 
However, these core questions will shape the analysis of the case studies and the 
comparative analysis in the conclusion. 
As these research all beg some understanding of the nature of public policy 
implementation in Mexico, the next section provides a brief account of the top-down 
implementation model that characterises Mexican government. 
The implementation process in the Mexican context 
Based on what was already observed by Gonzalez Casanova in chapter 1- that in 
Mexican politics what is stated in the constitution (or in any other legislation) is not 
necessarily related to the way policies are carried out - the implementation process 
acquires great relevance when analysing the Mexican local political context. Grindle 
highlighted the distinctive characteristic of the policy implementation process in 
Mexico. Her research analysed the nature of the relationship between the three levels of 
the Mexican government: federal, state, and local. She described the Mexican political 
system as highly centralised: 
In Mexico, the administrative apparatus of the national government is 
central to the process of formulation and implementation of public policy. It also 
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has a key role in the satisfaction of demands made upon the political system, the 
management of economic development, and the provision of social welfare 
benefits to the population. Moreover, the regulatory, welfare, and entrepreneurial 
activities of the centralised administration have a profound impact on the daily 
lives of Mexicans; the masses of the population increasingly receive their 
political experiences from contact with representatives of the national 
bureaucracy rather than from party officials or local notables (Grindle 1977: 1-2). 
Thus, public policies are usually conceived, developed and imposed from federal offices 
based in Mexico City, without taking into account the different conditions (social, 
economic, or cultural) prevailing in the city, town or village where the policies are to be 
implemented! Grindle's work is now somewhat dated but, despite efforts to 
decentralise the political system, 2 Mexican politics is still very centralised. One 
structural reason for this situation is the design of each sexenio 3 which contributes to 
the prioritisation of national rather than state or municipal projects. The National 
Development Plan, presented at the beginning of each presidential administration, sets 
out the priorities of the new government and it becomes a crucial point of reference for 
state and municipal governments, as their policies would inevitably be shaped by the 
policies laid out in this document. 
Theoretically speaking, the top-down implementation model assumes that organisations 
have clear and consistent objectives, a hierarchical control structure, and an optimal 
allocation of tasks between the relevant sub-units (whether that be internal 
organisational divisions or other agencies). Grindle's characterisation of the Mexican 
process of policy implementation as top-down, was influenced by the first generation of 
implementation studies developed during the 1970s in the US. 4 These studies attempted 
to understand the failures experienced after implementing several federal social 
programmes (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Pressman and Wildavsky, in a path 
breaking book, defined implementation as a process of interaction between the setting of 
goals and the actions geared to achieving them (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: 15). 
Some of the first findings reached by the implementation theorists concluded that there 
were many factors, including bureaucratic distortions, local resistance, inter- 
governmental conflicts and personal interests that were being ignored when developing 
social policies, hence causing policy failure (Bardach 1974). 5 As commented by Marsh 
and Rhodes, 'in fact, policy-making is not a simple top-down process. It is subject to 
shortfalls at every stage. Given the conditions required for effective implementation, no 
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government, not even one with illusions of grandeur, is either omnipotent or 
ornnicompetent' (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 34). In response to these criticisms several 
alternative approaches to implementation were developed, notably the bottom-up (see 
Barrett and Fudge 1981) and various integrated (see Sabatier 1986) models. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to debate the relative advantages and disadvantages of these 
models of implementation. Rather, the purpose of introducing the concept of 
implementation is to describe the approach to implementation that prevails in Mexico, 
and which was found to characterise the implementation of participatory initiatives in 
all three case studies. The obvious question that arises is whether a top-down pattern of 
implementation is appropriate for instigating participatory democratic practices which, 
as Benello and Roussopoulos put it, 'cannot be imposed from above, but must be built 
from the ground up' (1971: 9). 
The importance of using qualitative research 
A qualitative approach was used to address the questions identified earlier in this 
chapter. Because we aimed to learn more about a series of aspects that involved the 
views of politicians, bureaucrats, community leaders and the general public, we thought 
that the only way to gather all these perspectives was through interacting with them. As 
observed by Bryman: 'the most fundamental characteristic of qualitative research is its 
express commitment to viewing events, action, norms, etc. from the perspective of the 
people who are being studied ... the strategy of taking the subject's perspective 
is often 
expressed in terms of seeing through the eyes of the people you are studying' (Bryman 
1988: 61). A qualitative type of research allowed us to probe further, in depth, and to 
build trust with the respondents, an aspect that is very important when analysing 
Mexican politics, as they are characterised by high levels of mistrust. As commented by 
Silverman, 'the methods used by qualitative researchers exemplify a common belief, 
basically that they can provide a "deeper" understanding of the social phenomena than 
would be obtained from purely quantitative data' (Silverman 2001: 32). 
Data sources play a crucial role when a qualitative type of research using case studies is 
carried out. The utilisation of the case study method requires the extraction of 
information from several sources (Yin 1994: 13). Documents constitute the first source 
of information used throughout this research project: books, newspapers, official 
documents, letters, conference papers, and journals are all widely used. Of course, as 
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Yin points out, their usefulness is not necessarily based on their accuracy or lack of bias. 
In fact, documents must be used carefully and should not be accepted as literal 
recordings of events that have taken place (Yin 1994: 81). For case studies, Yin 
recommends that documents should be used to corroborate and augment evidence from 
other sources (Yin Ibid). 
The second source of information came from 68 semi-structured intervieWS6 carried out 
with politicians, local authorities, government officials, academics, neighbourhood 
leaders, individuals taking part in meetings, and members of the general public. Semi- 
structured interviewing was used, whereby questions are specified, but the interviewer is 
free to probe beyond the answer. This type of interview allows people to answer more 
on their own terms than the standardised structured type of interview permits, but still 
provides a greater structure of comparability over that of the focused interview. The 
potential disadvantage of semi-structured interviewing is that it might be prejudicial to 
the aims of standardisation and comparability (May 1997: 111). Whilst a structured 
interview -where the same questions are repeated for each interviewee- is appropriate 
for surveys, it does not allow the interviewee to probe deeper and elicit a fuller, more 
detailed account (see Frey 1994). 
Despite its advantages, one of the main risks when conducting semi-structured 
interviewing is that respondents could bias their answers depending on whether they are 
defending particular interests. 7 In countries like Mexico, there is also the problem of 
convincing people that their answers would not compromise their economic, political, 
or social situation. It was difficult to get people to express what they really thought 
about their local authorities and also about the different participatory schemes 
implemented in their respective municipalities. 
In order to facilitate people's understanding, each of the interviewees was provided with 
a basic background of the aims of the research. Three sets of questionnaires were 
designed for each group of respondents: politicians, neighbourhood leaders and citizens 
attending community meetings. The aim of interviewing members from each of the 
previously mentioned groups was to compare the perspectives that each of them had 
regarding the implementation and functioning of citizen participation mechanisms. 
Overall it proved to be a useful exercise, especially because opposing perspectives were 
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obtained from each group depending on their perception of the participation 
mechanisms under analysis. Participatory initiatives varied considerably from region to 
region, from tightly controlled forms of local involvement (as in Puebla) to more liberal 
participatory activities (Tlalpan). The quotes from interviews included in the text were 
firstly translated and later transcribed by the author. The information collected from 
semi-structured interviewing proved to be the most revealing source of information, 
requiring previous ideas about the operation of participatory mechanisms to be re- 
thought. 
In the current era of fibre communications, the third source of information came from 
the internet. Different websites constituted a valuable source of information and also 
functioned as a sort of 'facilitator, ' especially to get hold of distant information from the 
three localities. The internet also proved to be an efficient tool to gather information 
from international organisations and to follow news from local newspapers. Finally, it 
was also used to contact some interviewees and to organise interviews that were carried 
out during the fieldwork. 
Thus, for our research purposes, a qualitative type of methodology offered more 
practical advantages than a quantitative one. For instance, carrying out a survey implies 
collecting data from a large number of people, as observed by May, 'nearly all surveys 
are characterised by the collection of data from large, or even very large, numbers of 
people' (May 1997: 82). Ferber's definition of a survey establishes that a survey is: 'a 
method of gathering information from a number of individuals, a "sample, " in order to 
learn something about the larger population from which the sample is drawn' (Ferber 
1980: 3). Depending upon its aims, the procedures it adopts and the number of people 
who are interviewed, generalisation can then take place from the sample of people 
interviewed to the population as a whole (May 1997: 85). According to May, data 
collection in surveys is assembled mainly through three types of questionnaires: 
Mail of self-completion 
Telephone survey 
Face to face interview 
Although we could argue that the mail or self-completion questionnaire offers a 
relatively cheap option to collect information, a major problem would have been who to 
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send the questionnaires to, especially bearing in mind such issues as levels of education 
and the mistrust which most Mexicans feel towards these types of methodological 
instruments. A telephone survey could have also been used, however, a great obstacle 
was that in some of the poorest neighbourhoods where our research was carried out, 
residents did not have access to a telephone. Finally, face to face interviews could have 
also been carried out, nevertheless when information is collected through this tool it 
tends to be too general and without the depth required to answering our research 
questions. Moreover, applying a survey would have resulted time-consuming and 
perhaps expensive when our resources and time were limited. The most important 
reason why we chose for the utilised qualitative methods is that a quantitative 
framework only provides superficial information when we wanted detailed knowledge 
about the participatory agenda carried out in the three localities. 
Weaknesses of the qualitative method 
Despite the advantages above presented, there are a series of problems that a researcher 
using a qualitative methodology faces. The first problem concerns the interpretation of 
the data collected. As qualitative data is based on descriptive narratives, the critics of 
the approach question the categorisation of the events they describe. Hammersley calls 
this the problem of reliability, which basically refers to the degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same 
observer on different occasions (Hammersley 1992: 67). Similarly, Bryman argues that 
readers cannot readily decide for themselves whether researchers have genuinely put 
themselves in a strategic position to enter the world-view of their subjects, whether they 
have adequately understood that world-view, and whether their interpretations of actions 
and events are congruent with the subjects' understandings (Bryman 1988: 77). 
Moreover, Silverman establishes that when people's activities are audio or video 
recorded and transcribed, the reliability of the interpretation of transcripts may be 
gravely weakened by a failure to note apparently trivial, but often crucial, pauses, 
overlaps or body movements (Silverman 2001: 33). Mehan (1978) and Hester (1985) 
express similar concerns regarding this issue, however Buchanan, Boddy and 
MacCalman (1988) propose a solution to the problem of interpretation by using what 
they define as respondent validation. Due to time limitations in our research we could 
not implement respondent validation, which is basically to submit a copy of the 
8 researchers' findings to the subjects under research. To address this problem, a copy of 
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the researcher's findings will be donated to the local library of each of the three local 
authorities under analysis. 
A second problem is anecdotalism, which refers to the way research reports sometimes 
refer to a few informants, telling examples of some apparent phenomenon, without any 
attempt to analyse less clear (or even contradictory) data (Silverman 1989). According 
to Bryman: 
There is a tendency towards an anecdotal approach to the use of data in 
relation to conclusions or explanations in qualitative research. Brief 
conversations, snippets from unstructured interviews ... are used to provide 
evidence of a particular contention. There are grounds for disquiet in that the 
representativeness or generality of these fragments is rarely addressed (Bryman 
1988: 77). 
A related criticism deals with the issue of validity, or what Silverman defines as another 
word for truth (Silverman 2001). Sometimes one doubts the validity of an explanation 
because the researcher has clearly made no attempt to deal with contrary cases 
(Silverman 2001: 34). The critics believe that when qualitative researchers get immersed 
in their fieldwork, they could misinterpret the data under consideration. To avoid this 
problem, the researcher always tried to analyse with the same criteria the different 
points of view expressed during the fieldwork; so that the views of authorities and 
citizens were given the same importance. Also, the policies of the three political parties 
under scrutiny were analysed without favouring a particular ideology. 
Finally, the aspect that seems to cause most distress for critics of qualitative methods is 
the problem of generalisation. This problem is mainly linked to the use of case studies, 
-like this thesis-. The accusation is that it is impossible to generalise from a single case 
study, or even from a series of case studies (Ball 1981 and Burgess 1983). This 
drawback of the qualitative method will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Despite these disadvantages, it was felt that a qualitative approach was the best option 
for this research because it proved to generate much richer and detailed data on the 
nature of participatory schemes that could be obtained through survey methods. 
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The Comparative Case Study Method 
Why the case study method? 
Given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive 
comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial 
statistical analysis of many cases (Lijphart 1971: 685). The case study method seeks to 
evaluate explanatory links in social situations that are too complex for survey or for 
experimental techniques (Yin 1994: 15). At the simplest level, case studies provide 
descriptive accounts of one or more cases (Mcgoverg 1982). When used in an 
intellectually rigorous manner to achieve experimental isolation of selected social 
factors, they offer the strengths of experimental research within natural settings (Hakim 
1987: 61). 9 The three cases presented in this dissertation are Puebla, located in the state 
of the same name; Tlalpan, situated in Mexico City; and San Pedro, positioned in the 
northern state of Nuevo Le6n. Each of the cases is analysed as an independent empirical 
entity, where the perceptions of those individuals implementing and taking part in the 
participatory initiatives provide the main source of information. The core aim of this 
interaction with local actors is to collect and compare the views of official authorities 
and ordinary citizens, regarding the implementation of citizen participation mechanisms. 
For instance, in Puebla, authorities and citizens had quite different perspectives 
regarding citizen participation mechanisms. The authorities saw these bodies as a way to 
avoid corruption and to promote democratic values; by contrast, many citizens 
perceived these participatory bodies as closely linked to the party in power and as a too] 
of political control (see chapter 6). 
Based on previous research, notably Almond and Verba (1980) and the detailed analysis 
of Mexican federal and local hierarchies performed by Grindle (1977), we believed that 
the utilisation of case studies was crucial the most appropriate method to answer the 
questions addressed in this project. As stated by Schramm, the essence of a case study, 
the central tendency amongst all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a 
decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and 
with what result (Schramm 1971). Furthermore, the case study method is viewed by 
Ragin (1992) as a methodological tool providing a link between theoretical and 
empirical concems. 
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Difficulties with case study research 
An important issue to consider when carrying out a case study research concerns the 
way in which the data is presented. According to Hakim, 'a practical problem is that the 
analysis and presentation of case study data requires more skills than reports based on a 
single type of evidence. Two common errors are to present an indigestible mass of 
detailed evidence in the report, or to report only the researcher's conclusions' (Hakim 
1987: 74). To avoid this problem, in this study we will present -in chapter 6- a 
comparison of the three cases that we analysed. Identifying key themes and bullet- 
pointing the main findings that we identified in this research project. The chapter is 
organised around the research questions presented in the first part of this chapter. 
Case study research is also criticised for its lack of rigour. According to Yin, 'too many 
times the case study investigator has been sloppy and has allowed equivocal evidence or 
biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions' (Yin 1994: 9). 
Of course, bias is a common problem that has been identified when other research 
strategies have been carried out. For instance, Rosenthal (1966) highlights how bias can 
enter when conducting experiments, Sudman and Bradbum (1982) identify bias in the 
use of survey questionnaires, and there is also bias in historical research (Gottshalk 
1968). In our research, we always attempted to not favour a particular position. 10 
Another difficulty with case study framework is the limited scope for generalisation 
provided by such research. According to Yin, a frequent question asked when carrying 
out case study based research is how is it possible to generalise from a single case 
study? Yin's response is that similarly to when experiments take place, case studies are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. So the case 
study, like the experiment, does not represent a 'sample, ' and the investigator's goal is 
to expand. and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation) (Yin 1994: 10). That said, there have been some 
attempts to generalise by adding the evidence of several case studies to establish a 
certain degree of generalisation as evidence is accumulated (Kennedy 1976). However, 
it is important to state clearly that from the data gathered in our study it would be 
difficult to generalise and establish that the same patterns occur in each of the remaining 
2,424 localities that we did not study. Due to the various regional disparities in Mexico, 
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we believe that any attempt to generalise from the information here collected would be a 
mistake. What we did though, was identify policy trends, situations (i. e. the way 
politicians and citizens behaved), and then compare them between each of the selected 
cases, thus we can argue that we attempted to generalise but only between the cases 
studied in our research. 
A final problem with case studies concerns their length. According to Yin, in the past 
(see Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg 1991) some case studies result in massive, unreadable 
documents. He suggests that this criticism emerges from a confusion between the case 
study method and methods such as ethnography or participant observation. 
Ethnographies usually require long periods of time in the 'field' and 
emphasise detailed, observational evidence. Participant-observation may not 
require the same length of time but still assumes a hefty investment of field 
efforts. In contrast, case studies are a form of inquiry that does not depend solely 
on ethnographic or participant-observer data. One could even do a valid and 
high-quality case study without leaving the library and the telephone, depending 
upon the topic being studied (Yin 1994: 11). 
To avoid this problem, in our research we carefully selected the topics that we believed 
were more important for the aims of these research and tried to be as direct as possible 
when describing each case. We must also not forget that a doctoral thesis has a word 
limit, which must constrain the writing up of the thesis. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the case study method was deemed the most 
adequate tool for this research, particularly as some of the main problems could be 
anticipated in the research design. 
The comparative method 
Normal behaviour and norms cannot be studied without acknowledging 
deviations from the normal. Actually, no social phenomenon can be isolated and 
studied without comparing it to other social phenomena ... trying to understand 
and explain variation is a process which cannot be accomplished without 
previous reflections on similarities and dissimilarities underlying variation 
(Oyen 1990: 4). 
Comparing case studies is a heuristic device stimulating hypotheses in relation to 
theoretical concerns, rather than as a means of evaluating precise similarities and 
differences, or 'proofs' (Lijphart 1975: 159-160). The case study method can and should 
be closely connected with the comparative method, certain types of case studies can 
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even be considered implicit parts of the comparative method (Lijphart 1971: 691). The 
comparative method is a general term denoting the procedures and differences displayed 
by phenomena (or class phenomenon), based on the researcher's criteria, for comparing 
or classifying causal factors in the emergence and development of such phenomena and 
patterns of interrelation both within and between such phenomena or classes (Dictionary 
of Social Sciences 1964). Making comparisons is crucial for the aims of this research, 
especially for the future implementation of participatory mechanisms in Mexico. 
Theory provides both a way of organising and a way of interpreting data. 
Data or evidence then allows us to test hypotheses generated from theory, but 
only if we have developed robust concepts; that is, concepts which can be 
utilised across time and space. As a result of this testing, concepts may be 
adapted, hypotheses reformulated and perhaps theories recast. The point here is 
that comparative analysis plays a key role in these processes (Mackie and Marsh 
1995: 176-177). 
This study is based on making comparisons between the ways in which participatory 
initiatives have been designed and implemented under different party administrations 
(the municipality of Puebla is governed by the PRI, San Pedro is governed by the PAN, 
and Tlalpan is governed by the PRD). The research also involves issues of how the 
different party administrations understood participatory democracy and designed these 
initiatives to suit their respective understandings and interests. The study identifies two 
levels of analysis: firstly what we call the 'official level, ' which is composed of local 
authorities and all those functionaries involved in one way or another with the 
implementation of the participatory initiatives analysed. Secondly, the 'citizenry-level' 
which is composed of community leaders and those citizens taking part in these 
community initiatives. The aim of analysing both levels was to obtain the fullest picture 
of these local participatory initiatives, drawing on a range of perspectives. 
When methodologists talk about the comparative method, they tend not to distinguish 
between cross-national and intra-national comparisons, (see Mackie and Marsh 1995 
and Yin 1994) and most debates centre on the utilisation of cross-national comparisons 
rather than in comparisons within countries. Yet, Holt and Turner observe that, 'in 
principle there is no difference between comparative cross-cultural research and 
research conducted within a single society. For example, the scholar studying political 
parties in ten different states in the US will encounter dialect differences that will have 
to be considered during the research' (Holt and Turner 1970: 6). Although this research 
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was carried out in one country, the three cases present dialect and cultural differences 
that had to be considered when analysing the data. " An example is the way in which 
Nuevo Leon's proximity to the US influences state or local authorities to look for policy 
models implemented in Texas rather than those carried out in other parts of Mexico. The 
mayor (1997-2000) of San Pedro, Nuevo Leon, Teresa Garcfa de Madero, commented 
that the idea for installing neighbourhood participation units was brought back by the 
former mayor, Mauricio Fernandez (1988-1991) in 1988 after visiting Dallas, Texas. By 
contrast, authorities in Mexico City tend to find more affinity with projects 
implemented in Latin American countries than those implemented in the US. For 
example, Tlalpan's authorities drew lessons from citizen participation programmes 
implemented in Porto Alegre, Brazil or in Montevideo, Uruguay (see Zremefio 1999). 
Thus, although this research takes place within the same borders, there are differences 
(i. e. political, cultural, social) that make it similar to a cross-national study. As Holt and 
Turner have observed, 'the differences -between intra-riational and cross national- 
comparisons- lie, rather, in the magnitude of certain problems that have to be faced' 
(Holt and Turner 1970: 6). 
The utilisation of the comparative method is crucial for the aims of this research: 'if 
political scientists are to generate a body of theory and concentrate their efforts on 
making the theory more general and valid, comparative cross-cultural research is 
absolutely essential' (Holt and Tumerl970: 5). Furthermore, comparative research has 
the potential to check against narrow thinking by its production of studies in alternative 
cultures and societies. Ragin also argues that the comparative method is a case based 
method, inherently unsuited to statistically based variable analysis (Ragin 1981: 17). 
Weaknesses of the Comparative Method 
The principal problems facing the comparative method can be succinctly stated as: 
many variables, small number of cases (Lijphart 1971: 685). According to the critics of 
the comparative method, one of the key constraints when carrying out comparative 
research is bias. In the view of Mackie and Marsh, 'comparativists, like other social 
scientists, need to appreciate that reality is, in an important sense, socially constructed' 
(Mackie and Marsh 1995: 187). In the cases analysed, this proved to be a challenge for 
the researcher, as although the research covered cases within the same country, the 
customs and attitudes of public servants and the public did vary greatly between 
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regions. For instance, Daland points out that some aspects of politics can vary more 
within nations than between them (Daland 1969: 17). Moreover, some methodologists 
argue that in order to understand a culture, we have to know the rules which are 
employed in that culture (see Winch 1990). For instance, when carrying out the 
research, one of the first elements of confusion was to find the equivalents, within each 
municipality, of the department in charge of promoting citizen participation at the 
neighbourhood level. While in Puebla the department in charge of promoting citizen 
participation is-a directorate, in San Pedro, it is a secretariat; both bodies perform very 
similar activities, but their formal positions in their respective organisations are 
different. 
Language differences, even if researchers have a proficient understanding of a language, 
require a cultural understanding of words to allow for the equivalence of meaning. This 
becomes particularly important when dealing with dialects where the meanings of words 
vary, or entirely different words may be employed in referring to the same phenomena 
(Mackie and Marsh 1995: 191). As commented by Foddy, 'the meanings of ordinary 
words are not necessarily shared even by those socialised within a single cultural 
framework' (Foddy 1993: 39). In the cases analysed, language differences did not 
prevent the researcher from understanding what authorities or citizens said; but what 
was difficult was to determine the meaning each of the interviewees gave to such key 
concepts as democracy or citizen participation. For example, in the municipality of 
Puebla, for some members of the local bureaucratic structure the meaning of democracy 
was very narrow, involving no more than free elections, so any form of participation 
beyond election processes was perceived as a bonus for the population. 
These are further specific tactics that need to be addressed when making comparisons in 
Mexico because, 'there are differences among regions in Mexico in terms of economic 
development, land-tenure patterns, occupational structure, ethnicity, religiosity, political 
participation, relationships with the federal government, and other dimensions' (Craig 
and Cornelius 1980: 337). There is also some evidence of important intra-regional 
variations in patterns of community participation, interest-group formation, and 
competitiveness of politics, associated primarily with intra-regional differences in 
resource base, economic development, and government contact (Almond and Verba 
1980: 337). These differences were evident while carrying out the fieldwork, as will be 
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discussed in each case study, where the types of community demands presented to local 
authorities varied depending on certain social factors. Generally speaking, the lower 
income groups in the population give priority to basic infrastructure services such as 
piped potable water or sewage, whereas the middle and upper communities are more 
concerned about the quality of public services. 
The main problems with comparative studies involve issues of equivalence, 
appropriateness and language (Smelser 1976). Nevertheless, if the researcher is aware of 
these potential problems, then the comparative method remains a useful tool to carry out 
case oriented research. 
Why Tlalpan, PuebIa, and San Pedro? 
The selection process 
Due to time and resource limitations, it was of paramount importance to select the most 
appropriate cases that met our research expectations. Stake states that the first criterion 
in selecting a case study should be to maximise what we can learn. If possible, we also 
need to pick cases which are easy to get to and hospitable to our inquiry, perhaps for 
which a prospective informant can be identified and with actors (the people studied) 
willing to comment on certain draft materials (Stake 1995: 4). 
There were several facts that influenced the choice of Tlalpan, Puebla and San Pedro. 
As this study was intended to analyse the way in which the three main political parties 
of Mexico (PRI, PAN and PRD) implement participatory initiatives at the local level it 
followed these steps. Firstly, a list was drawn up of those municipalities ruled by the 
PRI, the PAN and the PRD, and from this initial list, those municipalities where no 
citizen participation mechanisms existed were eliminated. From the remainder those 
municipalities were selected where the researcher had a contact, a facilitator that could 
make the research easier, as well as having access to local officials. Contacts play a 
crucial role when trying to analyse Mexican politics, as otherwise politicians can 
literally 'close the door' to researchers trying to analyse any political phenomenon. 
However, it must be stated clearly that contacts were only used to facilitate the initial 
access to local officials and some community leaders. This way of proceeding produced 
a 'snowball' effect as through these initial contacts the researcher started interacting 
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with more people (who implemented or participated in the participatory mechanisms 
under analysis) from whom vital information was obtained. 
It is widely agreed that the victory of the opposition in the 1997 Governor election of 
Mexico City represented a crucial step in Mexico's democratic transition. Our interest in 
this unique circumstance was increased when the recently elected government - the 
leftwing PRD - announced a reform of the participatory agenda of the city. With the 
creation of the 1998 Citizen Participation Legislation, any of the 16 localities of the city 
would have been an interesting place to carry out a study on the new participatory 
legislation and its implementation process. However, Tlalpan was chosen because it 
possesses certain characteristics that seemed interesting for the purposes of this study, 
namely the way in which rich and poor areas of the city have been grouped together to 
implement participatory mechanisms. A core aspect that influenced our research interest 
in Tlalpan was to determine whether the PRD was - as it claimed to be - implementing 
a new style of government through the implementation of citizen participation 
mechanisms; and to determine the role which citizens played in these schemes. Finally, 
the researcher also had several contacts, who facilitated access to local officials and 
community leaders. 
Three main factors made Puebla an attractive case. Firstly, the capital of the state is 
considered a pritsta bastion, yet in the 1996 local election the PRI was defeated by the 
PAN. Secondly, the particular way in which the PAN attempted to implement an 
alternative participatory agenda to the traditional clientelistic structure offered an 
interesting case. Thirdly, Manuel Bartlett's (1993-1999 PRI Governor of Puebla) 
COPLADEMUN initiative which sought to diminish the influence of the PAN and to 
recover the supremacy of the PRI in the capital was also an interesting development. 
Once the PRI recovered the capital in the 1999 local election, Puebla's government 
returned to carry out the 'traditional' clientelistic mechanisms which were implemented 
before the 1996 election of the PAN. This case shows the implications of the co- 
existence of a PRI state government with a participatory agenda, and a PAN local 
administration with its own participatory schemes; thus it seemed likely to bring out the 
conflicts faced when different participatory agendas are carried out. Thus Puebla offered 
an interesting example of the evolution of the participatory agenda from a PRI 
administration to a PAN administration and then back again to a PRI administration. 
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However, the fieldwork in this locality encountered a series of obstacles that will be 
commented upon later in this chapter. 
San Pedro, an afflucnt municipality located in the north of Mexico represented a good 
opportunity to analyse the way participatory mechanisms have been implemented under 
the dominance of one single party - the PAN - in power for more than 10 years. In 
theory, this locality is one of the most efficient, modem, and democratic localities of 
Mexico, so it offered an opportunity to investigate a participatory agenda in a locality 
that has already covered its basic infrastructure needs and where initiatives such as 
referenda have been taking place for more than 8 years. 
The researcher was aware of the importance of analysing each case as an individual 
entity: 'case study research is not sampling research. We do not study a case primarily 
to understand other cases. Our first obligation is to understand this one case' (Stake 
1995: 4). It is true that a greater number of cases might have provided a broader vision of 
the participatory agenda implemented at the local level, in Mexico, but the price would 
inevitably have been a loss of depth and detail. As Hakim comments, 'once the number 
of cases increases to substantial figures, the logic of statistical inference begins to 
complement, and even replace, the logic of analytical inference from a small number of 
carefully selected cases' (Hakim 1987: 64). 12 We believe that the analysis of the three 
selected cases offers a credible account of the dynamics of the participatory mechanisms 
of democracy in each locality, but also demonstrates the diversity of experiences of 
participatory democracy in Mexico. 
Difficulties in canying out the research 
Inevitably, the fieldwork encountered several obstacles. For instance, in Puebla, the 
main problem was the lack of access to any kind of community meeting, so we had to 
base our analysis of these gatherings on secondhand data provided by actors who 
attended previous sessions. The main reason for this problem was that the schemes 
promoted by the PAN are no longer being implemented and the PRI current 
participatory agenda does not include frequent community meetings. There was an 
obvious risk of collecting biased versions regarding the way these participatory 
mechanisms operated, however, by listening to different perspectives the researcher 
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tried to interpret these views and maintain a neutral position. Despite this drawback the 
Puebla case study was retained because it provides an interesting account of the way in 
which local policies evolve when there is a change of administration, particularly as it 
was one of the most important bastions of the PRI before the PAN came to power 
between 1996-1999. 
Another common difficulty faced was the restricted access to information, especially 
when inquiring about issues related to financial matters. For instance, in Puebla, despite 
repeated promises to be given an account of some COPLADEMUN budgets, these 
never materialised. Also, in San Pedro, the mayor promised a fuller explanation of a 
scheme where citizens would decide about a budget, but, on the day of the interview, he 
cancelled the appointment (it was learned later that due to legal restrictions the scheme 
had to be cancelled). 
A third problem was that some potential intcrvicwces 'stood up' the researcher. Several 
appointments had to be re-scheduled or cancelled, which in large cities such as Mexico 
City is quite normal, but highly disruptive for the research schedule. 
Thus the collection of information is rarely a smooth process and it is important to 
recognise any consequent weaknesses in the data or analytical framework. There are a 
series of obstacles that will inevitably be faced and which are part of a researcher's 
learning process. Nevertheless, the fieldwork proved to be a fascinating experience that 
provided a series of positive experiences for the researcher, including learning more 
about carrying out semi-structured interviewing and the realities of local politics). 
Presenting the Case Study Findings 
The cases are presented individually in three chapters. In each case study, a brief 
description of the prevailing circumstances - economic, political, and social - is 
presented, followed by an analysis of the legal structures that underpin the participatory 
agenda. There are also sections dedicated to analysing the types of meetings taking 
place in each locality, as well as highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each 
participatory initiative. In all of these sections the views of those interacting at the two 
levels of analysis this study covers are introduced, the aim of comparing these 
perspectives is to avoid having 'one-sided' case studies. A case study that fails to 
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account for different perspective would rightly raise a critical reader's suspicions. The 
investigator may not have collected all the relevant evidence and may have attended 
only to the evidence supporting a single point of view. Even if the investigator was not 
purposefully biased, different descriptive interpretations were not entertained, thereby 
rendering a one-sided case (Yin 1994: 149). In chapter 6 we evaluate the research 
questions this research project aims to tackle. The theoretical ideas about participatory 
democracy introduced in chapter 2 are compared to the evidence collected from the case 
studies and the findings are analysed in the wider context of Mexican politics as 
described in chapter 1. 
Notes 
1 See Omelas (1998). 
2 For discussion of decentralisation see Assad and Ziccardi (1988). 3 Is the name given to each presidential term in Mexico (it lasts for six years). 4 For general reviews see Yin (1980), Barrett and Fudge (1981). Alexander (1982), and Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1983). 
5 See Murphy (1973). 
6 All interviews were recorded and are listed in Appendix 2. 7 See May (1997). 
8 See Buchanan, Boddy and McCalman (1988) for greater details. 9 For more advantages of the case study method see (Yin 1994, Ragin and Becker 1992, and Stake 1994). 10 For more discussions regarding this matter see Dalton (1964) and Lacey (1976). 11 This diversity matches with May's idea regarding the convenience of executing cross-national 
comparisons if within the society or country under research there is sufficient diversity between regions 
(May 1997: 186). 
12 See Mitchell (1983) and Glasser and Strauss (1967). 
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Appendix 2 
List of Interviews 
18.05.1999 Teresa Garcfa de Madero 1997-2000 Mayor of San Pedro 
29.05.1999 Sergio Zermeflo 1997-2000 Cuauht6moc Cardenas and Tlalpan Mayor 
Advisor 
10.04.2000 Eliseo Moyao 1997-2000 Tlalpan Citizen Participation Director 
14.04.2000 Martfn Flores Rodrfguez Tlalpan Neighbourhood Coordinator 
24.04.200OAlejandro P6rez Tlalpan Neighboruhood Coordinator 
25.04.2000 Jaime Alvarado Tlalpan Neighboruhood Coordinator 
26-04.2000 Jaime Chavez Neighbourhood Committee Leader Tialpan 
27.04.2000 Juan MOjica Neighbourýood Committee Leader Tlalpan 
27.04.2000 G6rman Gdzman Neighbourhood Committee Leader Tlalpan 
27.04.2000 Judith Reyes Tlalpan Neighboruhood Coordinator Assistant 
2.05.2000 Irma Zuchitl Ddvila Neighbourhood Committee Leader Tialpan 
3.05.2000 Julieta Informal Community Leader Tlalpan 
8.05.2000 Alicia Garcfa Tlalpan Neighboruhood Coordinator 
9.05.2000 Pedro L6pez Neighbourhood Committee Leader Tialpan 
12.05.2000 Maurilio Vdzquez Neighbourhood Committee Leader Tialpan 
16.05.2000 Samuel Moreno Neighbourhood Committee Leader Tlalpan 
18.05.2000 Socorro Jfmenez Informal Community Leader Tlalpan 
19.05.2000 Agustfn Upez Garcfa Citizen Participation Delegado 
23-06.2000 Alejandro Armenta Mier Puebla 1999-2002 Citizen Participation 
Director 
23.06.2000 Antonio Medina Ramfrez Puebla Citizen Participation Delegado 
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17.07.2000 Eduardo VdIdez Puebla Citizen Participation Delegado 
18-07.2000 Ixel Moreno Puebla Citizen Participation Promoter 
18.07.2000 Josefina Andrade Puebla Neighbourhood Committee Leader 
19.07.2000 Antonio Caso Puebla Citizen Participation Delegado 
19.07.2000 Raul M6ndez Puebla President of Street Committee 
20.07.2000 Alvaro Mendoza Puebla Neighbourhood Committee Leader 
21.07.2000 Rafael Ramfrez Puebla Neighbourhood Committee Leader 
29.08.2000 Guadalupe G6mez San Pedro Fuentes del Valle neighbourhood Board 
Secretary 
12.09.2000 Gerardo Garza Sada San Pedro 2000-2003 Mayor 
27.03.2001 Jorge Zubieta. y Landa San Pedro 2000-2003 Citizen Participation 
Minister 
28.03.2001 Amulfo Briones juez Auxiliar San Pedro 
28.03.2001 Isafas Ramfrez San Pedro Neighbourhood Board Leader 
29.03.2001 Carmen Bremer San Pedro Juez Auxiliar Coordinator 
29.03.2001 Leticia Vargas Juez Auxiliar San Pedro 
29.03.2001 Marisela Dfaz Ibarra Juez Auxiliar San Pedro 
2.04.2001 Juan Manuel Gaytdn Juez Auxiliar San Pedro 
4.04.2001 Juan Ignacio Duran San Pedro Neighbourhood Committee Advisor 
05.04.2001 Patricia Lozano Gonzdlez San Pedro Neighbourhood Committee 
Coordinator 
6.04.2001 Erika Treviflo San Pedro Citizen Participation Assistant 
6.04.2001 Rebeca Clouthier San Pedro 1991-1994 Citizen Participation Director 
27.04.2001 Carlos Albicker Puebla 1996-1999 Community Promotion Director 
30.04.2001 Felipe L6pez Puebla Citizen Participation Promoter 
30.04.2001 Rafael Rarafrez Soto Puebla Citizen Participation Promoter 
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1.05.2001 Pablo Rodrfguez Regordosa Puebla 1996-1999 Community Promotion 
Sub-director 
2.05.2001 Ana Luisa Espinoza Puebla Citizen Participation Promoter 
5.11.2001 Alfonso Garda Citizen 
5.11.2001 Gustavo Canizales Citizen 
7.11.2001 Nallely Estrada Citizen 
8.11.2001 Edith Cruz L6pez Citizen 
8.11.2001 Fabiola ifmenez Citizen 
9.11.2001 Aramis Aguilar Citizen 
10.11.2001 Cesar Octavio Ortega Citizen 
13.11.2001 Adalberto Reyes Citizen 
14.11.2001 Adfian Martfnez Citizen 
15.11.2001 Elena Manzo Citizen 
20.11.2001 Carlos Toma Ortiz Citizen 
20.11.2001 Carolina Davison Citizen 
20.11.2001 Adrian Aguilar Citizen 
21.11.2001 Jaime G6mez Citizen 
21.11.2001 Jos6 Guadalupe Reyes Citizen 
22.11.2001 Andr6s Espirdo Citizen 
22.11.2001 Patricia Portillo Citizen 
23.11.2001 Marfa Teresa Alvarado Citizen 
23.11.2001 Felipe Luna Citizen 
26.11.2001 Ciro Fuentes Citizen 
26.11.2001 Antuan Kuri Citizen 
26.11.2001 Rosalia Lira Citizen 
27.11.2001 Roberto Garda Citizen 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaires 
Questionnaire applied to local government officials 
1) Which are some of the factors that have contributed to the increase in the 
establishment of such participatory initiatives as neighbourhood forums or others in 
Mexico? 
2) Who wins with the implementation of participatory mechanisms? 
3) Are there any losers when participatory initiatives are implemented? 
4) Which role do you think different organisations (i. e. NGOs), besides local 
authorities, have had in the promotion of these mechanisms? 
5) Which is the role of International Organisations (i. e. World Bank) in order to 
promote these mechanisms? 
6) Do you think that the promotion of these mechanisms has been recently growing as 
a response to the economic crisis affecting our country? 
7) Do you think that this 'empowerment policy' which has been recently promoted has 
been established as a response to the demands of ethnic minority groups and the 
poor? 
8) In the case of your municipality, where do these initiatives come from (i. e. the 
national development plan or plans coming from within the party's structure? 
9) What is your opinion about the benefits the community has obtained after 
participating within these structures? 
10)Do you think the community is satisfied with the outcomes received after 
participating in these forums? 
11)How have these policies contributed for the democratic development of your 
municipality? 
12)Do you think that authorities gain the legitimacy and the credibility of the public 
after implementing these mechanisms? 
13) Does the community have a direct impact on the outcomes of the topics dcalt at 
these forums? 
14) Which is the role that political parties have had for the implementation of such 
mechanisms? 
15) From your own perspective, which are some of the major obstacles that these type of 
organisations have faced? 
16) Do you think these forums could be used as political platforms by the members of 
certain political party (ies)? 
17) Do you think the number of this type of participatory institutions is going to increase 
in the near future? 
18) Would your administration continue promoting this type of initiatives? 
Questionnaire applied to neighbourhood group leaders 
1) How and when did your organisation come to exist as such? 
2) What are the aims of your organisation? 
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3) Do you count with any kind of moral or financial support from official authorities? 
4) If you do not count from any 'official support' how do you finance your 
organisation? 
5) Have there been any NGOs involved in the formation of your organisation? 
6) Do you think the decisions you take within your organisation have an impact in the 
outcomes of the public policies implemented in your municipality? 
7) Have you had any difficulties with such local leaders as caciques for the operations 
of your organisation? 
8) Do you think your organisation contributes for the development of democracy in 
your municipality? 
9) Has your organisation ever supported a political party? 
10) Do you think authorities take into account your decisions for the implementation of 
local projects? 
11) Do you think this type of organisations promote democracy and democratic values? 
12) Have these participation structures impacted your daily activities? 
13) How is your relationship with official authorities? 
14) How many members does your organisation have? 
15) Which are the expectations of the members of your organisation (when attending the 
meetings)? 
16) Which have been some of the major achievements of your organisation? 
Questionnaire applied to the general public 
1. What do you expect to receive after participating in this forum? 
2. Is someone forcing you to attend these meetings? 
3. Do you think the meetings are a good option to deal with the problems faced by 
your community? 
4. Do you think your local authorities are going to listen to your views before 
implementing policies that could affect your area of residence? 
5. When you attend the meetings, do you previously know the issues that are going to 
be dealt in it? 
6. Do you understand what the majority of the issues dealt in the meetings are about? 
7. Do you think that all the members who participate in the meetings have the same 
opportunity to express their views? 
8. Do a few people dominate the discussions? 
9. Do you think that democratic values are promoted through this type of 
neighbourhood meetings? 
10. What do you think about the structure of the meeting? 
11. Do you think the outcomes of the meetings have been agreed before between group 
leaders and politicians? 
12. Do you feel that your views have a direct impact on the outcomes of the policies to 
be implemented? 
13. Do you think that the objectives of the consultation are generally reached? 
14. Do you think your participation in these meetings has been for political purposes? 
(i. e. party purposes) 
15. Do you think the frequency of the meetings is the adequate? 
16. Do you think the time at which the meetings are held is a convenient one for the 
majority of the group? 
17. Do you find the consultation process time-consuming and tedious? 
18. Do you think these forums promote democracy and democratic values? 
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19. Have these forums had a direct impact on your daily life? 
20. Do you think these forums represent the best way of involving the community in 
decision- making processes? 
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